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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The title and the table of contents of this thesis, in one respect, 
fully convey its contents, substance, and plan. Here is expounded, 
surveyed, and critically appraised certain branches of Macmurray' s 
thought.
Very little, if any, of either Macmurray or his work has been 
written about in this way, if at all. So this thesis is, as it 
should be, a unique and original contribution to knowledge and 
scholarship.
The prograirme and procedure has been to expound his ideas under 
suitable headings according to subject matter, and to follow this - 
from time to time - with a relevant appraisement, rather than 
intersperse criticism with exposition.
But Macmurray1 s thought is so broad, so encompassing, so diverse 
and intricate that it must never be imagined that adequate justice 
has been, or could be, done to the subjects contained in the title in 
such a short compass. Thus whilst not exhaustively covering the 
subject in exposition, which would require at least ten thesis of 
this length, it has also not been possible to raise, discuss, and 
positively answer numerous questions which frequently come to mind as 
we read both the original texts and this exposition of them.
Many, of course, have been raised, researched, met, and 
answered. But many more must wait for further researches, and for 
more space to consider and probe them.
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The above has had to be made clear for I would not want it to be 
thought that this is, and was meant to be, a definitive work in the 
selected field of Macmurray1 s ideas.
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A NECESSARY INTEOXKTION
For years John Macmurray has been overlooked or almost 
deliberately ignored. Yet about 1930 he enjoyed widespread public 
and popular allegiance and acclaim for his broadcast talks on 
realistic, practical, down-to-earth, philosophy in relation to 
contemporary and fundamental problems; problems of such an 
intransigent and intractable nature that they are still essentially 
the same, still with us, today; and still unsolved. In the early 
1940s he was still around and known, especially in association with a 
new political party, Commonwealth, which had proclivities towards 
moral and social regeneration, and had quite a following. Since that 
time, apart from some modest and minority academic attention, 
Macmurray has sunk into obscurity and oblivion.
Yet he gave so .much, and has so much to give. This thesis is 
written in the belief that much of what he had to say, made explicit, 
and taught, is as relevant, meaningful, and indeed downright 
essential today as it was when first enunciated. And if originally 
enthusiastically heard but coolly unimplemented then, Is nevertheless 
worth bringing to the fore to be given a second chance of 
consideration and, it is hoped, put into practice.
For although a man of thought, Macmurray' s whole emphasis was on 
action and practice. No ivory tower of pure thinking for him. No 
withdrawing from the world. Thought is for living, or it is not 
worth bothering about.
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What then are some of the ideas Macmurray introduced and 
propounded? As with the ideas of every thinker not all are of such 
originality and profundity that they need special attention and 
consideration. But those of vital and essential interest are the 
following. However, first a word of warning. In the readability, 
fluency and ease of writing; in the core of the idea; and in the 
telling, Macmurray can be, or may seem to be, simple and even 
commonplace. You read him, or hear of one of his ideas, and think - 
What's all the fuss about; we know of, or are doing, this already. 
But this is not so. If you pause, reflect, and look deeply enough, 
you will realize that none of his ideas, as given in the following 
summary, are yet, nor within an age of becoming, a part of our 
general, social, psychological, moral, cr educational ethos. None 
have been incorporated into our thought, behaviour, or actions - 
public cr personal. In ourselves, and in our society, we are still 
thinking, feeling, believing, and doing all the things Macmurray 
would wish us not tp think and do. So; be cautious of Macmurray's 
easy style and presentation - especially in his popular and best- 
known books. Their seeming simplicity belies their originality, 
depth, and profundity.
So what are some of the things which, so original yet so out of 
step with the general feeling and ideas of those times and these, 
Macmurray told, or still has to tell us?
But first - 
A Biographical Note.
John Macmurray was bom at Maxwell ton, Kirkcudbrightshire, on 
the 16th February 1891. His father, James, was a civil servant; and 
the family were deeply religious, a fact for which he says, "he was
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fortunate". (SKR 5). The home was one of Christian piety in the 
traditional Calvanism of the Scottish Church. This had a strong 
intellectual strain. The Bible was the book both of inspiration and 
of reference in case of dispute. There was a distrust and 
suppression of emotion, and doctrine was paramount. Macmurray speaks 
of the shock he received when he first heard by chance that, in 
contrast to science, religion expressed the emotional aspects of 
human consciousness. (SRR 5). Hitherto for him religion had been 
purely intellectual and the fount of control and discipline.
Macmurray was educated at a local grammar school, but later his 
father asked to be transferred to Aberdeen solely for the sake of the 
children's education. (SRR 7). At Aberdeen Macmurray went to Robert 
Gordon's College.
In the 1890s there was a tremendous upsurge of evangelistic 
fervour, much of it springing fran America, and Macmurray's parents 
were not unaffected by it. They experimented with several Baptist 
sects, eventually becoming Plymouth Bretheren, but still retaining 
their Calvanist rigidity (SRR 6). When young, Macmurray's father had 
wanted to be a missionary, but the Boxer Movement and parental 
commitments had prevented this. Perhaps influenced by this knowledge 
Macmurray went, eventually, to Glasgow University specifically to 
become a missionary in China. But his enthusiasm for this soon 
waned.
But from an early time Macmurray had been a Bible-class teacher, 
and continued as an open-air and tent evangelist whilst still at 
Glasgow studying. Gradually however, about this time of his life, 
although not once in all his years was he ever not totally committed
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to religion, Macmurray began to doubt his own religious sincerity, 
and the sincerity of all formal religion. He says (SRR 9), "It is 
possible to have a real religious experience coupled with religious 
beliefs and practices which are fallacious and undesirable; or to 
hold sincerely and convincedly to religious beliefs and practices 
with no reality to sustain them". Here we have the beginning, 
although as he says he did not fannulate it till much later, of the 
whole import and essence of Macmurray' s religious teaching and 
outlook. This insight is the root of all that Macmurray has to say 
about religion.
But parallel with his long-experienced and deep religious 
knowledge and way of life is another interest - science (SRR 10).
This interest began before he had reached his teens. Science came to 
him, he says, like a revelation (SRR 10). He wanted to become a 
scientist, and although fighting strongly against his schoolmasters 
who had insisted on him pursuing the classics, he was eventually 
forced to compromise, but became the only student at school, and 
later at university, permitted to study science as an extra subject. 
Biology, chemistry, and geology were his main science subjects. And 
science, either predictably or perversely, was the only university 
subject in which he gained a medal 1
At university he was very much taken up with the then widespread 
and influential Student Christian Movement. Apart from anything else 
"It taught him that religious fellowship could be fun". (SRR 13). In 
other words, his religious severity and strictness began to melt and 
warm up under the influence of more liberal Christians around him.
He also perceived at this time that "there was no branch of creative 
human effort which could not be integrated with Christianity". (SRR
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13).
Further religious and scientific studies taught him four more 
things. 1) Firstly; that the theology and scriptual texts, on which 
he had been brought up, would not stand up to serious scrutiny or 
criticism. Their dogmatism was becoming repugnant to him. 2) 
Secondly; religion is not to be identified with theology, nor with 
any system of belief or beliefs. (SRR 15. SRR 16/7). 3) Thirdly;
that religion ought to be non-sectarian and interdenominational in 
character, and be also missionary and ecumenical in essence, outlook, 
and practice. 4) Fourthly; Macmurray reasoned that when a 
scientific theory has been proved to be invalid or outmoded you do 
not overthrew and renounce science. On the contrary; you pursue it 
more avidly. Why then, when a particular religious conception is 
shown to be puerile or untenable, renounce religion, as countless 
people were doing and are still doing when certain religious beliefs 
and dogmas no longer stand-up? "Could we not hope that through 
testing and modification we should arrive at a religion which science 
need not be ashamed to serve?". This last insight of Macmurray1 s had 
an important and profound effect upon the development of his 
religious ideas and outlook. It explains how, and why, he is able to 
cling fast to his religion despite all his scientific interests, a 
position which was very unusual at that time, the first decade of 
this century. It reveals, too, why Macmurray insists, against all 
the conventional conceptions of it, that religion - to retain its 
credibility - must become, and be, empirical.
In 1913 John Macmurray took his first degree, at Glasgow 
University, and in the same year won a Snell Exhibition to Oxford,
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and entered Balliol College in October 1913. But his course was far 
from finished when, with the coming of the First World War, he joined 
the R.A.M.C. in October 1914. He chose this branch of the Services 
because, although not a full pacifist, he had qualms and reservations
about war and killing not yet fully worked out. But by 1916 he had
realized, so he says, (SRR 16) that he was as much a part of the
fighting organisation as if he were in the front line; so he took a
commission as lieutenant in the 40th. Cameron Highlanders. On leave 
in that same year, 1916, he married Elizabeth Hyde. They had no 
children. Also in 1916 he was awarded the M.C. Wounded near Arras 
early in 1918, he was invalided home, but not discharged for a 
considerable time. Indeed, he was allowed to return to Oxford and 
took his degree in the simmer of 1919, before he was finally and 
officially allcwed to leave the Army. (SRR 16).
Out of his experience in the War Macmurray learned, inter alia, 
two things very important to his subsequent thinking. Firstly, the 
removal far ever of .the fear of death. This was, and is, "a 
tremendous gain in reality; for until we reach it - however we do 
reach it - we cannot see our life as it really is, and so we cannot 
live it as we should.11 (SRR 18). Secondly, Macmurray learned or 
decided to remove himself, and never join again, any Christian Church 
or denomination; yet, of course, remaining a full and committed 
Christian. It is interesting how this second determination came 
about. On leave from France he preached in a North London church 
about being on guard against the "war mentality", and of the need for 
reconciliation. (SRR 21). On saying this he met with cold hostility 
and was shunned by the congregation as he left the church. This left 
an indelible impression upon him of the mistakenly, to him,
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nationalistic and limited character of the conventional and orthodox 
churches. This vow of non-attachment he broke only in the early 
1960s, when he joined fully, after years of admiration going back at 
least to the First World War, the Society of Friends.
On the whole Macmurray was, as were so many of his
contemporaries, disillusioned by the War. According to him the only
major result of it, and this was wholly unintended, was the setting
up of communism in Russia. (SRR 19). But not until later did
Macmurray concern himself with Marxism; and this occurred by chance. 
He attended a religious conference on "What Is Christianity?" at 
which one of the study groups were asked to prepare a contributory 
paper on the then rather novel and topical subject of communism (SRR 
25). Macmurray, not at that time knowing very much about it, 
actually wrote the paper. Instantly, he, in various ways unique to 
him, discovered certain unusual - not the commonplace ones - 
associations between Christianity and communism. From then on 
communism played a big part in his thinking. However, whether he is 
to be regarded, or regarded himself, as a communist, is an open 
question and is discussed in the relevant chapter later.
No known thinker has especially influenced Macmurray, nor does 
he acknowledge any or speak of any indebtedness. He does say (SRR 
24) that, like Kierkegaard, he was aroused and stimulated by the 
problem of "What is Christianity?" or "Hew to become a Christian". 
And he speaks of Martin Buber as one of the "very greatest of modem 
thinkers". (SRR 24). If not an existentialist Macmurray is often on 
the fringes of it. In "Ten Modem Prophets," (Frederick Muller 
1944). J.B. Coates says that "Intellectually, Macmurray has been
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greatly influenced by Bergson", but in all Macmurray's works Bergson 
is mentioned only once, and then rather casually.
Discharged frcm the Army, Macmurray resolved to join with 
anybody or any organisation to prevent war occurring again. He hoped 
to become a member of staff of the newly formed League of Nations 
(SRR 22) but this was not to be. Instead, philosophy became his task 
and profession for life.
After taking his degree at Oxford he was, in 1919, appointed 
John Locke Scholar, and in the same year became a lecturer at 
Manchester University. From 1921/2 he was Professor of Philosophy at 
the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. Returning from there 
he was made a fellcw and tutor of Balliol College, 1922-1928. During 
the early 1930s he gave his very popular B.B.C. talks cn philosophy 
and the contemporary world; and this whilst at the University of 
London as Grote Professor, 1928-1944. To finish his academic career 
he then moved to Edinburgh University as Professor of Moral 
Philosophy, 1944-58..
During the years 1953/4 he gave the renowned Gifford Lectures at 
Glasgow University. These were published as "The Form of the 
Personal" (2 volumes), and refer to one of Macmurray1 s foremost, 
exploratory, and pioneering themes, the fruits and development of 
which have hardly begun. They foreshadow an area to be defined and 
formulated, yet too far ahead for contemporary man, with his 
principal interest and obsession in knowing, manipulating, and 
exploiting the exterior world, to the neglect of emotional 
development and the promotion of true human relationships, 
understanding, and mutuality.
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Altogether Macmurray wrote 24 books. Stemming from his 
scientific interests his main recreation was gardening. He died on 
21st June 1976.
There ends a brief biographical note.
What then were -
Macmurray1s Major Contributions
1) Emotional Reason
Everybody in our society, and indeed throughout Western 
civilisation, is conditioned to the idea that thinking can be, or 
should be at its best, imbued with reason. Not all thinking is; far 
from it. Some of the biggest efforts, and hours of valuable time, 
both in private and public life, are taken up with pointing out the 
flaws and lack of reasonableness in others, rarely if ever in one's 
cwn, thinking and arguments.
Embedded in this idea of satisfactory thinking are the notions 
of logic and rationality. They are not the same. But here is not 
the place to discuss them. Sufficient if we knew and agree that 
thinking includes some reason, or ought to, and the more of it the 
better. Most, too, would agree that although rational thinking can 
be found in nearly all branches of human knowledge, its most advanced 
exemplification, so far, is in the scientific area of enquiry.
Along with this idea it is universally accepted that the enemy 
of good and reasoned thinking, the enemy within which prevents it 
fran ever becoming good thinking, is emotion; this apart, of course, 
from mere structural failings. It is our emotions, we believe, which 
keep us fran thinking satisfactorily. Just as we are on the verge of
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thinking successfully feeling intervenes and ruffles reason. We 
suspect, too, that feeling interferes with thinking even if we are 
unaware of it. It certainly does in other people, when we are only 
too pleased to tell them that they are "rationalizing", which despite 
the name, means just the opposite of what it might be thought to 
mean.
Emotion, according to this widespread view of it, at the best 
interpretation we can put upcn it, a-raticnal or a-reasonable. But 
beyond this, most would say that our emotions are the seat and fount 
of unreason and of irrationality; and that they are incurably so.
The very nature of emoticn is to be thus. This is how it is.
Thought alone has the monopoly, or the possible monopoly, of the 
highly commendable and laudable characteristic of reason and 
rationality. So says the conventional wisdom.
This is not so, says Macmurray. Nothing is farther from the 
truth. Feeling can be as rational, and imbued with reason, as 
thought. Like thought it often isn’t. But it can and should be. 
Reason, as we so mistakenly believe, is not the prerogative of 
thinking. Our emotions must be seen to be as equally subject to, and 
as much in need of reason, as our thought.
Moreover, Macmurray goes further. "Reason," he says (RE 26) is
primarily an affair of the emotions whilst the rationality of
thought is the derivative and secondary one". He could not make his 
point clearer. Emotion is the essence of our being. Thought is 
secondary. We are essentially "feelers" not thinkers. Therefore 
until we make our feelings as rational as our thought can, at its 
best, sometimes be, we can never live satisfactorily. Macmurray 
suggests, even if he does not state it outright, that all our
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problems, personal and public, private and social, psychological and 
relational, are due to our almost total obliviousness to this fact of 
human existence. Western man has got into the cul-de-sac of 
obsession with thinking which blinkers him to the need for emotional 
growth and emotional objectivity; to the need for emotional reason.
At first hearing, this notion may not sound radical and 
revolutionary. Modem psychology, you may say, has been around for 
some time and this has said quite a lot about the emotions. But 
reflect upon Macmurray's contention; allow it to penetrate and 
permeate your awareness, and you will soon come to realize its 
startling originality and perceptiveness. It calls far nothing short 
of a complete shift of emphasis, and a redirecting of our way of 
life, of our values, and of our way of seeing things. Only thus will 
we find the path that may lead us out of the immense difficulties and 
problems of this present age of man.
As with all these introductory sections, only the barest minimum 
has been given concerning Macmurray's thought. A much fuller 
exposition and justification, in this case, is given in the chapter 
on Macmurray's psychological thought. But there can be no doubt that 
the concept of Emotional Reasons has been Macmurray' s greatest, 
penetrating, and most profound contribution and insight into this 
fundamental and important aspect of our living. Some may have hinted 
at the notion; others intuitively or vaguely discerned it. But only 
Macmurray has made it explicit.
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2) The Personal
This is Macmurray's most major contribution after Bnotional 
Reason. In fact, emotional reason, although important in its own 
right can be seen, when both are known and fully comprehended, as a 
vital element of the Personal. Here again, when you first come to 
understand what the personal is, nothing is more tempting than to say 
- "Bosh! We've known that all our lives. What is it but another 
name for the spiritual. We certainly don't need to be told about it 
as if it were some important discovery like Copemicumism or 
electricity".
But look around you. Hew many people do you know who are living 
Personally? Are you living thus, except far very brief, unintended, 
and discontinuous periods each day?
What is the Personal? The Personal is the third order. We are 
all familiar with orders. The basic, because most ubiquitous and 
extensive, is the material order. This includes all the physical 
aspects of existence - the Earth, atoms, things, the basic substances 
of our bodies, to name but some. The essence of this order is 
fixity, rigidity, regularity, uniformity, usually a certain 
persistency and permanency, behaving always according to fixed laws; 
passivity, unfreedom, non-self-directing or self-reproducing, 
egoless; all the qualities we associate with thingdem.
The second order is the organic. Here are included all plants, 
trees, fish, bacteria, insects, animals, and certain aspects of man. 
The essence of this order is sentience, drives, desires, will to 
survive, adaptability, procreation, conditioned response, life cycle, 
and inevitable individual extinction.
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And then coming through, existing upon and as it were, 
creatively emerging from the first two is the third carder, the 
Personal. I say "emerging from" as this is the best way to depict it 
at this stage of our exposition and understanding. But Macmurray 
believes the Personal to be the most basic and fundamental of the 
three. But more elaboration and discussion of this in the text later 
on.
What is the essence of the Personal? Freedom, openness, 
creativity, intention, self-consciousness, objectivity, rationality, 
reason; and just as important - as we are all, car can be, or should 
be, all Personal together - interdependence, mutuality, relatingness, 
and the most advanced and satisfactory of these and of the Personal, 
fellowship, friendship, and love. The Personal can never be imposed. 
It cannot be implemented by law, social order, politics, force, cr 
administration. The attainment of it, of its very nature, must be 
from choice, and of self-volition.
As you will ncw> recognise, the Personal has been around a long 
time. Macmurray argues with considerable justification, that Jesus 
discovered the Personal. If nothing else it has been Implicit in 
religious teaching - especially those of Christianity - for 
centuries. But. as with Qnotional Reason, what Macmurray has done is 
to give it a form and definition, a sort of philosophical and logical 
acceptability; he has brought it down to earth. We were conscious of 
it before; he has made us self-conscious of it. And by doing this 
never again can it be something vague, something you by accident, 
choice, education, or cultural environment heed and attend to or not. 
He has identified it, articulated it, and named it. From now on 
nobody who understands what Macmurray has made explicit about the
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Personal, however sceptical of regarding man as anything but a highly 
complex, involved, and computerised animal, can not intend to live in 
the Personal. If you do not you are, as it were, degrading your own 
existence.
Before you came to the last paragraph, and the reference there 
made to it, it is highly inprobable that you could have read these 
introductory remarks on the Personal without the word and concept of 
religion arising in your mind. Far the Personal, as so empirically 
defined by Macmurray, for the first time in the history of human 
thought and awareness is, for him and I believe for us all from now 
on, because of Macmurray' s insights and articulations, is to be 
associated, if not absolutely coincidentally and oo-existently, with 
religion.
So, to Macmurray we owe the explication of the Personal.
3) Religion
Without being "religious", at least not in any visible, 
conventional, or recognizable sense, religion is the all-important, 
all-including, thing for Macmurray. There are few branches of human 
learning and culture about which Macmurray does not have plenty to 
say and threw enlightenment upon. Science, art, psychology, thought, 
economics, politics, communism, philosophy, ethics, and society all 
receive considerable attention, some even commanding whole books of 
exposition and discussion. But mingling and intermingling through 
all is Macmurray's penchant, his thing, that which he perceives as 
the essential factor of humanness, the ground of all living - 
religion. With such permeation and penetration we cannot help but
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get the feeling that religion is natural, not that Macmurray ever 
mentions the word in this context. But that is what he consciously 
or unconsciously, intentionally or unintentionally, is conveying.
And whether this is his open intention or not, from this perception 
of naturalness and religious normality, an extremely important and 
far-reaching effect occurs; at least for those who are prepared to 
understand and heed what Macmurray is saying.
One problem troubles countless people today, try as they may to 
brush it aside. It is - Hew to be religious. Millions of sceptics, 
agnostics, atheists, secularists, and humanists are, at heart even if 
not overtly, yearning to be religious. And countless people who are 
ostensibly religious, believing, and orthodox, and within the fold 
are, whether openly seen to be or not, confronted by the same 
problem. Either they have their doubts, witness the mental and 
intellectual struggles of so many bishops; or they are vaguely aware 
of shortcomings in their behaviour, practices, relationships, 
approaches, and attitudes. And yet another group, and a very large 
one indeed, especially amongst the young, are those trying every 
cult, from fringe religious organisations, the occult, astrology, 
spiritualism, evangelism, the maharishi, and Scientology to drugs, 
addictions, pot, and pops - to name but a fewl Everywhere, people 
knowingly and unknowingly are trying desperately, almost frantically, 
and in however a substitute fashion, to be religious, yet to no 
satisfactory, real, and happy effect. All is phoney, false, 
ephemeral, and unsatisfying in the long run, if not in the short.
Why is there this intense seeking? There are three reasons. 
Firstly; the important, even if not the sole, roots of our Western 
society are in Christianity. Therefore if for any cause, perhaps for
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example because of the effects of science and technology, the link 
with our roots is broken or partially severed, there must inevitably 
be a widespread feeling of voidness and loss; not so much a feeling 
of longing for what was as a disorientation, especially as those 
things which are most intrinsic, vital, and sustaining in our lives, 
namely values, become unstable as a result.
Secondly; the same applies to individual lives, not merely to 
society in general. Countless numbers of people alive today were 
reared directly, or in the lengthening shadow of Christianity, even 
if it was only a conventionalised Christianity exemplified by church- 
going or by school assembly. To many it was more, of course. The 
loss of this, shrugged-off with indifference by many, cannot but be 
felt, even if unadmitted. Something, however vague and 
unidentifiable, has gone from their lives.
Thirdly; and here we come to what no doubt Macmurray would call 
the essential reason; the reason which exists apart from both general 
history and individual experience. And to understand this fully we 
must recall the last section of this introduction; the Personal. We 
are, you remember, made to be Personal. To be Personal is what we 
are, or what we must become. Only thus can we be ourselves. We are 
things, and often have to exist as such; we are creatures and must 
act organically. But superimposed on all this, and indeed making it 
very difficult far us, is the Personal. And it is in this order that 
we must intend to live and be.
New the area especially relevant to the Personal is that of 
religion. Religion exists, hcwever inadequately, gropingly, or 
unconsciously, to promote the Personal. Because, therefore, however
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seriously or however reluctantly and superficially we are and must 
pursue the Personal, we are self-evidently, all and every one of us, 
religious and involved with religion. It is of our very essence.
The immature expressions of religion manifested so far have, quite 
naturally, "turned off" millions of people in today's world. But 
this does not in any way detract from our need for religion.
We can see now why countless are wondering how to be religious. 
And why the important contribution Macmurray has made to religion is 
that, whether totally acceptable or not, he has given us the clue as 
to hew we can recognize that, despite all our own ideas, and the 
ideas of the contemporary world, we are and must live in a religious 
context. We are religious whether we recognize it or not, for it is 
the most natural and normal thing for all men to be. We are 
Personal, and religion is the area, the ambience, of the Personal. 
Macmurray makes it possible for us to be religious again, and 
possibly at a more advanced, maturer, stage than before. Macmurray 
has metamorphosed religion. By discovering this, by showing religion 
to be as normal and as natural a part of human existence as thinking, 
breathing, and relating, he has gone a long way to making unbelievers 
religious again; and believers less eager to portray religion as 
something special, spiritual, sacred, and supernatural; something 
only for the "elect" and chosen and thus putting everybody else off. 
Religion for Macmurray is simply living Personally.
4) Freedom
Apart from religion Macmurray, throughout his works, has more to 
say about freedom than anything else. It is a major and important 
conception of his, and he brings much original thought to it. And
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where he is not original he, as perhaps we have come to expect by now 
of him, puts an emphasis on some aspect almost ignored in 
contemporary thought and action.
The important contribution Macmurray makes regarding freedom is 
that he deepens and broadens our awareness and apprehension of it.
Ask most people, not merely the man in the street but those in the 
more educated and higher controlling and influencing strata of 
society, what they understand by freedom, and they will give some 
sort of political answer possibly extended to include rather vague 
references to such social matters as freedom of the press and freedom 
of assembly. One thing is certain. You can be sure nothing will be 
said about psychological freedom, that is freedom of the emotions and 
of the self.
Yet this is Macmurray's greatest concern when the question of 
freedom arises. Moreover, he links the two. Structural and 
institutional freedom, that is political and social freedom, may be 
there for all to benefit from, but none can satisfactorily benefit 
unless they are personally free; that is, free in themselves and in 
their emotions. In a sense, political freedom, except formally and 
without any real meaning and substance, cannot exist without personal 
freedom. This is because the most unfree, yet energetic and vigorous 
members of society - the pcwer lovers - will take over, and do take 
over, even in a democracy. They then subtly and insidiously 
manipulate the feeling of the numerous and the majority but less 
power-driven of the people. Thus in a "free" society most people are 
unfree.
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Hew has this situation arisen? Because, says Macmurray, we have 
freed thought but not emotion. Freedom of thought started about five 
hundred years ago, and from tentative and opposed beginnings 
progressed to its greatest expression in science. The essence of 
scientific thought is freedom and reality. Without preconceptions or 
dogmatism and authority, it operates in freedom, seeking solely for 
what is, not for what it would wish to be. Science is the prime 
example of what all freedom, contrary to popular conceptions of it, 
must contain; and that is discipline. The discipline of relating 
itself, whatever the cost - in human pride, vanity, or dignity - to 
reality.
But although we have freed thought, and thus related it to 
reality and shifted its centre of balance from "in here" to "out 
there", from subjectivity to objectivity, to our immense advantage 
thought-wise, we have not freed our emotions. And remember, as 
Macmurray so pertinently reminds us - indeed, he might be said to 
instruct us, so oblivious is contemporary society to the fact - that 
the essence of our living is our emotional life. Our emotions are 
the vital, essential, part of ourselves. Not only does all 
experience come by and through our emotions, feelings, and senses, 
but all our evaluations, and hence our choices are determined by our 
emotions and not by our thinking.
Earlier we considered the importance of emotional reason and 
growth. No less an aspect of this, for Macmurray, is the freeing of 
emotion. Yet in this area we are enchained, biased, and as unfree 
and unreal as thought was in its pre-scientific era. Only as we 
bring the same freedom to our emotional life can we grow and develop 
into satisfactory, personal, human beings. The irony is that the
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cannon ethos tells us that we are free, mainly because we enjoy 
constitutional freedoms. Moreover, many people, probably the 
majority, think that more money and more material possessions would 
make them more free. Considering Macmurray's ideas on personal, 
emotional, and psychological development and freedom, additional 
possessions have very little to do with freedom essentially.
Macmurray gives interesting and cogent reasons and historical 
analysis as to why we are in this state of emotional unfreedom.
This introductory section can only hint at Macmurray's 
penetrating and valuable contribution to our understanding of 
freedom. Much more will be elaborated upon in the relevant chapter. 
But enough has been given to indicate the insight Macmurray has 
brought to this vital topic, and of the importance of what he has to 
say about it.
5) Monism
Of all the five major tendencies or advocacies considered in 
this introduction, Macmurray's monisn is the least heightened, 
focused, reinforced, and re-expounded by him. The other ideas have 
each been encapsulated in one or more books, devoted more or less 
exclusively to their subject matter. Not so his monism. Yet it 
pervades all his writings and thought. If one thing is the essence, 
if not the substance, of Macmurray, it is this.
Macmurray is the foremost monist of our time. He may not be the 
foremost in advocacy and intention, arguing, expounding, and 
defending his case in the most detailed, logically reasoned, and 
extended way. That, as we have come to knew, is not Macmurray's
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method. For him the proof of the pudding is in the eating (or should 
we say, in the experiencing) not in an inspection, analysis, and 
admiration of the list of ingredients, however brilliant and 
convincing these may be.
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Macmurray 
unquestionably considers the world as one, and merely by reading him 
we totally and automatically feel this to be so. Very subtly, or 
though not consciously or deliberately, and certainly with no 
ulterior motive, Macmurray through his writing and the consequent 
shifting and redirecting of feeling which we experience, is able to 
bring about a change in us imperceptibly; and without the doubtful 
necessity of logical argument we become monists. Through him, and 
the way he writes, we see and experience the point, and the need of 
so being.
Why is monism, and to be monist, so important? Because, both in 
ourselves and throughout Western civilisation, if not in all extant 
civilisations and cultures, we are divided. Now sometimes, and at 
different times in history, division or centrifuged interests and 
farces are necessary for growth, or at legist as an essential catalyst 
and precursor to growth. At other times unifying, centripetal, 
monistic, interests and directions are essential to promote and 
create cohesion, both within ourselves and in society at large.
Indeed, such monism may be essential to survival. Of such an era is 
the one in which we are now living.
It was Plato who first divided our consciousness, reinforced by 
Descartes the father of the modem world, philosophy-wise. Since 
then we have been bedevilled by dualism, and even by pluralism. 
Existence, the world, man, thought, politics, and religion must have
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or perhaps in the light of Macmurray we ought to say, "are seen by us 
to have" - two or more sides or aspects. Obvious examples of dualism 
are inexhaustible, but here are some to remind us; mind and matter, 
body and soul, left and right, heaven and hell, science and religion, 
will and passion, reason and emotion, spiritual and temperal, either 
or. And examples of pluralism are; mind, body, and spirit; the 
trinity; and social classes - upper, middle, and lower. Nobody can 
say that dualism is not an inbuilt feature of our way of perceiving 
the world, life and ourselves.
But, inconceivable as it may seem to us, conditioned as we are 
by the structure of Western thinking and perceiving process, we do 
not have to see things in this way. They are merely categories we 
have created in the human mind, mainly for our seeming convenience. 
And its effects have reached a dangerous stage as we well knew. 
According to Macmurray, since primitive times, only one people have 
been totally and naturally monist; the Jews of the Old Testament.
His admiration for them, in this respect, is immense. This example 
of monism forms for Macmurray one very important aspect (about half, 
if one can roughly apportion it) of his "clue" to history. For 
monism to appear so important speaks far itself in Macmurray's 
thought.
If monism, if to be a monist, is so important for us, how are we 
to achieve it? Descartes said, "I think, therefore I am." Here lies 
the root of all our troubles and divisions. Thought, thinking, is 
not the essence, the core, of our being. Thought is only 
instrumental, a means to an end. It can never be anything of itself. 
It can never be ultimate. It can never cause us to experience
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reality.
And this is where Macmurray turns the tables, and consequently 
revolutionizes our way of seeing things. Macmurray instead of 
saying, "I think, therefore I am", would say, "I act, therefore I 
am". But even this is not complete enough for him. Reality is 
Personal - remember? - and the Personal includes us all. Therefore 
the ultimate phrase, the ultimate expression of being for Macmurray 
is, "We act, therefore we are". In this conception of action lies 
the clue to Macmurray's monism. For, although thinking can be 
divided an action, at any one particular moment, can never be 
divided. It can only be one thing. For some reason, to be discussed 
later, Macmurray calls this paramountcy of action "agency"; we are 
"agents". But perhaps this whole aspect of his thinking could best 
be called Actionism. Macmurray's monism exists through and by the 
fact that he is an Actionist. We are here to do, not to dream or 
wish.
What "to act" means is elaborated upon at length. It includes 
the very important conception of "intention", which plays a very big 
part in Macmurray's psychology and philosophy.
Enough has been said to illustrate how important monism is for 
Macmurray; and of hew essential it is, both in ourselves and in our 
world, to be undivided and seamless. He has shewn how, by redressing 
the balance between thought and action, we can achieve this. 
Macmurray's monism, and of how to be monistic, is certainly one of 
his foremost conceptions - and a means of saving the world. For, 
although unsaid, this no doubt is one of Macmurray's major objects.
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A Final Note
The foregoing brief introductory sections have been written with 
two things in mind.
Firstly; to introduce, in an easy way, a few of the major ideas 
of John Macmurray.
Secondly; to awaken, arouse, and stimulate interest in an 
important writer and thinker who has much to say of great relevance 
for us today, yet who has been almost totally neglected.
No attempt has been made at this stage to appraise or criticise 
the ideas presented. In your mind, as you have read, some doubts, 
questions, and even antipathies, will inevitably have arisen. Each 
chapter following contains several sections of criticisn and 
appraisement; and a final chapter will attempt to summarise and 
evaluate overall Macmurray's place, contribution, relevance, 
influence, and shortcomings.
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FREEDOM 
Relevant Books
Freedom in the Modem World. (FMW)
Conditions of Freedom. (CF)
Philosophy of Communism. (PC)
Introduction
Macmurray has many diverse and varied ideas on freedom. It is 
not easy to bring total coherence to them, or to incorporate them 
exhaustively into one system. Although a man of reason and 
rationality Macmurray was not predominantly a man of logic or proof, 
not a man to totally and exhaustively justify what he was saying.
Nor was Plato - far from it. Yet he was not criticised on these 
grounds.
This does not mean that Macmurray's views on freedom - or, 
indeed, on anything else - are inconsistent or incongruent; at least, 
not beyond the inevitable and acceptable limits of any thinker. But 
as in all Macmurray's work and intentions, proof of anything said or 
believed is in the living of it, not in verbal substantiation and 
argument. Truth is to be found in living, not in and through 
thinking. Thinking plays a valid and valuable part to this end, but 
it is feeling which gives us our values and it is values which 
determine our life and living - not intellectual thinking. "Thought 
is only verifiable in action." (PC 26).
Such an outlook is quite against Western tradition, especially
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since the end of the Middle Ages and the caning of the Modem era; 
and since Descartes. Of this period, science is its prime, although 
by no means sole, manifestation. In philosophy, probably only 
existentialism challenges this. Even Pragmatism is thought-* 
orientated.
Thus, what Macmurray is really trying to do is to shift the
whole emphasis of Western thinking and ideas. This is like trying to
lift a twenty ton rock with, and on, one human shoulder. And if 
followers or acknowledgers are any indication of one's success and 
influence, Macmurray has - at least to date - failed miserably. At 
best, one can say he has gone unheard. Maybe the coming of the 
Permissive Society in the 1960s was in some way, hcwever indirect,
the result of Macmurray's work. But a lot of study and research
would be necessary to trace it to him (even as but one factor in a 
complex situation). And nobody has even attempted or suggested it 
yet.
But there can be no doubt that this major shift of life- 
emphasis, away from thought to feeling and consequent improved 
action, was a very prominent and important theme and intention of 
Macmurray's. It is perhaps unfortunate that Macmurray's style - 
except in the three more academic books - is so "easy" and fluent, so 
readable, that people understand it, or think they do, as they read 
without bothering to find reflection and questioning as to meaning 
necessary. If he were more obscure, and had to be worked at, he 
would be more revered. I remember a student in one of my classes 
saying of another lecturer (with slight intended amusement, but 
nevertheless meant), "He must be a good lecturer, I don't understand
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a word he says!"
If Macmurray had the obscurity of Hegel he might well have 
superseded him by now. For he is certainly attempting as major a 
task as Hegel (or Marx).
But now for freedom. And first of all - what, according to 
Macmurray, is:-
The Origin of Freedom
Why do we seem to want freedom? Why has it been a major theme 
and intention of modem man? From whence does this idea in us come 
from? ....................................................
It might be noted in passing that although the books listed at 
the head of this chapter are obviously, by their titles, the ones 
most devoted by Macmurray to this subject, freedom is often referred 
to throughout his works. It is a major theme.
Macmurray attributes freedom to two sources.
1 ) Firstly; to Christianity. "Christianity implanted in us the 
desire for freedom of life". (FMW 48). And again. "The driving 
force belcw the development of Europe has always been the struggle 
for freedom and the clue to that struggle lies in Christianity."
(FMW 48). (And more generally Macmurray speaks of this influence in 
CF 35).
One further special exemplification of this contention is given. 
Science, claims Macmurray, is our most notable area of freedom 
attained so far. It results from freedom of thought. And the 
required underlying freedom necessary far its production came not, as 
is usually contended, from the Greeks, but from Christianity with its 
insistence can truth and light. To illustrate this Macmurray quotes
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from the New Testament, (FMW 38). "This is the condemnation that 
light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than 
light because their deeds were evil". For full discussion of this 
see FMW 37/41.
So Christianity is a major source of the idea of, and need for, 
freedom.
2) Secondly: freedom is of man's essence, man would not be 
man had he not this urge and need for freedom. To quote CF 16. 
"There is a sense in which freedom is absolute. It is the sense in 
which freedom is the. defining character of Man;, the property which . 
sets us apart from the rest of creation and fixes a gulf between us 
and the highest of the animals.".
Macmurray then, in acceptable but nevertheless his own meaning 
and interpretation of words and terms, puts forward - or at least 
implies - three ways of being. These are:-
To act.
To behave.1
(see CF 16/17).
To react.
Material things behave. Living things react. But only man 
acts. (There is much more about this, and of the freedom and types 
of morality these three ways of being respectively evoke, in the 
chapters and pages of FMW 175/210, but I do not think it especially 
relevant to develop them at this point. See later in this chapter.)
To act means to form an intention and seek to realise it (CF 
16). To act is to be free. As Agents - one of Macmurray's most 
major concepts - we are concerned not with what exists or is, but 
with what will be i.e. with the future and our intentions for it.
The past is fixed and unalterable. The present is merely the point
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of action. Only in our intention for what is to be are we free.
"The future is the field of freedom" (CF 17). The only way to deny 
that freedom is of our essence is to assert that we never, nor can, 
act (but only behave or react).
Beside acting and agency another unique feature of man, as 
equally important and of the essence of freedom, is the Personal, 
also discussed later at length in this thesis.
So there are Macmurray's two main ideas - Christianity and 
essence - as to why man has, wants, needs, seems to be involved with, 
freedom.
(Rather than wait to the end of each chapter, I shall from time 
to time interrupt the exposition to make an appraisement and 
evaluation. The first occasion for this is now).
Appraisement (1)
1 ) Without being able to substantiate it in detail, I do myself 
feel that Christianity has been a major source of freedom. But 
surely Macmurray could give a better quote frcm the New Testament 
than the one he has given. Moreover, there must be many quotes he 
could give frcm the same source. To those unfamiliar with 
Macmurray's works one might reasonably say that Christianity, as it 
has come down to us, is a restricting, inhibiting, influence - not 
one of freedom. But Macmurray recognises this, especially in the 
realms of feeling and emotion (but not in the area of thought) and 
has given for this a rather interesting reason. This will have to be 
fully discussed later in an appropriate context. Sufficient to say 
here that Macmurray contends that the Christianity we have and know
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is not the original and real Christianity introduced by Jesus. It 
has all the hall-marks of the culture and attitudes of Ancient Rome.
So; to go back to this point in the appraisement. It would have 
been better if Macmurray had substantiated his assertion with more 
and relevant evidence.
2) Regarding his second reason for man's need for freedom i.e. 
that it is of our essence, the fact that you cannot prove it, or 
bring overwhelming evidence to support it may, of itself, be 
sufficient indication of it probably being true. But we must not 
confuse the "unknown" (which the future is) with the "free"). The 
future is definitely unknown, but is it open and free? Much of it 
e.g. movement of the planets, to give but one obvious example, must 
already be part of a deterministic and unfree chain. Is our own 
individual future any the less determined?
However, if we take Macmurray's ideas, and incorporate them in 
our cwn lives, thoughts, emotions, actions, and relationships we do 
find ourselves becoming "freer". No doubt other "systems" (of the 
right kind) will produce this effect too. So, in experience and 
practice, it would seem that freedom can be enlarged by each one of 
us; and, as it is enlarged, we feel more adequate, satisfactory, and 
effective persons. Thus, through living, Macmurray's contentions 
that to be free is of our human essence, would seem to be "proved" as 
far as it can be. And proved by the method of proof Macmurray all 
along advocates, namely action and living, not thinking. Speaking of 
the rejection of idealism, and the acceptance of the principle of the 
unity of theory and practice, Macmurray says, "they involve the 
belief that all theory must seek verification in action and adapt
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itself to the possibility of experintent. They make a clean sweep of 
all speculative thought on the ground that the validity of no belief 
whatever is capable of demonstration by argument. They involve a 
refusal at any point to make knowledge an end in itself, and equally, 
the rejection of the desire for certainty which is the motive 
governing speculative thought. The demand for personal certainty is 
only the ideal reflection of the demand for personal security and 
that demand is the psychological basis of the struggle for power 
between individuals, classes, nations and empires." (PC 63).
End of Appraisement (1 )
The Paradoxical Position of Man Concerning Human Freedom
Freedom may be of man's essence; it may be absolute (as 
Macmurray expresses it CF 16). But equally, Macmurray says, it is 
relative - which means that, although made for freedom, although 
freedom is of our nature, we are not always free, able to be free, 
nor even, in many cases, to want to be free.
As we would expect Macmurray (CF 17) quoted Rousseau's famous 
dictum "Man is b o m  free, yet everywhere he is in chains". But, to 
misquote, what I think Macmurray should have said (to be more in line 
with his thinking) is "Man is b o m  to be free, but everywhere he is 
still emotionally in chains".
We experience this relativity of freedom in many ways. When, 
for example, we fall short of what we would be, or know ourselves to 
be capable of. And again; in the conflict of conscience versus 
impulse (see CF 17). All other creatures are always themselves, but
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man's nature is not fixed and predictable. To illustrate this 
Macmurray quotes St. Paul, " - it doth not yet appear what we shall 
be". We are always becoming. We are ourselves yet always we are 
reaching out to be what is, as yet, not ourselves. So this is the 
paradox of human freedom. Our freedom is at once both absolute and 
relative.
But then there is a second paradox concerning human freedom. Or 
if not a paradox then at least a very marked proviso concerning the 
first, (see CF 18/20). We profess to desire freedom but fear to be 
free.
On hearing this phrase one is reminded of a book with the same 
theme written after Macmurray's ideas had been published, namely,
"The Fear of Freedom" by Erich Fromm. This is very relevant to the 
point. What is this fear of freedom? Perpetually - it is not a 
once-for-all choice and done with it - we are each confronted by a 
choice, freedom or security. And most of the time, "inhumanly" and 
"sub-personally", we choose security. This then is the second 
paradox of freedom. We are bom to be free yet out of fear we shun 
it. Yet, and here is the essence of the paradox, we can only be 
ourselves when going for freedom, therefore only in freedom can we be 
secure.
Going for security in preference to freedom can lead only to 
frustration, and to the destroying of ourselves. "If we aim at 
security we aim at the impossible, and succeed only in multiplying 
the occasions of fear, and magnifying our need far security. There 
is no security for us except in choosing freedom. For our insecurity 
is our fear, and to choose freedom is to triumph over fear". (CF 20).
- 37 -
As we shall come to understand as we go along, fear is another 
important theme throughout Macmurray's writings. The desire for 
security is based on fear. Fear is a negative emotion. It either 
shrivels us up and leads into a withdrawal frcm life and people; or; 
it puts into us a mighty urge to power, to conquer all and sundry, to 
master all imagined enemies and sources of fear.
But it never succeeds. In jungle and instinctive conditions 
fear is necessary, proper, and propitious. At the human, personal, 
level it is disastrous. Most of all - and very much to the point 
here - it is a major source of our unfreedom.
It is interesting to ask in passing - why is fear such a big 
"thing" with Macmurray? Is its discernment a rational, objective, 
analysis on his part? Or is he somewhere, somehow, a 'fearful, fear- 
filled' person? We cannot tell. But a slight hint might be gleaned 
frcm the following - perhaps. "The free man is the man who takes 
responsibility for his cwn life before God and his fellows. Is it 
any wonder that when we are faced with the challenge of freedom, our 
fear is usually more than a match for its attractiveness; and that we 
seek, far the most part, to escape the demand that it makes upon us?
This, at least, is my experience; and that our capacity to deceive
ourselves in this matter is of extreme subtlety." (CF 19). Does
this give us a clue or not?
So this is the paradox, concerning freedom, in us. Freedom is 
of our essence as men, as human beings, as persons. However, we are 
not yet free (or only partially so, and each of us has acquired 
different degrees of freedom, of which we may lose or gain more) 
because 1) of our inbetween and transitory state as man. 2) of 
fear(s) in us, evoked by, probably, this very transitory condition in
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which we find ourselves, and of our consequent need for security.
Very awkward isn't it I - but very cleverly analysed by Macmurray.
What is Freedom?
As we would expect, all of Macmurray's ideas of freedom are not 
concerned with their ontological, philosophical, or theoretical 
aspects, but with their manifestations in life and action. So; in 
practical, psychological, and dcwn-to-earth terms what, for 
Macmurray, is freedom?
After years of study I believe I know - and am able to summarise
- what Macmurray meant by freedom. But a serious first half-a-dozen
readings of his ideas on the matter (one reading will not bother 
you!) will lead you into a miasma of seeming anomalies, even 
contradictions; one moment he seems to regard freedom as "doing as 
you please" absolutely; the next he says that he does not mean this 
at all - so "don11 misunderstand him"!
Moreover, when you do understand him (or think you do), one of 
the terms essential to his conception of freedom, namely "reality", 
is extremely difficult to comprehend in this context of freedom.
However, as I say, I believe I knew what he means; but others
may have a different interpretation, or at least a different 
emphasis.
Let us start by quoting some of Macmurray's definitions or 
delineations of freedom:-
To do as we please without restraint or hindrance. (FMW 172).
To express one's cwn nature in action. (FMW 170).
To act freely is to act without restraint. (FMW 167).
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In the absence of personal reality freedom is just impossible.
(FMW 168).
Free action is spontaneous action. (FMW 170).
Free action flows frcm our own nature. (FMW 170).
Freedom is spontaneity. (FMW 170).
Communism is therefore the necessary basis of real freedom. (PC 80). 
The free man is the man who takes responsibility for his own life.
(CF 19).
Only a real person can be free. (FMW 171 ).
To be free means not to be under restraint. (FMW 169).
Freedom depends upon our inner condition. (FMW 172).
It is obviously untrue to say that we are free to do as we please, if
we don't know what we want to do. (FMW 172/3).
Even a real person cannot be free in the face of unreal persons. (FMW
173).
And to paraphrase other relevant quotations 
Unfreedom is to be still in the bondage of tradition and authority. 
(FMW 53).
Undisciplined thought is never free. (FMW 53).
It is only in friendship that we ever find ourselves completely, and 
so be completely free. (FMW 174).
To act freely is to take a decision and accept the consequences.
(CF 19).
Let me try to collate the above, and bring some cohesion and 
coherence to what may seem a disparate and sometimes incongruent set
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of assertions. And others could be added, equally as amorphous I
From the above quotations it will be seen that the key words, 
apart from freedom itself, are:-
Spontaneity.
Reality. Real.
Personal reality.
Friendship.
Own nature.
Inner condition.
Discipline.
Responsibility.
Using, where necessary, these words and concepts, what might be 
said to be Macmurray's ideas cn freedom - in a summary?
To be free means to be spontaneous, untrammelled, unrestrained - 
even unreflecting. (In "Persons in Relation" Macmurray strongly 
contrasts these two — action and reflection - alternating and 
essential phases of life.) To be free means immediacy and 
instantaneousness. It means living and acting creatively at a point 
of time.
But whilst spontaneity is essential to freedom, not all 
spontaneous action is free. Far frcm it; indeed very little of it 
is. Externally, and more important internally, we are constrained, 
unfree, and inhibited - and this without necessarily having the 
psycho-analytic connotation.
What, then, must accompany spontaneity in order for our actions 
and our selves to be free? Four things:-
Reality.
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Discipline.
Intention.
Friendship.
As we saw earlier Maanurray says that only real persons can be 
free. And so important is this idea of "real" and "reality" that the 
second part of "Freedom in the Modem World" is called Reality and 
Freedom, and five chapters (pp. 116/166), plus many other references, 
are devoted to it.
Reality might be said to be anything, and our ideas about it. 
"Anything" can be everything external to ourselves, all other people, 
even our own bodies with both their attributes and efficiencies, 
their defects and deficiencies. Included in the tern "ideas" are 
thought i.e. ideation, and feeling, and evaluation.
Now we can only live freely, and be free, if our ideas, in 
relation to what is not ourselves, are true i.e. if they coincide.
If they do not coincide, then we cannot be free. To give an 
outlandish example. If my ideas and feelings are such that I persist 
in the "unreality" of believing that carbon-monoxide will serve just 
the same purpose as oxygen in my breathing I shall not be here long, 
let alone be free I But extreme and ridiculous as this example may 
seem countless people, and all of us sometime in our lives and 
thinking (however much we may think otherwise) have ideas which do 
not coincide with reality. And to that degree we are unreal and - 
more to the point of our present consideration - unfree. We cannot 
act in terms of what is.
All this seems to me a secular and rational description of a 
situation which used to be religiously stated as (speaking of God)
"His service is perfect freedom". In other words; one important
- 42 -
aspect of freedom, if not all of it, is to discover what is out 
there, how it works, and then fit yourself in with it. If you don't 
you will always be tangled and twisted-up; in other words, unfree.
The area in man where this conception of Macmurray's has been 
best illustrated is in scientific thinking. All the time we thought 
we knew about the world; all the time we wove imaginative fantasies 
about it, we really got nowhere. But once, from the 15th. century 
onwards, we worked on our ideas about the external world in terms of 
reality we not only got on much better in finding solutions to 
problems, but to the degree that our knowledge was based on reality, 
so equally did we become free. And regarding thought - not emotion 
and evaluation for the moment - the more we really knew, the freer we 
shall increasingly become.
It is important to note a very pertinent point made by Macmurray 
(FMW 53) - and, incidentally, to see where another of our "words" 
fits in - concerning the above. Thought was increasingly freed from 
the 15th century onwards, freed frcm the fixed, rigid, traditional 
ideas of the Middle Ages. But although this thought was freed it was 
highly disciplined thought. Freedom, in this context, did not mean 
wild, uncontrolled, bizarre, thinking. On the contrary; only by 
relating it totally, through discipline, to what was, did it become 
successful, and enlarge freedom.
The need to relate it to reality, imposed a necessary discipline 
of its own. "The free thought that has unravelled the mysteries of 
the natural world is not and cannot be undisciplined thought, which 
is never free." (FMW 53) .." It is disciplined by the world with 
which it deals, by testing its conclusions against fact." (FMW 53).
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The importance of Macmurray's pressing of this point will appear 
later when we come to consider freedom, not of thought, but of 
feelings, and the discovery of values.
Earlier I spoke, paraphrasing Macmurray, of the absolute and the 
relative aspects of freedom. Another way in which freedan is 
relative for Macmurray concerns intention and the ability to fulfil 
that intention. (See CF 21). Freedom entails responsibility for 
yourself i.e. knowing what you want to do. If a man's wants are 
negligible he does not need much power to fulfil than; and to that 
degree he is soon free. But if a man has immense desires and
ambitions he has got to be very important, and command a great amount
of power to even begin to fulfil them. "But our freedom also depends 
upon what we want to do. For it is no limitation upon a man's
freedom that he has not the power to do something that he has no
desire to do". (CF 21).
"We can increase our freedom, therefore, by limiting our 
desires. The free man is the man whose means are adequate to his 
ends." (FMW 21 ). This reminds me of a very pertinent remark of Henry 
James. "I call people rich when they're able to meet the 
requirements of their imagination." (The Portrait of a Lady p. 196). 
Thus we can increase our freedom in two ways: -
1) By reducing our desires.
2) By increasing our power to achieve them.
But our chances at the present time of achieving more freedom 
are remote. Our power over the environment has increased out of all 
proportion and expectation; but as this has happened our perception 
of what we want, or could have, have increased even greater. Thus we 
are less free! On the other hand; to reduce desire (as did the
- 44 -
saints) in order to enlarge personal freedan has gone out of fashion. 
But presumably for our own happiness, and personal and emotional 
growth, it might be worth trying again. "The increase of power is an 
increase of freedom only if our demands remain relatively stable.
But this is what they will never do if left to themselves. Plato saw 
this more than two millenniums ago. In the Republic he pointed to 
the fact that though animal desires can be easily satisfied, desire 
in man is insatiable. For when the natural needs of men are 
supplied, new desires appear for more elegant and more complicated 
satisfactions, until the resources available are too few for the 
demands upon them: and in this he found the origin of war.
The very spectacle of increased resources breeds a corresponding 
proliferation of desires; and if this process is uncontrolled, 
desires always grow faster than the power to satisfy them; for their 
increase is rooted in the creativeness of the imagination. If, then, 
we double our resources while we treble our demands upon them we do 
not increase our freedan. We diminish it. There is no need for 
astonishment that the vast increase of our resources in the last 
generation has gone hand in hand with a loss of human freedom. The 
two variables - the moral and the technological - must both be 
considered. Self-control is as imperative as the control of nature 
if freedom is to be increased or even maintained." (CF 22/3). (See 
also CF 21/2 for very relevant remarks concerning these points).
The Three Modes of Freedom
Even as - we saw this earlier - there are three ways of being, 
so there are three corresponding freedoms. These are:-
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1 ) The freedan of material things, we recognise this when we say 
that things make a "free" fall to the ground if left to their own 
desires and "volition". (For a full exposition and discussion of the 
points merely stated here see FMW chapters 8 and 9).
This first type Macmurray calls mechanical freedom.
2) The freedom of living organisms. The essence of their 
freedom is to grew, respond, and adapt themselves to their 
environment. (FMW chapters 8 and 10).
3) The freedom of persons. "Personal reality expresses itself 
in spontaneous objectivity. (BMW 182). This means we are free - or 
freest - when we relate to, and live in connunion with, that which is 
not ourselves. (FMW chapters 8 and 11). The most advanced and 
satisfactory state of this condition is in our relationships with 
other human beings. Thus only in friendship can we find true, or 
perhaps we should say real, freedom.
"To realize ourselves we have to be ourselves to make ourselves 
real. That means thinking and feeling really, for ourselves, and 
expressing our own reality in word and action. And this freedom, and 
the secret of it, lies in our capacity for friendship." (FMW 219).
Thus, being essentially personal by nature, we achieve the 
maximum freedom we are capable of, and can knew, in friendship - and 
better and wider still, in the extension of this which is community. 
The whole of chapter 3 of "Conditions of Freedom" is taken up with 
the analysis and development of this contention of Macmurray's. "The 
prime condition of freedom lies in the character and quality of human 
relations". (CF 31).
Whilst not a perfect exposition of Macmurray's ideas on "What is
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Freedom?", I hope I have given enough, and got it together enough, to 
show that at least I have some understanding of what he is, or at 
least intends to be, saying.
Appraisement (2)
1 ) Regarding the paradox of freedom in which man finds himself, 
probably Macmurray's analysis, in principle, is right. Man's 
position for long, at least in or according to religious circles, has 
been recognised as one of in-betweeness. "We are a little lower than 
the angels." "We are fallen creatures." Philosophy, however, seems 
not to over-favour this view - not at least to my knowledge. All 
arguments in this area seem rather either/or; some philosophers 
contending that we are free; others that we are not. In this matter 
perhaps Macmurray introduces a realistic note into the discussion. 
Even Rousseau's dictum, perhaps for rhetorical effect, seems of the 
black and white, absolute, type.
2) As regards the fear aspect. I am sure much of this is true. 
But whilst Macmurray seems to suggest that the choice has 
continuously to be made between security and freedan, I am not so 
sure about this. There seems to me to be permanently negative people 
in whose lives fear, in a multiplicity of forms, pervades. Whilst 
others are not fear-enveloped. But, of course, even the most 
positive and free-loving person may sometimes be accosted by doubts 
and fears.
3) Macmurray (CF 19) makes the interesting point that history 
reveals not a struggle of man for freedom, but a struggle to avoid 
it! This is a clever volte-face; not a usual interpretation of
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history. But it is not wholly true. We are intending always to be 
free; over the last few hundred years anyway. Whether we are or not 
is another matter.
On the other hand, it does seem that innumerable people do 
depend upon, or are looking for, some form of external authority, 
leader, oracle, god-figure, saviour, prophet, religion, or ideology; 
and to the degree that they are dependent psychologically upon any of 
these, and other similar preps, they are unfree, and desire 
unfreedom. And must retain so. Perhaps at first there is a struggle 
not to be free - as witnessed in the opposition to the ideas of 
Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud - but freedom eventually seems to 
triumph; at least, so far.
4) We continue new with an appraisement of Macmurray's ideas of 
what Freedom is, or of how it manifests itself.
As already hinted, it is a pity Macmurray does not "get it 
together" more. To have to try and understand bits and pieces in a 
piecemeal fashion, and make some total coherence of it is quite a 
task. Be this as it may, I feel that Macmurray is on the right 
track. What other writer or thinker has given such valuable 
attention to freedom in the way Macmurray has? Nobody that I knew 
of. Some religious writers, with an axe to grind, are perhaps saying 
the same sort of thing but Macmurray, religious as he might be 
basically, discusses freedom in contemporary and secular terms. We 
all talk of freedom, from the heads of state to the humblest office- 
boy, but apart from political freedom - which is only a very small 
part of it, important as that may be - nobody discusses freedom, 
tries to understand, nor attempt to enlarge it. On the contrary. 
Everybody thinks, wrongly, that they have got it! All except
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Macmurray.
Macmurray's idea of freedom and its relation to reality is 
important. Science, as he suggests, proves it. Only as we rightly 
know what we have to contend with, external to ourselves, can we act 
propitiously, and thus be free. If we do not know reality there must 
be a great deal of hit and miss about our responses and behaviour.
The external and the internal grew together i.e. at the same 
time and out of the same experiences. As we come to know reality so 
we become more real inside, and thus more free. To this whole set-up 
I have always given the name - although Macmurray never mentions or 
suggests it - maturity. But maturity, as we shall try to understand 
it in this context, has not a great deal to do with maturity, and the 
mature person, as we commonly understand it in our society today.
Today's mature person is one who has swallowed and embodied all 
of the contemporary main-stream values. He is self-sufficient, 
materialistic, has a family intending to go to university or some 
other prestiged and advantaged training, professes to care far others 
but really doesn't care a darrm, holds responsible positions 
irrespective of any moral considerations these positions ought to 
raise and be concerned with; is an IQist, and actively promotes the 
interests of himself and the various limited groups with which he is 
associated, totally oblivious to the interests of other persons and 
groups, or of the interests of the community as a whole. In other 
words; absolutely different from Macmurray's idea of a real and free 
per sen!
Maturity, as I would have it understood, means and entails a 
great deal of objectivity in thought and consequent actions; much
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less subjectivity, whether of self or groups; belief in, and the 
practice of, emotional and relational growth - not the static, self- 
complacent , negative, self-indulgent belief that we are what we are, 
and that we feel what we do, and nothing will or could change it. 
Maturity, too, requires social interest, cne-mandan, caring - a sense 
of - and a strong belief and intention that men, all men are personal 
beings, and that we can live satisfactorily only if we promote this 
end.
If, as I believe, Maanurray meant all these and other similar 
things by his concept of reality, and its importance for freedom, 
then I think he would be better understood if at least the inner, the 
subjective, the felt, side of reality was called maturity, instead of 
calling it "being real". But then, if he called it maturity it would 
inevitably be misunderstood! Incidentally, after all his writing and 
chapters on reality and being real, his description of a "real" 
person (FMW 256/7, and to some extent subsequently - to page 166) 
seems nothing short of ludicrous! Surely our knowledge of whether a 
person is real or not comes from an acquaintance with his 
personality, mind, attitudes, and values. In other words, we must 
have some knowledge of him from his speech and actions. But 
Macmurray, for some reason I have never been able to fathom, seems to 
think that you can go into a room of people and, by just looking, 
pick out the real ones!
This is surely nonsense - the nonsense of mysticism and 
intuition, which frcm evidence elsewhere you would have thought 
Macmurray utterly despised and rejected. Even if some people do have 
a noticeable aura of calmness and appeal, which sets them apart in a 
crowd, from experience we knew that usually their minds are trivial,
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their attitudes trite, their character thoroughly selfish and self- 
promoting, their morals non-existent, and eager only to exploit their 
own attractiveness.
Perhaps you might assume that Macmurray was unconsciously 
projecting his own type of personality and ability to stand out in a 
crowd by some essence or emanation. Far from it. When I met him in 
1971, I was surprised - after reading his works and the person that 
comes through - to find him relatively insignificant and generally 
lacking in any special attraction or charisma. So perhaps if it was 
not projection which made him have this unreal idea of the perceiving 
of real persons, it was an unconscious wish or compensation factor. 
Whatever it was, it certainly produced a strange, inconsistent, and 
unfortunate anomaly.
Regarding other points as to what freedom is; there is much 
truth in the idea of freedom depending upon our needs and desires. 
Aldous Huxley's ideal - at least in one period of his life, circa 
1946 - was the "non-attached" man. This followed and exemplified, of 
course, in a modem context the religious ideas of many before him, 
as Huxley himself acknowledged - both in title and content - in his 
work "The Perennial Philosophy". Much of Eastern philosophy 
especially Buddhism, so advocated by Schopenhauer in recent times 
(advocated but not practised!), believes that a satisfactory human 
state can be reached only by a reduction, or even an obliteration, of 
desires and wants.
Thus we have, presumably, the paradox of a man in prison - with, 
needless to say, the right attitude - being the freest man on earth; 
or as free as a man outside who is enslaved by his desires. But if
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carried to extremes this approach to freedom entails a complete 
withdrawal from life. Where then would come the real freedom, as 
advocated by Macmurray, found only in the "personal", and in 
friendship and comnunity? So whilst recognising that we can enlarge 
our freedom by reducing wants, Macmurray - it would seen - cannot 
believe in going the whole way, for this would banish freedom, and 
the possibility of it, altogether; or at least the freedom Macmurray 
so earnestly advocates.
5) Is friendship, which includes fellowship and is extended to 
community, the area and condition of human life where we do, or can, 
achieve freedom? Freedom, by the way, is far Macmurray more 
important, satisfactory, and worthy of humanity, than happiness. "We 
recognise this when we honour those who have been ready to sacrifice 
happiness, and even life itself, for freedom's sake." (CF 16).
Being quite gregarious myself - if not fanatical about it - I am 
inclined, from my own life and experience, to regard this as true.
All permanent, or even tendencies to, withdrawal I regard as rather 
pathological. The saints i.e. those that did, I find strangely odd 
and not to be admired. Melancholics and isolates in mental hospitals 
cannot be regarded as enviable nor the sanest amongst us. People who 
choose to live alone seem to be missing out to me however happy and 
contented they may profess to be. The classical example is George 
Gissing in his semi-autobiographical "The Private Papers of Henry 
Ryecroft". It is not possible for me to believe that his solitary 
early retirement to an isolated cottage in Devon was as blissful and 
idyllic as he depicted.
Contrary to many people's views and feelings, during and after 
marriage, real, developed, mature, relationships do provide the
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condition where we are, or can be, ourselves; the condition where we 
are most self-realised, and therefore where we are most free, (FMW 
211/219).
And so in the wider world. The more people develop mutuality 
and fellowship, and reduce fear between themselves, so will freedom 
be enlarged. We are unfree in ourselves to the degree that mistrust, 
doubt, fear, jealousy, and suspicion pervade our relationships with 
others. Thus it would seem that friendship, fellowship, and 
community do provide the essential condition for freedom; and if, as 
countless people would say today, that this is pie-in-the-sky and 
idealistic nonsense, then recall what Macmurray says. "Any theory is 
ideal, and provides a standard which can never be realized in its 
application. One does not say that because perfect justice cannot be 
realized on earth, we should not aim at justice. We do not scorn the 
theory of the steam-engine because a perfect steam-engine cannot be 
built." (CF 92/3). Why then decry community, in all its aspects, 
because we so obviously cannot have perfect community?
To accept this is vital. Countless people, following the values 
and attitudes of our society, with its very rigid, built-in, idea 
that human nature is immutable, are only too keen to defend their own 
selfishness and lack of desire for moral effort, on these grounds, 
and pour scorn on everybody who suggests otherwise. It seems to me 
that Macmurray has provided a useful illustrative clue to the 
combating of this attitude which is met time and time again.
End of Appraisement (2)
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Have We Freedom New - Or; To How Far Have We It?
This is one matter cxxiceming freedom to which Macmurray gives a 
straightforward and easily discernible answer. We have freed the 
intellect and kept the emotions in chains. (FMW 48). Our thinking 
is free but our feelings are unfree.
To free thinking meant, and means, that we allow our minds to 
find reality by seeking and finding What Is, and not submitting to 
ideas imposed upon than from outside by authority or tradition. The 
prime exemplification of the freedom of thought is to be found in 
scientific knowledge; knowledge which we have obtained by thought 
being free. And individually, to sane extent, each person thinks for 
himself today and, in a democratic society, is allowed to think for 
himself. It is not enough to say that throughout human existence men 
have always been able to think for themselves because thought is 
private and hidden. This natural fact does not mean that most 
private thinking in the past, nor even most today, has been and is 
free.
Hew different with our feelings, contends Macmurray. And, not 
merely our feelings but our values, for "value is emotionally 
apprehended" (FMW 50). Even when we get our values secondhand e.g. 
from our parents, teachers, or Christ, and thus would seem to be 
acquired by thought, they originated, in the first discemers of 
them, in feeling and emotion, not in intelligence.
To become free, our emotions must be able to find and fulfil the 
same conditions as have our thoughts, namely, relate to what is 
outside of ourselves and not to be determined by authority or 
tradition. Writing as I am about Macmurray as he interpreted life in
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the 1930 s, I will not at this point question how far emotions and 
values have been since freed, as witnessed in the "Swinging Sixties" 
and the coming of the Permissive Society. Sufficient to remind 
ourselves of an earlier point in this exposition that the first 
requirement of real freedom, and its discovery and effecting, is 
self-discipline, as evidenced by the severe discipline necessary to 
produce science, far more discipline than is required to follow and 
effect traditional ideas.
Only as our feelings come to relate to real situations, and we 
cease to respond conventionally and rigidly in our relationships and 
evaluations, will we begin to get anywhere, either collectively or 
individually. Incidentally; our unfreedom of feelings and our 
freedom of thought have produced what Macmurray calls the Modem 
Dilemma. Through freedom of thought we have acquired inmense
knowledge and pcwer. But in our unfreedom of feeling, and consequent
ignorance of real values - or the absence of our discovery of than -
we do not know how to use the power we have. "We do not even know
what we want to do with it." (FMW 48).
So the answer to the question - Have we freedom now? - seems to 
have been answered quite directly by Macmurray. In fact, it is an 
important part of his total contention. We do have freedom of 
thought, but have yet to free our emotional life, to achieve which, 
he says, we need a third revolt. We have already had two - one at 
the Renaissance and the other the Romantic Movement (FMW 83/92).
"Our civilisation is heavily balanced in favour of the intellect 
against the emotions." Try as we may, the effort to do which has not 
been very conscious, we do not seem able to throw-off I.Qism.
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Why Are We Not Emotionally Free?
Once again, Maanurray never gets this totally together. In one 
chapter, or section of a book, he never systematically, and more or 
less exhaustively, applies himself exclusively to this question.
But, if we search, as I have done, through his writings with this 
question in mind, I think we may say that Macmurray gives, or would 
give, four main reasons why we have not yet got, or achieved, 
emotional freedom. They are:-
1) The undue influence of Rome - ancient Rome - upon us, with 
its philosophy of Stoicism.
2) Our insatiable demands in relation to our inmense power to 
fulfil them.
3) Fear.
4) Other people's unreality.
1) The first of these Maanurray is explicit about, and does 
develop at some length. (BMW 74/83).
In common with the usual analysis of our cultural origins, 
Maanurray recognises the three strands of Hebrew, Greek, and Roman 
influences. But, he says, these streams have never really fused 
together. Rome predominates. And this means prior concern for 
efficient organisation, governmental predominance together with law 
and management, and the maintenance of property rights.
Like the Romans, we do occasionally turn to the Greeks (art) and 
to Christianity (religion). But these are only of secondary 
consideration, and treated with a certain condescension - especially 
when they might come in useful 1 We regard the artist as rather odd, 
and the saint as a bit of a nuisance or a "mollycoddle" (FMW 76).
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Our ideal is social efficiency.
But the most important aspect of this Roman predominance is to 
be found in our moral tradition and outlook. Following Rome we have 
a morality of organisation, order, obedience, social reference, and 
an emphasis on Will. To live by will means behaving in a fixed way, 
according to a pre-conceived plan; of being something determined, 
whatever we feel. It is wrapped-up in policy. It may entail willing 
unpleasant, or even brutal, acts to achieve the fixed end. It means 
controlling and restricting the emotions. Duty is a strong element 
in the Roman type of morality and philosophy. . Roman. morality stands . 
by principles. Under this system desires, emotions, and impulses are 
a nuisance.
New to fulfil this morality of Rome, it is necessary to have a 
public, universally recognised, plan - and this was soon provided by 
the Catholic Church. It prescribed hew one should behave, and all 
"willed" to behave thus - short-falling often, of course, to be then 
plagued by a sense of sin and guilt.
Accepting this analysis by Maanurray, it is simple to see why 
the Christianity we all profess to believe in and follow is not the 
Christianity and morality of Christ, Not the religion of freedom and 
love, but one of unfreedom, enslavement (if only emotionally), and of 
the subordination of the feelings, and the subjection to authority 
and obedience; in other words, a religion of duty and will.
Looking at the extreme forms of Puritanism and Victorianism one 
can realise how true this analysis is. Over Christian morality we 
have all been deceived1
On pp 79/81 of FMW, Macmurray shows hew, through St. Paul, 
Stoicism became the official philosophy and morality of the Romans,
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and subsequently our cwn morality and pervading social philosophy. 
Thus did the rational tradition, as Maanurray calls it, prevail over 
our emotional life, thus ensuring the unfreedcm of our feeling life. 
"The Roman i.e. Stoic insists on the distinction between reason and 
emotions. Its ideal makes reason dominant and emotion subservient, 
or even itself the source of all evil .... For this ideal of life 
emotion is the real enemy." (FMW 82).
But the disaster of this is shewn later on the same page. "... 
emotion is the creative force in human experience, the only source of 
living growth, progress, and development. Reason can organise what 
is given ... but it is only emotion which can provide the impetus." 
(FMW 82).
At this point Maanurray, although giving a complete clue, does 
not seem to develop sufficiently what he would wish to say, and which 
obviously (from reading elsewhere in the same bock) is the essence of 
his thought. Namely; emotion is not only the supplier of energy; it 
is the supplier - which reason can never be - of quality, i.e. 
values. As R.R. Maret said, and with which I am sure Maanurray would 
agree, "All true progress is progress in charity" i.e. fellowship and 
love.
So; the Roman ideal and Stoicism so germinal, if only 
unconsciously so, to our tradition and the culture we have developed, 
is the main source of our present emotional unfreedom.
2) The second source of our unfreedom is our insatiable 
appetite, which has out-paced our immense power to provide. This 
"gap" of unfreedcm was discussed earlier here together with the 
relevant Maanurray quotes and references. As far back as Plato's
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"Republic" - Macmurray observes - it was pointed out that "although 
animal desires can be easily satisfied, desire in man is insatiable" 
(CF 22). And again, "The very spectacle of increased resources (as 
in the modem age - VE) breeds a corresponding proliferation of 
desires ... and this demanded increase is rooted in the creativeness 
of the imagination" (CF 22). If our power trebles yet our desires 
quadruple we are, according to Macmurray, that much less free.
3) Our third source of unfreedcm is fear. This, too, was 
discussed earlier, and Maanurray's references given. Fear inhibits 
both ourselves and our relationships with others. To meet these, 
mostly by unjustified or "unreal" fears, we either withdraw into 
ourselves - erecting actual or psychological walls for defence - or, 
we aggressively acquire various forms of power from bullying to 
money, position, and status, in order, never successfully - success, 
at least in the long term, is inpossible - to pretend we are 
conquering, beating dawn, ar mastering our fears; or those who we, 
mistakenly mostly, think are the source of those fears. Anybody, any 
society, can never be free whilst living under, often of its own 
making, imagining, or evocation, the shadow of fear.
4) Real and free as we may become in ourselves, we cannot be 
free whilst other people remain unfree or unreal. We are all in this 
together. To give a simple example. How often are we forced to be 
unfree with certain persons we meet because we know that we dare not 
bring-up a particular subject or tell a particular joke? Wider 
still, in the area of politics, how many people, by their attitudes, 
use of money and position, and lack of empathy - all classifiable as 
"unreal" or immature - are causing others to be and remain unfree? 
"Far even a real person cannot be free in the face of an unreal
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person.” (FMW 173).
So these are the main reasons why people are unfree.
Hew Then Shall We Become Free?
"The primary condition of freedom lies in the character and 
quality of human relations." (CF 31).
Two factors are involved in this - the means; and the intention. 
(See FMW 49).
. One main thing provides the means - the political aspect, of . 
society. Cooperatively we together provide the physical means i.e. 
economic and the non-physical means i.e. institutional and political, 
embodied in the concept of, and the implementation of, justice.
The intentional aspect springs from religion. Hie function of 
religion is to intend and create fellowship and cofnnunity. Politics 
may create order but it can never create fellowship - and only, as 
has been demonstrated, in the fellowship of all men, world-wide, can, 
ultimately, freedom be found, practised, lived, and sustained.
Briefly, Macmurray (CF 91) analyses the three major religions, 
and the role they may seem to be able to play in this prime task of 
religion. But both Buddhism and Islam are motivated by fear, and 
consequently manifest the features we would expect where fear is 
present. (See earlier section of this chapter). Buddhism is a 
religion of withdrawal. Islam is a religion of assertion, power, 
aggression, and compulsion. Only Christianity is positively 
motivated. It seeks a universal fellowship realised in the actual 
condition of human life, a brotherhood of mankind, a kingdom of 
heaven on earth (CF 91).
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Christianity, it would seem, is and has been the fount of 
freedom, and the means by which this freedom can be achieved. And 
presumably, at least for Macmurray, is the only way.
Much more exposition could be developed in relation to the role 
politics and religion respectively are playing, or should be playing, 
in relation to freedom. But I will leave that far the present as I 
shall deal with the role of each, in relation to economic, social, 
and political matters, later in this thesis - or a subsequent onel
Appraisement (3)
1) In general I think this analysis is true. People are unreal 
and unfree in their feelings and evaluations. And, compared with the 
distance there is to go, I do not think we have come all that far 
since Macmurray was telling us about this - in the 1930s. Countless 
people you meet and talk with are unfree. And this is where an area 
of human psychology and perception needs more elaboration or, better 
still, deep study and penetration. Perhaps for the purposes of 
presentation - although he never makes this qualification or proviso 
so maybe he is not aware of it - Maanurray seems to have rather a 
black and white idea of thought and emotion. (For a deeper analysis 
of this, see my book "Practical Philosophy" 1982 - which may be 
useful). But to my way of thinking, an idea or conception always has 
three facets and all are co-existing in one thought, howbeit in very 
different proportions in different thoughts.
Even a bold, seeming "thought-filled" thought, such as 
2 x 2  = 4, has some emotional content and evaluative aspect - and 
even these may vary according to the circumstances in which the
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conception is used by different people at different times. On the 
other hand a political thought is far from being a pure thought as 
Macmurray would seem to see it to be. It is full of emotion and 
valuation, and has a quite low "thought", or ideation, intellection, 
objective, or factual - call it what you will - content.
2) To turn to another point. Macmurray several times suggests 
that it is within the emotional aspect of mind that values lie or are
generated, and not in the thought i.e. intellection, aspect. I
believe this to be a wholly, descriptive fact i.e. true I But nowhere 
does Macmurray demonstrate this, nor even make the attempt. As 
values, and not merely emotions, are highly involved with attitudes 
and actions of every kind - especially to that of freedom, in our 
present concern and context - he might have performed a useful and 
propitious service by showing how values emerge from emotions.
Incidentally; this is a general and public comment. I do not need to
be told. To know this is my profession and competence. But not 
everybody knows how values arise in emotion. They need to be shown.
3) I hope and believe, although I cannot always and exactly see 
how it works out in practice, that Macmurray's idea of freeing the 
emotions produces results parallel to that of freeing thought. We 
know how science "gropes" in freedom for truth, which is ultimately 
found, because the things it is seeking are "in fact" out there.
But is there, as seems to be implied if never stated in 
Macmurray1s exposition of this idea, something "out there" of a 
parallel kind to which our emotions and values can discover and 
relate? There perhaps would be if values are absolute and eternal. 
And perhaps Macmurray believes this, although he never says so. But
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his idea of "groping" in freedom for emotional and axiological truth 
seems to suggest vaguely that he does not. On the contrary, it would 
appear that values and right emotion - objects are, as it were, 
created as life, in man, moves forward into reality and freedom.
As I say; I am not sure about this contention of Macmurray1 s. I 
think that my life - following Maanurray's influence - has proved it; 
but hew can I knew that, in fact, I am not really living in terms of 
values, rationalised and objectified maybe, instilled into me as a 
boy? And not by values I have personally discovered through the 
freeing of my emotions?
However there is no doubt that our civilisation is highly biased 
in favour of intellectualism. And presumably it must be; far all the 
time we are primarily concerned with promoting the world "out there"
- science, technology, thingdom, economics, materialism, I.Quism - 
and always at the expense of "humanity", we must, per se, be putting 
the intellect before the emotions. All our supposed questioning of 
values, "caring" services, and welfare provision are but a shallow 
pretence and sham.
But in responding to this situation Maanurray seems, in the same 
book, to advocate opposing solutions! On page 44 of FMW he says "If 
we leave the decision of what is worth while as a use far science to 
chance (i.e. go on as we are. VE) then inevitably chance will decide 
against us. There are laws of the world of values". This, on the 
face of it - although we get the point - is all very unsatisfactory.
If there is such a thing as chance, which is doubtful in this 
context, how could it decide against us?
But to turn to his second contention, which contradicts the 
above. On page 61 of FMW he says "So I say let us be quiet and wait.
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To those who want to reply 'But if we don't hurry and get things 
settled; if we do nothing, we shall be lost', I say, 'Be quiet, be 
still - the world is not resting on our shoulders. If it were, 
heaven help us'".
It seems that Maanurray is unaware of this contradiction; that 
is, if we have traced his thinking correctly and interpreted it 
rightly on this particular point.
4) Why are we not emotionally free? You will remember 
Macmurray suggests four reasons for this.
Probably he is right about the influence of Rome and Stoicism. 
Our strongest influences have been from Gaul, the Normans, the Roman 
Church - and presumably all these were anchored in Stoic thought and 
action.
From my knowledge, at least concerning the distortion of 
Christianity as a result of Stoicism, and of our lack of emotional 
freedom, it does seem quite an original conception. And, as with so 
much of Macmurray's thinking, it puzzles me why he has passed so 
unnoticed, let alone unheeded.
On the point of influence for our freedom; besides Christianity 
he might have mentioned Anglo-Saxon influences e.g. the witan and the 
like. But my detailed knowledge of ancient history does not extend 
to awareness of how far institutions, like the witan, were at one 
time influenced by early Christian thinking. Or did they have 
another source? If so, this would have to be another important 
source to add to Macmurray' s suggestions concerning the origin of the 
idea of freedom.
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5) Regarding his contention that the area of freedom is reduced 
if our increased demands are matched only by a smaller increase of 
provision and production - I am not sure about this. Logically it 
would seem to be irrefutable. But beyond a certain point i.e. 
provided a good amount of basic needs, and above, are fulfilled and 
satisfied, I do not feel that my freedom is lessened when extravagant 
wants are not fulfilled. A factor which comes in, yet is unmentioned 
by Macmurray, is the strength of that imagined desire. If it swamps
us with its supposed urgency, then it will truncate our freedom. But
a number of vague, unsatisfied,, wants - not, I stress again, of a
basic-to-life type - does not seem to really reduce our freedom. In
full rational moments we can often observe that if a desire were 
fulfilled it would not bring the satisfaction we, in a different and 
unreflecting moment, imagined.
6) Fear, as another limiter of freedom, is very real. People, 
in a variety of ways, are much more fear-ridden than we would 
normally observe and believe. There is, I would assess, much more 
fear in the world than unfear. And to the degree we have fear, in 
any of its multiple manifestations - and these are indeed numerous - 
which is unjustified by rational assessment, then to that degree we 
are unfree. Fear is a major source of our unfreedcm.
7) And Maanurray's diagnosis that the unreality of other people 
is a source of our unfreedcm, is indeed true. To my way of thinking 
it hardly needs confirming. That it is not recognised, talked about, 
understood, and responded to by people in high and influential 
places, let alone by those in more pedestrian walks of life, has 
always totally bewildered me; at least, ever since I found Macmurray.
I was brought up under entirely normal conditions. Parents,
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teachers, church people, child and youth organisations, working 
colleagues, and friends all had average and contemporary responses 
and ideas. None of them were offensive, ill-willed, anti-social, or 
anything else outside of the variations one would normally expect, 
and which are generally agreed to be acceptable.
Yet; if only I had been brought up and surrounded by Macmurray1 s 
"free" people 1 How different, and better, life would have been! Hie 
tragedy is that - as everywhere manifested - although some of us now 
knew the importance of educating the emotions, and the value of the 
relational side of life, nothing is done about it. Nobody even 
really talks and writes about it, let alone publicly implement it on 
an adequate scale, or even begin to. Certainly, as Maanurray said, 
our civilisation is much too weighted in favour of the intellect, at 
the expense of emotions and values.
Other people's unreality is a source of my and your unfreedcm. 
And we are a source of theirs 1 - although, as followers of Maanurray, 
not too great a source I hope and believe!
8) We now appraise Macmurray's idea on: Hew we can become
free. This is achieved, he seems ultimately to be saying, through 
Christianity. In principle, I think this contention is true. But 
with thousands of ideas of Christianity around, to understand and 
implement this contention is an impossible task - at least within the 
contemporary condition of human thinking, and ability to deal with 
thought and emotion - which is still exceptionally elementary, to say 
the least!
Basically - getting rid of, or forgetting for a moment, all the 
theology, spirituality, type of world-arientaticn which existed at
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its inception, religiosity, and all the other clutter - Christianity 
introduced a new order of human relationships. This does not mean to 
say that there were no signs of this before. And it certainly does 
not mean that the new order has predominated since. Far from it I
But it does mean that man knows of a new orientation, the only 
orientation which will "save" him i.e. 1) permit the species to 
survive; and 2) enable man to continue as the agent of this new order 
of living, or of "going on" to yet further developments and orders. 
The essence of this new order, introduced by Christianity, is 
friendship, fellowship, fraternity, and conmunity. Only as we 
achieve these, shall we be what we are able to become, and only thus 
be, free.
So here is the paradox. Only as we change from excessive 
"intellectualism" to more emotionally-based values and attitudes, can 
we be free; but we cannot change, or find it excessively difficult to 
do so - both collectively and individually - because only the new 
unnourished and unrecognised emotional side of life can motivate us 
to do it, and to show us hew.
End of Appraisement (3)
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Conclusion
Freedom is for Macmurray a big thing; and so it ought to be for 
us all. The idea is familiar to every mind, to the degree that it 
has become cotimonplace, pedestrian, hackneyed, and very much taken 
for granted.
But; whilst external, public, political freedom - call it what 
you will - needs to be defended and enlarged, inner, personal, 
psychological, emotional, internal freedom -- call this what you will 
- hardly exists. Everybody is "tied-up", and is tying everybody else 
up. Few people know what this type of internal and personal freedom 
is like. Macmurray, almost alone, has investigated, opened-up, tried 
to stimulate and arouse interest in, and enlarge, this area of 
freedom.
In the face of the general, prevailing, philosophy, few if any 
have heeded him. But political, organisational, social, economic 
freedom can never bring each of us to full freedom. Only a far 
greater concern for the personal, relational, religious, aspects of 
freedom can achieve this.
So, I believe, says Macmurray.
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Relevant Quotations
Religion is what a man makes of his personal relationships. 
(RE 211. 225).
The primary religious assertion is that all men are equal, 
and that fellowship is the only relation between persons 
which is fully rational, or fully appropriate to their 
nature as persons. In this assertion the whole nature of 
religion is bound up. (RE 205/6).
The religion of any society is properly the expression of 
the forms of personal relationship which constitute it, of 
the interpersonal values which determine its structure. (RE 
211).
The field of personal relationships is the centre of every 
human life. (RE 225/6).
The civilising of the emotions is the business .... of 
religion. (RE 190).
Religion (is) the expression of rationality in the field of 
personal relationships. (RE 211).
The salvation of the world is the task of religion. (SRE 
14).
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The focus of religious valuation concerns the mutual 
relationship of human beings and the sharing of a oonmon 
experience between them. (SRE 13).
Religion is simply the universalization in reflection of 
the central factor in human experience, (i.e. the common 
facts of everyday relationships). (SRE 54).
Religion is merely the description of facts which are so 
caimon and universal in our daily experience that we hardly 
notice them. (SRE 53/4).
Religion is that mode of reflection which relates to the 
problematic of personal experience. (RAS 62).
Religion is always something that we do. (i.e. act).
(SRE 73).
The reality of life lies in community and any religious 
statement about human life is a statement about human 
comnunity. (CH 63).
The religious claim - that reality is personal. (RE 213).
Hie goal of religion is the creation of a human society, 
universal in its extent, based upon the communion of 
persons. (RE 229).
Conquest of fear - the eternal task of religion. (CS 102).
Since there is nothing in the whole range of our experience 
which cannot or which may not be seen and valued in its 
bearings upon our relations with one another, there is 
nothing at all which does not, directly or indirectly, 
belong to the field of religion. (SRE 45).
Religion is firmly rooted in our common experience. It 
arises from our ordinary experience of living in the world 
in relation with other people and to that experience it 
refers. (SRE 108/9).
The only way to reject religion, is to reject, deny, or 
ignore, our relations to one another. (SRE 109).
Whilst wide-ranging these quotations clearly indicate the trend 
of Maanurray's thought on religion. As stated in the Introduction, 
religion pervades the whole of Macmurray's thinking. It is important 
therefore that we understand what religion is far him.
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What Religion Is
Put in one short phrase religion for Maanurray is human 
relating. At its minimal level this means that we find ourselves 
here together, and have to get on together to some extent for our own 
survival. But, of course, human relating, and consequently religion, 
can and does entail very much mare than this. It includes comnunity, 
friendship, fellowship, and cannunicn between ourselves at family and 
personal level right up to, at the mcment, the ideal of total world 
harmony, integration, and community, plus all the possible stages and 
levels inbetween. Religion exists to unite mankind into one family.
To avoid misunderstanding this at the start it must be said that 
Maanurray distinguishes two ways of recognizing the attainment of 
this end. It can, ostensibly, be reached politically. In fact, this 
is the only way men today visualise it being attained. Voluntary 
world fellowship is not seen as a practical possibility. Already, 
and for some considerable time, there have been economic networks, 
links, and ties, extending far beyond any political or religious 
units or boundaries. This is but a forerunner and indicator of the 
possibility of world union by formal means, not by religious ones.
And several ways are envisaged as to how world unity can be achieved 
politically. One power, by conquest, infiltration, or both could 
dominate and rule the Earth; there could be a total federation, 
voluntarily reached, of states, with one acceptable and recognized 
controlling agency. The United Nations was this in embryo. Or 
states, voluntarily surrendering or amalgamating their sovereignty, 
could gradually form into one world unitary state. Such a political 
unification might come, or be prompted by, some huge catastrophic
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threat from within or without.
But, and here is Maanurray's point, this would not be the final 
and finest achievement of human comnunity, relationships, and the 
apotheosis of religion. For such a unity would be merely structural, 
mechanical, and inpersonal. There are two forms of unity; 
cooperation and comnunity. (CC 33/4). Mainly we cooperate because, 
and only because, we have to in order to survive. We commune, or 
create and enjoy comnunity, voluntarily and because this is the very 
essence of being human. It is only the second which Macmurray 
affirms as being religious. This is not to say that they cannot be 
related. The family is a prime example of this. Relationships in a 
family are enjoyed supremely for their own sake. But family 
cooperation exists for less joyful but equally necessary ends.
Another example is a people in wartime. Political cooperation and 
comnunications may break down but a sense of comnunity keeps the 
people together. One has only to think of France 1940-1945 to get 
this point.
Maanurray fully recognizes the paradoxical situation we, as 
human beings, are in. As human beings we are from inception b o m  
into a nexus of relationships, into the Personal if you like, the 
best and ultimate form of which manifests itself in fellowship. This 
fact of being so b o m  is the area of religion. Yet, and here is the 
other side of the paradox, at any particular time, whether in our 
individual lives or in society at large, or more widely, in history, 
we have not achieved the full end and religious possibility of this 
fellowship. We can only, perhaps, and then only if we so intend, be 
moving towards it. To be however in this situation is the essence,
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and the inevitable accompaniment, of two important features of being 
human; our possession of freedom; and our possession of reason. But 
more of these as we go along.
Maanurray's idea of religion may, on first acquaintance, seem a 
very limited, even unusual, view. Where are some of the common 
features we have come invariably and importantly to associate with 
religion? Such conceptions as God, worship, prayer, belief, creeds, 
salvation, redemption, the Church, sectarianism, and a theory of the 
ultimate? Why is he not more open and honest, and realistic, and 
call his views mere, human, or interpersonal relations, social 
psychology, a form of natural sociology, or human ecology? Or why 
not see them as a branch of, or kind of, morality? Why call this 
area of life, important as it is, religion? Or perhaps its 
importance is a reason for so-calling it! We shall later see that 
within the basic framework of religion as human relating Macmurray 
does have a place for at least some of the normal concepts and 
activities associated with religion, but they are all subservient and 
subsidiary to this main idea. Hew then does he justify his 
conception?
He hardly does justify it. And certainly not in any extended 
arguments of substantiation. But he does strongly hint at an answer, 
in the following manner. What are some of the most basic tenets and 
acts of religion, especially of the Christian religion? Fellowship, 
sin, guilt, remorse, reconciliation, and forgiveness. Are these not 
the very same essential features of good human relationships? When 
we quarrel, or experience or even create antagonism, strife, and 
discord, is not harmony restored only by a change of heart, a 
recognition by one or both parties, of error and hurt, a certain
- 73 -
resultant humility, and subsequent forgiveness? And is not this 
exactly what conventional religion bids us do? So it is by this 
overlapping and coincidence of these ideas that Macmurray comes to 
see religion as the area of human relating, the area of the Personal, 
No other explanation or hint is given as to why there is this 
identity. But perhaps this identification is more important than at 
first appears. For, as mentioned in the Introduction, does not this 
create, in hcwever and tenuous a fashion, a bridge by which the anti­
religionists may find an acceptable way back to religion, and the 
warmth of human fellowship and belongingness? Does it not prove that 
we are, and must be, by nature religious? If he has not made us 
religious again, Macmurray has shewn us the way to so be.
If religion is the ambience within which we do and must 
inevitably live why is this so? Why does religion exist, or have to 
exist, at all? How does the need for religion arise? Why is it the 
very essence, the essential fact, the sine qua non, of human 
existence? Macmurray gives four reasons.
1) Firstly; because of our interdependence (SRE 107/8). Nobody 
in the world, try as they may, can live unto themselves. "It is a 
simple comnanplace that the lives of human beings are interdependent. 
Other people bring us into the world and other people bury us when we 
die, and all our life through we are dependent in a thousand ways 
upon other people. That is the simple fact; and it means that the 
structure of human experience, dependent as it is for its very 
existence upon the mutual relations of persons, is religious in its 
texture. It is this primary fact about us that gives rise to 
religion, and since this is a universal fact about human life,
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belonging to its very nature, it follows that religion is an 
inseparable component of human life and always must be." (SRE 45/6). 
The only way for religion, as understood by Macmurray, not to exist 
would if we were "all hatched out by the sun on desert islands and 
lived and died without knowing that there was anybody else in the 
world but our solitary selves." (SRE 46). We are all, whether we 
recognize it or not, whether we like it or not, members one of 
another. And only as we live thus can we be truly human. And the 
reverse obtains. "A person who has no religion, or a society which 
has repudiated religion, has merely forgotten that humanity exists 
only in the relation of human beings to one another." (SRE 46). Our 
interdependence compels us to be religious.
2) Secondly; we are religious because we have reason. (CS 
36/48). Reason for Macmurray is not merely the power and process of 
cogitation laced with logic; nor is it a certain type, or way of 
acquiring, knowledge. It is all these things, but principally it is 
what we would call awareness or self-consciousness." In man, the 
continuity of nature is broken through the emergence of a new 
capacity in consciousness. In animal life there is consciousness; 
but it is a consciousness in the world, not consciousness of the 
world. The new capacity in human beings sets them over against the 
world, knowing it, and knowing it with foresight." (CS 36/7).
Because of his reason man knows he is alive, and because of this 
awareness he knows he must die. Thus this knowledge brings fear of 
death, and all that this means and includes. Isolation, separation, 
the end of life and not merely of physical life but "the whole 
delicate nexus of possessions and interests and values with which the
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individual has identified himself." (CS 40/1). Unless this 
consciousness of death were met and overcome, human life would be 
paralysed and we would sink back into the sub-rational world of 
animal existence. In this situation of awareness our greatest fear, 
according to Macmurray, is of our fellows. They can harm us, kill 
us, shun us, exclude us, and not cooperate to sustain us. Thus 
religion, as understood and propounded by Macmurray, is the means by 
which we seek to live harmoniously with our fellows so that we can 
survive as long as possible. And is not this fear and its attempted 
alleviation part of conventional religion? Religions are concerned 
at one end of the scale with ancestor worship i.e. with prolonging 
the "life" and influence of those gene before; and at the other with 
eternal life and with some form of resurrection or after-life.
Reason indeed, on this broad definition of it, is certainly one of 
the roots of religion, and to discern this has been a genuine insight 
of Macmurray's as to why we have to have religion, and are religious 
at all.
3) Thirdly; this is closely related yet not identical to the 
last. Man is a spiritual being. Now here again, as with religion, 
Macmurray astutely suggests a meaning of spiritual which is very 
worldly and natural, and therefore acceptable to the most extreme 
cynic or sceptic. Very explicitly he says, "The spiritual world to 
which, by our transcendence of the natural order, we belong is not 
another world, but the natural world known and intended. We live in 
the natural world in good truth; but we know it and know that we are 
living in it. Because of this knowledge our actions, so far as they 
are human, are intentional; and our intentions, directed upon the 
natural world that our knowledge reveals, transforms it and all that
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it contains. It is no longer a world of fact, but a world of 
possibility; no longer an existing present, but a world with a 
future. So we have our being in a spiritual world which is the 
natural world of existence raised to a higher power by our capacity 
for reflection and the intentionality which reflection confers upon 
our activities. It is this world which is the real world; not the 
world of fact but the world of significance; the world of fact become 
possibility; become existence with a meaning, a future, and a 
destiny. For a fact known is no longer a fact. It is a possibility 
Of transformation.n (SRE 107).
Always we should be intending to enlarge and "increase the scope 
and the complexity of human cooperation by creating, sustaining, and 
expressing men’s union in a spiritual family or a spiritual 
brotherhood. It should be noticed that the term spiritual here means 
merely not related by blood. It does not mean not material." (SRE 
62/3). So here again, yet with a completely new interpretation and 
angle, Macmurray links up, in a contemporary and acceptable way, the 
spiritual and the religious which in the minds of the conventionally 
religious are virtually facets of the same thing. But it is not a 
vague, etheral, impalpable, ineffable, spiritism, but one which is 
tightly and inextricably bound to the tangible, the material, the 
real. "To assert that the world is spiritual is not to deny that it 
is material." (RE 223). Moreover, and very importantly, if we 
accept at least some of Macmurray’s ideas, and as referred to in the 
Introduction, his idea of the spiritual as outlined above totally 
reinforces his insistence on monism. He will have no dualism between 
matter and spirit. Yet both are.
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4) Fourthly; reason, as we have seen, and as understood by 
Macmurray, is the principal distinguishing feature of human life.
New this attribute of reason applies itself, or should we say has to 
apply itself, to three areas, or to three ways of looking at things. 
Firstly, there is the way which ultimately results in the reflective 
activity we call science. Emotionless thought is applied vigorously 
and relentlessly to an external feature until it yields information, 
information which we can use and is therefore solely instrumental. 
Always when reflecting scientifically we are searching for factors 
which apply as generally and widely as possible. .We have no use for 
individual examples, except as they reveal and illustrate the 
universal.
The second way in which reason is expressed and asserted is 
through Art. Art is just the opposite of science in so far els it 
exalts the individual thing. It does not look for the common 
features but portrays the unique. Its object is to give significance 
to anything the artist chooses for his subject. The bringing of 
reason, through emotion, to each individual thing in creation is what 
Art does, or intends to do when successful.
Now you will observe that, except for the need of elementary and 
natural contact to pursue the matter at all, both science and art, 
the scientist and the artist, have no relationship with their 
subjects at all. They both look and explore their subjects as if 
they did not exist as entities in their cwn right. And this, at 
least far science, is perfectly legitimate and true. We can assume 
that a lump of iron, or even an atom, has no awareness at all, let 
alone any interest in it's observer. And an artist may perhaps have 
to relate to his subject perfunctorily, but this is only for his own
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ends and purposes.
But hew different when we reach the third order and possibility, 
one human being in association with another. Here there is, or ought 
to be, no absolute one-sidedness, no one human being using, 
analysing, depicting, or enjoying another without the least care and 
consideration for his responses, or as if he did not exist in his own 
right. Just the opposite. Mutuality, interdependence, response and 
counter-response are the minimal exchanges talcing place between two 
human beings, right up to union, ccmnunion, and fellowship. And 
indeed, this mutuality can only be maximised for both if there is 
accord, goodwill, harmony, consideration, and unselfishness, all - to 
brings us back to the main point - traits and conditions advocated 
and promoted by religion as we have come conventionally to understand 
it. Thus this aspect of reason, as depicted and analysed by 
Macmurray, suggests why religion exists, and why it is vitally 
important and central to our living.
Appraisement (1)
Religion is, essentially, what Macmurray understands it to be.
If we for a moment look beneath all the ritual, ceremony, dogmas, 
creeds, professions, symbolism, and formal religious actions and 
activities of conventional religion we come to the basic and 
fundamental nub of the matter, namely, How are we getting on 
together, how are we treating each other, how can we better promote 
and further the ends of human comnunity, brotherhood, and fellowship? 
And, if we would, we can accept how religion arises from the four 
situations of human development; and from the given, evolved or
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developed, faculties special to us as human beings.
But to agree with all this, profound or very ordinary as it may 
be (whichever way we look at it) does not mean that no doubts can be 
raised or questions asked. For example -
1 ) Has Macmurray a too limited, a too parochial, view of 
religion? Although we have not dealt with this yet, Macmurray does 
stretch out a bit to include God here and there. But beyond this he 
has no universal conception or total explanation of experience, life, 
being, and the existence of the universe. About these things he 
never hints, let alone speculates. Except for the Logical 
Positivists Macmurray is probably the least speculative of all 
philosophers. Christianity, far example a religion, does have a 
total explanation. God created the universe, put man into the world 
as a free agent to do His will, and so on. Even if some people take 
this only symbolically and figuratively it is an explanation. But 
religion for Macmurray, broad as he may suggest he makes it i.e. that 
the Ultimate is Personal, is so small in conception; and without 
really being anthropomorpic (although he does say elsewhere that man 
can only be this, his is rather a man-focused religion. Can we 
really believe that, in relation to the billions of light years, 
black holes, and countless galaxies, which we no know exist, the 
essence of everything, the heart of the matter, is for us to become 
friends amongst ourselves? Is this the limit of our religious 
perceptive powers? If so, it does seem rather inadequate. To say 
this is not to discredit in any way Macmurray's earnest desire for 
human personal unity. It is a great and worthy object, and perhaps 
the sooner achieved the better far all mankind. But can this, ought
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this, to be identified with, and seemingly exhaust, the concept which 
we call religion? This may be religion. Time will tell. But it is 
a much more limited religion than most of us have ever regarded 
religion as being.
2) Macmurray1 s ideas of religion, which include emotional 
reason, development, and maturity; the harmonising of all mankind; 
and the recognition, promotion, and supremacy of the Personal, 
rightly and valuably redresses our excessive concern for all the 
intellectual aspects of life. Science and technology, and their 
effects, are everywhere ranpant. Physical discoveries, inventions 
and their application, are our permanent concern. We are rushing 
into this like the Gadarene swine. Our evaluation and classification 
of people is almost solely related to their I.Q, never of their 
intrinsic worth, at least, not publically. Bearing of, or speaking 
to, a newly-met person our first question and interest is not, "What 
sort of person is he?", but, "What does he do?". And by the answer 
that person is immediately slotted and categorized. And mainly, if 
television and the tabloids are anything to go by, the admired person 
is the crook, the self-publicist, the get-rich-quick, the pervert, 
the playboy, the womaniser, the slick twister, the person who outwits 
his fellows, the dodger, the uncooperative, the way-outer, and those 
who cunningly evade the law.
Our educational system has, naturally, the same aims and 
intentions, and produces the desired end product; living to promote 
and pass-on the same instrumental and non-personal values to the next 
generation. Very little, if anything, is done in education to 
promote good relations, or emotional management and maturity. Hence 
all the stress, tension, unhappiness, addictions, marital breakdown,
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suicides, oppression, depression, and dissatisfaction.
But having said all this, does Macmurray go a bit too far? This 
may be questioned on four grounds.
Firstly; important and good as human harmony might be, does not 
some good result from human conflict, discord, disharmony, and 
strife? It is easy to give scientific and material examples but 
these are hardly fair to the argument. Space exploration, medical 
progress and alleviation of suffering, a positive agricultural 
policy, and radar, to give but a few examples, all developed out of, 
and as a result of, the conflict and holocaust of the Second World 
War. But so did the United Nations Organisation; the growth and 
freedom of the colonial countries into independence; a more 
harmonious, if not entirely so, Western Europe and the E.E.C., the 
welfare state, and rapid steps made towards the levelling out of 
social classes.
I have not had occasion to mention this so far, but quite a lot 
will be said about it in a later chapter. Far Macmurray a favourite 
and essential element in the structure of thought, and indeed of 
movement and progress in actual reality, is the dialectic. The 
dialectic proceeds by two opposing farces and situations 
compromisingly merging to form a new unforeseen position. This new 
position then becomes a new thesis, as it is called, which in turn 
will develop its cwn opposite, the antithesis, and so on. Could it 
not be argued therefore that a temporary conflict, even in human 
relationships can be necessary and good? For from it might not a 
higher and better good emerge? If, therefore, in human relationships 
we are to have no discord, but only fellowship, will progress stop
- 82 -
and growth cease?
Secondly; can there ever be harmonisation except in a limited 
way, and between limited numbers of people? Is there net something 
innately intransigent in human nature? Psycho-analysts have shown 
that, even if not severely and disruptingly so, most of us have some 
leanings towards either masochism car sadism. We are either prepared 
to be hurt, 'sat on1, or be used; or, to do the hurting and 
oppressing. Some of this, on either side, arises frcm fear, and of 
different ways of meeting and dealing with it. But not all. Banish 
fear and we would still have these leanings. Now, whether these 
tendencies are merely part of a long age of Man, the age, say, of 
industrialism or nationalism i.e. culture patterns, or whether they 
are permanently in-built and have contributed to our emergence, 
survival, and authority, we cannot knew. Other similar questions 
arise concerning such traits as aggression, assertion, and 
combativeness. And even more extreme, the annihilation of whole 
classes and peoples who thwart progress, presumably towards freedom, 
equality, and unification of man, as exampled in the French and 
Russian Revolutions. Was this good, bad, or only necessary? Can we 
afford to forgo these entirely? The only hope in the creation of 
Macmurray's desired religious end is to sublimate them. Even in an 
everyday way how many people do we know who enjoy, and indeed 
psychologically and emotionally need, a little row and quarrel. For 
them it keeps things alive, relieves the boredom of so much of 
contemporary life, and affords an outlet for feelings which are 
beginning to build up. What better example of this than the widely 
acclaimed Albee play, "Who's Afraid of Viginia Woolf?" And, to add
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another point; ought all broken marriages be ultimately reconcilable? 
It would have to be a very optimistic, or naive, person who answered 
'Yes' to that one!
Thirdly; one thing must be mentioned here, as it will have 
occurred to many people as they read Macmurray on religion. And this 
same idea is frequently thrown impatiently at other notions, whether 
Macmurray' s or anybody elses', which dare to stray from the 
contemporary path of intellectualism, materialism, secularism, and 
non-personalism. And that epithet of contempt is 'idealism'; 
'idealistic nonsense'; 'Nobody, or very few indeed yet have taken the 
right-relationships aspect of religion seriously. Why then does this 
John Macmurray suddenly appear and purport to show us the way?'
Macmurray anticipates this inevitable comment and has an answer 
which, once and far all, should silence the critics and cynics 
concerning idealism, whether it makes specific reference to religion 
or to anything else.1 "There is a tendency in many quarters to think 
that it is idealistic and inpractical, because it would involve a 
universal perfection of character which is far beyond the reach of 
the mass of human beings. Such a view rests upon an elementary 
misunderstanding .... One does not say that because ideal justice 
cannot be realized on earth, we should not aim at justice in the 
political field. We do not scorn the theory of the steam-engine 
because a perfect steam-engine cannot be built. Nor do we imagine 
that because an ideal friendship is beyond our capacity, it is stupid 
to make friends. The question of a universal community is of the 
same sort." (CF 92/3). As already stated this seems a splendid 
answer by anybody whose ideas, intentions, and moral and relational
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concepts are scornfully accused of being "idealistic".
Fourthly; this follows from appraisement (1) and need not detain 
us long. But it is a legitimate question to ask. What happens next 
i.e. When we have achieved total human harmony and community? Why 
are we, why have we had to be, in the process of doing this? And to 
what ultimate end? Fortunately for him Macmurray is never bothered 
by such questions. Being profoundly realistic, down to earth, 
content to live far the moment (in the finest interpretation of that 
phrase) and unspecaLative, the question seems never to have occurred 
to him. But, when possible, is it not always better to see an act or 
intention in a wider context even if such visualising might have to 
include a little speculation? Does not to do so lend proportion and 
perspective, and a more eager anticipation of fulfilment of the 
present sector and task? For my part, I see human comnunity as a 
worthy, indeed a necessary, object and condition; but considering the 
known immensity of Ultimacy I cannot see this as anything more than a 
stage in the process of something striving to attain a much more 
comprehensive and far-reaching end which must include meaning and 
conceptualising as well as emotion and fellowship.
End of Appraisement (1)
So far we have considered Macmurray1 s general view of religion. 
We must now turn to his ideas concerning Christianity.
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(Christianity (Part I)
You would think that being of the West, and religious at the 
same time, Macmurray would inevitably and automatically espouse 
(Christianity; and that anything written about it by him, as with so 
many other apologists, could be seen as a rationalization, or a mere 
unconscious justification of a conditioned situation. This proves to 
be not so. Muddled and higgledy-piggledy as much of his exposition 
and analysis of Christianity are, a prolonged and serious study of 
these reveals several deep, penetrating, and major ideas, seme of 
which indicate not only. a. genuine adherence to Christianity, but 
produce a number of novel and innovative thoughts. Through these 
understanding is considerably enlarged, and approval and acceptance 
of Christianity is, far some, made more possible; where for others it 
is strengthened because grounded in fact and reason.
To understand all this we must first discuss the Jews, and then 
Jesus.
The Jews
The Jews, especially the Jews of the Old testament, are for 
Macmurray historically, socially, and religiously the race par 
excellence. "The achievement of the Hebrews lies in the fact that 
they retain, through the process of their development, the capacity 
to think this world religiously (CH 30). They of all people 
conformed, and presumably still do, to Macmurray* s essentials of real 
religion. What are these essentials?
1) Realism. To quote again, "The characteristic of Hebrew 
religion which makes it unique in history is its intense and 
continuous realism. This realism shews itself peculiarly in the
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absence of a doctrine of imnortality and in the absence of other­
worldliness. For the Hebrews religion remained the great organizing 
principle of social life, capable of unifying every aspect of 
individual and social activity, It never became a particular aspect 
of human life, relating men to a human existence transcending the 
earthly life. Hebrew religion was, in fact, intensely materialistic, 
and it is precisely this that gave it its persistent and effective 
reality". (CS 59/60) And again, ".... there is obvious empirical 
truth in the assertion that the ancient Hebrews present us with the 
only example in history of a specifically religious civilization, and 
there is no unambiguous trace in the whole of their classical 
literature of a belief in another world or in a life after death."
(CH 20). These quotations are so clearly expressed, that the point 
about the realism of the ancient Jewish religion would seem to be 
self-explanatory.
2) Non-dualism. A vital feature of the real, as opposed to 
pseudo and unreal religious consciousness, is, according to 
Macmurray, non-dualism. Without this no society can be religious. 
Dualism arises when there is a dissociation of the inner life from 
the outer. (See CS 131). Where this happens religion can take one 
of two forms. It can become idealist, mystical, other-worldly, 
withdrawn; or it can become an instrument of power "seeking to create 
and control society by its control of secular power". (CS 131). 
Neither of these, says Macmurray, is real religion. Primitive 
societies were and are, non-dualistic, but only the Jews, of all 
societies, retained it as they progressed. Indeed; they progressed 
religiously because they did retain it. They did not split their
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lives and consciousness into spiritual and material, secular and 
religious, the ideal and the real world, the present and the after­
life. Theirs was one, undivided, world and experience. And this 
monism of the Jews was wholly extended into every area of life 
without exception. For example; social classes are an evident 
exemplification of dualism. The Jews would have nothing of this, The 
priesthood, it might be thought, were a group apart. But according 
to Macmurray they were not. "The main danger of dualism in Hebrew 
society arose in fact from the position of the priesthood, and it is 
in the resistance of the Hebrew consciousness to this tendency of a 
priesthood to become a ruling class that the historical significance 
of the prophetic tradition is to be found. The prophets are the 
mouthpieces of the resistance to the privileged position of the 
priests. They may happen to be priests, but it is not as priests and 
not in virtue of any privileged position in the social order, that 
they say, 'Thus saith the Lord*. In Jewish civilization it is the 
prophet, a person without social authority, who is the inspired 
source of religious revelation. There is no priestly hierarchy which 
is the guardian and exponent of religion". (CH 31/2). Nor would the 
Jews tolerate classes founded on rich and poor; or, at least, not 
frcm extremes of wealth and its consequent power as we know it. To 
prevent such situations developing the Jewish law required debts to 
be cancelled, if unpaid, after a certain period. "The elaborate 
precautions of the Jewish Law to prevent the enslavement of debtors 
or even the perpetuation of the debtor-creditor relation beyond the 
year of Jubilee, are in fact, provisions against the rise of an 
aristocracy of wealth." (CH 31). Usurers were thus strictly 
controlled in the interests of the maintenance of a non-dualist,
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religious, society.
Not that the Jews were never confronted by the possibility of 
dualism, nor tempted by it. "The establishment of the kingship under 
Saul is an excellent example both of the tendency to split the world 
into the ecclesiastical and a secular aspect, and also of the 
resistance that this tendency met with from the Jewish consciousness. 
Indeed, the whole history of the Jews as described in the Old 
Testament, is the story of the continuous struggle to overcome the 
continuous tendency towards dualism." (CH 31). Why they were able to 
resist this almost ubiquitous trend, Macmurray never really makes any 
pertinent suggestions, except perhaps that the Jews had a real, 
integrated, religious consciousness. But this either begs the 
question, or is a circular argument.
This opposition to dualism by the Jews is tellingly summed-up in 
a phrase which, with our divided consciousness, seems on first 
hearing not possible to believe. Yet we come to see it as true. 
Macmurray says, "If a society (or an individual) has a religion it is 
not religious. If it is religious it cannot have a religion. The 
reason is that to "have" a religion, religion must be conceived and 
experienced as a particular aspect of life which is contrasted with 
others which are not religious. The religious mode of consciousness 
is precisely a habit of mind which prevents such an atomizing of 
life. For any other farm of consciousness religion is a particular 
and distinguishable set of beliefs. But for the religious farm of 
consciousness, religion is a way of living the whole of life, and 
consequently, as part of this, a way of thinking and understanding 
the world." (CH 29). A similar confirmation of this point is to be
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found in SRR 36. To finalise this point, "The Hebrew consciousness 
demands a theocracy, that is to say, an integral religious 
community." (CH 31).
3) Empiricism. Hebrew religion was empirical. ".... Hebrew 
thought is at once religious and empirical. It is religious in that 
it thinks history as the act of God. It is empirical in that it 
reflects upon history in order to discover the nature of God and the 
laws of divine agency ... this reflection is an effort to discover 
the true principles of social life." (CH 38/9). Hebrewism ...
"unlike other tribal religions never became fixed upon the past and. 
divorced fran the actual fortunes of the people. It adapted itself 
continuously to the material and social changes in the development of 
Hebrew history, and so maintained the conditions of religious 
evolution." (CS 60). Empiricism in religion is a great thing with 
Macmurray, and we shall have occasion to mention it again. Dogmas, 
creeds, authority, may be good and necessary from time to time to 
sum-up and embody the stage reached so far, but inevitably they 
become fixed and prevent further necessary progress religiously. The 
Jews were the one people to avoid getting into a creedal cul-de-sac. 
Their whole view of their history, experience, and of the 
contemporary situation, at any one time, was empirical. "Throughout 
Jewish history, the development of culture is the result of a 
continuous reflection upon contemporary history in the light of past 
historical experience, It is not, as the non-religious mind is apt to 
think, a reflection upon specifically •religious' experiences." (CH 
39). No other people or religion could be said to have this 
attribute. It is this empiricism which enabled them to be 
progressive, and thus be the 'chosen* vehicle for the development of
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religion. the Jews are God's chosen people. For the religious
consciousness this is not a boastful claim to superiority. It is a 
mere statement of historical fact" (CH 54).
4) Social Righteousness; it was this empiricism, and the 
enpirical approach, which also enabled them to work out, recognize, 
and give to the world an important awareness. Only gradually did 
this emerge and dawn on them. And this is the consciousness of 
social righteousness. "It was this intimate connection between their 
religion and the whole of their material life as a nation that forced 
upon them, as their great contribution to culture, the development of
an understanding of the moral basis of social life Every
national failure was traced to a failure to maintain that social 
righteousness which was the basis of God's favour; so that the 
process of Hebrew development became the process of discovering the 
spiritual basis of human community. We can trace in the succession 
of the Hebrew prophets the gradual deepening of the conception of 
social righteousness, not as an abstract ideal but as the structure 
of inner relationship between men which creates and maintains the 
ccmnunity of social life, and which is the basis of all social 
fulfilment." (CS 60/1). Notice; morality for the Jews was not an 
ideal, something we ought to be thinking of doing and becoming, if 
only we could. It was an essential and integral factor in social 
living. That is quite a different conception of morality from that 
which is held in Western society today; where, that is, it is 
considered and reflected upon at all. Morality is very marginal to 
us. It is not an integral part of our lives and society. One 
illustration of this, if any is necessary, is that a person is at
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once criticised, censured, discouraged, or ostracised, if he starts 
1 moralising'. We fear, of course, that there might be some truth in 
what he says, and we ought consequently to change, or even think of 
changing, our ways. Thus we find it difficult to understand hew 
involved the Jews were with it, and of how central morality was to 
their living. "Social disaster or social failure is, therefore, 
always interpreted by Jewish thought as evidence of national sin, 
that is to say, of a national departure from the purpose of God for 
his people, and this failure is also interpreted as the act of God in 
history to bring his people back to the acceptance of his purpose." . 
(CH 39).
5) God; we have just had occasion to mention God. That sounds 
rather casual, but as Macmurray says, "Let us forget about God for 
the moment. He won't mind. He is much too reasonable! What would 
you think of a father who wanted his children always to be thinking 
about him? Surely, that he was the complete egoist I So true is it 
that our emotional subjectivity insists on fashioning God in our 
likeness". (RE 62).
But to return to the point. God, from the beginning of known 
Jewish history or myth . i.e. from genesis, was the one, central, 
figure of Jewish culture and living. There must, of course, have 
been a time previously when, as with all other races and tribes, 
polytheism was the order of the day. Even in the early times of the 
Old Testament there had only be a little trouble or disunity, and God 
would find himself vying with the old gods. But the Jews are unique 
in their perception and establishment of one god. At first, this was 
mere monolatry, one qod for them. But this eventually developed into 
monotheism, one God only far everybody and for all peoples. Modem
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religious people everywhere conceive of God i.e. one entity and 
beinq, but because no total agreement exists as to his character and 
beinq, it is disputable whether there is one God in practice and 
reflection. However, this does not lessen the importance of the 
conception; nor of the Jewish recognition of it.
This Jewish idea of one qod probably arose out of their monism, 
i.e. non-dualistic view of life and experience as previously briefly 
discussed, and of their perception of social riqhteousness. The 
first is, at least far us, easy to conceive and understand, althouqh 
we as members of Western culture are, accordinq to Macmurray, 
ourselves dualists. But of the second, social righteousness; once 
recoqnized, this must, to be effective and to ensure communal, 
relational, proqress and social unity, be exacted and expected from 
all, and applied to all. This was the idea contained within the 
ambience, expectation, and jurisdiction, of one qod. Today, we 
should probably call this a projection, but the point is made, call 
it what you will.
God, as one, having been perceived and identified, is 
insufficient far the Jews. Out of this, and because of, their 
aforementioned empiricism, so marked a feature of their religious 
approach and attitude, the apprehension and understanding of God and 
his nature qrew and developed. At first, as Jehovah, he was 
thunderously like Thor, arbitarily lashing about in general in his 
wrath. Then he was modified, or modified himself, into a Kitchener­
like figure, stem but a little less violent, temperamental, and ill- 
tempered. Later he became Lord, an authoritative entity, rather more 
approachable and to be held in awe rather than in fear, althouqh the
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‘fear of the Lord' was still held in reserve. Later still, and after 
these Jewish aqes, he developed further, as will be shewn. But, and 
here is the relevance of Macmurray1 s argument; only because of 
earlier Jewish insights, was this later progress possible.
So the great innovation of the Jews was the recognising of one 
God, and that he was very much concerned with righteousness. The 
third factor which Macmurray finds applicable to God as unearthed by 
the Jews, is that he was and is a worker. "In the dualist forms of 
consciousness God always appears as an aristocrat. What is 
characteristic of the Hebrew conception of God is that he is . . .  . 
primarily a worker." (CH 33). Macmurray makes no bones about this, 
nor tempers what seems to be, for him and indeed for us, a rather 
bald and blunt fact and statement. It is cannon to understand that 
God is creator, and that, in the theistic view, he is still moving 
and acting in his creation. But to call him a worker, with all the 
connotations of that word, comes rather as a shock; and this possibly 
no matter how many times we have read it. Yet worker he is for 
Maanurray; or rather as Macmurray sees it for the ancient Jews. How
does he justify this statement? Basically, it arises out of 
Macmurray's own philosophy which is, at least partially and 
seminally. derivative fran and identifiable with the Jewish outlook 
and its ensuring post-Jewish phase. Besides being a monist Macmurray 
is an actionist. The universe was created to be, to move, and 
become, not to be pondered over and reflected upon except as this 
serves and contributes towards effective action. Therefore, once God 
is established he must, to be real and perfect, be a doer too. 
Macmurray is no lover of leisure 1 He would not agree with Sir Ernest 
Barker that "Leisure is greater than work". "But the religious
- 94 -
consciousness of the Hebrews conceives of God as a worker and, 
therefore, in terms of action. The religious idea of perfection is, 
therefore, not timeless. It does not believe in leisure as the qoal 
of human life". (CH 37). And we are qiven a hint as to why this is 
so. "New the motive which sustains this mode of consciousness is the 
desire for the contemplative life of leisure. But the material 
necessities of life forbid this and peremptorily draq men out of 
contemplation into action for their satisfaction. The problem... of 
the leisure class.... is therefore to escape from the necessities of 
the practical life or to find some way of doing without work. This 
involves a tension and conflict between the 'spiritual' and 
'material' aspects of life." (CH 132). So leisure is to be 
deprecated because it brinqs inevitably the bedevilment of dualism.
We must remember Macmurray was writing this before the days of 
automation, intensive computerisation, and the enforced leisure for 
many these things inevitably bring. Hew he would evaluate the 
situation today would be most interesting to knew. Dualism, at least 
in its original and Greek form, brings as its acocmpliment and ideal 
the contemplative life; and this can only be achieved and sustained 
by spells of non-work. As Maanurray sees the world as a place of 
activity, even by God, he will not countenance leisure at any price. 
Perhaps this is a rationalisation of a rather stringent upbringing, 
as we saw in the Introduction. Equally, however, it depends on what 
is really meant by leisure, both by him and by us. But, to return to 
the point. An important aspect of God far the Jews was that he was a 
worker.
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An attempt has been made in the last five sub-sections to 
outline what Macmurray sees as the main contribution of the Jews 
towards the eventual creation or emergence of Christianity. Here are 
a few quotations to sum-up.
"What is the unique contribution of the ancient Hebrews to human 
experience, and why is Western civilization so shy of it? Hie answer 
to both these questions is, I believe, that the Jews were and are 
reliqious, while we are not." (CH 19).
"What is characteristic of the Hebrew people is that it achieved 
a development to a hiqh level of civilization without this breakinq 
up of the aspects of social life into autonomous, contrasted, and 
competing fields of interest and effort." (CH 28).
" because in the Hebrew unity the integration of practice
and reflection is maintained, the development of Hebrew culture is 
not a development of ideas, in which the implications of the 
primitive forms of Hebrew life are speculatively worked out.
Instead, the history, of the Jewish ccnmunity itself becomes the 
working out of the implications of its social consciousness. The 
reflection of the prophets is itself a call to the Jewish people to 
return to the divine purpose which is embedded in their history, at a 
higher level of understanding. Consequently, it is not the ideas of 
reflection (as in the case of the Greeks) nor the practical 
institutions of social organization (as in the case of the Remans) 
that are universalized and scattered abroad throughout the world, but 
the Jewish people themselves." (CH 40/41).
We now turn to review and discuss Maanurray's second, and 
obvious, major source and contribution to Christianity, namely -
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Jesus
Jesus is the supreme expression of the religious mode of 
consciousness (see CH 49). Most of us, by our upbringing, have an 
idea, however vague, of what Jesus was and did; and of his real or 
supposed significance. These vague impressions are made more 
definite and articulate by Macmurray in a way perhaps not done 
before, certainly on sane points. What are these?
1 ) Jesus universalized Judaism. The Jewish religion was the 
only true religion in so far as all life and all people of the Jewish 
race were totally included in it. But, according to Macmurray/ this, 
situation, so splendid and admirable as it was, had one major 
failing. It was limited in its area of includingness. Many were 
excluded from its recognition and belongingness. These were every 
other race and people, generally known as the gentiles. Jesus 
corrected this, or rather recognized that if we are to create a human 
community, which is the prime object and purpose of religion - "The 
creation of the universal family is the meaning of the religious 
impulse". (CS 67) - none on earth must be excluded. Moreover, only 
thus can man, any man, by so acting and recognizing, really become 
human. "The conception of a universal community of mankind is in 
itself an enormous revolution in human thought. But for Jesus this 
is more than a bare possibility. It is the expression of the true 
nature of man himself and, therefore, it is grounded in the nature of 
reality." (CS 67). "It was in Jesus that Judaism became a universal 
religion through the discovery of its own implications, and this 
discovery was the culmination of a long process of historical 
development." (CS 59).
In this context of the universalisation of religion two points
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must be made. 1) It remained concrete. It did not take off into 
the realms of other-worldliness and idealism. It stayed firmly 
rooted in reality and in the material and social. 2) Maanurray 
makes the distinction between conservative and creative reliqion. 
Conservative reliqion is one which "... maintains exclusiveness by 
fosterinq and emphasisinq ccnmunity where it already exists." (GC 
35). Creative reliqion, on the other hand, "is... concerned to 
create community where it does not exist." (GC 35). The fact that 
today we are fight inq the inequalities of race, sex and class proves 
that our reliqion, at least up till new, has been far from creative. 
"Creative reliqion must keep, as it were, the emotional unity which 
characterises the natural family qroup and yet lose its natural basis 
in blood-relationship. By achievinq this, it escapes from the 
exclusive community and becomes a 'universal' reliqion." (OC 39). 
There can be no doubt that Jesus introduced and promoted this 
transition, which was probably conceived of by him because of the 
'universal* extent of the Roman Empire around. "In the Roman Empire 
(Jesus) sees the act of God creating a universal community and 
insertinq the Jewish people like a leaven into it." (CH 117). But he 
had no illusions about this. The universalisaticn of the Roman 
Empire as such could not form the basis of his human family. The 
Roman Empire was a political unity. Jesus thouqht only reliqiously. 
"The Roman Empire was already a political unification of a large part 
of the world. One might have expected that Jesus would have souqht 
to use this approximation to a universal integration as a basis for 
the creation of the kinqdom of heaven on earth. Yet this was 
precisely what he had already decided against in the temptation in
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the wilderness." (CS 70).
To illustrate Jesus' move from conservative to creative 
reliqion, Macmurray aives many already well-kncwn examples to 
substantiate this contention; the Good Samaritan, enlarqinq community 
beyond his own people (CS 65/6); The 'who is my mother and brother' 
question (CS 66/7. CH 63); the recoqnition of obliqations beyond one's 
own kin and blood; the rich younq man told by Jesus that he had 
obliqations beyond his class i.e. to the poor (CS 80/1). Moreover, 
because of his riches he excluded himself from the human family. The 
obvious example of this is the Prodiqal Son, who until he had become 
impoverished could not become a member of the family aqain. (CS 79). 
"The reliqious transition from Judaism to Christianity which is 
recorded and reflected in the New Testament is a perfect instance of 
the transition from a conservative to a creative religion". (CS 39).
2) Jesus advanced still further the idea the Jews had 
developed of God. You remember hew it had proqressed to one God, and 
then to Lord, still a relatively remote entity in feel inq if not in 
personal propinquity. But arisinq out of Jesus' idea of one human 
family, God emerged as, or became, the Father. "Therefore (the 
universal family) becomes at once the conscious end of all real human 
effort and at the same time the purpose of God for human life. It is 
this that brinqs God and man so closely toqether in the thought of 
Jesus, so that God becomes the universal father; and human life, in 
its true expression, the revelation of the Divine nature." (CS 67/8). 
Such a recognition develops yet even further a major aspect of 
reliqion. Reliqion, inter alia, exists to overcome fear. "The 
overcoming of fear and isolation is possible throuqh the complete 
integration of mankind, throuqh a conception which makes God their
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carman father and the world their father's house." (CS 68). Thus 
Jesus' recognition of God the Father makes possible, according to 
Macmurray, the banishment of fear fran our lives.
3) Jesus discovered the Personal. "Jesus made the discovery 
that human life is personal". (CH 55). What is the Personal? It is; 
the defining characteristic of human life, of being human. It is 
that element or elements which we all have in common. It is that 
which distinguishes human life from all other forms of life. "... 
properly speaking, personality is a tern which denotes the general 
character which distinguishes human life from all other forms of 
life. To say that human life is personal is primarily to deny that 
human life is organic, or that it can be treated as differing from 
animal life only in degree and not in kind. It is to assert that the 
essence of human life is radically different from the essence of 
organic life, and that the relations which constitute the totality of 
human life are radically different from those which make a unity of 
the organic world. It is this essential character of human life, the 
thing that constitutes its humanness, that Jesus discovered." (CH 
56). Macmurray would like to call this personality, but the term in 
modem times has been degraded or misused. It is now seen as that 
which highly differentiates and individualises human beings. "We are 
accustomed to use the term to denote that which is peculiar bo a 
human individual in distinction fran other human individuals, and 
which, therefore, constitutes his unique individuality". (CH 56/7). 
But personality, or the personal, is far Macmurray, as we have seen, 
that something which we all have in common, and which makes us 
essentially human. And there is a built-in corollary to this. It
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means that human life, to be and remain human life, can only be lived 
personally. (CH 56). If you are not livinq personally, then you are 
not livinq humanly. You are livinq either mechanically i.e. as 
matter or as a thinq; or, orqanically i.e. merely as other forms of 
life. These are deep and important distinctions far Macmurray which 
we cannot, in this qeneral review, qo into here. It miqht be said, 
however, that livinq personally can have two major aspects, neoative 
and positive. It is neqative when we are livinq merely non- 
orqanically, that is just above and beyond the orqanic level. It is 
positive when we are reachinq out to include and create human . . .  
community. The essence of this positive approach and way of livinq 
personally is love. (CH 62/9), (CS 114/121).
Jesus discovered the personal, but it was already implicit in 
the Old Testament Jewish reliqion, experience, and development, where 
it had been ccminq nearer and nearer to the threshold of 
consciousness. (See CH 56). Macmurray reqards the discovery of the 
personal not merely as an added piece of human kncwledqe, but as the 
very self-discovery of man, by man. And this self-discovery 
necessitates a transformation.
At this point (CH 56/7) Macmurray, very perceptively and 
convincinqly, elaborates upon the cost of not acceptinq this revealed 
truth about ourselves. What does this discovery entail? A knowledqe 
of the siqnificance of all human life, and of the intention which is 
embodied in the existence of human nature i.e. what human nature is 
for and what it can become. ".... it defines the end to which 
present history is in fact movinq." (CH 58). "Thus, by discoverinq, 
at the point where the development of Hebrew reflection completes 
itself, his cwn essence as a human beinq, Jesus discovered the
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intention of God for man." (CH 58).
4) Jesus discovered the cannon people. This, accordinq to 
Macmurray, is Jesus* qreat contribution to social history. (CS 70). 
Macmurray firmly believes in the dialectic. Time and aqain he refers 
to it throuqhout his writinqs. And he believes that Jesus, knowingly 
or unkncwinqly, used this method for discerning and promoting truth 
and progress. (CS 69/76), (CS 80). The common people, and Jesus' 
use of them for the fulfilment of his intentions and mission, is an 
example of this. To achieve the greatest and highest condition of 
man, that is, complete human community, or the Kingdom of Heaven to 
use traditional religious language, Jesus harnessed the support, not 
of the rich and influential, but of the cornnon people, the working 
class, as we would call them today. (CS 76/81). These alone were 
capable of achieving the ultimate human success." Blessed are the 
meek, for they shall inherit the earth". (CH 72).
And from this recognition and choice of the common people by- 
Jesus sprang democracy (CS 70). Allied to this are other commendable 
progressive and essential features of a real human community; freedom 
and equality - althouqh Macmurray does not argue in detail the link 
here. Communism itself also has its basis (CS 143) in Jesus' 
promotion and advocacy of the common people.
To conclude in general concerning Jesus. "What makes (the life 
of Jesus) unique is the scope of the vision which it embodies, and 
his profound insight into the conditions demanded for its 
accomplishment. The teaching of Jesus is not something separable 
from his life; it is the expression of the understanding which grew 
out of his life. Theory and practice are there completely unified.
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The one interprets and expounds the other. It is this fusion of 
insight and action that makes the life of Jesus the religious life 
par excellence, though it is far fran being the kind of life that 
nowadays would be so described. And it is in terms of this life, and 
its expression in his teaching, that we have to rediscover the nature 
of Christianity." (CS 88/9). Rediscover the nature of Christianity? 
Did we ever fully knew it before Macmurray?
With this reminder of the main theme of this section, and having 
discussed the Jews and Jesus, and their respective and seminal 
contributions to the formation and formulation of Christianity, let . 
us return to Christianity itself. But before doing so let us pause 
to give an appraisement of the last sections.
Appraisement 12)
Whilst saying almost nothing about God i.e. as to what he is, 
his character, his intentions, and to what might be meant by the 
concept at all, Macmurray frequently refers to him when writing about 
the Old Testament Jews and of their naturally theocratic outlook.
And, of course, as we would expect, he refers to God often when 
speaking of Jesus. For example, from countless which could be given, 
"Now it is a fundamental postulate of religious rationality that the 
purpose of God must inevitably be achieved." (CH 58). And again, 
"Social disaster or social failure is, therefore, always interpreted 
by Jewish thought as evidence of national sin, that is to say, of a 
national departure from the purpose of God for his people, and this 
failure is also interpreted as the act of God in history to bring his 
people back to the acceptance of his purpose." (CH 39). Obviously
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Macmurray believes in God, literally, unquestionably, and as an 
automatic assumption. Moreover, at least as it comes throuqh his 
style of writinq and expression, he assumes everybody else does tool
New, here is the issue. Nobody advocates empiricism, and the 
empirical approach and application to all matters of life and 
experience with such concern and fervour, as Macmurray. Furthermore, 
because reliqicn is his prime area of interest, it is more that he is 
one of the few advocates, and certainly its most passionate, of 
empiricism. How then does this tie-up with his frequent, 
unsubstantiated, assertions concerning God* s existence and being, 
even if he never, fortunately, purports to know or tells us what he, 
God, is doing?
Macmurray has quite clearly defined what his conception of 
empiricism is, "The hall-mark of empiricism is its emphasis upon 
facts. It insists upon starting from facts and ending in facts ..." 
(SRE 12). To put it cogently and succinctly; by Maanurray's own 
declared standards what factual evidence is there of God, which he so 
authoritatively proclaims the existence of? Surely about this 
Macmurray could be a little more reserved and circumspect; or, a 
little more explicit for, if not doubting himself, he never 
demonstrates how God is, or can be, recognized as a fact. To say 
that God is or exists - and the automatic assumption of this is even 
worse - is to be dogmatic, an attitude Macmurray professes, 
presumably in all other contexts than this, to deplore.
Macmurray seems unaware of this anomaly, let alone to raise or 
discuss it. But to me, and inevitably to any other observant person 
who is critical of yet sympathetic to Maanurray's general themes and 
position, this must seem very anomalous and incongruent. The very
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slightest suggestion as to what he might reply if he were ever 
challenged on the point is given in the following, "It is highly 
dangerous to include in a statement of religious belief, anything 
that is liable to empirical disproof." (SRR 58). Maybe, he would 
say, God cannot be proved. But equally he cannot be disproved. For 
Macmurray to argue thus would still allow a matter to be regarded as 
empirically acceptable, pro tem. But, even if not to be disproved, 
can it be said, according to Macmurray’ s necessary requirement of the 
empirical, that God is a fact? Has Macmurray strayed from, or even 
broken his cwn ideal and standard? And on a very major and 
fundamental point too?
2) Were the Jews like this? i.e. as outlined on pages 14/21. 
And, if so, were they thus for the reasons Macmurray gives? It has 
long been understood in Western thinking, and not contradicted by 
modem scholarship and interpretation, that the Jews were an 
unusually religious people, and that their experiences did cause them 
to recognize, proclaim, and live by the idea of one God. Probably 
they were, too, the main human instigators and agents of living 
rightly with each other, or of realizing that they could and ought to 
be so living; this developing from the earlier prescribed moral and 
social code, the ten commandments, throuqh the exhortations of the 
prophets, up to the more advanced, universal, and all-including 
standards of Jesus, loosely incorporated in the idea of love, and in 
whom religion finally became mature. In this sense, the Jews have 
rightly been called the 'chosen' people.
But were they able to be so perceptive because of their 
undivided, non-dual is tic, consciousness and perception of life, the
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world, and experience? Or was it so by the merest chance, an ethnic 
fortuitous mutation, or even for sane other reason? Are the two, on 
the one hand God and riqhteousness and the discovery thereof, and on 
the other non-dualism, necessarily related? Macmurray never 
speculates cn this, nor puts forward any argument. He merely states 
and asserts it. Yet the point is both interesting and important.
Interesting, because no other thinker has proposed or even 
hinted at such an idea and linkage. Most are content to ascribe it 
to God's will and purpose. They give no hint of a natural or 
empirical reason. And important, because does it indicate the way, 
indeed the only way in Maanurray's estimation, to lead a satisfactory 
human life, both individually and together? Modem man, as we have 
earlier seen, and know any way, is immensely "Broken-up", "Broken- 
dcwn", and diversified. We have a sort of unspoken method far 
meeting every situation, namely divide and rule. In many things we 
are dual is tic, but pluralistic would be a better description of the 
situation, both within each man, and in society at large. But, has 
not this division and diversification helped us materially at least, 
and Macmurray is no despiser of the material I Examples of this are 
division of labour; where would we have been, or be, without it? We 
analyse, classify, specialise, categorize, and label all for sane 
good. Would a less pluralistic, a more whole society and man, be 
less well provided for? At least we are in with a chance of moving 
towards a more satisfactory condition. We are each in our own cul- 
de-sac; but to be thus has been an avenue of human advancement.
Perhaps the basic question, the one which Macmurray would ask 
but never did, is, Can we have diversity without dualism and 
pluralism resulting? Do we want to get back, or go forward
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(whichever way you look at it) to a whole and unified consciousness 
such as the Jews had?
So the question of Jewish one-mindedness is important. If 
Macmurray is riqht, and we could come to learn of the oriqin, roots, 
promotion, development, and the sustaining of a sinqle consciousness, 
perhaps some of our problems would automatically be soluble, or 
indeed resolve themselves. Ouqht we to somehow create, or recreate, 
a truly religious society, in the Macmurray sense? At least the 
question is worth asking.
3) Macmurray1 s idea of conservative and creative religion is an 
original and useful one. All people and organizations professing to 
be religious could profitably ask themselves into which category they 
fall. Apart fran the missionary zeal of the 19th century, most 
Christians in recent times have been conservative and excluding.
Some other religions, especially the Eastern ones and Islam, seem 
more expansive and creative at the present time. Most churches and 
Christian groups, except far American evangelists and their European 
counterparts, Jehovah1 s Witnesses, and Catholics in South America, 
seemed concerned only with conserving what little of their essential 
religious belief and fellowship they have left. They have no time or 
enerqy to encompass the world, or even their own neighbourhood, in a 
mood and spirit of religious creativity.
But if Jesus discerned the difference between conservative and 
creative religion he was not a complete exemplar of it. Good, 
perceptive, innovative, and enlarging as he may have been, he was 
less than perfect in this area when it came to practice and example. 
Nothing is easier in life than to love and be friendly towards those
- 107 -
who honour and support us. Hie crunch and test comes for all of us, 
including Jesus, as to hew we act and respond creatively and 
constructively towards those with different ideas, positions, 
psychologies, characters, and life-styles. Jesus had nothing but 
scorn for certain classes of people, especially the scribes and 
pharisees. It is no use contending that they were traditionalists, 
or opponents of Jesus' intentions, or hypocrites. That they may have 
been all these, and anything else seemingly adverse, only 
demonstrates and reinforces the point. If Jesus had felt so 
creatively about religion would he not have been more constructive, 
more creative, and shewn us by his own example hew to bring disparate 
elements into the one human fold of fellowship? Surely, this is 
what, as human beings, we are still trying to find out how to 
achieve.
Creative religion is a vital and useful concept. But a 
discernment of it is not enough. We must knew how to effect it. 
Macmurray as a realist and actionist should appreciate this.
4) Regarding Jesus' conception of God. I am sure that he did 
enlarge and deepen this. The idea of God the father, leading, 
caring, nurturing and loving his universal family, enlarges our 
humanity and togetherness. By it our relational and emotional edges 
are softened. We become, and have become, more inter-relatable as a 
result. In saying this, of course, Macmurray would be the first to 
admit that this idea is nothing new, but has far long been part of 
the lore of Jesus.
5) Did Jesus discover the personal? This depends on whether 
you can recognize something even if you do not name it. Jesus 
discerned what Macmurray calls the personal, or at least aspects of
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it, but it would not appear that he so named it. Apart from the 
reservation made in Section 3 of this appraisement, Jesus was 
qenerally, and certainly in intention, creative in relationships. 
This in itself would be evidence of at least an awareness of the 
personal. But the personal includes a wide, creative, attitude to 
life at larqe in all its branches and aspects (see RE 156/163). No 
mention is made in the New Testament of, far example, Jesus* joy in 
art, although obviously, by his figurative use of language, he was 
alive to, and immersed in, all around him, and not least in nature.
It is difficult to distinguish fact from fiction; and, because of 
intensive and excessive conditioning, few of us brought up in a 
Christian social environment can ever see Jesus objectively. But it 
does seem that he was a very alive person and, as such, an embodiment 
of the personal.
6) Jesus did discover the cannon people. What is important, 
from our point of view, is that Macmurray was the first to draw our 
attention to this, with all its tremendous consequences; consequences 
which surprisingly only fully began to manifest themselves in the 
last century, probably as a result of the French Revolution.
Eighteen hundred years of dormancy and gestation! It vividly 
illustrates how long some ideas, especially social and moral ones in 
contrast to material ones, take to become anything like operational 
and effective.
Both, in his thought and action, Jesus, of all ancient and 
mediaeval leaders and thinkers, almost alone espoused the cause of 
the common man. Admittedly, he found it useful to use them far his 
purposes, but there was probably more to it than that, especially if
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he did have some awareness, as Macmurray contends, of the dialectic, 
and of its contradictory and paradoxical workinqs. Because of his 
espousal of the common man there can be no doubt that communism 
(small c) sprang from Christianity and Jesus; iqnorinq, that is, 
agqressive Marxism, mistakenly called Communism today.
End of Appraisement (2)
Christianity (Part II)
To return to Christianity. We new have a fair idea of what 
Macmurray thinks of Christianity; or rather, what he thinks 
Christianity is. Some of his thinking is traditional and 
established, but much of it is novel. Having written, far an 
introduction, so much already cn this I shall not attempt to 
summarise what Christianity is far Macmurray, as I think this has 
come throuqh clearly enouqh. Macmurray is primarily a Christian, and 
one could riqhtly say this, along with religion in qeneral, farms the 
matrix out of which most of his ideas, in other fields of human 
activity and thouqht, sprinq. Christianity is, far him, a seminal 
idea.
But this far from says it all. About many aspects, 
developments, omissions of Christianity Macmurray is somewhat 
critical and disturbed. Here again, marry of these are unusual, and 
consequently deserve special attention and consideration even if 
ultimately some of them may not be acceptable, or at least subject to 
doubt. In continuing therefore I propose to qive an outline of some 
of these.
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1) Our idea of Christianity is not Christian. "Unfortunately, 
most of what is new called Christianity has little enough to do with 
the teaching of Jesus." (FMW 214). And this applies not merely to 
the idea. It permeates, mostly unconsciously, the very way we live, 
or intend to live, as Christians - that is, when we intend this at 
all these days. And this distortion, this misquidedness, goes back a 
long way; indeed, to the ancient world itself. For, according to 
Macmurray, our idea of behaving, our conduct, is Roman; and much of 
our religious thinking is Greek based. And this, of course, instead 
of being founded upon, and grounded in, the Hebrew ethos and 
tradition, as we think it to be.
To take conduct and morality first. "What is called Christian 
morality to-day is based upon a Stoic tradition; upon intellect and 
will, upon the suppression of the emotional basis of conduct in the 
interest of 'principles'. The result of that is inevitable. Though 
Europe has developed itself intellectually with a steady growth 
upwards, has progressed in its grasp of principle, in scholarship and 
understanding, in the organization and control of life and of the 
world, it has remained all but completely barbaric on the emotional 
side. Our civilization, for all its scientific and administrative 
capacity, has remained emotionally vulgar and primitive, unchaste in 
the extreme. We do not recognize this, of course, because it is 
simply the reflection of our own inner insensibility. That 
insensibility is the inevitable result of a morality based upon will 
and reason, imposing itself upon the emotions and so destroying their 
integrity. Until we insist upon emotional sincerity, until we cease 
playing ducks and drakes with our feelings in the mistaken desire to 
dragoon them into conformity with what we conceive to be our
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'duties', until we beqin to trust our emotional life, this state of
affairs will necessarily qo on". (RE 132). And aqain; "Now if this
capacity to act rationally, accordinq to plan, is made an ideal of 
conduct, as it was by the Remans, then we qet a morality which 
consists in obeyinq a moral law. Moral conduct, can this basis, will 
be conduct which adheres consistently to the moral plan and 
successfully resists all our inclinations to do otherwise. The qood 
man will be the man who always does what he ouqht to do, not what he 
wants to do. He will be the man who acts rationally, not
emotionally. Desire and emotion and impulse will be the qreat
enemies of such a morality, since it is their interference that makes 
it difficult for us to act accordinq to plan." (FMW 78). A full 
statement of this whole contention can be read in FMW 74/82. And all 
this Stoic morality which has permeated Christianity, no doubt as a 
result of the powerfully influential Roman Qnpire adoptinq 
Christianity as its official reliqion, is contrary to the reliqion of 
Jesus. "But the spirituality of the Hebrews expressed itself in 
their long line of individual prophets, who stand out aqainst the 
background of leqal organization and in opposition to it. The 
prophetic tradition was one of inner vision and emotional response, 
not of the fixed plan of law and formal obedience. That prophetic 
tradition culminated and completed itself in Jesus, who insisted ... 
that life should be based upon an emotional principle, not on an 
intellectual one. Thus the morality of policy and plan, of will and 
obedience is the antithesis of the morality preached by Jesus". (FM 
80/81). Jesus' idea of life, livinq, relating, and action was based 
on freedom, emotion, and love, not on duty, will, and obedience,
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either to another person, or to an abstract, supposed, moral law.
Reqardinq reliqious thinkinq. The Romans were an overt, 
materialistic, praqmatic, law-conscious, rulinq people. Hence their 
zest for the will and obedience. They had nothinq but contempt for 
the emotions and reflection. The Greeks, on the other hand, were an 
artistic and contemplative people basically, but also without much 
deep concern for reliqion, such as the Hebrews had. "Greece 
developed a reflective consciousness at the expense of social 
development in the practical field, and when her social structure was 
overthrown by superior practical orqanization, her reflective 
development became a universal heritage for the reflective life of 
mankind in the future." (CH 40). Arising out of this reflective and 
contemplative mood and tradition, there came to be introduced into 
Christianity, in the early centuries, the idea of the mystical and 
other-worldliness, causinq various deqrees of retreat fran this 
world, and dissatisfaction, even abhorence and renunciation of it. 
Apart from pure mysticism the most extreme exemplification of this 
was monastic ism and celibacy. Plato contributed to and endorsed this 
strain with his doctrine of Forms. Perfection, the ideal, is laid up 
elsewhere. Here we see and knew only the shadow of things. Even 
more effective in distancing real reliqion, as Macmurray and the 
Hebrews understand it, was Neo-platonism, which flourished from about 
200 A.D. to 500 A.D., and was expounded by Plotinus. Unification of 
the individual soul with the divine was to be achieved only through 
asceticism and purification.
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The unfortunate and unwelcome upshot of all this contemplative 
and unrealistic development is that it inevitably leads to 
Macmurray's bete noire, dualism; the bane of religion and life. "On 
the practical side Christianity became dualist by accepting the Roman 
structure of law, organization and administration as the guarantee of 
the unity of the Church. On the theoretical side it fell into 
dualism by the acceptance of the thought-forms of Greek philosophy." 
(CH 131 ). (See also OC 51/2).
So; we are mistaken. The Christianity we know is not 
Christianity. "In this way Christianity came to be identified with a 
conception of the world and of life which is largely pagan in origin 
and wholly pagan in its intellectual structure, and in consequence 
became the bulwark of a traditional paganism which it had set out to 
supersede." (OC 51/2). Perhaps pagan is too strong a term. But, 
indeed, the effect was not in the true Hebrew-Jesus tradition.
Another source of dualism within the Christian religion has 
arisen historically. When the Roman Qnpire officially adopted 
Christianity a difference soon became apparent between the very 
robust, earthy, and secular, Roman way of life and of state 
authority, and the way of life prescribed by the Church. To meet 
this incompatibility, yet for both to work in harness and harmony, a 
tacit compromise and modus vivendi was eventually reached. Rome, and 
by new the mediaeval political world, would exercise their power in 
and over this world. The Church, with ostensibly equal power, 
authority, and force would ignore the evils and injustices of this 
world, and proclaim, and be content with, a 'heaven' in the next. 
Macmurray calls this agreement a pious fraud. It is, and has been, 
the prime source of unreality in the Christian religion, of pseudo­
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religion, of dualism, and of a false spirituality. "The Christian 
Church could new sanctify and defend the traditional system of 
morality, of law, of property, of warfare as well as of myth and 
philosophy, by referring its revolutionary conception of community to 
another world. This pious fraud - far it is nothing less - might be 
very effective far a time. But it must inevitably recoil upon the 
Church itself in the long run. We see the final result in our cwn 
day. The Church has created a demand for the classless society of a 
universal brotherhood in the hearts of men, but has bidden man look 
to the secular power for the ordering of life on earth. The Church 
itself has decided that the effort to establish the Kingdom of Heaven 
on earth shall be a purely secular effort, and that so far as it 
distracts men's minds fran the pursuit of spiritual aims it is an 
effort which she must condemn and oppose. Why then should we be 
surprised that the revolutionary movements of our time are anti- 
religious, anti-Christian, and materialistic? The Church has willed 
it so." (OC 50/1). This obviously, far Macmurray, was nothing but a 
sell-out of religion to the state; a way of buying by subterfuge the 
continuance of its cwn existence, however ineffective, moribund, 
pointless, that might turn out to be.
2) The progressive temper of our age is empirical. Everybody 
recognizes that all the benefits and the 'progress' of man and 
society spring fran empiricism, the prime examples of which are 
science and technology. Throughout the world all peoples want the 
science which originated and is still at its most advanced in the 
West. On the other hand, they are not so keenly seeking our 
religious and artistic culture, except in so far as a plastic veneer
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of it must inevitably accompany technological society wherever it 
goes, (see RE 172/3).
Christianity, because of its archaic, dogmatic, authoritarian, 
mood and tone, its mediaeval orientation, its total inability to 
modernise itself, has, and still is, losing ground. All its 
progressive pushes of the last forty years, promoted by such 
Innovators and thinkers as Bonhoef fer, Bultmann, John Robinson - the 
renounced Bishop of Woolwich - and Tillich, have, or seem to have, 
all come to nothing. Only de Chardin, of the reorientators has any 
credence left and he alone, of them all, bears some resemblance to 
Macmurray. It is, although this is a much too vigorous and 
picturesque conception of it, fighting a rearguard action, but it is 
a losing battle. ".... the tide of social evolution cannot for ever 
be dammed by the dykes of vested interest. The progressive forces 
are bound to win; and it looks as though the bursting of the dykes 
would be quick and catastrophic. If in that hour religion is found 
still on the side of .reaction, as it was in Russia, it must suffer 
almost total eclipse. Its existing form will be doomed to 
destruction." (SRE 9). And the irony is that, as we have seen, it 
is not Christianity at all I Marx, one of the major trumpeters of 
this rout and inevitable death-knell, did not, according to 
Macmurray, knew what real Christianity is. His denunciation was of 
the religion of other-worldliness and unreality which he mistakenly 
took, as so many millions of other people do and have done, to be 
Christianity.
Although Macmurray never says so, and although he regrets this 
dying of Christianity, now even more marked in the Western World than 
when Macmurray was producing the bulk of his work, perhaps its
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passing would be a good and saving event; its final demise the end, 
to say no more, of a mistaken, costly, and unfortunate deviation from 
the path of true religion. But Maanurray is eager to resuscitate it 
in its true and essential form. And there is only one way to do 
this. Like science, like the mood of our era, religion and 
Christianity must become empirical. All dogmas, assertions, and 
rigidities; all antiquated and obsolete ceremonies, rites, beliefs, 
and structures; and its whole reactionary and conservative temper, 
must go. Science did it - to become real science. Science came to 
maturity when it ceased to search for the philosopher's stone, the 
arcane formula for changing base metals into gold, when it stopped 
looking for the elixir of life, when it superseded alchemy. Growth 
and maturity come when all is orientated to reality i.e. the facts, 
conditions, and situations of this world and existence. So too, must 
religion, to become real, a vehicle of life and the creator of an 
acceptable human future, shed not only its past but also its 
unacceptable extant methods, thought-forms and techniques, and 
reorientate itself to this world, and to the facts of existence here. 
"One of the main reasons for the fatal alignment of religion with 
reaction is that the progressive attitude of mind is frankly 
empirical, while the religious temper remains traditional and 
dogmatic. The empiricism which is at war with our religious 
traditionalism is bound-up with science, and upon science the 
progress of civilization increasingly depends. So our house of life 
is divided against itself and cannot stand. Our religious habits of 
mind, defending a tradition, pulls us backwards to the past, and 
fastens us to forms of life which the march of development is surely
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destroying. Our scientific empiricism draws us into the future, 
toward the construction of new habits and forms of life. Between the 
two tensions we are paralysed and can only stand helplessly watching 
the approach of catastrophe." (SRE 9/10). "But there is another way 
out of the dilemma. If religion could abandon its traditional 
dogmatism and become itself empirically minded, it could lead the 
progressive movement with science as its technical adviser. If this 
is impossible, then religion can no longer perform any positive 
function in a society which depends, even for its daily bread, upon 
the empirical temper of scientific research and technical 
inventiveness. Religion must either transform itself or fade away." 
(SRE 10/11 ). Only the empirical approach can save religion and 
Christianity. What Macmurray regards as the essence of empiricism 
was quoted here, a little way back.
3) In this I include a number of short criticisms made by 
Macmurray, all very important, but which space and time are 
inadequate for their development, or, to the fuller treatment they 
deserve. They may be follcwed-up more adequately from the references 
given in, or after, each. To need to mention them, however, 
indicates their significance.
Western Christianity places much too much emphasis on requiring 
adherence to certain beliefs and doctrines in order to be, or at 
least to feel oneself to be, a member of a particular church.
Eastern Christian churches, being Greek in origin, are much less 
rigid on this point, the whole atmosphere being, as one would expect, 
orientated towards the aesthetic and emotional side of worship, not 
the doctrinal. This is not necessarily good, but neither is 
insistence upon intellectual conformity. "Eastern Christianity, when
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it succumbed to dualism, did so in the pure contemplative mode, not 
in the ethical mode which compromises with the necessity of practical 
activity. The result is an official religion which is non- 
intellectual and does not codify belief as a law of faith and action, 
but instead develops an aesthetic and mystical character and seeks a 
dramatic expression. In relation to action, such a religion performs 
a negative function. It provides a contemplative expression for the 
suppressed Christianity which it introduced into pagan society and so 
provides an escape-mechanism far emotional energies which might 
otherwise have bought expression in social change." (CH 152/3).
".... the identification of religion with intellectual assent to 
organized doctrine could hardly have arisen within the sphere of 
Eastern Christianity, which has always been relatively innocent of 
theological systems and even of moral codes. Instead Eastern 
Christianity has elaborated the aesthetic moment in religious 
reflection, (see RAS 72). Then, having said (RAS 77) that adherence 
to belief or doctrine is the aspect of religion farthest removed from 
the essential core of religious practice and meaning, Maanurray goes 
cn to add two further reasons far this contention. "Firstly, it is 
in the nature of intellectual formulations that they are 
hypothetical. Certainties are either formal, or they belong to the 
field of action, where knowledge is integrated with movement. When, 
in reflection, we substitute symbols for the things we meet directly 
in action, truth lies in a reference beyond thought, and all our 
statements require verification. In the second place, it is of the 
utmost importance, and particularly in the revolutionary 
transformation in which we are now involved, that we should not
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profess to believe anything that we cannot believe effectively. If 
this means that religious beliefs are reduced to a minimum, then we 
must put up with it. Also it is wrong to ask anyone to profess to 
believe something that he does not even understand, and that has no 
meaning for him. In religion particularly complete intellectual 
sincerity is required of us. From this it follows that it is 
necessary, if the task of religion in our time is to be undertaken, 
that there should be an end of dogma, and that the statements of 
theology should be accepted, like those of science, as hypothetical 
only. For Christianity must become, not in fact only, but in 
intention, a developing religion. It must be able to integrate 
itself, both in respect of fact and of value, with the development of 
scientific and artistic knowledge." (RAS 77).
Christianity has sentimentalized love, to turn to the next 
point. This contention is discussed in CS 113/121. Human action has 
two fundamental positive motives; hunger and love. Together these 
lead to the integration of human life. Hunger motivates us to 
collectively cooperate to provide our material and physical needs; 
Love, even in its sexual form, is self-transcending. Its essence is 
what we spontaneously give, or "spend", upon the world. Unlike 
hunger, its expression is unconditional. To live satisfactorily the 
two, hunger and love, must work together. One without the other is 
useless. Communism i.e. Marxism, concerns itself with, and 
concentrates upon, the hunger factor; probably because of Marx's 
aforementioned misunderstanding of Christianity, and his subsequent 
denunciation of it. Christianity, on the other hand, has come to 
dwell almost exclusively upon the love motive, and consequently 
sentimentalizes it. By this Macmurray means that it has ceased to be
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a motive for action, a motive bent on realizing community in this 
world. Instead, it becomes an escapism, a love of the mystical or of 
other-worldliness. It is a love displaced from its real purpose. In 
other words, it has become unreal. "The dissociation of love from 
hunger is one of the forms in which pseudo-religion expresses itself 
most readily. This dissociation turns love into a mere idea or a 
sentiment which exists as the idea or the sentiment of communion.
But in this form it has already ceased to be a motive for action and 
has become, therefore, unreal and imaginary." (CS 120). Love, to be 
real, must be love as motive, expressing itself in practical intent 
and action. Very relevant here, but too long to quote, are pages 
120/121 CS).
Thirdly; fear is a very marked feature of human life, and one of 
the tasks of religion is to rid us of all but the most essential 
fears. "... conquest of fear (is) the eternal task of religion." (CS 
102). Yet, contrary to Jesus' teaching and outlook, Christianity has 
used and exploited fear. One reason for this is that there is 
nothing like fear to make people amenable to the control of others. 
Fear has, mistakenly, become one of the main agents of so-called 
salvation. The principle way this has been introduced is through the 
instilling of a sense of guilt. Spontaneous living, happiness, and 
creativity, are the essence of Jesus' teaching. When wrongs are 
cannitted nothing is more important between people than genuine 
contrition, forgiveness, and reconciliation. But to be continually 
belaboured by a sense of sin, guilt, and fear of divine retribution, 
often for the most absurd, irrational, and trivial so-called 
offences, ruins all joy and spontaneity in living; it produces just
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the opposite of what Christian living is, or should be. "This 
doctrine of the forgiveness of sin has been almost more completely 
parodied by pseudo-Christianity than any others. A great deal of 
Christianity has actually perverted the plain teaching of Jesus as to 
conceive that its first duty was to arouse and deepen in men, by all 
the means in its pcwer, the sense of guilt. This is, of course, one 
of the subtlest means of destroying the spontaneity of any individual 
and making him amenable to the control of others. The whole problem 
for religion, as Jesus clearly saw, was to reverse this process; and 
so to create the kind of man who could not be imposed upon by 
authority through their own sense of guilt, but would spontaneously 
create from a sense of equality and freedom. His method was to 
assert the falsity of the sense of guilt, without denying the reality 
of the occasions which give rise to it...." (CS 111/112).
Yet a fourth failing is that Christianity has become an ideal 
instead of an intention. Christianity is for living and for action. 
It is a way of life,* something to be worked out, lived, and literally 
realized. But formal and official Christianity has, more and more, 
allowed it to become something hoped for, something in the future, 
something to vaguely set your sights on, but obviously hopeless of 
ever being realized. Only as Christianity is seen and acted upon, 
says Maanurray, as an intention, can it be anything but an 
unrealistic, pie in the sky, other-worldly, and useless idea. (See 
CH 6/10). "....we must define Christianity in terms of intention.
This means that we must not define it in terms of an ideal. An ideal 
of life is precisely a conception which is not thought in terms of a 
practical intention. It is inherently reflective and contemplative 
in character. It appears, therefore, as an idea of hew life might be
- 122 -
lived or ought to be lived; as a standard by which actual life can be 
measured and either approved or condemned. In this way it is 
concerned with judgement, not with action. Or it is an imaginary 
picture of a better world which can be believed in or hoped for. In 
this case it is associated with a belief that there are forces 
working in the world which will, or may, produce it by transforming 
the world. But all this is independent of any purpose or intention 
informing and determining practical activity." (CH 8).
As mentioned earlier, many other interesting questions, raised 
by Macmurray, concerning Christianity could be made. But enough has 
been said to indicate seme of his original thinking cn this subject. 
For a good summary of his keen desire to see changes in Christianity, 
and its consequent re-establishment as a necessary, major, farce and 
influence in modem society, read RAS 74/79; OC 59/63; and SRR 78/81.
In closing this section two other interesting points regarding 
Christianity must be made.
Firstly; that, according to Macmurray, and ironically, and quite 
contrary to what is very generally understood, science is the child 
of Christianity; in fact, the only child it has yet produced of any 
lasting value and substance. "The one creative achievement of the 
Reformation was science and the scientific spirit. Science is thus 
the legitimate child of a great religious movement, and its genealogy 
goes back to Jesus. In its true sense, science is the one proper, 
positive, expression of Christianity that the world has yet seen.
The rest of modem culture - its art, morality, and religion - is 
simply the disrupted remnants of the pseudo-Christianity of the 
mediaeval world." (RE 172/3). ".... it was Christianity which gave
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us science by its insistence on the spirit of truth" (FMW 37). See 
also FMW 38/9. Could this be, one cannot help observing, a brilliant 
example of hew one of Maanurray's favourite themes and mechanisms, 
the dialectic, is operating in the world and history?
Secondly, to be effective, we have observed Macmurray argue, 
religion must be universal. It must intend to include the whole of 
mankind. Jewish Old testament religion, excellent as it was, fell 
short on this point, and was only metamorphosed into universal ism by 
Jesus. But, it may be rightly said, There are at least two other 
universal religions, Buddhism and Islam. Are not these, therefore, 
to be considered as of equal worth and value with Christianity? No, 
says Macmurray, Christianity stands supreme and alone. Why? Because 
Buddhism is other-worldly, much moire even than debased Christianity. 
Not to act at all; to remove oneself from the pains and pleasures of 
feeling and existence, is the essence of its teaching. And, in 
contrast to Christianity, Islam is too much of this world. It aims 
to live by power, mastery, and conquest. It has no time far real 
community, human communion, and fellowship. Christianity alone, 
properly understood, performed, and realized, perfects in action the 
full possibilities of our existence with one another here. A full 
development of this point is to be found in CS 63/4.
This concludes what is able to be said here in outlining 
Maanurray's main ideas and directions concerning Christianity. We 
new turn to our last subject under religion -
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God
Nowhere does Macmurray bring together his scattered views and 
hints of God. Probably God is mentioned a hundred times throughout 
Macmurray's writings, yet only one chapter, that of the second in 
"Creative society", has God in its title; and, although called 
"Belief in God", is mainly about Ccmnunism. According to Macmurray 
the Marxists, unconsciously of course, have a faith in God far 
exceeding that of any decadent Christian; which is rather a telling 
point, except that elsewhere Macmurray renarks that Marxism can never 
be religious because it operates only through the hunger and not the 
love motive. (CS 27/9). CS 116/121).
Hcwever, although scattered and never made comprehensively 
explicit or coherent, we can piece together some of Macmurray's 
thoughts on God, and of what he understands by the concept. And I 
think the following is a fair summary of his major views on this. 
Whilst adding a few extra relevant remarks at the end I shall treat 
the matter in three short sections. (1) Macmurray's idea of what 
God is; (2) Knowledge of God; (3) Belief in God.
Macmurray sees God as the infinite ground of the personal. To 
explain. We are all familiar with the idea of matter in the cairoon, 
exhaustive, concept of 'matter, life, and mind'. When we speak of 
matter in this context, or within any similar universe of discourse, 
we are not referring to any particular piece of matter but to the sum 
total of, and every instance of, all the stuff in the universe 
manifesting the substance and behaviour of matter. The same, quid 
pro quo, with life in such a context. New God, for Macmurray, is the 
sum total of all the personal, and its manifestations, in the
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universe. God is, "The infinite person in which our finite human 
relationships have their ground and their being." (SRE 81). Further 
quotes, relevant to the above, are, ".... the only way to discover 
what matter is is to investigate particular material facts, to deal 
with actual instances. None of these, of course is matter, because 
matter is the infinite ground of all instances. (RE 209). "God is 
the infinite ground of all finite phenomena in the personal field - 
and therefore, ultimately, of all phenomena whatsoever." (RE 210). 
Regarding the last phrase. Macmurray believes the personal is the 
ultimate thing in creation, God being its ultimate expression and 
manifestation, and includes the "lower" orders of life and the 
material (see RE 223).
Why is this so? Why is the personal the supreme, fundamental, 
and seminal element? Because, so the argument, if you can call it 
that, seems to run - we are interdependent upon each other. It is 
this basic fact, as we saw earlier which makes us and the ambience of 
our living, whether we recognize or like it or not, religious. But 
we are also dependent upon the material i.e. the earth, air, soil, 
water - remember the quite valid, if seen in its proper place and 
perspective, hunger motive? Thus God, the ground and sum total of 
the personal, must be and to continue at all must be, or at least 
include, the material and organic as well. Easy to write, it is less 
easy to understand how this can be. Macmurray would definitely call 
himself a theist, yet if he has here been understood aright, his 
thinking on this matter would seem to border very much on pantheism. 
But as previously mentioned, as more of an intuitionist than a 
logician, Macmurray leaves some questions rather vague and open; 
perhaps intentionally. For as we have seen, his whole emphasis is
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upon relating, living, and action, not upon the perfecting of theory 
and doctrine.
Macmurray also conceives this idea of God as the infinite ground 
of the personal frcm quite a different but allied approach. We can 
only be because we are aware of something which is not ourselves. We 
are always aware of this "other". If we were not we would be living 
in an interior, mental, world of unreality. "To say that personal 
consciousness is objective is to say that we are persons because we 
live in and through a knowledge of what is not ourselves .... Hie 
difficulty of grasping it arises simply from the fact that it is 
almost impossible to be explicitly aware of it. There is nothing to 
contrast it with. But if we consider the familiar statement that 'we 
live in the world' we shall discover that it is paradoxical. It 
asserts that we have our conscious being not in ourselves but in what 
is not ourselves. We live in the other, in that which we recognize 
to be other. It is only when we withdraw into ourselves and find 
ourselves in a dream-life of phantasy and imagination that we 
discover the possibility of a consciousness which has no objectivity, 
and we discover it precisely because we are now living not in the 
world but in ourselves, in a world where we are not dependent on 
reality but masters of the unread. Our dependence on what is not 
ourselves - or rather, since we always are dependent, whether we 
recognize it or not, our recognition of dependence and our living in 
terms of this recognition - is the core of our readity." (RE 219). 
Now this other includes the usual three orders of material, organic, 
and personal. We naturally experience them all. To be brief, but I 
think the point is easily understood, the ultimate Other, now
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properly favoured with a capital letter; the other which, although 
essentially of the personal but which nevertheless as we have seen 
must include the material and organic, is according to Macmurray,
God. This for him is God. "Who then is the Other in relation to 
Whom all find themselves in a complete self-transcendence? The Other 
can only be an infinite person, who is at once the Father of men and 
the creator of the world. For the Other must be personal - since he 
is one term in a personal relationship. He must be infinite and 
eternal - the same yesterday, today and for ever; and since the 
ordinary experience of a personal relation is necessarily a unity in 
cooperation, directed towards nature and upon nature, he must unify 
the natural with the personal." (RAS 59). But Macmurray goes even 
further than to suggest that this "factual", essential, experiencing 
of the universal other is God. He asserts that God as so perceived 
cannot be rationally denied. "The idea of God as the universal Other 
is, therefore, inherent in the act of religious reflection itself.
It is given in the act of reflection itself, which starts from the 
actual fact of personal relationship. The universal cannot be 
denied, since to deny it would be to forbid the act of reflection, 
while it is only through the act of reflection that the denial is 
possible. The existence of God cannot, therefore, be rationally 
denied, since it cannot be denied without self-contradiction. And 
since, as we have seen, religious reflection is the primary form of 
reflection from which scientific and artistic reflection are derived 
and in which they are contained, God is the primary correlate of 
human rationality." (SRE 80/81). See also "Persons in Relation" 
164/5. For a comment on this see the appraisement of this section 
later.
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In the brief explanation of these two conceptions, of the 
infinite ground of the personal and of the incontrovertible other, 
enough has been given to indicate what God is for Macmurray; not 
forgetting to add, of course, what was earlier mentioned in the 
section on Old Testament Jewish religion, that God is a worker, a 
living acter-out of his cwn intention, in and through that which he 
has created, and is still creating. Moreover, according to 
Macmurray, whatever we do his intention cannot, ultimately, be 
frustrated - or he would not, presumably by definition, be God. (CH 
54. SRR 45).
We new turn to the second part of this section; knowledge of
God.
For Macmurray intellectual, formal, knowledge is not real 
knowledge. It is only knowledge about not knowledge of. It is 
merely instrumentals Macmurray calls this type of knowledge 
information. "Intellectual knowledge tells us about the world. It 
gives us knowledge about things, not knowledge of them. It does not 
reveal the world as it is. Only emotional knowledge can do that.... 
The wider use of the senses for the joy of living in them, is knowing 
the world itself in and through emotion, not by means of the 
intellect. This is not to disparage intellectual knowledge but only 
to insist that it is meaningless and without significance, apart from 
the direct sensual knowledge which gives it reality. One cannot 
really know about anything unless one first knows it. Intellectual 
awareness is egocentric. It uses the senses as its instrument. But 
the direct sensual awareness has its centre in the world outside, in 
the thing that is sensed and loved for its own sake." (RE 43). All
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scientific knowledge, fear example, is and can only be of this kind. 
It merely gives us information. "When he (the scientist) escapes 
from the real world of home and friendship and the traffic of life, 
and shuts himself into his laboratory, he escapes from himself and 
loses himself in a world of information. Of information, however, 
not of knowledge. Knowledge is always personal, always somebody's; 
but information is just anybody1 s. Science wants facts, atoms of 
information, which must all be indifferent to their being known; all 
equally valid for anybody at all. Science is not the personal 
knowledge of this scientist or that; it is information, the raw 
material out of which you and I can pick and choose what we want for 
our purposes, to build up our own knowledge which is real knowledge 
just because it is ours and nobody else's." (RE 150/1). Real 
knowledge comes only through the emotions. Art provides, whether as 
experienced by the actual artist or merely by the recipient and 
appreciater, a much more real knowledge of things than does science. 
It puts us, or should do if it is good art, emotionally and 
essentially in touch with the basic essence of whatever it purports 
to be depicting or creating. "The receptivity of art, the artistic 
consciousness of the object, is knowledge proper as distinct from the 
understanding of or information about the object, which is all that 
science can give us. The artistic attitude alone enables us to come 
into contact with the reality of things, to realize the 
individuality, the value of actual objects, actual people. For 
science things exist only in terms of something else. Reality is 
that which exists in and far itself, the individual. Knowledge is 
the grasp of reality, the contemplation of the individual in its own
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proper being. This is precisely what art gives us and science does 
not; therefore the receptivity of art is knowledge; the receptivity 
of science is not." (RE 155).
But even this is one-sided and incomplete as the art-abject 
cannot knew us. We can only know it. Only in human relations can 
the knewer be known, and, in turn, knew. This is meaning of St. 
Paul's deeply religious perception, and echoed in the well-known 
hymn, "I shall know as I am knewn". Religion transcends and 
completes the limited relationship of art " .... by the simultaneous 
recognition that I am one of them, and that I am recognized and 
appreciated by them, as they are by me. For the artistic rationality 
"I knew" is the full expression of its contemplation; far the 
religious consciousness this is not enough. It must say "I know and 
I am knewn". The promise of the full maturity of religion in human 
life is put perfectly in Paul's wards: "Then shall I know even as
also I am known"; and it is the close of his paean in praise of love. 
It expresses the perfect and complete mutuality of communion, of 
mutual emotional awareness." (RE 63). The essence of essential 
knowing is mutuality leading to conmunion. Such a state can only be 
realized in a condition of equality and freedom. (See RE 104/5. RE 
1 1 1).
Thus God, to turn to the upshot of the last paragraphs, whom we 
have seen is the total ground of the personal, of relating, and the 
entire and essential Other, can only be known through the emotions.
We can only, if we would wish to experience God, do this in a very 
down-to-earth, practical, way. There is no element of mysticism 
required to know the God of Macmurray. Nor, on the other hand, can 
we knew him by ideation. Of course, it may be necessary to do this
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for the sake of formal corrinunication between ourselves. But this is 
not knowing him as such. God is only to be discovered and known 
empirically i.e. in our relationships with each other. "God is the 
primary correlate of human rationality. And moreover, because 
religious reflection is not primarily expressed in thought but in 
action, God is not primarily apprehended as an idea, but in life 
which is centred in the intention of mutuality, as that infinite 
person in which our finite human relations have their ground and 
their being." (SRE 81).
The more real these relationships are, the more shall we know 
God. Obviously, far Macmurray, there is no other road to God. This 
is, and must be, and can only be, the way. We cannot know him by 
reason, or by seeking to establish proofs of his existence. "It 
might seem proper .... to make reference to the traditional proofs of 
the existence of God. But this would serve little purpose. For they 
belong to a mode of philosophy which we have been compelled to 
reject, and even in that mode they failed to stand .... If we refer 
to these proofs at all, it is only to underline their failure and to 
add a further reason for it, which has arisen in our own study." (PR 
206). Once you have discovered that God is the ground of emotion and 
relationships the only way to experience and know him is through 
emotion and relationships. "Thus, like the true scientist, the truly 
religious man will talk little about God - he will leave that to the 
speculative philosopher and theologian - and much about the empirical 
life of personal relationships. He will realize what Blake meant 
when he wrote: "God only exists and is in existing beings or men."
So a scientist might truly say that matter only exists and is in
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existing material phenomena or object. In particular the really 
religious man will define the nature of God, not in terms of the 
analysis of ideas or of transcendental beliefs, but in terms of his 
empirical knowledge of human relationships. So Jesus is reported to 
have said; 'He that hath seen me hath seen the Father, and hew sayest 
thou, then, shew us the Father.'" (RE 210). And again. "The idea of 
communion with God is the universal correlate of the empirical 
experience of finite personal relationships and its meaning is 
discovered and realized only in the empirical field." (RE 210).
Our last section concerns belief in God. For Macmurray, to 
profess belief in God counts far little ar nothing. As we saw, some 
way back, Western Christianity, mistakenly, gives priority to, and 
puts far too much emphasis upon, doctrine and dogma - especially 
concerning God - as a sine qua non of being supposedly religious at 
all. Basically it is theology and its ramifications which divides 
Christendom into its countless sects and denominations. Differences 
concerning what life* we should be living hardly ever divide or 
diversify. Occasionally ritual and ceremony i.e. the art side and 
aspect of religion, may do this, but rarely the personal, relating, 
and moral side. Macmurray says, critically, "To believe in an idea 
of God would seem to be the very symbol of self -righteousness and 
self-assertion. If I can insist that my idea of God must be 
maintained, how can I have the humility to recognize the existence of 
a Being in the light of whose infinite understanding all my knowledge 
must be the ignorant phantasy of a child? I have a growing 
impression that many religious people now speak and behave as if the 
existence of God depended upon their belief in him." (CS 16/17).
Hew then can we assert our belief in God? We do it in our living,
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behaving, and relating. "Belief in God is properly an attitude to 
life which expresses itself in our ways of behaving." (CS 19). "If 
we wish to knew what it means to believe in God, we must ask 
ourselves what this practical attitude is and how it expresses 
itself." (CS 20, and much more follows on the same page). "We are 
concerned with actions, not with professions, and we have repeated 
warnings from the teaching of Jesus that the Divine judgment pays 
little attention to professions and is likely to have surprising 
results." (CS 20). And equally, whatever our professions, we deny 
belief in God if we do not live thus. "For all our relational 
investigation and rational planning of the economic and political and 
social spheres is without meaning unless it is the means to one end - 
the living of the personal life of community in joy and freedom. To 
sacrifice life to its own conditions is the ultimate insincerity and 
the real denial of God." (RE 254).
And underlying, and fundamental to all this, is one factor which 
is indicative of itself of our belief in God. This is our attitude 
of faith and trust. Faith and trust not specifically in God, as is 
conventionally and traditionally proclaimed, but in life and being. 
Are we trust motivated and pervaded? Or is it fear which motivates 
and pervades us? These, according to Macmurray, are the crucial and 
fundamentally relevant questions, revealing our belief, or the 
absence of belief, in God. "Perhaps the fundamental component of a 
belief in God is the expression in action of an attitude of faith and 
trust. Its opposite is an attitude of fear. A man who is on the 
defensive in his attitude to life does not believe in God, whatever 
his professions may be. Belief in God necessarily delivers a man
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from fear and from self-centredness, because it is his consciousness 
that he is not responsible for himself nor far the world in which he 
lives. It involves the recognition that his own life is a small, yet 
an essential part of the history of mankind, and that the life of 
mankind is a small but essential part of the universe to which it 
belongs. It involves the recognition that the control and the 
determination of all that happens in the world lies in the hands of a 
power that is irresistible and yet friendly." (CS 20/21). To be 
other than this is to disbelieve in God. "If we believe in God we 
live as if the fortunes of the world did not depend on us; we live as 
if the world did not depend on us; we live as if the world could be 
trusted to work out its cwn destiny and to use us, even through our 
mistakes and our failures, far its own good purposes. (CS 22).
The concept of faith we have come principally to use is in the 
context of "what I believe". Faith, as Macmurray would have us use 
and understand it, as an indication of our belief in God or not, 
means "do I trust in' life and reality?" This trust and faith 
includes our relating, and of our including all men in our 
fellowship. "These two things - the inner integrity of the 
individual and his integration in caimunion with all individuals - 
are strictly correlative, since human nature is objective and can 
only be integral in the integrity of its relationships to what is not 
itself. Similarly, there could be no distinction between religion as 
communion with God, and the social comnunity of man. There can be no 
whole without its parts; and a ocnmunian with God which is not a 
communion with man is no communion at all, but its refusal. If any 
man say he loves God and loveth not his brother, he is a liar, and 
the truth is not in him. For religion in its maturity, whatever is a
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condition of real and complete communion between men, is a condition 
of religion itself," (RE 250). a relation to God which is not
a relation to my neighbour is unreal." (RAS 69). If we have not a 
true conception of God, or at least of the area of experience in 
which he is to be found, (presumably, that which is suggested by 
Macmurray) then it might well be that those who reject and repudiate 
our God, and profess to be atheists, are (so far as it goes) more 
religious, honest, and more in touch with reality than those still 
professing belief in an erroneous and outdated image of God.
Macmurray puts Marx and the Marxists in this category. (See CS 
22/7). "When, therefore, a society has crystallized a conception of 
God which is false, the professed atheist may be more truly religious 
than the theist." (RE 207).
To end; a few rather stark, and here undiscussed, remarks of 
Macmurray concerning God.
"If there is no God, the effort to maintain and propagate 
religion is a crime against humanity" (CS 17).
"I do not believe that there can be a religion without God, or 
even that the existence of God can be rationally questioned." (RE 
208).
"There is an inherent connection between a people*s conception 
of God and their conception of man. In particular, the way they 
conceive the relation between God and man determines the way they 
conceive the relations between men in society." (CH 33).
"There is, then, only one way in which we can think our relation 
to the world, and that is to think it as a personal relation, through 
the form of the personal. We must think that the world is one
- 136 -
action, and that its impersonal aspect is the negative aspect of this 
unity of action, contained in it, subordinated within it, and 
necessary to its constitution. To conceive the world thus is to 
conceive it as the act of God, the Creator of the world, and 
ourselves as created agents, with a limited and dependent freedom to 
determine the future, which can be realized only on the condition 
that our intentions are in harmony with His intentions, and which 
frustrate itself if they are not." (PR 222).
So, within the limits possible here, a brief summary has been 
given of Maanurray^ ideas of God. It is hoped that enough has been 
said to do justice to Macmurray on an aspect of religion which, as 
remarked earlier, he has never collated, nor made fully coherent and 
cohesive. I wonder why?
Appraisement 3
1) Christianity
Hew far is our Christian morality Roman and not truly Christian? 
Perhaps we can, to be honest, appraise and judge this contention only 
in relation to the time Macmurray was writing i.e. the 1920s - 1950s; 
as since then there has been a revolution in conduct, if not in 
religious belief. Moreover, there were times in the past when 
society was freer and less duty conscious and concerned. Whether our 
permissive society is a temporary, releasing, lid-off-the-kettle, 
phase - as were, far example, the times of the Reman orgies, the 
Restoration decades, the age of Louis XIV, and the Gay Nineties - or 
whether it heralds the start of a more permanent trend, allowing us 
to grew emotionally in freedom, as it seems Macmurray desires, has
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yet to be seen. Only the future will tell.
There must be raised the slight doubt as to whether the mistake 
was wholly attributable to Rome and Stoicism. No doubt it played 
some part, but I would put part of the blame at the door of St. Paul, 
who Macmurray often quotes and who is obviously a favourite of his. 
The cumulative influence of St. Paul, with his restrictive and 
restricting ideas of life and morality, upon Calvin, the Puritans, 
Baptist, and Methodists, to name but some, to be followed later by an 
age of moral restriction, severity, and at least in part by hypocrisy 
i.e. the Victorians and Victorianism, seems a considerable and 
influential contributory cause to our mistaken view of Christian 
morality. However, whatever the cause, I think we can agree with 
Macmurray that we have not got real Christian behaviour and 
intentions today; in principle and understanding that is, let alone 
in practice.
Regarding the sell-out of the Christian Church to the Roman 
state, and the consequent development of dualism and other­
worldliness in Christianity as an effect of this, this would seem to 
be as good an explanation as any. The early centuries of the Church 
were vigorously earthy, related to the situations and demands of this 
world, outgoing, obviously empirical, and except for the odd, 
ominous, Council, not over-concerned with doctrine or the conditions 
of another, hypothetical, life. Yet a change does seem to have come 
over the Church in the mid-centuries; so the engineered compromise of 
this "pious fraud" could, as Macmurray contends, be the major reason.
Who else, to turn to another point, is advocating empiricism in 
religion, whether strongly and persuasively, with an interested
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following, or simply hinting at it and suggesting that it might be a 
good thing? Nobody to my knowledge. And if by any chance somebody 
is, but is doing it couched in traditional religious symbolism and 
language, then it is no wonder they are not being heard car heeded. 
Only Macmurray, forthrightly and unashamedly, puts, expounds, and 
urgently pleads such a case and a breaking with the past.
In this he is extraordinarily novel and, religiously, far ahead 
of his time. Only two points of critical questioning need be made of 
his advocacy, and these are made in no carping, petty, or trivial 
spirit, at least not by me, because I agree utterly and unreservedly 
with Macmurray's contention. I am no lover of Barth and allied 
schools of theology. To me they are purely reactionary.
Firstly then; right and proper as empiricism may be for 
approaching and discerning religion and its truths, how is it to be 
done? What are its skills and techniques? Of this vitally important 
matter Macmurray makes not the slightest suggestion. He does 
identify and define the relevant field, namely that of human 
relating; but as to how and what we might discover, or seek to 
discover, and learn here about religion, and of any acceptable 
hypotheses about it, he gives no hint. Intangible and imperceptible, 
piecemeal and exploratory, as growth and discovery must be in this 
difficult field, surely it must be possible to describe and 
articulate a little of it, however tentatively, from the beginning. 
And presumably Macmurray himself has, in his cwn life, and in his 
feelings and relating, made a start privately, even if not openly 
admitted anywhere in his writings. But perhaps time is necessary 
here. After all, science was ages getting off the ground. Although 
its mature consciousness was envisaged and promulgated by Francis
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Bacon, not until John Stuart Mill, in the middle of the last century, 
nearly four hundred years later, did science fully realize and state 
its own techniques and methodology.
Jesus apart, despite seeming evidence to the contrary with its 
profusion of saints and mystics, who incidentally are mostly, but not 
quite all of them, withdrawers from life and reality, religion has 
perhaps yet to produce men of real religious genius, both in practice 
and in the description and analysis of that practice. From them, and 
perhaps only from them, as in all other areas of life and 
disciplines, we shall learn in detail the elements of empiricism in 
religion. There must be more to it than merely living satisfactorily 
with, say, one's family. Admittedly, from such a situation there 
will emerge happiness and joy of a profound kind. But although one 
might legitimately, if one would so wish, call this religious, or the 
expression of religion, can one really think that this has been an 
empirical discovery, experience and exploration of religion? Good as 
this is, surely there must be more to it than that.
The second challenge concerning empiricism in religion, and of 
its paramount importance, is that Macmurray does not, in his writings 
on religion, observe it himself. His writings are full of dogmatic, 
challengable, statements. Whilst far much of the time it could be 
said he has the empirical approach, which is admirable, he constantly 
slips back into assertions of the most rigid and unproven kind. And 
he, astonishingly, seems quite unaware that he is doing this. For 
example; to speak of God the way he often does, fails to measure up 
to the standards he would wish us to be adopting in our empirical 
approach to religious thinking and feeling. Written science may,
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admittedly, be full of old dogmatic assertions when in the process of 
describing a new discovery car hypothesis. But we know that these 
seemingly necessary dogmatic assertions have already been empirically 
"proven" in earlier experiments and works, and have become acceptable 
and a part of the established orthodoxy. Not so with Macmurray1 s 
religious assertions, especially as we are only on the threshold of 
the religious approach, with as yet no empirical, or very little, 
past to work and build on. Religion is at the stage empirically 
which science was five hundred years ago, if that. Indeed, to 
approach religion empirically is hardly understood yet; and to the 
perceptive eye, Macmurray's dogmatism and unempiricism in this area, 
however inadvertent, detracts from its promotion.
In closing this part of the appraisement section on Macmurray's 
views and criticisms of Christianity, only the briefest comment on 
other matters can be made.
Already we have had occasion to refer to doctrine and 
intellectual beliefs. We must agree with Macmurray that these hold 
much too important a place in Western Christianity.
Love is sentimentalized in much of Christian thought and ritual. 
Jesus did make the supreme sacrifice as indeed countless others have 
done, Christian and otherwise, far their beliefs. But the 
sentimentality concerning, inter alia, the cross, rightful, proper, 
and useful a symbol as this may be, is often too sickly, sentimental, 
and maudlin, to be believed. If, as Macmurray would have us envisage 
real Christianity to require and entail, a quarter of that emotional 
outpouring was spent on helping people in need or, better still, in 
genuinely and realistically promoting improved relationships with 
those with whom we are daily in contact, the world would begin to
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knew what real love is.
Can religion cast out fear? To some extent perhaps, but not 
always in the way and to the degree we would wish it to. Certainly 
if human relations are right, or, it would be better to say, were 
right, one great area of fear would be banished. But would all fear, 
except of course the most biologically necessary, be removed as a 
consequent? It would seem not, at least not cn this account alone. 
To give but one example. We should still certainly fear severe, 
chronic, progressive, illnesses which are inevitably accompanied by 
pain, incapacity, permanent discomfort, hopelessness, and the 
inevitable extinction. These only in the most indirect sense can be 
attributed to our fellows, and then often only in the most innocent 
and inadvertent manner.
But Macmurray even meets this point. He says, "All religion, as 
we have seen, is concerned to overcome fear. We can distinguish real 
religion from unreal by contrasting their formulae for dealing with 
negative motivation. The maxim of illusory religion runs: 'Fear
not; trust in God and He will see that none of the things you fear 
will happen to you.1; that of real religion, on the contrary, is 
'Fear not; the things that you are afraid of are quite likely to 
happen to you, but they are nothing to be afraid of,"' (ER 171).
This would seem to be going a bit too far. One would have to be more 
than extremely religious, or possessed of an unconscious death wish, 
to genuinely and really live in this state of suggested trust and 
faith. And, moreover, when it comes, if it comes, one suffers 
whether you are fearful or not. So what's the odds!
To turn to the last part. In vie* of all the criticisms made
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earlier, including both their style and kind, it would seem fair to 
say, as Macmurray does, that Christianity has come to be regarded as 
an ideal rather than as an intention; which it must be to become 
effective i.e. achieved in reality and action. I never have argued 
with the old adage, "Hell is paved with good intentions". Intention, 
genuine intention, is everything. If you do not intend, but are 
content to exist in the shining light of an ideal, you may get a glow 
of self-glory and approval, but you will get nowhere and soon become 
even more unreal and ineffective in this world which is enveloped in 
and demands action and activity.
There seems truth in Macmurray’s contention that of all the 
universal religions only Christianity is read, and capable of totally 
fulfilling life. This, however, must always be taken with the 
proviso, never stated by Macmurray but which by implication he would 
entirely agree and endorse, namely, that the Christianity concerned 
must be real Christianity, not the pseudo, other-worldly, unreal, 
facade it has become.
2) Of God
Once again we must recognize that Macmurray has a novel, even if 
not quite a unique, view of things common only in this case of God. 
Its novelty lies not so much in any originality as in the fact that 
it updates the imagery and conception of what has been loosely and 
vaguely understood before in other, and now less acceptable terms and 
images. To do this revisualizing is an excellent and essential thing 
to do as it brings, especially to the exceptionally sensitive and 
vulnerable area of religion, once again into the fold a conception 
which has wrongly been rejected because it is clothed in the wrong,
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and outdated, language and imagery.
But on his cwn sort of acceptable argument, does Macmurray go 
too far? Exampled only in finite manifestations we still call matter 
matter when speaking of its infinite aspects in the same way we call 
life life. Why then call the infinite ground of personality, 
manifested in countless examples, God? Why not call it personality? 
Is not personality a substantial and worthwhile thing in its own 
right without having to give it, as it were, an extra status symbol, 
an extra bit of kudos? Is not personality justification enough? 
Nowhere does Macmurray attempt to explain or suggest why he has made 
this sudden leap.
Moreover is personality the fundamental thing of the Ultimate? 
Conventionally religious people automatically and unthinkingly affirm 
this, but at least it is questionable. Although personality is the 
essential thing for us - we are nothing if we are not living, and do 
not live, as persons. And even if we recognize that personality is 
the most advanced knewn manifestation in the universe, does this 
justify us thinking that it is the fundamental, seminal, stuff of 
creation, prior to all other substances and essences, except perhaps 
far that of a higher, and as yet unperceived by us, form of itself?
Of course, Macmurray would argue that anything, any whole, cannot be 
less than its most advanced part, hcwever small, tentatively holding, 
and insecurely placed, that part may be. But I would not be 90 sure. 
There might be genuine emergence in creation.
Rationally and objectively can we, on the evidence available, 
believe that personality is the basic and all-pervading stuff of 
creation? Is there not a large element of anthropomorphism about 
this? Or a psychological projection to succour what we would wish?
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We new knew something of the vast extent of matter, space, and time. 
It would seem to be a gross over-statement to say that in and on this 
vast, celestial, and infinite structure, mind (let alone personality) 
occupies a billionth billionth part. So Macmurray's firm belief in 
the paramount nature of personality, ultimately perceived as the 
essence of God himself, needs more justification than Macmurray ever 
gives for it to be even tentatively acceptable.
Macmurray's conception of God as the infinite Other is 
interesting. Obviously we experience consciousness only because we 
are aware of something external to ourselves even if that external is 
only a part of our own body. Why not then an infinite all-inclusive 
Other ultimately common to all finite others? Whether true or not, 
whether possible or not, it is certainly a very interesting idea.
But, as with our corrment on the infinite ground of personality, why 
call this Other God? Only presumably because, by our cwn human 
definition, the concept of God requires to be the infinite, the 
ultimately all, the all-included and all-including entity. Whether 
such an entity actually is is another matter.
To knew God through the emotions and in our relationships with 
each other, requires some comprehending. I feel that a blind man 
might understand and be able to move seme way towards appreciating 
and experiencing it, more than a sighted person, far whan knowing 
almost invariably includes a visual element. Far, far, from this 
being all that is necessary, but some element of it has to be 
present. Even listening to music for the majority of people I would 
suggest, and here I am talking about all music not merely programme 
music, includes a visual, visualizing, or pictorial element, even if
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this visual element is only secondary i.e. "seeing" the orchestra in 
the mind's eye, let alone all the hundreds of wider mental images 
that might arise.
Good deep relationships, as mentioned before, are of infinite 
value and worth. The fact that they exist could be interpreted as 
the sign of a benign creation and creator, despite all the evidence 
and experience to the contrary. But to say that this is the way to 
knew and experience God, together with a few other types of emotional 
experience, such as from art, seems to me a limited conception of 
God, and certainly a very difficult one to accomplish. After all; 
knowing must include the full articulation and verbalization, or 
enumeration where relevant, of what is purported to be known.
However articulate, could one "know" God from and through 
relationships and emotions? Would it not be merely a case of 
describing feelings?
Obviously, behind this question lies the whole concept of what 
is, or should be, meant by knowing; too large a question to be 
discussed herel
The next section, that on believing in God, embodies, I think, 
the truth. Not by their professions but "by their fruits ye shall 
knew them". Naturally, being an Actionist, Macmurray would endorse 
this approach, and I see nothing wrong with it either. Similarly 
with faith and trust. There is only one doubt here. Macmurray seems 
to take no account of pathological disorders such as the numerous 
phobias and anxieties brought on by chemical, congenital, social, or 
environmental factors. Desire, intent, and will alone, and even 
"religion", on the part of the afflicted, seem powerless to induce a
- 146 -
state of faith and trust in living. From whence then springs the 
pcwer to be trusting?
Macmurray's suggestion that people become atheists because the 
current conception of God is outdated or unreal sounds good, and nay 
be true for seme people. But most people are atheists, the same as 
others are extreme left or right in politics, because of emotional 
factors, experiences, and influences, most of which they are totally 
oblivious. Their reasons and justifications are quite unrelated to 
the real cause. However, talcing it at its face value, is Macmurray's 
assertion true? To answer this we must ask another question. Have 
you ever known a religious person who has become an atheist ever 
being able to build-up, over perhaps a number of years, a new and 
acceptable concept of God? I have not. The old, new discarded 
image, instilled and experienced in childhood, is too ingrained to be 
emotionally modified. It may have been rejected, but it cannot be 
replaced.
Moreover, there are very few professing and outright atheists. 
When the current idea of God becomes effete or moribund most people, 
as we are witnessing today, are quite content to live in a sort of 
religious, no-man's-land, vacuum. Few, if challenged, would profess 
to total disbelief and atheism; but, equally, few act positively 
Christian.
With one contention of Macmurray's I find it very difficult or 
even impossible to agree with. "If there is no God, the effort to 
maintain and propagate religion is a crime against humanity". (CS 
17). This seems to me to be a totally immature and irresponsible 
standpoint. And it brings to light a contradiction in Macmurray's 
thinking. Speaking of science and the state of the world, admittedly
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in the 1930s, but the situation has not altered much since 
fundamentally, he says, "If we continue in this state, if we leave 
the decision of what is worth while as a use for science to chance, 
then inevitably chance will decide against us. There are laws of the 
world of value. The civilisation which leaves the decision of its 
values to chance has failed; and history, like Nature, sweeps its 
failures on to the dust-heap and starts over again. If we do not 
deliberately decide what we shall do with our science, science, like 
Samson, will bring down our house upon us and destroy itself, with 
us, in general ruin." (FMW 44). However we interpret this we must 
basically agree in regarding it as meaning that we i.e. man, us, 
individually and collectively, must recognize that we are responsible 
and have the future, both of man and the world, in our hands. I 
would say that such a position is even more marked and obvious today. 
But in the same book, a few pages later, he says, "So I say, let us 
stop trying and be quiet, and wait. To those who want to reply 'But 
if we don't hurry and get things settled, if we do nothing, we shall 
be lost,' I shall say 'Be quiet, be still - the world is not resting 
on our shoulders; if it were, heaven help it'" (PMW 69). Also see 
20/22 CS. This can only mean that we of ourselves can, and need, do 
little in face of the purpose of God and creation of which we are the 
indispensable but, in the last resort, a non-self willing part.
Now I prefer to take the first stance, and I do not believe we 
can have it both ways. We cannot leave it to chance and must save 
the day by our own efforts. This is our God-given task. Moreover, 
to return to the opening comment and criticism of this sub-section,
God or no God, we are obligated, if only by the fact of life itself,
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to work for a richer, more harmonious, existence for ourselves and 
for all our fellows together. God, or no God, makes little or no 
difference to our vital need for fellowship and communion. In other 
words, or rather Macmurray's, whether we will or not, and whether God 
exists or not, we still have hope, endeavour, and vision. To say, 
virtually, that nothing matters a damm if God is not, is to me a very 
narrow, self-centred, unobjective, and childish view. It is 
virtually saying, if the game is not as I want it I will not play.
No - religion is vital, God or no God.
One final point. If God is to be found in the fellowship and 
communion of life with our fellows, the essence of which is 
mutuality, freedom, and equality, we must be equal with God. The 
essence of personality is, and can only be, fully realized in this 
condition, Macmurray tells us. Therefore God must be part of this 
equality. If he is superior to us we cannot totally mutualise. This 
condition can only be attained in circumstances of equality. Perhaps 
to make this comment1 is to be either too arch or too logical, or 
both. But it is a consideration worth noting concerning Macmurray's 
idea of God, and of how and where he can be found and known.
End of Appraisement (3)
And so we end what must inevitably be, with so limited a space 
available, this cursory introduction and examination of Macmurray's 
principal religious ideas. I hope later, in a more extended form, to 
devote at least one book to this important and germinal aspect of 
Macmurray's thinking. But being such an extensive and permeating 
part of his thought it is doubtful if one book could do it justice.
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SCIENCE
Relevant Books
The Boundaries of Science. (BS)
Interpreting The Universe. (IU)
Reason and Etaotion. (RE)
Freedom in the Modem World. (FMW)
Religion, Art, and Science. (RAS)
The Self As Agent. (SA)
Persons in Relation. (PR)
Introduction
Religion, Science, and Art are for Macraurray the principal modes 
of reflection and human rationality. "Now religion is one of the 
three major modes of reflective activity. The others are science and 
art". (RAS 7). "Religion, in the seise in which it deserves 
consideration, is one of the three general expressions of 
rationality. The other two are art and science" (RE 195). "...
religion is the pressure towards rationality in our relations with 
our fellows". (RE 201). "It is through science that we come to 
relate our lives rationally to the material world, it is through art 
that we can come to relate our lives rationally to the world of 
organic life." (RE 203).
Of these, as we have seen, religion is for Macmurray the major, 
prior, and all-encompassing mode. Religion is of the essence of
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human living and is both the end and the ambience of our real 
existence as human beings. Its hallmark is the personal. But of the 
other two, by far the most prominent far Maanurray is science. Let 
it be pointed out at once that for him science is predominant in 
interest and concern only, although it takes up more time and space 
in his thought and writing than does art. A whole book, "The 
Boundaries of Science", has been devoted to but one aspect of 
science, or rather of one basic problem philosophically viewed; but 
none has been given over to art. Yet art, far Maanurray, no doubt 
takes precedent over science on the scale of worth and human values. 
Art is of a higher order than science. Science is the Cinderella of 
the three, and rightly so if we accept Macmurray1 s contentions, to be 
revealed as we go along.
But the reason why science, despite its lower status, occupies 
so large a part of Maanurray's thought is attributable to at least 
two reasons.
Firstly; science, rightly or wrongly, is the paramount mode of 
thought of our time in Western society, and probably throughout the 
world. And this is more so today than when Maanurray was doing most 
of his writing. Far in a later book of 1961 he says, "In our present 
social condition it is almost essential to begin by considering 
science. For science occupies the centre of the stage." (RAS 9).
And again. "We forget hew very recent the faith in science is. One 
might almost say that it is one of the consequences of the Second 
World War." (RAS 9).
Secondly; because as we saw in the earlier biographical note, 
science was a major interest of Macmurray1 s when very young. His
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first acquaintance with science at about the age of ten, after a 
severe and exclusively religious upbringing, was "a revelation."
(SKR 10). And throughout his youth his aim, although thwarted and 
determined otherwise by his elders, was to be a scientist. "If I had 
had my way I should have been a scientist". (SKR 10). Under these 
circumstances art, which in less strictly religious families and 
sects might get at least a look-in via sacred ritual, ceremony, and 
music, had very little if any place in Macmurray' s early environment 
and conditioning. This is not unusual in non-conformist households, 
but accounts far Maanurray* s seemingly modest interest in actual art, 
although not neglected by him in its philosophical aspect, compared 
with religion and science.
Having then, as it were, given the rough geography of science so 
far as Macmurray is concerned; that is, its place and status in his 
mind and outlook, and consequently of his view of it in life and the 
world, let us turn to a more detailed exposition and examination.
But first must be mentioned his unstinted and unreserved praise 
and admiration of science; properly understood and in its right 
place, of course.
"Science needs no justification and by its very existence and 
development it refutes any condemnation. This view of science 
requires to be enforced in the opening chapters of the present book. 
We start from the conviction that modem science represents one of 
the finest achievements of human activity and constitutes a final and 
unassailable value in human history. To condeim science is as absurd 
as to condemn architecture. To j ustify science is to gild the lily. 
Let this be said once and far all, so that it need not be repeated, I 
yield to no one in my admiration of modem science." (BS 19/20).
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Other similar laudatory passages are to be found in BS 21, BS 136,
RAS 10, RAS 28. And this despite the inadequate and sometimes 
unsatisfactory use so far made of science, and of its misuse or even 
destructive effects. ".... my belief in science is not a reaction to 
the practical effects that have so far followed from the use to which 
science has been put.... On the whole, it seems to me that modem 
society has been characteristically inept in the use that it has made 
of the science it has created. But even if modem society uses its 
science to destroy itself, I should still refuse to retract by one 
iota my assertion that science is in itself wholly admirable.... I 
insist on this, because a good deal of what I have to say about 
psychology might seem at first sight to involve not merely a 
disparagement of psychology but of science as a whole. I shall 
indeed have occasion to reject some of the claims which are made for 
science by its uncritical devotees. But that is a totally different 
matter." (BS 20). So, whatever is said later, questioning and 
criticising science, must not be regarded as detracting from 
Maanurray1 s whole-hearted support and advocacy of science. Indeed, 
only science has made possible that which he would have us achieve in 
the religious sphere of human life, namely a "truly human society"
(BS 20).
In what follows much that is known and accepted about science 
will obviously of contextual necessity have to be mentioned or 
referred to. But an effort will be made to bring out, and dwell in 
more detail upon, ideas which are unique or peculiar to Macmurray's 
conception of science, or which are at least favoured or emphasised 
by him, so that we can clearly comprehend and assess his view of
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science.
What is Science?
Science is knowledge, but of a very limited kind; so limited, in 
fact, that Macmurray prefers to call it information to contrast it 
with real knowledge. "When (a scientist) escapes from the real world 
of home and friendship and the traffic of life, and shuts himself 
into his laboratory, he escapes from himself and loses himself in a 
world of information. Of information, however, not of knowledge. 
Knowledge is always personal, always somebody's; but information is 
just anybody's. Science wants fact, atoms of information, which must 
all be indifferent to their being known; all equally valid for 
anybody at all. Science is not the personal knowledge of this 
scientist or that; it is information, the raw material out of which 
you and I can pick and choose what we want far our purposes, to build 
up our own knowledge, which is real knowledge just because it is ours 
and nobody else*s." (RE 150/1). And again. "Information is always 
information about something, not knowledge of it." (RE 151). 
"Scientific knowledge is, of course, the result of systematic 
activity of a reflective kind. In our concentration upon this we 
erect science into the type of all knowledge. We forget, in our 
preoccupation, that the kind of knowledge science achieves is the 
result of investigating a world that we already knew. The 
conclusions of some centuries of scientific research into the 
characteristics of matter constitute only a minute portion of our 
knowledge of the physical world." (IU 16). If this, in an age given 
over more or less exclusively to science and technology, is difficult
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to accept we have only to do two things.
Firstly; simply ask, 'Did man knew anything before science 
appeared five hundred years ago?'. Asked thus, the question at once 
appears ridiculous, as indeed it is. Of course they did, and a vast 
amount too, or they, and men from the start of the world, would not 
have survived. "Men knew the world they lived in long before science 
was thought of. And in seme ways, perhaps, they knew it better and 
more intimately than most of us knew it today, since we took to 
living in towns and travelling in motor cars. That immediate 
knowledge of the world which is the effortless result of living in it 
and working with it and struggling against it has a much higher claim 
to be taken as the type of human knowledge than anything that science 
has or can make possible." (IU 16).
Secondly; to remind ourselves of other kinds of knowledge. All 
of these are much more real and immediate than science is or ever can 
be. Of these the most important and ubiquitous is sensual knowledge 
i.e. that which comes to us through our senses. This is not to be 
confused with mere perception or elementary or primitive experience, 
as Macmurray takes the trouble especially to point out on page 19 of 
IU. You know your wife, husband, house, and job. And however 
brilliantly, articulately, detailed, and feelingfully you were able 
to describe these to anybody, they could never be known as you knew 
them, immediately and wholly. "The understanding of the world which 
we gain through science can never be a substitute for the experience 
of it that we have in the normal unreflective process of living.
Apart from this experience, indeed, all scientific conclusions would 
be completely meaningless, with no significance of any kind. They 
signify something only because they interpret our immediate knowledge
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of the world. If we did not know what water is by drinking it and 
washing in it and boiling it in our kettles, the scientific statement 
that water is H20 would be merely a meaningless noise. Yet time 
after time, in discussions of science and its discoveries, we find 
people talking as if the discoveries of science wiped out our 
unscientific knowledge of the world and put something quite different 
in its place." (IU 17).
"Knowledge, then is first and foremost that immediate experience 
of things which is prior to all expression and understanding. Upon 
this primary knowledge all reflection and all thought are based.
This perhaps is specially obvious in our knowledge of people. When I 
say that I know my father, the knowledge I am speaking of has nothing 
to do with the results of my thinking about him, nor has anyone any 
doubt of what I mean. But if I tried to describe my father to 
someone who did not knew him I should find it a very difficult task.
I should have to reflect and think and express the results of my 
reflection in words. Probably the result would seem adequate neither 
to the listener nor to myself. And if later the person to whom I 
tried to express ray knowledge made the acquaintance of my father he 
might well tell me that I had given him a quite false description.
He might even say that it was obvious that I did not understand my 
father. But he would never dream of denying that I knew him." (IU 
17/18). "If I ask a Londoner whether he knows St. Paul's Cathedral, 
he will almost certainly answer 'Yes'. But that would not imply that 
he could put his knowledge into words, that he could describe the 
Cathedral in any adequate way to someone who had never seen it" (IU 
18).
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Another vast area of knowledge of a different kind is self- 
knowledge. Apart from knowing how we "see" things, this field of 
knowledge includes self-depiction, evaluation, fears, doubts, 
feelings, responses, habits, obsessions, techniques, values, our 
self-discerned awareness of our "position" and "status" in relation 
to those close to us; those whom we have to be in contact, far 
example work colleagues; and indeed to the whole vast concourse of 
all humanity. We know what other people think of us, or of what we 
think they think. No matter which, and no matter whether right or 
wrong, true or false, it is part of our self-knowledge whether we are 
fully aware of it or not, and whether we could articulate it or not.
Then there is the field of knowledge concerning the intangibles; 
invisible and impalpable perhaps, but nevertheless very real and 
essential knowledge. Such knowledge permeates, penetrates, and 
affects our every action and choice. Primarily, here is our 
knowledge of God, values, beauty, truth, and ultimacy; your concept 
of man, and of other men in general; of society, and of our purposes 
and intentions. You may be inclined to say that this is not 
kncwledge but surmise or assumptions. It may be on reflection, but 
in practice and in its effects we treat it as if it were knowledge, 
and live by it as much as the tangible knowledge of fire keeps us 
from being burnt or of wanting to be burnt. Value kncwledge is far 
more ubiquitous and practical i.e. important to each of us and 
useful, than is scientific kncwledge. We live by this kncwledge. In 
more abstract, technical, and general terms than outlined above, 
Macmurray speaks of these other forms of knowledge in BS 100/4 and BS 
106/8.
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So blind or unaware as we usually are of them, a reminder of 
these major forms of kncwledge enables us to see scientific knowledge 
in perspective and proportion, and to realize that, if it is 
kncwledge at all, it is not the main avenue of our knowing by a very 
long way. It is very important indeed that Maanurray, almost alone 
these days, has drawn our attention to these very important facts 
about kncwledge, especially in relation to science. It is 
unfortunate that his ideas on this vital topic are scattered, and 
that he never made an overall comprehensive effort to educate and 
inform us of this most necessary perception and enlightenment.
Maanurray is a great admirer of Kant. In "The Self as Agent" a 
whole chapter is devoted to him, and there are frequent references 
throughout the book. "The adequacy of a philosophy depends upon its 
range; upon the extent to which it succeeds in holding together the 
various aspects of human experience, and exhibiting their unity.
Kant is unique in the comprehensive unity of his thought." (SA 39). 
".... in discussing Kant we discuss, in principle, all modem 
philosophy". (SA 39), although Maanurray does admit that "... every 
significant movement in philosophy since Kant can be derived from the 
Critical philosophy by rejecting parts of it". (SA 39).
It is this admiration, or perhaps mare likely what Maanurray 
learned from Kant, to turn to another point, which causes him to 
regard science as rather insubstantial, invented, kncwledge. "Kant 
was convinced that kncwledge is created by the spontaneity of the 
mind, by that productive imagination which he described as a blind 
art hid in the depths of the soul. To use the language of modem 
psychology, Kant realized that all our kncwledge, including
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especially our scientific kncwledge, is the product of fantasy. His 
greatness consisted in the fact that he realized the problem which 
this recognition involves. If we invent our knowledge, what right 
have we to call it knowledge? For kncwledge is by definition the 
receptivity and not the spontaneity of the mind. The pure 
spontaneity of the mind is art, not science. If science is the 
creation of the human imagination, how can it be more than a modem 
mythology?" (75/76).
This invention or imaginative product manifests itself in at 
least two major ways. Firstly; after all their observations of the 
real world scientists aim to embody their findings and conclusions in 
a law, hypothesis, or formula, and are never more satisfied than when 
they can do this in mathematical form. But where and what are these 
formulae? "They are not to be discovered in the external world. 
Mathematics, from beginning to end, is an invention of the human
mind In so far as physics consists in a set of mathematical
formulae, it is something invented by human minds". (BS 76).
Moreover, when they produce something slightly less abstract and 
a little mare imaginatively visual, as with electrons and neutrons 
moving in a microcosmic atom, or proclaim that a table is mainly 
space with a relatively few atoms whirling within that space, they 
are not depicting anything we could ultimately see and know, even if 
we were to become minuscule ourselves, or improved our present mode 
of perception. It is nothing but an imaginative analogy. "This 
other world that science has created for us, is in fact, much more 
unlike the familiar world which we observe than any of the other 
worlds that the fantasy of the religious mythologists of earlier ages 
ever produced. This is one thing that Kant realized about science.
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The scientist sets out with the conviction that there is something in 
the world that we do not knew. He tries to discover it, and so to 
bring it within the charmed circle of our experience. Yet instead of 
doing this, he succeeds only in inventing a new mathematical formula. 
This formula is an invention. Kant's question is, 'If we invent our 
scientific knowledge, what right have we to call it knowledge? How 
is it distinguished from imaginative fiction?'" (BS 77).
Secondly; this end product, this summary of supposed facts is 
not the only element of invention and imagination in the scientific 
exercise. Most of the observation is imagined as well I Macmurray 
illustrates this by the well-known example of the vase. Accidentally 
we knock a vase off the table and find it smashed on the floor. The 
subsequent and instant train of thought is too familiar to repeat. 
But, our actual experience of the event has been negligible, 
especially compared with our account and supposed "kncwledge" of it. 
All we experienced sense-wise was a slight touch on our elbcw, a 
noise, and the sight of the shards an the floor. Our minds and 
imagination built-up the rest. (See BS 78/81). Scientific practice 
is a little more careful in its observing and inferring than we would 
be in everyday life, but even then much of it arises from speculative 
imagination. Most of what we regard or say is happening is 
invention.
These criticisms can be partly offset in action and practice.
By testing, and satisfactorily using the "invented" formula in 
practice, and in the natural world of events, we "prove" it. This 
may sound a bit like pragmatism, but Macmurray denies this. "The 
pragmatist is no doubt wrong in claiming that what works is true, but
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he may be right if he limits his claim to the statement that what 
does not work is false.” (BS 82). Hinted at in this quotation, and 
as a very timely reminder to ourselves, we must remember that, 
contrary to a very popular and widespread conception, the usefulness 
of a scientific formula or hypothesis has nothing to do with its 
truth or falsity. "We must guard against the tendency to use the 
term 'scientific' as a substitute for 'true'. A belief may be true 
even if it is not scientific. It may be scientific and yet untrue. 
This tendency is part of the 'religion' of science. It comes from 
the very unscientific hankering after an authority which will certify 
the truth of our beliefs. But science depends upon the repudiation 
of such authority and upon our ability to overcome our natural 
tendency to seek far such an illusory certitude." (BS 22). Science 
is no more than an imaginative idea which happens to work in 
practice. Nothing more; and it would be most unscientific to 
proclaim it as anything else. "And you will notice that scientific 
kncwledge is always .about how things behave, rather than about the 
things themselves. It is not really important to know whether 
electrons exist or not, so long as things that do exist behave as if 
they were composed of electrons." (RE 190). "The term 'objective' 
does not mean 'true*. Objective statements are often false. Nor is 
the term 'scientific' synonymous with correct." (PR 31).
So far we have seen that, according to Macmurray, some main 
features of science are (1) that what it provides is information, not 
knowledge. (2) that, contrary to what we commonly suppose, science is 
not a statement of fact or of reality but is, at best, an invented, 
imaginative, symbolism, whose only justification is that it enables 
us better to manipulate and manage the world external to ourselves.
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Three other features of science can be considered together.
These are generality, abstraction, and impersonalism. Probably, more 
people would be agreed upon these than upon the previous two.
"Science is concerned with generalities, with more or less universal 
characteristics of things in general, not with anything in 
particular. And anything real is always something in particular."
(RE 152). "... to what I call the 'generality' of science. The
scientist is not interested in particular things, or particular 
happenings. He must, of course, deal with particulars, since any 
object or any happening is particular. Yet when he observes anything 
he thinks it as an instance of a kind. He abstracts from its 
particularity, and attends only to what it has in conrnon with all 
other members of its class." (RAS 13). "But it is peculiar to 
science that it never does anything else. It is only concerned with 
the general, never with the particular in its particularity; as, for 
instance, the historian is. Perhaps the best way to express the aim 
of science is to say that it is the search far constants; that is to 
say, for patterns which repeat without change indefinitely." RAS 13). 
"Science must be abstract. It cannot, in its very nature, deal with 
anything in its individual wholeness. Now, when we talk of the 
concrete we mean that wholeness which constitutes the individuality 
of things. The moment you analyse and classify you are committed to 
the dissolution of individuality - to breaking things 15) into their 
elements. The moment you generalize you are committed to dealing 
with your subject matter in a special aspect, in terms of what 
individuals have in oomnon, in contrast to the specific differences 
which mark their individuality, which make them themselves. This is
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not an accusation against science; it is a justification. It is the 
business of science to analyse and classify in general terms; if it 
fails to be abstract, if it tries to be concrete, it falsifies 
itself.1* (RE 185/6). Here, in this extract, is mentioned indirectly 
another marked feature of science, its fragmentariness. It fragments 
to knew; and as it knows more it fragments even further into more and 
more sciences and sub-sciences. The fragmentation of science is 
dealt with in RE 185.
Regarding impersonal ism; "This is the pith of the whole matter. 
Whose kncwledge is science? Everybody*s? Nobody's? Science is 
impersonal; that is to say, it is available information, and the 
place of information is in books, where one can find it when one 
wants it." (RE 191). ".... a scientific enquiry is merely objective;
and an objective account is necessarily impersonal". (ER 27). 
Concerning generality, abstraction, and impersonalism Maanurray gives 
a very good analogy, or is it more than that, related to the three 
speech situations. (RE 145/50. PR 178/181). When two people meet to 
converse and enjoy each others' company they talk about anything.
The subject does not matter. Its their harmony, mutuality, and 
fellowship which is everything. This is comparable with, or perhaps 
indeed is, a religious situation.
Two other people meet and one begins to speak about his holiday 
in Switzerland. He becomes so enthralled with his recollections of 
the scenery, climate, food, and atmosphere that he totally 
monopolises the conversation, and the other person can only listen 
and either share the other's enjoyment, or at least try to be 
interested in what is being described. This is the art situation.
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Two egg-heads meet; they shew no interest whatsoever in each 
other personally, or of what each has experienced or felt, but they 
talk and discuss unemotionally, abstractly, objectively, and 
endlessly the one topic that has brought them into contact and 
conversation at all. Science is the analogue here.
This I think clearly, indeed brilliantly, illustrates the type 
of thing science is essentially; and of what, incidentally, the 
essence of religion and art are too.
When science gets to the stage, as it first tentatively did 
about a hundred years ago, where it begins to investigate human 
beings and their behaviour i.e. it has reached psychological science, 
a problem always implicit in any science, becomes explicit. How can 
an observer observe, totally objectively and impartially, that which 
is of his own kind and stuff, whilst he himself is obviously of that 
kind and stuff? This is discussed in BS 87/91. Here is not the 
place to go into this question, but one result, relevant for us at 
this moment in our general review of what science is, or rather what 
Maanurray thinks it is, emerges. Hiis is the fact that science is 
instrumental. By this Maanurray means that science, investigating 
anything - and Maanurray insists that science can investigate 
anything; no field is closed to it (BS 92) - cannot, and never can, 
give us complete knowledge of that thing. "The answer that I shall 
suggest to this problem is that science is instrumental knowledge." 
(BS 81/2). "Science can cover the whole range of phenomena but not 
the whole of the possible knowledge about any of it. It is not 
limited to a part of the field but to a particular aspect of any part 
of the field. In other words, there is nothing that science cannot
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give us some kncwledge about, and there is nothing that science can 
give us complete kncwledge about." (BS 92). "The world is material 
for our use, and science seeks to develop that kncwledge of the world 
through which we can use it as the instrument of our intentions." (PR 
217). Such kncwledge, as the name suggests, is a means to an end. 
"But if societies are to progress beyond a limited and impoverished 
existence it can only be by the deliberate invention of more 
elaborate techniques, of more complicated machines and methods, in a 
word, by the invention of instruments of control. Science is the 
kind of kncwledge of the world that is needed for this purpose, and 
it is far this reason that we can define it as instrumental 
kncwledge." (BS 99). "Science is throughout concerned with the 
control of the world in so far as it is material and in relation to 
the development of human life. It is the theoretical instrument for 
subordinating the material environment to man." (IU 150).
"Scientific kncwledge is instrumental kncwledge; it is the kind of 
kncwledge which provides the basis of technological advance". (RAS 
16). Science, instrumental kncwledge, can never be a kncwledge of 
things in themselves. This can only come from art; or from religion 
in the case of persons. Nor can it be, or ever give, a kncwledge of 
hew or what to choose and intend i.e. of values. It is merely a 
kncwledge better able to achieve ends discerned by other means of 
knowing. To realize this is of special relevance today when 
countless people see science both as an end in itself and as the 
provider, mistakenly, of a philosophy of life which perhaps most 
appropriately could be called scientific materialism - mistakenly, 
not merely because it is wrong, but because it is not even 
philosophy I But more of this later.
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In his exposition of science Macmurray finds it necessary to 
distinguish between events and actions. This is a major distinction 
based upon what we find in the actual world. And it is a permanent 
distinction. "The distinction of 'act' and ‘event* is a principle of 
ultimate or metaphysical classification, and .... is an absolute 
distinction." (SA 149). Nothing could make us see that they could 
ever coalesce or become compatible. Especially, the fundamental 
difference is that an event has a cause. It is an happening. On the 
other hand an action is intended; there is, that is, a reason for it. 
"For every event there is a cause; far every act there is a reason." 
(SA 149). "To speak quite strictly, nothing can be dene without an 
intention. Action is inherently intentional. Where there is no 
intention there are only events which happen." (BS 206). '*We have 
therefore to draw a distinction between actions and events; a 
distinction which we can mark clearly by saying that events happen, 
while actions are performed. Events are not performed and actions do 
not happen. Whenever we conceive anything as an event, we imply that 
it is not an action. In other wards, all events are matters of fact; 
while no actions are matters of fact, but matters of intention. The 
world of fact consists of things and events. Things are, as it were, 
the static components of the world of fact, and events the dynamic 
components. What characterizes this world of fact is the absence of 
intention and, hence, of action. The distinction between fact and 
intention is the basis of all practical consciousness.1* (BS 206/7). 
Macmurray goes much deeper into this and its ramifications in SA 
chapter 7; and in BS 206/218. The relevance for us here, at this 
point of our first and cursory examination of Macmurray' s view of
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science, is that events only, it would seen, can be properly and 
satisfactorily subject to scientific examination and, consequently, 
as a ground for the effective practical use in the world of those 
scientific findings. Intentions, at least from the external and the 
scientific observer's point of view, are not recognizable in his 
observings. He can only see events. Yet, of course, intentions are 
a major part of human make-up, personal psychology, and consequently 
of reality which the scientist purports to be examining and dealing 
with. Is there a way, as yet undiscovered, by which intentions can 
be discerned with complete objectivity? That is, not 'known' only 
because we are told about them by a subject, or merely assume them in 
others because of our own private experience of them? Or must they 
far ever be hidden, secret, indiscemable, and thus never available 
for scientific, objective, examination? Have we here reached the 
'limits' of science? This will be touched upon later.
A seeming anomaly or paradox is found in Maanurray' s writings on 
science. Frequently, in the foregoing we have had occasion to use 
the word 'objective*. Macmurray uses it often too, either directly 
or by implication and we understand and agree, without exception, 
that this is an appropriate word and idea to use in connection with 
scientific activity and research. If one thing describes science it 
is objectivity. And where better illustrated and proved than in the 
earlier given analogy of the speech situation? Emotion had been 
banished and only objectivity prevailed. "By objectivity, I mean the 
capacity to stand in conscious relation to that which is recognized 
as not ourselves. Everything, of course stands in relation to what 
is not itself, and everything that is capable of consciousness stands 
in conscious relation to what is not itself. This however, is not
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sufficient to constitute rationality. We must add that that to which 
we stand in conscious relation is recognized, is consciously 
apprehended, as not ourselves." (IU 128). "... all objective
knowledge is kncwledge of matter of fact only and necessarily 
excludes any knowledge of what is matter of intention." (ER 39).
"For science is only interested in the object, and therefore writes, 
speaks, and thinks, even of itself, in the third person. (RE 150). 
Then suddenly, out of the blue, Macmurray speaks of science as 
subjective. ".... science remains subjective, while art achieves 
objectivity." (RE 155). And there can be no denying that this idea 
of subjectivity, in this context of science, has been used by 
Maanurray a number of times, as subsequent extracts will demonstrate.
By a long and roundabout examination of Maanurray's subtle 
meanings it is partially possible to resolve this anomaly, but it is 
a pity confusion was caused in the first place.
Apparently, science in its drive for objectivity is subjective 
because it cares nothing far the thing in itself nor for relating 
with it, even if it were a person. Thought is considered only as a 
means to the scientist's end. "Science cannot rest in any object, 
just because it is not interested in any; its interest is subjective, 
in the operations of the mind upon the object, in doing something to 
it, describing it, referring it never in the object itself, in and 
for itself, in its individual reality." (RE 156). "Any reeil object 
is for science only an example, a fact, something to be referred to a 
class, something to be analysed into elements, something which is the 
effect of something else. Thus science is endlessly referred from 
one thing to another and chases objectivity over the infinite cosmos,
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finding, like Noah's dove, no place on which the sole of its foot may 
rest. For science really is always round the next comer." (RE 
155/6). Whether these very opposite and irreconcilable concepts 
ought to have been used to describe the same activity, much as we 
eventually begin to understand their respective meanings in this 
context, is certainly questionable.
This finishes, so far as is possible here, a summary of what
science is far Maanurray. Many extracts from his books oould be used
to sum up his ideas of science, but the following is as good as any.
"THe term 'science' refers primarily to a personal 
activity of intellectual reflection. It is something that 
people do. It means secondarily and negatively the set of 
beliefs which form the datum far this activity, at a 
particular time, in any branch of scientific enquiry. All 
scientific knowledge rests on a postulate of determinism.
If it did not, it would not be 'objective', but if 
scientific knowledge were made normal far all possible 
kncwledge; if this were interpreted to mean that there are 
in fact no human activities, or no aspect of human 
activity which are not objectively determined; if it 
involved a total denial of freedom, then the possibility 
of the personal activity which we call science would 
itself be denied. For the production of science is one of 
the manifestations of the 'I do'. It is a matter of 
intention, and not merely matter of fact. (H* 42).
It is natural that only an incomplete and tenuous review can, 
and only could, be given; but an attempt has been made for it to be a 
fair account. After a brief appraisement, we will turn to some 
further ideas and comments of Macmurray, either extending or arising 
out of his basic conception of science.
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Appraisement (1)
Macmurray gives us a timely reminder that there are other ways 
of knowing besides science. We are inclined to believe, 
unthinkingly, that scientific knowledge, and its older, long­
standing, ubiquitous brother, knowledge of things and facts and of 
their workings, constitutes all knowing. This attitude has been 
blindly and unquestionably reinforced by, and since, the 1902 
Education Act which by its nature, inevitably if not intentionally, 
made I.Qism and instrumentalism the permanent basis of our outlook, 
kncwledge, knowing and apprehending, to the exclusion of almost all 
other ways of kncwing. Personally, being like everybody else the 
product of the current educational system and conditioned by this 
ethos and theory of knowledge and learning, increasingly and never so 
intense as it is today, I find it difficult to accept in my feeling 
life, although of course I recognize it intellectually and 
theoretically, that other forms of knowing exist. And it is even 
more difficult to accept their primacy, and to appreciate that 
scientific kncwledge is only information. I believe this obtains 
from everybody else too, which leads to the question as to whether 
Maanurray could really have been living "out of his time". Did he 
live in the full awareness that experiencing and relating, and other 
direct forms of kncwledge, were more real to him than the sort of 
kncwledge we generally get, admittedly indirectly, from books, 
science, and other secondhand sources and which we comprehend and 
take to ourselves mainly through the intellect? Would he not be an 
exceptional or rare person if he did? This does not mean of course 
that he was not right in his analysis of the kncwledge situation.
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Perhaps we should go further than Maanurray, and not oily remind 
ourselves that other more immediate and vivid ways of knowing exist, 
but recognize that we have lost a whole vast area of knowing; or if 
we have not lost it in fact, we have nevertheless lost it in 
consciousness. Hew often does our kncwledge of theatre, drama, 
literature, poetry, sculpture, and music consist not so much of 
direct experience, appreciation, and joy, as of a vast bulk of 
analysis and criticism; our cwn sometimes but, more often than not, 
other peoples? This, surely, can only be called secondary and 
"scientific" kncwledge, and not direct, immediate, experienced, 
personal, kncwledge. Often the same goes for our kncwledge of people 
too. Probably the only thing we knowingly feel directly is a spring 
morning! Often we are too busy thinking of the next task to enjoy 
and know the immediate and live in it. Under pressure we eat our 
meals quickly and fail bo know and enjoy the immediate taste of our 
food; and very few people have time far the real enjoyment of each 
other's company, wife's, husband's or children's. We deliberately 
set out, through the social ethos and its chief agent in this matter, 
formal education, to constantly enhance a person's kncwledge of 
facts. We do very little to enlarge and improve his ability to know 
himself, improve his emotional and relational life, nor to improve 
his kncwledge of the whole fundamentally important world of values, 
whether artistic or social.
As mentioned earlier in the exposition it is unfortunate that 
having perceived and diagnosed this vital failure in our knowing, and 
of our consciousness of it, that Macmurray does not make more of it 
as a major theme. "Reason and Emotion" does have much to say about
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it, but even here it is not contrasted strongly enough with our 
distorted and ultimately disastrous insistence that there is only one 
way of knowing, or at least that there is only one worthwhile way.
And in this way everything else is considered to be either non­
existent, secondary, or of no account.
Next, as we have seen, Maanurray intentionally or 
unintentionally goes a step further. What we take to be information, 
as scientifically provided, is on the one hand invented by us and 
embodied in abstract formulae whose source can only be described as 
the imagination. It is about as much like reality as that of a 
drawing by a man's blind from birth would be. And on the other hand, 
the observation out of which we create the formulae are, to say the 
least, extremely tenuous. Moreover, they are made up far the most 
part from our assumptions and inferences not from whole and 
continuous observations at all. The only positive thing to be said 
about such formulae or hypotheses is that, in practice, they work and 
often enable us to move on to yet another step or another formula.
Is this true? It obviously is, and must be, assuming that the world 
you and I habitually experience is the real world, the known world. 
Admittedly it is, and must be, the world for us. but if we take this 
too seriously could we not rightly be accused of excessive 
subjectivism or anthropomorphism? Whether the source of knowledge is 
of a questionable kind or not, surely we must believe that the 
universe we experience is the external manifestation of underlying 
basic stuffs, whether we choose to call these stuffs atoms, elements, 
or anything else. As a philosopher Macmurray cannot possibly be 
unaware of this very elementary conception. A per sen who had never 
heard of philosophy or science would concede it. New; who is to say
- 172 -
that "our" world is the real world? Why have our senses been endowed 
with the prime ways of knowing, and to be regarded as such? From the 
practical point of view it is proper far us so to regard knowledge, 
but to stamp it, as Maanurray seems to do, with the authority of 
ultimacy, if only by implication, as if this is, and must be, the 
final situation seems to be going beyond the evidence. Sense and 
direct knowing obviously evolved for our survival as the entities we 
are. It need not be the essence of real or ultimate knowing.
We must concede that Maanurray does admit that scientific 
kncwledge does not give us truth, except if it does so by chance; and 
of course, we do not know that. But, by the truth here he means the 
minute truth of that particular formula. He does not mean all truth, 
reality, or kncwledge which is questioned above and which, let it be 
repeated, he is strangely unaware of.
As foreshadowed in the exposition I think most people would 
agree with Maanurray1 s contention that science is general, abstract, 
and impersonal. And his speech situation illustration and support 
for this seems both very enlightening and vivid. We can visualize 
the three situations clearly. The question again arises as to why 
the first should be called religious, but this is not the place to 
re-open that criticism.
Whatever we think of science, and agree partially, wholly, or 
not at all with Maanurray's previously discussed criticism of it, it 
is useful to be reminded that science, even if it gives knowledge, 
does not give the whole of it, but only the instrumental kind. Never 
does, or can it, give us a kncwledge of values. This is regardless 
of whether one is an Absolutist or a Relativist. Values may or not
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be eternal, intrinsic, and vital elements in the universe, laid up in 
heaven as it were, and there for us to discover and live by. They 
may only, as the Relativists would claim, be humanly created, 
practical, discernments and rules arising out of our constant 
necessity to act and choose. But whatever they are science cannot 
provide a working hypothesis concerning them, let alone a full- 
fledged prescription. They are of a different order and category. 
However we regard science it is, as Maanurray says, instrumental.
Events and actions, to turn to another point, are fundamentally 
distinguishable, and to make such a distinction is very pertinent.
And within the meaning of the terminology and explanation used here, 
they are importantly different. Moreover; the distinction makes it 
easier to scientifically explain, or not explain as the case m y  be, 
certain things we observe in the world. Without going into detail 
one might ask, Do actions, once they have become established, 
irrespective of their reason for being, become events? To ask this 
will not perhaps help us to satisfactorily describe their origin, 
motive, and reason for being as they are; but in a "chain", and not 
merely one hypothetical, isolated, act, it m y  become more 
explicable, and become the subject of scientific observation and 
surmise. But this is only a preliminary suggestion. Certainly there 
are events, and there are actions.
As stated in the exposition objectivity and subectivity, 
although seemingly incongruous, can be (as shown by Maanurray) 
explained and used within the same universe of discourse. But it 
seems regrettable that, at least so far as "subjective" seems to be 
understandable, another descriptive term might have been chosen to 
better effect. "Objective" seems an appropriate term in the context,
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and as comnonly used to describe what indeed it does here.
Apart from someone who is a specialist philosopher of science, 
Maanurray1 s understanding, ideas, and criticisms of science seen very 
comprehensive and cogent, and in one sense, that is in the wider 
conspectus of life, thought and practicability, of equal or even 
greater value than those of somebody who is a narrow specialist in 
this branch of human thought. Such a person might be too much of a 
"scientist" of science, and not a philosopher of itl
End of Appraisement (1)
Origins of Science
Hew does science come to be? "The scientific impulse is as old 
as nan. It is the impulse to control nature through understanding." 
(RE 245). I have emphasised "impulse" because even Maanurray would 
find it hard to give' evidence far science before the Renaissance? or 
to stretch a point - before the end of the Middle ages. There may 
always have been the impulse but not the science. However, he does 
go slightly further in his analysis and nomenclature than would seem 
to be necessary by declaring that science came to maturity at this 
time. Maturity, one would ordinarily think, is the condition 
achieved by something which has existed for a considerable time and 
is at last becoming, after a period of gestation, infancy, and 
adolescence, of trial and error, an established entity or being in 
its cwn right. It has at last found itself. Indeed Macmurray says, 
"Science found its real nature at the Renaissance." (RE 245). It is 
doubtful if this is true. For a couple of centuries or more after
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this it was groping to find its own reality, meaning, and techniques.
However, in one respect science did evidence maturity at the 
Renaissance. "If we try to discover in what the difference between 
mature science and its immature farms consists, we find the essence 
of it in a new attitude of mind which defines a new method and 
secures unity and continuity of development through a full 
consciousness of the task. There is first a repudiation of 
dogmatism, and a conviction of ignorance. Immature science, like 
immature religion, is cocksure and convinced of its knowledge.
Mature science is humble and tentative, convinced of the immensity of 
its ignorance, and sure only that patient research can gradually 
extend the field of knowledge. It has given up the hope of 
certainty; it has lost its life in order to save it. It has become 
objective, governed by the facts, submitting to the discipline of the 
world it seeks to know". (RE 245/6). Pages RE 245/7 are also 
relevant to this point.
Another obvious factor of long-standing in man which is 
conducive to the production of science is the need to explain, to 
find reasons far things. "It is grounded in the impulse to reason 
that creates science." (RE 55). But it took many ages far man to 
reach the scientific temper. Yet explanation and reason were usual, 
common, indeed rife before science. They certainly were never 
lacking. To give one example from Macmurray, "The ancient Indians 
thought that the world rested on an elephant, and the elephant on a 
tortoise. That belief was the expression of the reason in them 
seeking an explanation of the world. Yet it is a childish 
explanation of a crude kind." (RE 55).
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But on the point of origin, a very cannon trap, as Maanurray 
warns us, we must not fall into. Many authorities write and speak 
under the impression that the Greeks originated and established 
science. This they certainly did not. Coincidentally they nay have 
had imaginative ideas about the elements, atoms, and even evolution. 
But this was brilliant guesswork. It was more allied to art and 
poetry than to science, the essence of which is a total cocmiitment to 
ascertained facts and experimentation thereon. "It is only through 
the ambiguity of words that we consider modem science to be 
continuous with Greek philosophy. Modem science rests upon the 
adoption of the experimental method in preference to all forms of 
reflective speculation. Greek theories, even when they coincide with 
some of the conclusions of modem science, rest upon aesthetic 
insight and are not the products of observation tested by experiment. 
In the modem sense, science is not science because its results are 
true, but because they are arrived at through the use of a certain 
technique." (CH 24). And again. "A great artist has often the power 
to arrive through intuition at a truth about the structure of the 
world, which science only discovers in its own slower but surer 
fashion later on. But this does not make it possible for the 
scientist to look to the artist for his conclusions nor even to 
accept them as scientific hypotheses." (CH 25). "The poet may 
anticipate the scientist; but even if his insights prove true, it is 
not thereby scientific. It is at best the suggestion of a hypothesis 
which science may, in its own systematic development, find 
verifiable." (SA 61).
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But if Maanurray, quite rightly, dismisses claims made on behalf 
of the Greeks as the originators of science, it is with greater 
surprise that we find him attributing, if not its origin then its 
inspiration and motivation, to Christianity. He does this mainly on 
the grounds of integrity. Maanurray mentions this several times - at 
least seven. He sometimes uses the term truth. But as in another 
context he contends that science is not about truth this is slightly 
misleading. But we understand and accept what he means.
Christianity introduced a burning desire and urge far the 
discovery and recognition of reality. Only science, so far, of the 
three main modes of reflection, has taken this seriously. Hence, 
according to Maanurray, its foundation in Christianity. "There is 
one limited field of knowledge in which we can find a clue to the 
integrity we are seeking and that is in modem science. This is no 
accident. Science, in its own field, is the product of Christianity, 
and its most adequate expression so far." (CH 86). "Science, then, 
is rooted in Christianity and stands or falls with it. So that if we 
threw Christianity overboard in order to choose science, we shall 
destroy the basis of science in doing so. It is therefore inpossible 
to choose between science and religion." (PWW 40). "There is ample 
evidence, though it is generally overlooked, to justify the judgment 
that the empiricism of modem science is itself the product of 
Christianity. One has only to read the Christian gospels to realize 
that it was for the realistic, empirical, naturalism of his attitude 
that Jesus was hounded to death by the religious traditionalists of 
his day." (SRE 11). Other references are to be found in CH 192, RE 
184; RE 193; RE 172.
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Moreover, science is our only farm of reflection, so far, 
grounded in empiricism, as opposed to speculative phantasy or 
ingrained traditionalism, an attitude or way of seeing things we 
must, and will have to eventually and inevitably, adept in all areas 
of experience and living.
However, we must remember, as was said earlier, truth or falsity 
does not come into it, either with yesterday's or today's 
explanations. "But we must not suppose that the expressions we have 
found, or that men have found in the past are true and adequate 
expressions. That would be very unlikely. It would be just as 
absurd to suppose that the ideas men have had about the nature of the 
world, or the ideas they have now, were true and adequate ideas." (RE 
54/5).
So; if man has always had the scientific impulse, and if he has 
always sought to explain things through reasoning, why did science 
appear when it first did, about five hundred years ago? And why has 
it continued to grow and flourish, until new it is probably our major 
form of thought and action, at least so far as its two allied, or 
should we say rival, farms of human modes of reflection are concerned 
i.e. art and religion?
One thing about the origin of science, as we know it in our era, 
is certain; or so we must believe if we are to be scientific at all. 
And that is, that science did not appear arbitrarily, a sort of 
spontaneous, social, mutation. It must have had a cause.
And Maanurray attributes its emergence to two causes or 
conditions. He calls these:-
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1 ) The outer objective, material condition.
2) The inner, subjective, psychological condition.
The first is grounded in the economic conditions of existence. 
Obviously, this is based on the economic interpretation of history. 
Environmental changes necessitate human adaptation and response and, 
as we knew, if we accept the theory, this causes repercussions beyond 
the mere basically economic. Science was such a response to a unique 
situation at an appropriate time in history. "The material 
conditions are no doubt mainly economic. They are pressure of social 
necessity which society finds itself under of adapting its forms of 
social behaviour to changing material conditions of life, and certain 
new possibilities of doing so." (BS 40/1). "It is part of the effort 
of society to adapt itself to changes in the conditions of its 
existence. It is always the pressure of necessity which sets a 
problem for society. Science was the answer of modem society to the 
problems set for society by environmental conditions at that point in 
history." (BS 41). .
The second, the psychological conditioning, implies Maanurray is 
less well recognised than the first, whether in this context or in 
any other. And it must also be noted that the first cause alone, as 
outlined above, is insufficient in itself to produce science. "Hie 
necessity of changing the social habits of life, if society is to 
survive or maintain its standard of living, is not in itself 
sufficient, since it might be met by a conservative resistance to 
change which did actually result in the failure to survive or to 
maintain the standard of life. If a society meets the threat by an 
effort of conscious adaptation instead of by an increased effort to 
maintain the customary forms of adaptation, then it will need a new
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sort of knowledge on which to base its deliberate effort." (BS 45c). 
Nevertheless, it is not permissible "to explain the development of 
science without reference to the field of practiced effort". (BS 46) 
i.e. the economic.
So what is the second condition? It is not, as some have 
suggested, the sudden upsurge of a desire far knowledge. Stimulation 
for this did not come from a rediscovery of Greek thought with its 
reawakening of interest. "No doubt natural curiosity at all times 
makes us ask questions and seek to answer them merely for the sake of 
doing so. But such a natural curiosity will never give rise to 
science." (BS 42). "It is no sociological account of science which 
relates it to the general human desire for knowledge. That desire is 
universal in human nature and operates at all times in all societies. 
But it does produce science at all times and in all societies. And 
since the actual people who produce science are limited in number to 
a relatively small minority, the social motive which underlies the 
production of science is not their motive necessarily." (BS 44/5).
The essential condition is dissatisfaction in a society with a 
strong desire to improve and progress. The Middle Ages could not 
have produced science. "The attitude of mind which was 
characteristic of the Middle Ages could not have produced science.
It had no interest in doing so. Mediaeval society did not want 
scientific questions asked and answered because it had no intention 
of modifying the traditional forms of life." (BS 42). "The mediaeval 
world was a traditional society. It lived by custom and habit. It 
assumed, therefore, that the right way to do anything was the 
traditional way, the way it had always been done. Its intentional
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life was conservative." (BS 43).
Maanurray emphasises that the motivation must be that of a 
society, or at least of a considerable number of people within it.
Not once does he refer to the stimuli provided by great and pioneer 
thinkers. Except perhaps, by implication, to Kant - who is not 
relevant at this point. Nowhere in his writings does Macmurray ever 
mention or support the "great men" theory. It can only result fran a 
deliberate effort and the deliberate effort must be a social one 
because science, unlike art, is only possible through a continuity of 
cooperation. In other words, the inner condition of science is the 
intention to produce it, and the intention to produce science is a 
particular aspect of the intention to achieve progress. 
Sociologically, therefore, the inner condition of the appearance of 
science as a feature of the life of a particular society is that the 
society should have farmed the intention to progress." (BS 43). 
"Before society can produce science there must be a socially 
effective group of people who have abandoned the outlook that finds 
its canons of rightness in the wisdom of the past, and replaced it by 
an attitude which is determined to mate the future better than the 
past. Until people feel that the right way to do things is to do 
them better than they have ever been done, the idea of progress and 
the intention to progress are unthinkable." (BS 43/4). There is much 
more elaboration of this kind in neighbouring pages. But enough has 
been said and quoted to mate the point.
But is the explanation sufficient? Maanurray seems not to think 
so for he goes yet a step deeper into the social and psychological 
mood. The clue he gives is that many people wanted, for the first 
time, to live their own lives and break free from the bonds of habit
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and custom. "The social condition far the origin of science is that 
a particular society wants to strike out upon a new path in its 
social behaviour instead of to maintain its traditional form of 
behaving. Towards the end of the Middle Ages in western Europe this 
was the situation which arose, and it marks a very significant change 
in the inner conditions of social life. Large numbers of people 
found themselves wanting to live their own lives in their own way 
instead of in the traditional and customary way. They began to break 
loose from the social custom and to attempt to live by their own 
judgement." (BS 46/7).
This naturally caused chaos at first, rather similar one could 
say to the stage we are now going through with the coming of the 
Permissive Society, which has thrown off the moral, social, and 
relational restraints and shackles of Puritanism, Victorianism, and 
the rigours of Non-conformity. Once freed, and released from the 
past, people in this situation have no idea of what to do or of how 
to do it. They have to learn. And to learn means knowledge, new 
knowledge. And in the case we are considering i.e. the overthrow of 
Mediaevalism, the new learning, the new knowledge, was science. "The 
social result was the threat of chaos. The first discovery, in fact, 
was that people could not live their own lives in their own way 
without first discovering how to do it. This discovery no doubt 
tended to throw numbers of people back into the conservative camp as 
conscious opponents of the effort to invent new ways of living. But 
it also gave rise, in other quarters, to an effort of a reflective 
kind directed towards the achievement of the kind of knowledge that 
would enable the effort to succeed. Thus the desire to devise a new
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form of social life led to the desire to create a new kind of 
knowledge as the condition of success. The progressive intention 
which had arisen in society was thus canalised into the field of 
reflection. The first stage in the transition from a customary to a 
progressive social life had to be a deliberate effort to achieve 
progress in knowledge. Science is the first stage of the effort to 
achieve social progress, and it is the first stage, because until 
science has been developed, it is in fact impossible to change 
practical modes of social life without disastrous consequences". (BS 
47/8).
Macmurray makes several relevant points concerning this.
Science is a reflective activity, therefore it is some time before 
its effects could be felt practically. Meanwhile society had to get 
along as best it could within the old framework and social structure. 
(See BS 48).
Furthermore, the change at the end of mediaevalism to science 
"constitutes perhaps* the most far-reaching of all revolutions in 
human society. It involved the production and spread of a radically 
new attitude to life, and for this reason it is fundamentally a 
change in moral outlook. Its novelty does not consist in the fact 
that numbers of people rebelled against customary authority. That 
has always happened to a greater or lesser extent. It consists 
rather in the association of the sense of rightness with the revolt. 
Instead of feeling that the right way to live was the way that was 
hallowed by tradition and custom and guarded by social authority, 
they began to feel that the right way was to live better than anybody 
had lived before." (BS 48/9).
- 184 -
Macmurray admits (BS 49) that the foregoing account of the 
origin of science is incomplete and leaves many questions unanswered. 
But it does initiate a train of historical thought and analysis worth 
following up. No reason or cause can ever be fully satisfactory as 
an explanation. There is always the need and feeling to seek for, 
and to push it back, to the stage before i.e. to the preceding cause, 
ad infinitum.
And there are a number of subsidiary but important and relevant 
questions that need to be answered. Macmurray makes a tentative 
attempt at one. Why did science take the mathematical form in its 
enquiry into matter when, presumably, it could have taken other 
forms? After all, as we have seen, science is only invented 
knowledge. We could therefore, perchance, have invented other forms 
to describe matter.
Mathematics became the farm because it is related to the 
techniques of the counting-house, which at this time was emerging as 
a foremost economic factor, as trade both local and on a wider scale 
began to grow and prosper. (See BS 50). This was incipient 
mercantilism if not capitalism. And for this, quantity - the 
duplication of identical items and units - became as important as 
quality. "All commodities must be represented as complexes of 
identical units of value, and equations established between different 
complexes. Thus the way in which the merchant succeeds in dealing 
with his world of materials is identical in principle with the way in 
which the physicist deals with the material world. There is thus an 
instructive set of correlations to be worked out between the methods 
of developing science and the method of developing capitalism; 
between the enterprising spirit of modem society, in the practical
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and in the reflective fields." (BS 51/2).
We are often presented with the view that science first attacked 
the material and physical word because this was the most remote from 
human feeling; and thus more acceptable, although Copernicus had a 
rough time. (See BS 56). Only recently have we been able to bear 
scientific research into religion and psychology, the most personal 
and sensitive part of ourselves. "The field which is most highly 
charged with emotion and which the inhibitions which express our fear 
are most powerful, is the field of the personal life." (BS 58).
But whilst not disputing this (see BS 56 & 58) Maanurray 
suggests another reason why matter came first to be studied by 
science. "We should observe that the underlying social intention of 
progress makes it inevitable that the new reflective effort should be 
directed primarily upon the material world in an effort to secure a 
conscious and deliberate control of material conditions. The control 
of material is the primary necessity of life, and an improvement in 
our control of matter is the primary necessity if we are to improve 
our ways of social life. The first effective expression of the 
intention to progress must be an effort to achieve the basic means to 
progress; and this is clearly an increasing mastery of the material 
world." (BS 51)
The Development of Science
Macmurray' s ideas of the development of science are the common 
and usual ones, and short of a major upheaval in historical thought 
by an original thinker, these will continue to be the views.
Therefore it need not detain us. The view, of course, is that the
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development of science parallels the main ethos of society. (See BS 
55/60). From the Renaissance to the middle of the eighteenth century 
physical science matched a reason-orientated society. Fran this time 
until 1914 Romanticism paralleled scientific biological and allied 
interests. Since 1914 psychological science has matched a chaotic, 
'mental* and irrational age, which has yet to be dubbed and receive 
its final categorizing by historians. Needless to say, all the 
suggested dates and ages above are merely approximate.
The Acceptance of Science
But in all this development and growth of science Maanurray 
makes a point - indeed he makes it several times - which is often 
overlooked by historians, and which leads to the important question 
of hcwar it still operates, or has ceased to operate, today. We 
have already referred to the fear of science and of hew, as a 
consequence, it was allowed to grow only gradually, from material to 
personal investigation. But this fear brought another consequence. 
Science was allowed to grow only under a pretence - the pretence that 
it was about theory only, and had no practical effects. This 
pretence has, from time to time, been expressed in different ways, 
but they all amount to the same thing. "Under the stress of the 
tension between the desire far progress and the fear of abandoning 
custom and tradition modem society achieved a compromise by which 
the effort to achieve progress in scientific knowledge was socially 
accepted while any effort to apply it to the transformation of social 
practice was declined. This is the sociological meaning of the 
notion that knowledge should be sought for its own sake". (BS 54).
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"We decided, if I may use the personification, to face the task of 
deliberately developing our knowledge of hew to control the world but 
not to proceed to the length of deliberately controlling it. We 
decided, in other words, that the new knowledge must be pursued as an 
end in itself, but it must not look beyond knowledge to the control 
of practical life." (BS 59). "The structure of modem science is 
socially conditioned by the inhibition which expresses itself in the 
idea of knowledge for its own sake." (BS 62). "But, as we saw, it 
is this same inhibition which resulted in the divorce between the 
progressive development of knowledge and its application in the 
practical field. This divorce is responsible far the form of pure 
science, since it limits progress to the field of theory and makes 
knowledge an end itself". (BS 68/9). (See also BS 67).
Have we at last, in our time, freed ourselves from both fear and 
pretence? The inmense technological advances of the last forty 
years, permeating the whole of society and affecting every aspect of 
our lives, would suggest that we have. But let us not overlook the 
reservations. But for trade union thwarting and restrictive 
practices in face of the introduction of new techniques, founded on 
scientific research and progress, we could all enjoy a standard of 
living 10% higher than at present.
That we new allow psychological aspects of life to be 
scientifically investigated suggests to Macmurray that we have 
overcome our final fears and banished the pretence of theory only.
"The acceptance by society of the effort to establish a scientific 
psychology is evidence that this inhibition is being broken down".
(BS 61). "Our society is now beginning to be able to look directly
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at the facts about ourselves, our actual behaviour and its 
motivation. This is the inner social condition which is necessary 
far the development of psychological science. As a result, it is no 
longer impossible to apply the methods of scientific investigation to 
the study of human behaviour. (BS 58). But hew far have we allowed 
this to affect us practically?
Despite the whole of our lives from work, culture, literature 
and art, the press, to all entertainment being riddled with, and 
probed by, psychology, hew far have we allowed it and its findings to 
genuinely affect our lives, both as individuals and as a society?
Very little indeed, one would think, if the childishness, inmaturity, 
irrational behaviour, crime, addictions, and mental disorders are any 
guide. We still prefer to interpret events and our lives, and even 
our health, especially our emotional and mental health, in terms of 
non-scientific conceptions.
Perhaps, even yet, science is only physically and materially 
acceptable. And we are certainly and rightly suspicious and unsure 
of the damage it may yet, in its variety of ways, do for and to the 
human race. In fact, we may be more familiar with science, as indeed 
we must be compared with past generations, but we are no less wary of 
it.
The Limits of Science
Has science any limits? We live and think in the belief that it 
has none. The general feeling is that eventually science, despite 
present fears, will 'knew' everything and open up for us the whole 
field of opulence, ease, bliss, and health. Science, we believe is
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the key to the universe and eternity. Reservations there may be 
about mishandling or misusing it - as stated in the previous section. 
But none about its ultimate efficacy and ubiquity.
Yet Macmurray, with deeper perception, reminds us that this is 
not so on at least five counts. But, contrary to what some people 
are inclined to think, he does affirm that there are no areas of 
existence into which science, in principle, may not probe. Nothing 
is outside of the scope of science. Everything can be grist to its 
mill. "Science takes the whole world of experience and leaves 
nothing over for religion. But equally, religion claims the whole 
world of experience for itself. The artist does likewise. We are 
driven, therefore to suppose that the difference between them must 
lie not in their fields but in the attitudes of mind in which they 
deal with the same field." (SRE 21).
But despite this ubiquity, we already have a hint as to one 
limitation of science. It may have the whole field, but the 
attention and concern with this is limited by its own perception and 
intention. And this occurs in two ways. Firstly; it limits itself 
to what might be termed the material and measurable aspects of things 
or events. Secondly; such knowledge as it does obtain of the object
is always, as we saw earlier, instrumental. It is never the whole of
knowledge, but only one aspect of it. And this is all it is
interested in. This is a vital and fundamental limitation of
science, and we should all recognise it, both for our personal 
benefit, and far society and its future. We are so apt to think that 
science is the only kind of knowledge. Nothing is further from the 
truth. If we persist in this we are likely to go into a biological 
and evolutionary cul-de-sac from which we shall be unable to retreat,
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thus becoming a 'fixed' species as all others have become through the 
blind specialisation of one faculty.
Referring to science, art, and religion Maanurray says, "It is 
as if the same field of general experience became organized in three 
different ways round three different centres of interest." (SRE 23). 
"... the whole field of experience can be scientifically 
investigated, but that the knowledge that results from a scientific 
investigation of the whole field, or of any part of a field, is not 
the whole of the knowledge that can be gained about it. Science can 
cover the whole range of phenomena but not the whole of the possible 
knowledge about any of it. It is not limited to a part of the field 
but to a particular aspect of any part of the field. In other wards, 
there is nothing that science cannot give us some knowledge about, 
and there is nothing that science can give us complete knowledge 
about." (BS 92). "Everything in the world is material. It may be 
that nothing in the world is merely material, though certainly much 
that is in the world is more nearly pure matter than the rest. Even 
in the field of what we usually call material objects, there seem to 
be features which escape fran the meshes of the mathematical net.
But organisms and persons, whatever they may be, are certainly 
material objects. It follows that there is nothing in the world as 
we knew it in immediate experience to which mathematical thought is 
inapplicable. The proper way to state the limitation of this type of 
symbolic interpretation is to say that it is valid far reality 
in so far as it is material." (IU 101/2). And although we cannot 
here elaborate upon it the following is relevant. "The limits of 
mathematical thought are, in fact, the limits of science. Science
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cannot offer us and should not be expected to offer us an 
interpretation of the universe. It is limited by the abstraction 
which creates it, and to apply its results beyond these limits is 
merely to be unscientific and illogical." (IU 102).
Arising from the foregoing is another marked but important 
limitation. That of value. Macmurray, following the usual 
classification, divides values into two categories, utility or 
instrumental values and intrinsic values. Hie names are sufficient 
to recognise their respective roles, if they are not familiar enough 
already. Whilst having to exist by the first, that is, compelled to 
make choices as the best means of surviving and of 'doing* things, it 
is the second, intrinsic values, which make us essentially human. 
These are really what we are living far and by, or ought to be, 
although unfortunately we often are not. And as we shall see later, 
we are ironically not so living because of science itself, or of its 
effects. To give relevant quotations for this paragraph. "We can 
value things in two different ways, far themselves or for their use, 
and both of these ways of valuing can be generalized. We can look 
upon the world from either of these points of view. If we envisage 
it from the point of view of intrinsic value we look upon it as good 
in itself and therefore to be enjoyed. If our valuation-attitude is 
instrumental the world appears as material which can be used." (BS 
107/8). Three times Macmurray gives very extended examples of these 
different values. SRE 25/6; BS 100/4; SRE 27/9).
Thus we see that science, value-wise, is limited to only one 
half of life. The rest has no place in the world of science.
Indeed, Macmurray in one place goes the whole hog and calls science 
'valueless'. He qualifies this at once but nevertheless it has been
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said. "The corollary of this is that science in itself is strictly 
valueless." (RE 189).
Thirdly; we will not linger over this point for it has been 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis; but it needs to be mentioned in 
this context. Life, as we experience it, is whole and infinite. The 
moment, this moment, is undivided and indivisible. The instant we 
begin to break it up we are not living, not acting, but reflecting. 
Science is always discrete. Of its very nature it is so.
Philosophy, religion, and art are whole. Their intention is to be 
whole. They cannot but be whole. Science, to rule, must divide.
This is its only way and method.
And this is its limitation. Wholeness is the essence of knowing 
and of living. Science is extremely useful. But it must always be 
the part, never the whole. By its very method it can produce only 
indicative and contributory bits of the truth, never the truth." But 
science is abstract and partial in a way that philosophy is not. For 
science always thinks about a part of what there is to reflect upon, 
never the whole. It limits itself to a particular subject-matter. 
Indeed, there is no such thing as science, but only a number of 
different sciences each dealing with a part of what is given in 
immediate experience." (IU 26).
Fourthly. Science is limited to the exploration and knowing of 
things which can be verified. If a thing, or rather an assertion 
concerning that thing, cannot be verified, it does not fall within 
the province of science." This explains why it is a fundamental 
principle of scientific method to exclude from consideration whatever 
cannot be verified by observation and experiment. So soon as our
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minds pass beyond the limits of what can be verified in this way, we 
have no longer any means of distinguishing between reality and 
fiction." (BS 83). "The necessity for the verification of all 
conclusions is new completely recognized in the scientific field".
(IU 74). (See also the whole of IU 74/83).
This note on verification as a limitation of science, important 
as it is, is mentioned only briefly because it has been dealt with 
more fully in another part of this thesis. But one thing needs to be 
especially noted in respect of verification. Science accepts only 
that which can be verified. But not all things which can be verified 
are necessarily scientific. Macmurray, you will recall, endeavours 
to find ways of verifying philosophy. And as a totally committed 
empiricist, he would wish to discover ways of verifying everything, 
in any field, before accepting it. Whether this is possible is 
another matter.
Lastly, we come to a problem of limitation which is much less 
direct, and much more subtle, problematic, and obscure than those 
hitherto mentioned. Although many matters relevant to science, as we 
can see by the quotations in this chapter on science, are raised and 
discussed in Maanurray's book, "The Boundaries of Science", 
essentially its raison d'etre is this problem; as follows.
Scientific psychology enquires into human behaviour. About its 
capability of doing this there can be no doubt, far as Macmurray 
says, "Already in certain fields scientific psychology has provided 
far itself the same kind of justification as the other sciences. The 
field in which it has done so is limited; and the extent to which it 
has done so is still snail in comparison with sciences such as 
physics and chemistry. But in principle it is the same kind of
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justification. Already psychological sciences have thrown a great 
deal of light upon problems of human behaviour which have until now 
remained wrapped in mystery, and already the results of psychological 
investigation have proved themselves capable of successful 
application." (BS 90/1).
But hew far can it go? And hew correct is it so far as it has 
gone? This problem arises because of the following doubts. Firstly; 
can like investigate like? The essence of science is the 
independence of the investigator and the investigated. The scientist 
must always, and can only, explore the 'external'. "It follows from 
this that scientific knowledge is only possible so far as we can 
stand apart from things and observe without interfering." (BS 86 - 
and there is much more relevant to this on the same page). "Now, 
there is a field of experience where it is impossible to maintain 
this distinction between knowing something and acting upon it. What 
is the situation if I want to understand what I myself am doing? Is 
it possible for me to observe, in the way that science demands, rny 
own actions? If I stop performing an action in order to observe it, 
there is no longer any thing to observe. My actions depend upon me 
and they only exist because I do them. It is quite clear in this 
case I cannot stand aside and observe what is happening as if it were 
external to me and independent of me". (BS 87). There is much more 
relevant to this point on adjacent pages of BS.
Secondly; science is concerned with events and causes. Here 
again, the full meaning of these terms and an understanding of them, 
is discussed elsewhere. But human beings are not of this form. The 
essence of being hunan is to intend, and subsequently to act; not to
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be an automatic part of the chain of cause and effect. But this is 
the whole of science. Its purpose is to discover the workings of 
this chain of sequence. Intentions are created moments. Whilst they 
can be known they can never be 'discovered' in any scientific 
science.
It would seem therefore, if Macmurray is right, that whilst some 
aspects of human and social behaviour may, in so far as it is purely 
external and natural, be observed, classified, and brought within the 
bounds of the theories and hypotheses of science, the essential part
of man can never be. "....  it must set limits to the possibility of
science by isolating a part of social behaviour which is in principle 
independent of our intentions as its object of study. The difficulty 
which would then arise would be the mystery of the relation between 
the part of our behaviour that is independent of our intention and 
the part that is dependent upon it." (BS 67/8).
Obviously, if this is so then this is a real limitation of 
science. And, moreover, as science is a human activity and 
endeavour, hew could science explain and prove science? Man is more 
than cause and effect and must therefore be, in the last resort, 
outside and beyond science." The philosophical question which arises 
can then be stated in the form, 'Can science give a satisfactory 
scientific account of science as a part of a general scientific 
account of human behaviour?' If it cannot, then the limits of 
science have been reached in the development of science itself." (BS 
35).
The question of limitation is a very important aspect of the 
subject and we have been barely able to touch upcn it. It deserves a 
thesis of it own.
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Appraisement (2)
Nobody but Maanurray has before suggested that science 
originated in Christianity. This is not merely novel but shrewd - 
whether intended or not. In a way one of the greatest divisions in 
the world and in the mind of men, if not the greatest, is still 
between religion and science. Despite what Macmurray says, and he 
says it a number of times in his works, that the 'scientific view' of 
the universe and existence is not philosophy, nor 'religion', it is 
not easy to accept this, especially as the revelations of science get 
both more encompassing and mind-boggling.
Macmurray' s strong argument, or supposedly strong, argument 
against this is that such a view is not scientific. Nobody pretends 
that it is. Everybody recognises it for what it is, and it is no 
less cogent far that. Looked at objectively there is much more 
evidence for it than for the religious view.
But assuming that this, the religious view, is in some way right 
- and of course Maanurray believes this to be so, especially that of 
Christianity - then to contend that it is the source of science, and 
he does so with seme conviction and persuasion, is certainly a major 
and good step in the much needed direction of reconciliation and 
unity, both of society and of mind.
Earlier numerous attempted reconciliations, since the 1860s, 
have failed. They relegate either one of the contenders to a 
ringside role. Or they fudge the issue, and leave it unresolved.
But Macmurray, if only heeded, as with many other things, could have 
done the trick. He has attempted to heal the breach at its very 
roots and not tried merely to manipulate the branches.
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On this problem of conflict between religion and science 
Maanurray says, "And a perplexing question arises for us. How can 
the spirit of science, which is a passionate faith in truth, be in 
conflict with the spirit of Christianity? How is it possible to 
accept Christianity and reject the spirit of truth which is the basis 
of science?" (E>1W 39).
2) Regarding the origin of science. We can accept the 
environmental, economic, view provided it is not to be the sole 
source but is to be taken with the psychological. But what causes 
the psychological is problematic. Why did more people want to think 
their cwn thoughts and live their own lives? We know from the 
experience of our cwn time and living how few people have original 
ideas and act upon them.
The question is - Who has the ideas? One person, car a small 
number of people? Maanurray, although he does not state it outright, 
seems inclined to the latter. But why were these so motivated? Is 
there no room far the 'great man' theory? Is social pressure so 
pervasive and uniquely timed that had Erasmus, Copernicus, Galilei, 
Newton, Freud, and Einstein not appeared, others of equal stature, 
awareness, and brilliance would have been thrcwn-up to do the job? 
Does not, to believe this, undermine Maanurray's whole conception of 
the uniqueness, spontaneity, and creativity of personality and human 
intention?
Obviously there can be at the moment no precise answer to the 
question of the origin of science, but supposedly an answer would add 
to our understanding of what it is. There is a chance, one would 
moot, that both the origin of science and what it is essentially and
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in relation to man and this role, turns out to be something quite 
different from what we think new. A clearer and more realistic 
perspective of it must come with time.
3) Macmurray' s explanation of hew science came to be associated 
with mathematics is interesting. But hew far is mathematics 
necessary to science? Of course, as it has developed, mathematics is 
a function of science. They are concomitants. They are essential to 
each other. But could science have developed without mathematics? 
And, if so, hew? Macmurray vaguely suggests that it could. But does 
not offer, imaginatively, possible ways of this happening.
4) Perhaps because for so many years I have known and been 
influenced and conditioned by Maanurray1 s thinking, I find it easy to 
accept the limitations of science he has given. They seem obvious. 
But I can imagine countless people, unless open to reason, not 
finding them easy to accept.
We are so conditioned to think of science as knowledge, indeed 
the only form of valid knowledge, that it is not easy to re-orientate 
our minds and feelings. And this concerns the general outlook and 
field. Hew much more difficult it must be to accept the more 
abstract discussion of the limitations concerning the area within the 
human psyche.
There can be no doubt however that Maanurray’s point is an 
extremely valid and practical one. It is obviously important not 
only for science, but for every field of human interest, especially 
for religion. What, if any, a conclusive answer could be is not 
apparent at this stage, but it is certainly a field of enquiry which 
must be sustained.
End of Appraisement (2)
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ART
Relevant Books
Reason and Emotion. (RE)
Religion, Art, and Science. (RAS)
The Structure of Religious Experience. (SRE)
Introduction
Unlike religion and science, art is not a major interest or 
consideration of Maanurray's. You feel that he knows, experiences, 
and lives religion and science, but not art. As we have seen he has 
a number of books named and each devoted to religion and science 
respectively, but none to art; and only one with art in the title - 
along of course with religion and science I Only the odd chapter in 
any book is concerned with art.
Given Macmurray1 s background, as related in the Introductory 
chapter and Biographical Note earlier, this is understandable. His 
home background, or perhaps we should say foreground, was intensely 
religious; and very early in life he developed a deep interest in 
science. Art either had no place, or Macmurray never refers to it, 
which is equally as telling and indicative. In his early religious 
life the usual artistic elements of religion - architecture, ritual, 
ceremonial, dress, and music - have little place.
Protestantism, and especially non-conformity from which 
Macmurray springs, is almost devoid of art; or it is only very
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modestly allowed to shew its face in devotional and sacred music, a 
little elementary carving, and a few flowers as decoration. Art is 
associated with the sensuous, an aspect of life never to be openly 
recognised, and certainly not to be enjoyed or encouraged.
However, despite this, Macmurray has a very definite and 
important place for art in his theorising, if not in his life. And 
much of this stems from his concern to shew the respective places and 
function of religion and science - and art. For Macmurray the role 
and contribution of each is very significant, clear, and precise; 
and, together, exhaustive both of human experiencing and possibility.
Relevant Quotations
With this in mind we give a few quotations indicative of Macmurray's 
thinking and assessment of art.
The three generalised expressions of the personal - 
science, art, and religion - can only be properly 
understood in relation to one another. Of the three, 
religion is the fully concrete expression; the other two 
are partial and abstract. (RE 145).
Religion, in the sense in which it deserves consideration, 
is one of the three general expressions of rationality.
The other two are art and science. Of the three religion 
is the basic expression and the most comprehensive. The 
others are more abstract and in a special sense included 
with religion. (RE 195).
Art, then, like science, is an abstraction from the full 
unity and wholeness of the personal. Yet it remains 
personal in a sense that science is not; and its value is 
higher than the value of science, because its 
abstractedness is lower. (RE 154).
Starting from the same facts, religion and art and science 
move in different directions because they deal with the 
facts differently. The religious man comes to worship, the 
artist to admire, the scientist to observe. (SRE 21).
- 201 -
New religion is one of the three major modes of reflective 
activity. The others are science and art. (RAS 7).
Science is the creation of intellectual freedom; art of 
emotional freedan. (CH 182).
Apart from the above all saying something very important about 
art, they very obviously, in their wording and sentence structure, 
illustrate a point made earlier. In the mind of Macmurray thoughts 
of art come after religion and science! But some others do say a bit 
more about art.
The artistic attitude alone enables us to come into contact 
with the reality of things, to realize the individuality, 
the value of actual objects, actual people. For science 
things exist only in terms of something else. Reality is 
that which exists in and for itself, the individual. 
Knowledge is the grasp of reality, the contemplation of the 
individual in its own proper being. This is precisely what 
art gives us. (RE 155).
The field in which emotional reason expresses itself most 
directly is the field of art. (RE 30).
The artistic attitude, therefore, organizes the data of 
experience in terms of their beauty. The more beautiful 
anything is the more near it lies to the centre of 
interest. (SRE 29).
Innumerable other pithy and telling quotations are to be found 
in the following.
RE. 53. 58/9. 160. 164. 165. 187. 167/8.
RAS. 30. 31. 33.
SRE. 29. 31.
PR. 133/4.
Although not in their context these quotations are sufficient to 
illustrate Macmurray1 s ways of thinking on art, and of its sometimes 
rather bewildering, amorphous, wide-ranging, and unusual nature. We
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have such terms as empiricism, abstract, rationality, moral, 
generalised expression, the personal, reflective - to name but some. 
Not an easy lot of ideas with which to work.
After much examination and thought I have tried to consolidate 
these ideas, and bring some coherence and order to them, although I 
am not sure hew contradictory some of them might be. Sometimes, as 
mentioned before, Macmurray threws 15) ideas, often of value and with 
considerable insight, without relating them for us - they may be 
related in his mind - to the immediate context.
And rarely do sub-headings appear in his work, always a feature 
helpful to the reader; to do which also tends to bring more order and 
self-discipline to the writer.
Why Art?
Perhaps the first thing we have to ask ourselves is, Why art?
Why do we have, create, recognise, experience, appreciate, enjoy this 
thing called art? Why, and how, does it come to be? Why do no other 
creatures have it? Why is man its only exponent? Why has art, in 
man's existence and history, increasingly become a recognised good, 
even a necessity?
Macmurray's answer to the question, Why art?, as you will have 
concluded from the quotations, may be summed-up in three basic ideas 
and concepts, all of which are related and to some extent 
interdependent. These are - the personal, rationality, and 
reflection.
To take the personal first you remember the quotation, earlier 
given, "The three generalized expressions of the personal - science,
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art, and religion - can only be properly understood in relation to 
one another." The personal is such a major and important theme for 
Macmurray that I shall be expanding, examining, and evaluating it 
later in a section to itself in the philosophy chapter. Therefore, 
this is not the place to go into it deeply. Sufficient to say that 
the personal is the total and wholeness of those elements and 
manifestations, which are peculiar to man, and which makes man man 
and not any other entity or creature. But one example of this is 
language. Other creatures may communicate, but none have language.
Ncw we turn to our other two characteristics mentioned earlier, 
which are also unique to man; rationality and reflection.
Rationality is "objective consciousness, and is possible only in 
beings who stand in conscious relationship to objects which they know 
and which are not themselves." (RE 195). This means, to be brief, 
two things. Firstly; that all creatures are conscious, but man is 
conscious that he is conscious. Secondly; and this is most 
important; that man can appreciate, live his life, and indeed best 
live his life, in terms of what is not himself i.e. in terms of 
reality; and not live subjectively i.e. in terras only of himself and 
of his immediate feelings and demands. To live subjectively is to be 
apersonal or even non-personal. It is to be less than man.
And one of the general expressions of rationality is art. (See 
RE 195). To say this may seem quite incongruous because we have been 
conditioned to associate rationality only with reasoning, and 
therefore with thought. But Macmurray, as you have realised from his 
definition, has a much more comprehensive view of it. Rationality is 
an aspect of the personal, and therefore can manifest itself in and 
through all man does and experiences, including feeling - and art.
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Indeed art is an exemplification of this rationality; a contributory 
proof of it, as it were. That art exists at all demonstrates our 
rationality; that we are rational; that rationality is one of our 
constituents. "New art and religion are two aspects of this search 
for the life of rational personality. They are the efforts of our 
sensitiveness to live in the knowledge of the reality of which we are 
a part. They are efforts to express the life of reason in us. They 
are alike in this, that they seek the awareness of reality through 
our emotional sensitiveness. They are the expressions of reason 
working in the emotional life in search of reality. Because we are 
persons it is not enough to have a feeling. We are driven to ask: 
'What is it in the world that this feeling is about?' It is not 
enough to feel fear like an animal and then turn tail and run. We 
have to ask; 'What am I afraid of, and is it really to be feared?'
The reason working in our emotional life forces us to take our 
feelings as an awareness of things outside us, as a consciousness of 
the meaning and value of things other than ourselves. So, on the 
basis of our emotional consciousness of the world we become artists 
and we become worshippers of God. Art and religion arise as ways of 
behaving as rational beings, as ways of expressing in our modes of 
living our awareness of the significance of the world we live in, an 
awareness that we possess through the reason in our emotional life. 
They are ways of expressing our emotional rationality." (RE 54).
What of the other basic term, reflection? Reflection is another 
big theme of Macmurray1 s. In his most erudite work, "The Form of the 
Personal." (two volumes), two long chapters are devoted to it; and 
there is a chapter on it in SRE. And many other references are made
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on reflection throughout his writings.
Yet it is not always clear what he means by it. Sometimes he 
uses it as one would in everyday life, contrasting a mode of 
withdrawal into private mental activity with acting and relating in 
the tangible, physical, world. "... and indicate the relations which 
hold between the reflective activities and the primary unreflective 
activities." (RAS 8).
At other times he seems to regard reflection, especially as it 
shews itself in art, as a form of activity - beyond of course the 
obvious fact that even thinking is an activity i.e. the brain moving 
about. "When, therefore, we now turn to consider the arts, we shall 
think of them as activities - as human doings; to be understood as 
forms of reflective activity which have their place in the Browning 
called 'the general deed of Man', and their justification in the 
contribution which they make to it." (RAS 29). Perhaps the answer is 
that although you must "do" religion, art, and science, the fact that 
they exist as we know them, and are conscious of them, is enough to 
make them be seen as reflective, or perhaps reflected, entities.
This is all we can say at this point without the space available 
to analyse exhaustively and dissect; and if necessary reconstruct 
Macmurray's very lengthy exposition of reflection. We must be 
content to accept that, for him, art is one of our foremost forms of 
reflection.
From the foregoing enough has been said to indicate Macmurray' s 
answer to the question, Why art? Art is, and exists, because it is 
one expression of man's nature and essence. It is a concomitant of 
the personal. Admittedly this is only an answer which merely pushes 
the question further back. It might even be circular. But all
- 206 -
questions of this kind cannot be answered in a total, absolute, and 
ultimate sense. We, with our limited minds, understanding, and 
comprehension, have to be content with forays, explanations, and 
suggestions which illuminate and orientate, and take us a step on the 
way. And I think Macmurray's conception of art does this.
What is Art Doing?
Or, what does it have to do? What is its role? How does art go 
about its business?
Man is personal and therefore needs to be doing personal things 
and be living personally. If he does not, either collectively or as
an individual (each one of us, you and I), he is shortfailing. He is
virtually not man. New, as man, we have to contend with three orders 
- things, organisms, and people; matter, life, and the personal.
Science deals with things. Even when it studies organisms, or 
even people (psychology and sociology) it deals with them in a 
"thing" way. Its very essence is to be "feelingless".
Religion deals with the personal, which includes relating, love, 
freedom, and equality. The essence of religion is total, mutual, 
benign feeling, exchanging, giving, and sharing.
Art deals with the organic. It takes up and captures life with 
all its vibrant and enveloping zest, vitality, and sensuousness. As 
with religion, feeling is rich and positive, but its expression is 
all one way - outgoing, but not reciprocal or receiving.
As art is our present concern, let us have a quotation to 
illustrate this. "This joy in the life of the senses would seem to 
be a particular expression of something wider - the feeling that it
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is good to be alive. There is a pleasure in the healthy functioning 
of our bodies, with which there is joined that sense of overplus of 
energy ready to be used. We feel fit far anything; and the natural 
outlet for this energy is to shout or sing or dance. One sees this 
particularly in children. The sense of organic well-being tends to 
express itself in rhythmic movement. It is natural to suppose that 
the origin of this externalizing of rhythm, this natural expression 
of harmonious sounds, lies in the rhythms of the bodily life itself, 
and in the smooth and harmonious interplay of all the organic 
functions. It is certainly the case that there is a close and 
constant relation between art and the organic aspect of our own 
experience. In philosophy, too, we can observe that where the 
attitude of mind is aesthetic - as it is with the ancient Greeks or 
with the modem Idealists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
- the world is conceived invariably in organic terms." (RAS 31).
"Life as life, in its characteristic nature as growth, 
development, self-reproduction, sensitiveness and instinct, needs 
another approach. We must find hew to relate ourselves organically 
to organic nature; and the pressure towards an objective, rational, 
relationship with this world of life gives rise to art in all its 
forms. If it is through science that we come to relate our lives 
rationally to the material world, it is through art that we can come 
to relate our lives rationally to the world of organic life. The 
drive to rationality in this field is a pressure towards balance and 
rhythm and harmony, towards functional relationship; and the 
rationality it seeks is a rationality of the instinctive and 
emotional life." (RE 203/4).
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Fran this we can see a little clearer what the special area and
competence of art is. Not, let it be at once noted, that special
aspects of life are reserved far art - or far science or religion, 
for that matter. Although some things tend to be the focus of their 
respective interest and attention, there is no ultimate restriction 
an any of them. Hew many things and happenings in our own lifetime 
have become the subject of art which were ignored, or deliberately 
excluded, in our earlier days? Art excludes nothing (see RAS 40/1 ). 
This whole matter of the respective fields and interests of religion, 
art, and science are discussed at length by Macmurray in SRE 20/4.
Having cleared the ground, we are now in a better position to
consider our question, What is art doing? What are its intentions
and purposes?
But, firstly, following Macmurray, we must say what art is not 
about. To appreciate this is very important. Ch this we may find 
ourselves not agreeing with what Macmurray says. It may surprise, 
shock or even annoy us, being so contrary as it is to a very cannon 
viewpoint. But as we are here to study Macmurray and his ideas, 
however unusual these may be, we are not here necessarily to endorse 
our cwn feelings, predilections, prescriptions, or prejudices; nar to 
continue our comfort and security if these are unreal. This is an 
example of hew Maanurray, taken seriously, promotes our own growth 
towards, and into, the personal.
Rationality, as we touched upon earlier, is grounded in our 
objectivity, or in our genuine intention to be so. Now the need for 
rationality and objectivity applies just as much to our feelings as 
to our thought and perceiving. In the case of our feelings Macmurray 
calls this worthwhile state or intention, emotional reason. "The
- 209 -
real problem of the development of emotional reason is to shift the 
centre of feeling from the self to the world outside. We can only 
begin to grow up into rationality when we begin to see our own 
emotional life not as the centre of things but as part of the 
development of humanity. The field in which emotional reason 
expresses itself most directly is the field of art. The artist is 
directly concerned to express his emotional experience of the world. 
His success depends upon the rationality of his emotions." (RE 30).
Because art arises from, and is developed in, feeling it is 
obvious that emotional reason is very relevant to it. But, says 
Macmurray, "Unfortunately the very first thing that confronts us in 
this is the fact that our way of regarding art bears witness to the 
absence of emotional reason." (RE 52). Using the terms technically, 
we are subjective and egocentric. We regard the world as existing 
for our private satisfaction, as a means to our individual ends. 
With reference to art, "We think that art is concerned with our 
pleasure or our consolation; so long as we look upon it as an 
activity of our own or of other people which gives us something that 
we want; which makes us happy or comforts us, we are in a subjective 
and irrational frame of mind. Now this is the way most of us do 
regard art (and religion and science too, for that matter). We look 
upon art as a decoration and a beautifying of our lives. Beautiful 
things are made for our delight. This is hew we look at the matter. 
Our treatises on Beauty start off, almost without exception, by 
assuming that the real question about art is why it gives us 
pleasure; and proceed to try to distinguish good art frcm bad by the 
kind of pleasurable effect it has on the spectator or the listener."
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(RE 52).
So art is not mere adornment; not just a pretty appendage and 
distraction frcm the rigours and cruelties of reality; not an 
escapism and compensation; not the superficial icing on the cate on 
the solid, monotonous, cake of life. Nor is it the luxuriant and 
syharitic pleasure of wallowing in feeling - often combined with a 
self-righteous sense of cultural snobbery - evoked by a so-called 
work of art.
If none of this, what is it then? It is, or performs, a number 
of functions.
1) Education of the Emotions
Firstly, it is the educator of the emotions and senses. Our 
emotions in their natural state are primitive, stark, and unrefined. 
Just observe a baby or young child to confirm this. We experience 
unreal feelings; we have feelings which are mistaken; or we do not 
feel at all when we ought to be feeling something. Our emotions are 
often misdirected too.
For many people emotions remain undeveloped all their lives, 
especially in a society like ours where the emphasis is on science 
and technology, and where consequently the purpose of education is to 
develop the intellect, not the feelings. Art, subtly, is the 
instrument of remedying this crudity and self -centredness. At our 
mother's knee we are, or were (few mothers have time to do this today 
- a very symptom of the above) told stories which at once began to 
enlarge our empathy, and even our sympathy and compassion. Our 
emotions were beginning to develop. They started, however 
tentatively, to become objective.
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And so throughout our lives, so far as we heed it - one of 
Macmurray' s greatest complaints is that art is of so little interest 
to our society. "The supreme condemnation of a civilization is that 
it is inartistic, that is to say, impersonal, inhuman, unreal. The 
absence of art is the absence of spontaneity, of proper humanity; the 
penalty for it is an inner stultification, a loss of spiritual 
integrity, a slowing down of the pulses of the inner life." (RE 158). 
Art is developing and enlarging our sensitivity, our capacity to 
feel. It is educating our senses too, the only channels - sight, 
hearing, touch, taste, and smell - by which we apprehend the world 
outside of ourselves. If these senses are poor, inadequate, obtuse, 
and insensitive, so too will be our whole life and living. Art 
quickens, stimulates, arouses, and renews these important avenues. 
"The practical function of art is, therefore, the refinement of 
sensibility." (RAS 42). "It (art) is an education of emotion and a 
training of judgement." (RAS 42).
How art perfarns this task will be referred to later.
2) Value Discernment and Training
A good second role of art, is the discernment of good values. 
Values - except monetary 1 - are, along with emotional development, to 
which they are extremely closely allied, never mentioned or discussed 
today; except, of course, in closed academic circles and coteries 
where they are still-born and have no practical relevance or effect.
Yet values are the very essence, the tissue and substance, of 
ourselves. Each moment of the day we are either choosing or living- 
out choices already made. And choices, all choices, are, and must 
be, the expression of values.
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Macmurray, following tradition, recognises two kinds of values, 
utility or instrumental, and, intrinsic. For a full discussion of 
these see SRE 25/32. Utility values are manifested in things we 
choose as means to our ends. Intrinsic values are those which are 
ends in themselves. The practice of science, to give one possible 
example of many, is grounded in utility values. Art, on the other 
hand, is concerned with intrinsic values.
And one of the purposes of art is to promote such values; to 
make us aware that things are, and can be, worth something in 
themselves, and not merely for our own self-utilisation and physical 
satisfaction. Not that proportion is not necessary here. Without 
utility values we would not survive to enjoy intrinsic values - or 
more precisely, things of intrinsic and not mere instrumental worth.
But what has intrinsic worth? The Greek trio of Beauty, 
Goodness, and Truth, held by so many far so long - as recently as the 
1940s, C.E.M. Joad was their greatest popular exponent - have little 
meaning today. The whole idea is too vague, and thus virtually 
meaningless. They sound good but are vapid and empty.
Intrinsic worth can only be discerned as we grow emotionally, as 
we develop emotional reason and objectivity. At least, this is 
Macmurray's view. We have, as it were, to grow in our own emotional 
self-trust. "The appraisement is a search far an appropriate 
emotional attitude to the object". (RAS 37). Thinking "cannot decide 
whether the thing it reveals is good or bad, beautiful or ugly, to be 
shunned or to be sought. For the determination of values we are 
dependent on our emotions - or on those of someone else." (RE 36). 
"There can be no hope of educating our emotions unless we are 
prepared to stop relying on other people's for our judgment of value.
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We must learn to feel for ourselves even if we make mistakes." (RE
37). Too often our values are 'external' and phoney. "How many 
people would maintain stoutly that Milton's Paradise Lost is a very 
beautiful poem, who have never read it, or have been bored by it when 
they did!" (RE 37).
All our evaluating must be empirical, a favourite approach of 
Macmurray's you will recall. "This involves a reference to a third 
form of empiricism which finds its appropriate expression in 
aesthetic activity." (SRE 13 and see this and adjacent pages for more 
on empiricism). And one of the things empiricism means in this 
context is that we are not afraid to revise our evaluations in the 
light of experience. "It is my feeling that is the basis of the 
judgement, so that the judgement, as in science, remains hypothetical 
only, and always liable to revision." (RAS 38).
But although you start to develop your ability to evaluate once 
you stop taking your values secondhand and begin to trust your own 
feelings (from which all valuation springs anyway) a great step will 
be made when your attitude and style of evaluation, paradoxically, 
changes from "I like this" to "This is good" - honestly made of 
course. When you are doing this you will have made an immense shift 
of feeling and perception from the subjective to the objective, from 
the self to the abject. "The condition of this process from 'I like 
it' to 'it is good' is that I should be interested throughout in the 
object, and not in myself being affected by it. My feeling must 
really be for the abject itself and not to enjoy myself by means of 
the abject. This is the essence of emotional self-transcendence; or, 
if you will, emotional 1 objectivity1. We are, in fact, quite
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familiar with the distinction; it is the difference between the way 
we enjoy a good 'thriller' and the way we enjoy a great novel. In 
the first case what one enjoys is the thrill the story gives us; in 
the second it is the book itself, in virtue of its own inherent 
quality." (RAS 38).
3) Significance
Art discerns, creates, and specialises in, significance. This 
is one of its main raison d'etre. The great aim and purpose of 
science is to discover the common factor of a million things. Each 
of these million things has, for science, no individual value or 
significance. Each is as good as, or a substitute for, any other.
It glories in generalisation and uniformity.
Art takes just the opposite view. It searches out, discovers, 
heightens, and depicts those gestures and elements of a thing 
different from anything of its kind, cr indeed of all other things in 
the universe. "The artistic attitude, in reflection, moves in the 
opposite direction toward individuality and uniqueness. Bringing to 
experience the desire to contemplate and admire, it sees the world as 
a collection of unique and interesting objects." (SRE 31). "The 
scientist seeks to minimise the personal factor. He wants to see as 
everybody sees. The artist maximizes the personal element." (RAS 
41).
If art is not doing this, then no matter how much a production 
would seem to resemble art, it is not art. It is counterfeit. "Art, 
it seems to me, is always a search for the value in the individual 
things with which the world is stared." (RE 58/9). And this means 
something quite extra as well. It is; that art sees a thing as
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existing in its own right. It is not something to be 'found-out 
about', however uniquely regarded. It is to be cherished just 
because it is. "And this suggests at once what the development of 
art signifies in human life. It represents the effort to become 
aware of the significance of individuals in themselves through an 
emotional apprehension of them. Art expresses to us our capacity as 
rational beings to apprehend the values of things in themselves; not 
their value to us but their meaning and significance in their own 
right as individuals in the world. It expresses that rational 
impulse in us to delight in the things that are real individuals in 
the world just because they are there and reveal themselves to us. A 
mature art, if we achieve it, as we have new achieved a mature 
science, would be our way of reaching nearer and nearer, through the 
cooperative effort of many individuals, to a real emotional knowledge 
of the significance of real things. (RE 59/60).
So what does art do? It not only trains us in value 
discernment, but leads us to recognise the uniqueness of everything 
in creation. And thus produces a sense of awe and wonder. But for 
Macmurray's firm admonition that we are not to confuse art with 
religion (a matter we will refer to later) we might feel that here, 
when we speak of awe and wonder, we are approaching the domain of the 
latter.
4) Conservation
This point is a sort of negative, but necessary, accompaniment 
of the last. To discern, even create, significance is a splendid, 
outgoing, thing to do. One feels the care, concern, energy, 
vitality, and the optimism of youth in it. The whole of creation
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must be depicted, illuminated, and inmortalised through the artist's 
brush, the poet's pen, and the composer's rhythm.
But, says Macmurray, besides this urge to creativity, art exists 
to capture and conserve beauty before it inevitably dies and fades 
far ever. Whilst creativity is a sign of youth, this conservation 
and nostalgic feeling must be the sign and prerogative of age. But 
art is required to do this because we live in a constantly changing 
universe. "What distresses it most is the changeableness of the 
things of experience. Individuality is everywhere subject to fading 
and dissolution. Nothing keeps its beauty long. So the artist 
seeks, as we say, to immortalize what is in experience evanescent.
He seeks to make what is passing a possession for ever; to confer on 
the data of common observation a individuality which can defy time; 
to prevent what is unique from being wholly reabsorbed into the 
common dust frcm which it arose." (SRE 31). And even this 
encapsulation cannot, of course, be for ever; canvases rot, the 
hardest stone erodes and crumbles, porcelain shatters.
But a work of art endures longer than that which prompted its 
creation; and longer, too, than its creator. And so long as new 
treasures, new embodiments of artistic awareness and vitality, are 
being created, so will this purpose of art be, at least partially, 
fulfilled. "The effect of art upon us is the opposite. It leads to 
the effort to maintain and preserve against the ravages of time 
things which have for us an intrinsic value. Not merely ancient 
works of art but ancient ceremonial, ancient buildings are carefully 
guarded and preserved; and even comers of the world which have 
struck man by their natural beauty, like the Yosemite Valley, are 
carefully and expensively preserved against the scientific attitude
- 217 -
which would dissolve their beauty in an effort to exploit them for 
practical purposes." (SRE 32).
5) Wholeness
Art creates wholeness. Good art is whole and entire. It is 
strange that Macmurray, in all his varied and scattered conceptions 
and notions about art, refers to this function but once, and then 
only briefly in one paragraph. "The image, if it is to present the 
object in its individuality, must itself be self-contained. This is 
what is meant by saying that a work of art is an organic whole. The 
elements of which it is composed are not merely arranged; they are 
organized. They are functionally or purposely related to one 
another, so that they give the impression of necessity. What this 
secures is that the composition of the image is such that the 
elements refer us to one another, and so are seen as constituting a 
completed whole, which needs nothing beyond itself far its 
apprehension. Its formal characters, therefore, are rhythm, 
proportion, balance and harmony." (RAS 39/40). But wholeness has 
always seemed to me to be one of art's foremost purposes and a very 
cogent test of its satisfactoriness, car even whether it is art at 
all.
Life is disparate, broken and piecemeal as we experience it. 
Each moment may be whole, especially an unreflecting moment - but if 
we are reflecting we do not recognise that we are experiencing that 
moment unreflectingly at the time. However organised a life is, and 
very few are in a total and emotional sense, experiences come and go 
haphazardly, and fortuitiously, and in-ccmprehensively. And if we 
have a certain amount of personal coherence and cohesion, public
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events - even limited ones, say, within our work situation, let alone 
wider happenings - present a broken, discontinuous, even bewildering 
and unordered succession. This feeling and impression exists whether 
we are directly concerned with them or not.
Now, it is the function of art to depict wholeness far us; to
emotionally, if only for a short time, bathe us in the joy and 
delight of unity and unbrokeness. This should be seen not as an 
escapism but as an experience of the reality that can be. Such 
wholeness may be demonstrated and conveyed in the painting of a 
simple flower, a symphony, a novel, a Gothic cathedral. Size and 
matter are immaterial. Through some work of art we have far a moment 
or longer experienced the wholeness we do not, and cannot, because of
the nature of things, know in everyday living.
Perhaps a recluse alone, if he is at peace with himself and not 
bedeviled mentally by earthly things, experiences this of, as it 
were, his cwn volition. But then he is not living; certainly not in 
a Macmurray sense. He has withdrawn from lifel
As I have said, Macmurray does speak of this wholeness (see here 
the end of the later section on 'Constructive Imagination1, but he, 
it seems to me, fails to give it the emphasis and importance it 
justifies, as one of the main things art does.
6) The Architect of The Future
Art is the architect of the future. This very vital role will 
be discussed where it is most relevant i.e. under the section on the 
Artist.
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Artistic Reflection
"Art is a reflective experience." (RAS 33). It is one of the 
three main reflective activities of man. The other two are science 
and religion. And each has a particular node or manner. For science 
it is intellectual analysis. Far religion, comnunity. The 
enveloping and distinguishing node of art is contemplation. This 
Macmurray has unravelled and discussed on pages 33/42 of RAS.
He distinguishes three elements in contemplation so far as art 
is concerned
1) Looking.
2) Reflective Activity.
3) Constructive Imagination.
By the way; far ease of exposition Macmurray has chosen to 
analyse and illustrate artistic contemplation through the visual 
arts. But, as he says, "I have confined myself in this commentary 
upon art to the visual arts." (RAS 40). Then after much more in the
same vein, which should be read, he adds. " what I have
selected for comment in the case of the visual arts has its proper 
counterpart in all the others, and that the account I have given will 
apply, mutatis mutandis, to any." (RAS 40). Despite this we must 
say that, as he is prone to do - a little too often perhaps - 
Macmurray seems to have hedged his bets, far on an earlier page he 
says, "We shall have in mind, to begin with, the visual arts, 
reminding ourselves, however, that there is a danger in assuming that 
all that is true of the arts which derive from an appeal to visual 
experience will be true of the others - of music, far instance, of
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dancing, or, of poetry." (RAS 33).
Let us then look at these three aspects of contemplation.
Firstly, Looking. (See RAS 33/4).
This, for Macmurray, is something very much more than just 
looking and seeing. It is to be undertaken systematically, 
purposefully, and critically. It is a prolonged activity. Unlike 
scientific observation, with which we are most familiar today, and 
considered to be the norm and apogee of knowing, we are not looking 
at an object for what it has in common with other similar things.
Nor are we looking with utilitarian and functional eyes to see what 
it can give us, car of what we can get out of it.
We are looking as a lover looks at his sweetheart; looking with 
intensity of concentration so as to absorb her splendour and 
uniqueness. "Compared with the artistic description of nature, in 
poetry, fear example, or in painting, the scientific is description 
only in a very Pickwickian sense. The empiricism of art, it would 
seem, is much more thorough-going than that of science. At any rate, 
the physicist's picture of the natural world - cold, dark and shaking 
like a jelly - is much further removed from the world as we know it 
in perception that the wildest fantasy that the imaginative painter 
can put on canvas." (RAS 30).
We all knew hew dramatists, novelists, and biographers, will 
spend a whole year in libraries reading up background material, most 
of which will never be used in their ultimate production. And 
Maanurray has another illustration. "It is said that Japanese 
landscape artists think it necessary to live for a time in the 
landscape they intend to paint. They walk about it, watching it at 
different times of the day, under different conditions of light and
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in different weathers. This prolonged visual study may last for 
months, until the painter has thoroughly learned the landscape with 
his eyes. Then he will shut himself up in his study and paint from 
memory." (RAS 34). Can anyone challenge that this is not the real 
way to know something? It is, says Macmurray, the only way to know 
anything in its actual, individual, existence, as distinct from 
knowing about it. "We recognise this most clearly in the case of 
other human beings, where the distinction between knowing a person 
and knowing about him is familiar and unambiguous. But the same 
holds over the whole range of experience." (RAS 34).
Looking, then, systematically and purposefully is the first 
major element in contemplation, and is the only way of getting to 
know things, places, and people individually, which is the essence of 
artistic reflection.
Secondly; in the contemplative process is, Reflective Activity 
(see RAS 34/9).
Perceiving the object, however intimately, special, and caringly 
is not enough. It produces nothing of itself, essential as it is to 
be performed. Reflective activity may be likened to the stage in 
scientific reflection when observation is succeeded by analysis and 
assessment, and perhaps the formulating of an hypothesis. But in no 
way are they to be confused. Scientific analysis is purely 
intellectual. It would not be scientific if it were not. But the 
reflective stage of art is emotional, leading to the evaluative.
"New the reflective activity in contemplation is not at all like 
this. It is not an intellectual activity. Scientific reflection
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results in general theories; and these become the basis of 
constructive activity through the application of a technical rule 
which is grounded upon them. But any reflection that results in a 
theory is not contemplation, and any painting which proceeds by the 
application of rules is ipso facto bad art." (RAS 35).
Much of what happens and is required at this stage was discussed 
and worked-out a few pages earlier under both Education of the 
Emotions and Value Discernment and training. It is all a tentative, 
evaluative, exploration, a discerning of worthwhileness or otherwise. 
Of its very nature no rules or prescriptions, or even real methods, 
can be laid down far it. "Ib describe the process of contemplation 
is extremely difficult - perhaps, in the end, impossible. This is 
because it is not an intellectual process; it has its own mode of 
expression which is by means of imagery, by the construction of 
images. We might say that it is largely 1 unconscious1; that it is 
not discursive but intuitive; that in the end if our reflection is 
successful we just knew that we are right, but we cannot tell how we 
knew and certainly not prove that we are right." (RAS 38/9). It is a 
matter of trust, especially of self-trust and emotional growth.
"Given this concentration of interest in the object the process of 
contemplation proceeds by perceptual examination, by discovering mare 
and more of what is there to be perceived, both as to the elements 
which make it up and as to the relation of them to one another in the
whole." (RAS 38). "And as the "seeing" of it - the knowing of it by
critical looking - becomes more adequate, so the "feeling" of it - 
the valuation of it by feeling - becomes correspondingly more 
adequate. In this process the feeling which is our first reaction to
the object always changes; and it may be completely reversed." (RAS
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38). "The capacity to appraise an object in this way has to be 
learned and it grows with exercise." (RAS 38).
But however good one's own appraisement of a particular object 
is; however good one's own appraisal apparatus and ability becomes in 
general, this can never be wholly satisfactory. Or even if it is can 
never be known to be so without the critical appraisal of others.
(See RAS 29). Thus, out of this need, we reach the third state of 
contemplation which is:-
Constructive Imagination (See RAS 39)
Only with the physical creation - construction to be taken quite 
literally - is the process of contemplation completed. If the image 
remains private (i.e. mental) it "remains an unfixed, inpermanent and 
almost certainly unfinished image." (RAS 39).
This image, the result you will recall of emotional reflection, 
is not a reproduction, not a copy, and certainly not a 'photograph', 
but an appraisal in itself. And as the purpose of art is to 
individualise, the more individualistic the image the more valuable 
it is; provided, of course, that it is sincere.
What is the essence of an adequate and satisfactory image if it 
is to manifest individuality? On this point, but without elaborating 
(see RAS 39/40) Macmurray refers in a paragraph to some of these 
questions. These include rhythm, proportion, balance, and harmony. 
The work of art, to be a work of art, must be self-contained, or, in 
other words, an organic whole. Each part of which it is composed 
must be "functionally or purposively related to one another, so that 
they give the impression of necessity." (RAS 40).
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The composition of the image must be such "that the elements 
refer us to one another, and so are seen as constituting a completed 
whole, which needs nothing beyond itself for its apprehension." (RAS 
40). These are achieved by selection, modification, and 
organisation.
We have just discussed contemplation, the basic attitude and 
approach of art. We new turn to consider what Macmurray has to say 
about the comtemplator, namely
The Artist
Art is an expression of the personal; and the essence of the 
personal, is emotional freedom. The core, or essential manifestation, 
of emotional freedom is spontaneity. "The spontaneity of the 
personal, which is art, is the capacity we possess to create 
reality". (RE 167). "The spontaneity of art is personal 
creativeness, or self-expression." (RE 156. See also RE 69).
From all this we can conclude with Macmurray that "creative 
spontaneity (is) the quality which the real artist shews us in 
abstraction from what normally conceals it." (RE 157). This creative 
spontaneity is the essence of personal individuality.
New, because of this because we all, each one of us, must have 
personal individuality, so must we be, or have it in us to be, 
creatively spontaneous. And so we come to Macmurray's first point 
about the artist. We are all artists; or, at least, have it in us to 
be so. This reminds one of Gray's 'mute inglorious Miltons'. Or of 
the old adage that 'we are all poets but we do not all write poetry'. 
"Ail of us, without exception, because we are persons, are
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essentially artists. The capacity for creative self-expression is 
our birthright; it is what makes us human." (RE 157).
Macmurray then goes slightly astray. He says, "Genius is no 
mysterious gift that some magical power confers on one man in a 
million. It is not something unique and supernatural. It is simply 
human spontaneity, the expression of personal freedom." (RE 157). 
Whoever said or thought that all artists were geniuses, or that art 
must be, and can only be, the expression of genius? Surely this 
assumption, and use of language, is going too far. One would hardly 
regard it as a usual or acceptable definition of genius. We all, it 
could be agreed, have creativity which is dormant, unrecognised, and 
uncultivated - a regrettable waste of humanity both for man and for 
the universe and creation. But to call this creativity, in every 
case, genius seems an exaggeration!
But Macmurray goes on, more acceptably and wisely, to say that 
the fact that we do not recognise this i.e. the innate artistic 
ability of all, is "a measure of the derangement of our Inner life, 
of our failure to be our human selves. The artist is not abnormal, 
but simply the normal human individual. Not of course the average 
human being, after education and the constraints of social and 
physical necessity have succeeded in suppressing and stunting his 
natural capacity." (RE 157). And later, in the same context, he goes 
on to say, "Remove the restrictions, both inner and outer, which 
suppress the spontaneity of any human being, and his natural 
spontaneity will shew itself as artistic creativeness." (RE 158 - and 
much of what follows should be read).
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So, in a sense, we are all artists. We all knew the most 
seemingly uncreative person becomes alive and creative when he finds 
an interest and expression suitable for his gifts and capacities.
And this applies to all persons, irrespective of intelligence, 
education, social background, or handicaps.
But, accepting all this, what sort of person is the recognised 
artist; or everybody else, for that matter, when they are exercising 
their spontaneous creativity? How and what is the artist living and 
experiencing, as an artist?
The artist, it is obvious, must feel and act in all the ways 
earlier stated and discussed under contemplation. He must be a 
looker. "The artist is first and foremost the observer." (RAS 29). 
He must be able to utilise, organise, and develop his feelings so 
that he comes to a satisfactory evaluation of that which he has 
chosen to dwell upon. And he must have the skill, technique, and 
competence to exhibit, in one of the many innumerable forms, what he 
has 'seen', so that his individual, personal, and unique vision may 
be given to others. To summarise these essentials of the artist we 
cannot do better than quote Macmurray himself. "He is emotionally 
contemplative. He fills his senses with an object or set of objects, 
and seeks to feel it; to become emotionally aware of its being, and 
to realize it fully as that individual thing, that is his attitude to 
the world, when he is being an artist. He wants to go out to it, to 
soak himself in it and so to become emotionally conscious of its 
meaning and significance in itself. He is not trying to discover 
things about it but to knew it as something that exists in its own 
right, something that is part of the furniture of earth, and 
therefore has value in itself - not for him or for anyone else." (RE
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59). And again. "So far as he can do this he finds that it has the 
result of producing in him a spontaneous creative activity which 
expresses the awareness of the thing which he has achieved. If he 
paints a picture, what the picture says is not 'This is what the
object looks like; so, if you have seen this you needn't look at the
object' it says rather: 'I have known something - really known it -
and this is what it means in itself. Look at this and you will 
realize the significance of the thing as it revealed itself to me'." 
(RE 59).
The artist, to turn to another point, lives in and for the 
senses. His task is "to apprehend the world finely through his own 
sensibility, and to express it in spontaneous activity purely for the 
joy of doing so." (RE 74/5). But "he does not exclude the
intellectual processes." (RAS 42), and certainly not in the way, nor
to the extent, that the scientist excludes emotional activities. But 
the artist does subordinate the intellectual processes of analysis, 
inference, and generalisation, to those of feeling and contemplation.
The senses are important to everybody. But we do not always 
realise that they can take two forms. We can use them as a means to 
an end. This we mostly do in the daily business of life and 
survival. The scientist uses his senses in this way all the time.
Or; we can use our senses for the benefit they can bring in 
themselves. The artist chooses the latter way. "The relation of 
each to sense-perception is quite different, and the difference is 
one which belongs to our everyday experience. When we are engaged in 
some practical activity, we rely upon our senses for guidance. They 
provide us, so to speak, with information which enables us to act
- 228 -
successfully. Our attention is concentrated upon what we are trying 
to achieve; what we see, hear, and feel is what is necessary or 
useful to our purpose. What is not we ignore. In a word, we are 
using our senses as means to an end which lies beyond them. But 
there are times when this 'use' of our senses is interrupted; times 
when we do not merely see, but look; when we do not merely hear, but 
listen. There are occasions when we live in our senses instead of 
using them; when the sensuous activity is its own end, and has its 
meaning in itself. The artist's perception is of this latter kind; 
the scientist's is the former. Consequently, the artist's seeing or 
hearing is associated directly with satisfaction, and the delight is 
in the hearing and the seeing". (RAS 30).
To be an artist one must live in the senses. In them, too, the 
artist must experience joy, even if sometimes mingled with anguish at 
his own inadequacies and artistic imperfections.
We new have to mention an aspect of the artist, pointed out by 
Macmurray, which is contrary to what anybody has thought before. 
Whereas until now it has been proclaimed and unquestioningly 
understood that the scientist is objective, indeed the prime example 
of it, and the artist the most subjective and highly self-centred of 
all human beings, Macmurray reverses this. It is, he says, the 
scientist who is highly subjective; the artist objective. In fact he 
can be a good artist only if he is this. Hew does Macmurray justify 
this very surprising volte face?
Simply on the ground that, as we have seen, an artist must know 
the object he has chosen to depict, and this knowing requires him to 
get right out of himself into the object and, as it were, identify
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himself with it. What could be more objective?
On the other hand, the scientist is not a bit interested 
essentially in that which he is studying. He could not care twopence 
about it intrinsically. He wants only to make use of it for his own 
ends, or of those he is working on behalf of. Thus, in relation to 
it he is living highly self-centredly and highly subjectively. 
Contrary to what we have believed there is no objectivity about it. 
And indeed there is none - at least, not in the artistic sense.
If we accept this slightly arcane interpretation, although it 
seems down-to-earth enough when explained and understood, then 
Maanurray would seem to have a point, even if we still have slight 
reservations and doubts - probably due to our conditioning, or to our 
lack of real interest in, and attention to, art; scientifically, or 
at least intellectually, orientated as most of us, knowingly or 
unknowingly, are. Some quotations to illustrate and confirm this 
aspect of Maanurray' s view of art must new be given. "For the same 
reason the value of science is utility-value, while the value of art 
is intrinsic. Why is this? It is because science remains 
subjective, while art achieves objectivity. Any real object for 
science is only an example, a fact, something to be referred to a 
class, something to analyse into elements the more unsubstantial the 
better; something whi is the effect of something else. Thus 
science is endlessly referred from one thing to another and chases 
objectivity over the infinite cosmos, finding, like Noah's dove, no 
place on which the sole of its foot may rest." (RE 155/6). "But art 
never has to seek objectivity, because it is objective from the 
beginning. It rests in the object of its choice, stirring only to
- 230 -
penetrate deeper into the heart of its reality. Its enjoys its 
object, and without such an interest in the object for its own sake, 
it is impossible to grasp any reality at all. Science cannot rest in 
any object, just because it is not interested in any; its interest is 
subjective, in the operation of the mind upon the object, in doing 
something to it, describing it, referring to it, never in the object 
itself, in and far itself, in its individual reality." (RE 156 - and 
see RAS 41 ; RE 59: 151 : 187; for many more relevant quotations.)
Artists, to turn to what must be the last point in this section, 
are architects of the future. You will remember we referred to this 
earlier, under What Art is Doing; but now we enlarge upon it.
Macmurray follows Plato on the point about to be made. In fact 
Maanurray is a great admirer of Plato in general and refers to him 
admiringly a number of times in his writings. Why, it is not easy to 
understand; far, if anybody, with his 'forms', dualism, and elements 
of other-worldliness - to say nothing of his elitism and aversion to 
democracy - was less like Maanurray and of all he stands far and 
advocates, it would be difficult to discover a better example. 
Moreover, Plato's thinking is so seminal to all European thought, 
both philosophical and religious, that his ideas are the source for a 
whole succession of thinkers, instilling ideas to which Macmurray is 
strongly opposed. Personally, being a convert of Macmurray's, I 
deplore Plato and his influence, and cannot understand why Maanurray 
does not feel and recognise this too. It seems to me that Plato, 
apart from being the first to formulate philosophical problems and 
questions, and then in only a mere literary form and in a very non- 
phi losophical , non-rational, way, was the biggest mistake in European
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history, thought-wise.
However, to return to the question. The artist's creation takes 
on an aura very similar to Plato's forms, and like those forms, gives 
a glimpse of reality. "A work of art is always in this sense an 
idea, the form of something, nothing actual. This is, I think, our 
experience of works of art. They express to us some actual phase or 
aspect or fragment of the real, and they reveal an intimacy of 
knowledge of the real that all our science and philosophy can never 
shew." (RE 166). But that is not all. This vision, this momentary 
insight into reality, evokes in us a desire that that thing might be. 
The artist thus "creates the possibility of a reality that is not 
yet, the idea of a future reality more perfect than the actual world 
we knew". (RE 166). The artist is therefore the architect of the 
future. This is emphasised in the following. "And it is the modem 
artists that we must look to in our need; the old masters are 
useless. They have no knowledge of the actual world in which we 
live, out of which a new world might be created. The craze for what 
is old and what has stood the appraisal of the centuries is a symptom 
of the fear of art rather than of the love of it. The cult of the 
antique may develop taste, but it tends to destroy artistic 
receptivity. For the old has done its work of social transformation. 
It remains as a monument of beauty. But a living work of art strikes 
always at the roots of our complacency and its beauty is hidden by 
its attack upon our security and our tradition." (RE 167/8).
Macmurray particularly stresses that the artist is the 
architect, not the creator. He may provide the vision, and suggest a 
plan, but he is not the builder. This task is for others to perform 
(see RE 166/7) once aroused and fired by the artist's glimpse of what
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might and could be. If none listen then the artist will be "a voice
crying in the wilderness, a despairing voice that cries: 'Ye will not
come unto me, that ye might have life'". (RE 167).
What better way to sum-up than with Maanurray1 s own words on
this. "But art is no adornment of life, no amusement or relaxation 
for energies that are weary of the serious work of civilization, no 
'purgation of pity and fear', no safety-valve for an excess of
emotion, no laboratory for the sublimation of dangerous passions. It
is the spontaneity of the personal, the expression of self, the 
creation of the vision of what might be real, and therefore the 
architect of the future. We have to build the future. But it is 
mere insanity to build without an architect - even with a completed
science to fetch and carry far us." (RE 169).
Problems of the Artist 
- both to himself and to others.
All the problems of the artist stem from, and are related to, 
one fact. The artist cannot be, or even hope to be, a whole human 
person. "The artist is not a full human being, because of the 
abstraction which isolates him." (RE 164). In this self-limitation 
the artist is not alone. The scientist, too, is equally incomplete. 
"Darwin lamented in his old age that his mind had become a mere 
machine for grinding out general laws, and wished that he had read a 
poem a day." (RE 164).
What effects has this inevitable situation upon the artist?
1) Because he is interested only in giving, be that giving a 
vital part of himself, he cannot receive. He therefore cannot knew
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and enjoy mutuality - which, as we know, is far Maanurray, along with 
conmunion, the highest and most satisfactory and satisfying human 
condition.
The artist is rather like the tireless - and very tiresome - 
person, we have met or knew, who must give of their time, energy, and 
life itself helping others. They have no life of their own and no 
tine to, or awareness of the need to, receive the love and care of 
others. In this sense they shut others out, much as they think they 
are helping them and relating to them. Some people are rarely able 
to truly relate or mutualise. The artist is in the same position.
"The artist wants to give, not to receive; so that mutuality is 
lost, and his experience, though it remains intensely personal, is 
one-sided, has lost part of the fullness of personal experience. 
Knowledge there is, and the pouring out of knowledge, which is self- 
expression, but not mutuality." (RE 154). "The artist can write his 
description for anyone to read, to paint his picture for anyone to 
see. He gives himself, not to anyone in particular, but to the world 
at large. That is not a fuller but a narrower experience; because 
personally, to give yourself to everyone, is to give yourself to no 
one." (RE 154). A major part of the essence of the personal is 
mutuality. (See RE 154).
2) A second effect of the artist's predicament is that he 
cannot cooperate - not even with his fellow artists. The essence of 
art is the artist's individual vision, and the essential 
individuality of this. If it has no individuality it is of no 
account. It is not even art. "Consequently, the extreme 
individualism of the artist and the extreme individualism of the
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object provide no basis for personal togetherness." (RAS 43).
An artist, as artist, cannot possibly cooperate. As Maanurray 
says, the foremost illustration of this is Plato's Republic. A 
brilliant piece of work by a supreme artist - and to get it to work 
he had to exclude artists 1 "For Plato's ideal republic is an 
artist's vision of the perfect society; and even to imagine it he had 
to exclude the artist, attack art and devise a system of education to 
eradicate the individualism of the artistic element in human nature. 
There was no room in Plato's Republic for any artist but Plato."
(RAS 43). If the artist seeks to use human beings as his medium, he 
is so constituted that they must be merely passive in his hands.
There can be no equality, and thus no mutuality and cooperation.
"Each artist is confined within the limits of his own acquaintance 
with the world, within the individual objectivity. No artist can 
speak for art, only for himself as an isolated artist." (RE 162/3).
3) Macmurray says that the artist is always at the mercy of 
society. This follows from the foregoing. An artist, as it were, 
'sticks his neck out.' He is not interested in you or anybody else. 
He baldly lays his cards on the table, with a take it or leave it 
attitude. If he wins, he wins well. If he loses he must, with equal 
nonchalance, take the consequences, and suffer accordingly. If the 
essence of his approach is non-mutuality, then when he receives no 
response it is hardly more than he can expect or ask for. "Hie full 
life of the personal is a continual give and take. For that very 
reason he is completely dependent upon the takers, and must await 
their pleasure. That is why the artist, in peculiarly desperate 
fashion, is always at the mercy of society." (RE 165).
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4) The artist is amoral. Proverbially he is in his life but, 
more important here, he is in his art. This arises from his limited, 
intense, interest. He chooses an object and medium and concentrates 
on these to the exclusion of all other things. He becomes almost 
fanatical in his one-purposeness. He has a kind of mono-mania. 
Nothing else is of value. His one aim is to express, fulfil, and 
corporealise his vision. Is it any wonder he has no time for, or 
interest in, morality? For the essence of morality is mutuality, the 
way we would wish to be and act together as persons. Such a 
consideration is not within the artist's capability. "The mere 
artist would be necessarily amoral far lack of mutuality and would 
therefore fail of the fullness of the personal." (RE 164). "The 
artist notoriously tends to treat other persons as objects, and so to 
fail in the fullness of moral relationships." (RE 164).
The Shortcomings and Limitations of Art
What are the shortcomings and limitations of art? - apart fran 
those already referred to, by implication, under Hie Problems of the 
artist.
1) Its Immaturity
This is indicated by our dogmatism. We all rigidly know what is
good and bad art. Our values are set. Once again we are back to
empiricism, and the need for it. Only when we become open is there 
any hope of art becoming more mature. And an aspect of this 
dogmatism and non-empiricism is our subjectivity.
We are nearly all at the stage of "I like this" rather than
"That is good (or bad) in itself". "I believe that in art mankind is
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still in the stage of immaturity. There has been no true art 
established yet in the world. And one of the strongest reasons that 
I have for saying so is precisely that we are so sure that we are 
right in this field. We are so confident that we knew what is right 
and what is wrong; and yet we all contradict one another over it."
(RE 56). "It is worthwhile to remember that one of the signs of a 
subjective consciousness is its habit of swinging from the heights of 
confidence to the depths of despair." (RE 56). "When art reaches 
its maturity/ the sign by which we shall know this is our discovery 
of our ignorance, the falling away of our dogmatism." (RE 57 - and 
much more of relevance follows on this page, and must be read).
Of our three principle modes of reflection only science has 
achieved maturity. "A mature art, if we achieve it, as we have new 
achieved a mature, science, would be our way of reaching nearer and 
nearer, through the cooperative effort of many individuals, to a real 
emotional knowledge of the significance of real things". (RE 60).
2) Failure to be Artistic
Not only is art imrature but we fail to use the art we have got. 
We are failing to be artistic. Perhaps this is not actually a 
shortcoming of art itself but it is a very important and relevant 
point to be considering.
Perhaps this failing is due to our overwhelming concern for 
science and technology. All our effort, energy, mental power, and 
emotion is consumed by these, with the result that, as art cannot be 
totally excluded frcm life, we are still living in and with the 
puerile forms of the past - important as they were when first 
conceived. Consequently today we have no real interest in, nor
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emotional and sensuous knowledge of, the real significance of things; 
and that means of everything, people included. Our values, such as 
they are, are utilitarian not intrinsic.
How many millionaires, and thousands of less wealthy people, 
owning pictures and other so-called art treasures, love and 
appreciate for their own sake? Very few, if any. They possess them 
merely as an investment. This ignorance and non-appreciation of art 
is regrettable; for only art, never science, is the sign of a 
people's humanity, a people's sensitivity, and their ability to be 
really living. We are too intellectual by far. This is evidenced in 
our educational system and ethos. "We should be seeking to make 
children exquisitely aware of the world in which they live, purely 
for its own sake, because this constitutes an increase in the quality 
of life in them. We are seeking to develop a fineness of expressive 
activity because it is good in itself, not in any sense because of 
what may be achieved through it." (RE 74).
So our educational system reflects our society's poverty of art. 
"Education in art is turned into an intellectual or scientific 
activity, and becomes not a training in artistry but a training of 
the mind in the analysis and understanding of the artistry of others. 
The proper training of the aesthetic capacities is, as I have 
described it, a training in perception and expression, which in its 
full results would develop to the fullest measure of which the child 
is capable, his ability to be an artist; that is to say, to apprehend 
the world finely through his own sensibility, and to express it in 
spontaneous activity purely for the joy of doing so." (RE 74/5).
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Art, as we have seen, has much wider implications and effects 
than mere beauty, adornment, and pleasure. It is both the essence 
and the indication of the quality of our lives, measured as it only 
can be in terms of feeling and sensuousness. So the sooner art 
becomes a vital part of our lives the sooner will we truly start 
living. New we are less than man, less than the persons we have it 
in us to be. We are instrumentalising ourselves. "In sober 
language, if this country is to have a future, if we are to create a 
society even a little better than the ramshackle patchwork which we 
live in at the moment, we shall have to attend to the artists, and 
learn how to attend." (RE 167).
Art, Religion and Science
We now, having given a chapter to each - Art, Religion, and 
Science - have some idea of Maanurray*s views on these subjects.
They are all an aspect of man's reflective activities. They are, and 
exist, only in virtue of man's reason and rationality; his ability 
alone of all creatures to live, if he will, not subjectively but 
objectively i.e. in terms of what is not himself. Only thus can he 
live satisfactorily.
We also saw earlier, in the opening of this chapter, on Art, 
that Macmurray had by predisposition and conditioning a much greater 
natural concern for religion and science than for art. Art was 
brought into Macmurray's consideration to complete, quite 
legitimately and properly, the reflective picture of man.
Having covered the ground then, what has Maanurray to say about 
the relationship of these three? Being, as we have seen, each so
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clearly defined and located by him in its respective human role, his 
main concern is with the confusion between them he finds in men's 
minds and actions. This especially applies to confusion between 
religion and science, and between religion and art. I do not think 
he has seriously recognised car diagnosed much fudging between art and 
science, although he does mention it.
That there is confusion at all causes immense difficulties. If 
men have not clear ideas on these matters how can they live rightly? 
They are misleading themselves. Why does any confusion arise in 
general between any of them? It arises because of our whole thought 
tradition, starting with the Greeks, and especially with Plato and 
Aristotle, of putting reflection before living, thinking before 
action. "The second main abject which governed our way of treating 
science and art was the fact that both are apt to be confused with 
religion. It may be profitable to preface our direct consideration 
of religion itself by asking for the underlying reason of these 
strange confusions. • The reason lies in the theoretical character of 
our philosophical tradition. By this I mean that philosophy has 
always tended to take the reflective activities as primary and to 
define reality from the reflective point of view. Plato and 
Aristotle expressed this typically Greek view when they argued that 
the good life is the life of contemplation. From this it follows 
that the practical life should be a means to the life of the mind; 
while knowledge, whether of the good, or secondarily of the world of 
actuality, is an intrinsic good, an end in itself." (RAS 45/6).
There is much more of this over the next page and a half, some of it 
slightly repetitive, but which nevertheless should be read.
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Another reason for the confusion, and a consequence of the last 
point, is that we fail to see science, art, and religion as 
activities which can be evaluated only in relation to their role in 
action in life.
Let us new consider very briefly the confusion between religion 
and sciences. Macmurray has a whole chapter on this giving the 
detailed differences. (RE 171/194). This must be read. But it is 
with the main overall difference with which we are concerned. 
Religion is about relating, conmunity, and mutuality. It is about 
persons. For a very good summary of this read SRE 43. Science, on 
the other hand, is merely the discovery of information about the 
universe. Why then being, apparently, such separate things are they 
confused?
Because, instead of both being content to fulfil their 
respective role, they take it upon themselves to expound a philosophy 
- hewbeit religion conceals this endeavour under the cloak of 
theology. "People refer quite often to what is called 'the 
scientific view of the world', and the phrase is often used in 
contrast with the 'religious view of the world', with the assumption 
that one has to choose between them. This is a clear case of science 
out of bounds. Nothing can properly be called a 'scientific view' 
except a belief or theory which has been reached by using scientific 
method, and tested by experiment or by some other method in use, in 
one or other of the sciences, for this purpose. One would be 
justified, therefore, in asking anyone who spoke of a scientific view 
of the world, which of the sciences is responsible for its discovery. 
And one could properly ask for references to the papers embodying the
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researches by which it was reached and the experiments or other 
recognized methods by which it was verified. Merely to ask such a 
question shews that 'science* here has got beyond its limits. A view 
of the world can only be philosophical. 'A scientific view of the 
world1 might mean - and often seems to mean - the kind of philosophy 
that results from ignoring the limits of science, overlooking all 
other aspects of experience, and conceiving the world as the ideal 
object of scientific enquiry". (RAS 20). The reason for this 
confusion was suggested above. "The confusion of mind that makes it 
possible to think of religion and science as rivals arises from the 
traditional adoption of a purely theoretical point of view. We 
assume that man is primarily a thinker, and so lock upon religion and 
science as systems of knowledge. From this point of view the roots 
of their difference, and the functions they serve, remain below the 
surface. The only question that arises is whether these two systems 
of knowledge are compatible with one another and, where they are not, 
which of the two is ‘right. Instead of proceeding in the way I have 
invited you to think of science - and I shall invite you to think of 
the arts and religion - as activities, as things that people do."
(RAS 28/9).
One effect of confusing science with religion, in whatever form 
this takes, is that pcwer instead of love becomes a dominating factor 
in human relationships. "This led to our second main conclusion, 
that the attempt to push science beyond these limits could only lead 
to the irrationality of making power an end-in-itself, and involve us 
in treating everything, including human beings, as merely means to 
the increase of power." (RAS 28). It also mistakenly leads us to 
think that scientific reflection is the only form of reflection.
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(See RAS 134). "The attempt to mate scientific rationality the whole 
of rationality and to look to science to humanize life throughout its 
whole scope is at once readily comprehensible and radically 
mischievous." (RE 204).
What about the confusion of art and religion? This is easy to 
recognise and diagnose. According to Maanurray, as we have had 
occasion to repeat many times, the essence of art is contemplation; 
of religion, comnunion. Yet how often are these two confused 
religiously.
So much of religion, especially that aspect of it regarded as 
religion at its highest and most profound, is really contemplation 
i.e. a manifestation of art. The supreme example of this is 
mysticism, where the mystic entirely cuts himself off from all 
possible association with his fellows, thus utterly withdrawing from 
any possibility of coranunicn, which is the very essence, or should 
be, of his religiousness.
In mysticism, the mystic is displaying, almost to perfection, 
the prime role of the artist - a brooding absorption with an object, 
real or supposed - and not doing what he professes to be doing. If 
he says he is loving God he is mistaken, according to Macmurray, 
because the first step to loving God is to be vitally and actively 
loving your fellows. And love for Macmurray remember is not a 
sentiment but an action, or intention, made manifest in the real 
world of people and relationships.
It is only a tiny step from this position to Maanurray1 s bete 
noir of religion, namely otherworldliness; his strong aversion to 
which, for very real, genuine, and down-to-earth reasons, we
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discussed in the chapter on religion. "Indeed, the confusion is both 
insidious and very widespread. It was to point the radical 
difference between them that I chose as the title of this lecture, 
'Contemplation and Communion.' For 'comnunion' is the key word of 
religion in the same sense that 'contemplation' is the key word of 
art; and the two experiences are very different. Indeed, there is a 
fundamental sense in which contemplation excludes comnunion. 
Contemplation is inherently a solitary activity. It is the attitude 
of the spectator. One must stand aside to contemplate; one must not 
be personally involved. But personal involvement is the core of 
communion." (RAS 43).
Much, too, of religious ritual, music, ceremony, and dress falls 
into the realm of art. Art, of course, as elsewhere does have a 
place here. But all too often it assumes such priority and dominance 
that the real meaning, significance, and purpose of religion, namely 
communion and love between people, becomes quite secondary, even if 
considered or heeded at all, especially in practice. As we know so 
well it is, as we say, given only lip service. "The substitution of 
art reveals itself in the 'spiritualizing' of religion, and this in 
turn rests upon the dualism of matter and spirit which identifies 
reality with the spiritual. The purely spiritual, unrelated to the 
material, and unrealized in the material, is the purely imaginary.
And it is art that creates in imagination. Religion creates in 
reality. The belief that religion is grounded in mysticism, that it 
grows out of a commerce, real or imagined, with the supernatural, is 
a form of the confusion which is very common at the present time. 
Mysticism is, in itself, an expression of contemplative reflection.
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It is an aesthetic rather than a religious experience; or rather, it 
expresses the point at which the aesthetic attitude seeks to take the 
whole real as its object, ignoring the limitations of art, and finds 
it ineffable." (RAS 44c).
But despite the foregoing confusions, art and religion are 
closer to each other than they are to science. "For art is in 
certain important respects the natural ally of religion, and is much 
more definitely anti-scientific." (RE 176).
Let us close with two very relevant quotations for this whole 
matter. "Art and religion are ways of living the personal life - and 
I mean by that the life of rational consciousness, the real life of 
human beings. The question is not 'What use is art or religion to 
us?' but 'What is it in us that demands and produces art and 
religion? What is it in our nature that insists that we should seek 
after beauty and after God?' My first answer to these questions is 
that it is simply the natural impulse to fulfil our own being, to be 
rational creatures, ‘to achieve personality. Primarily it is a blind 
urge towards reason; and it is the force in us that makes us human 
beings at all. It is that drive in us that makes us seek reality and 
be dissatisfied with illusions and unrealities in ourselves and in 
the world. We are made to be reasonable creatures - to live a life 
of objective consciousness. Because of this there is in us a need to 
be aware of the world - and to live in that awareness and by it."
(RE 53/4). "Art and religion arise as ways of behaving as rational 
beings, as ways of expressing in our modes of living our awareness of 
the significance of the world we live in, an awareness that we 
possess through the reason in our emotional life. They are ways of 
expressing our emotional rationality. (RE 54).
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So we end our brief review of Maanurray's ideas concerning art. 
And of the relation of these to religion and science.
Appraisement
This appraisement is apart, of course, fran what has already 
been given or raised, directly or indirectly, or by implication, in 
the foregoing exposition.
The first thing to ask is; are we more enlightened by reading 
Maanurray's views on art? I think we are. Unless the theory of art 
is one's specialism, it is not usual - as is indeed true also of all 
other studies and fields of life - to consider, let alone study, the 
philosophical background. I am sure artists never do. They are too 
busy producing art. And if one is a philosopher, aesthetics and the 
philosophy of art are usually, short of being one's specialism within 
philosophy, very marginal interests. All other branches and aspects 
of philosophy are more well-kncwn and popular. And not many works of 
philosophy bring into their general train and trail of interest the 
subject of art as Maanurray does.
Art forms an integral part of his philosophy. In fact, 
philosophers at large are a little fearful of the subject, and if 
they feel that they have to discuss it, for conscience or 
completeness sake, relegate it to the sidewalks or even the basements 
of their works. So to work it into the mainstream of several of his 
writings and theories is a commendable feature of Maanurray's.
Moreover, one feels that it has a genuine place in his thought, 
if not a major spot in his life. He has done a great service by 
lining it up alongside of other predominant human reflective
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activities, and giving it a comparable place.
Not that he, as in so many other things, has been particularly 
heeded. Art is no more recognised than it was when Macmurray was 
writing about it fifty years ago. It has not enlarged its hold on 
our lives, individually or collectively. We and society are not more 
art permeated than then.
So much for general conment. What of specific points?
1) Does art educate the emotions? It does in some ways but not 
in others. Macmurray, despite all his psychological insight, seems 
not to make arxy distinction. Art does refine our taste and visual 
(or whatever) sensibility. But on his own admission, and obviously 
so anyway, our emotions play a vital role in our relationships. Art 
does nothing for this very important area of human action, which for 
Macmurray must surely take priority over emotions connected with art 
objects.
For this is the field of religion. Indeed, as we have seen, art 
has the opposite effect. It isolates the artist relationally and 
morally. The more efficient and effective as an artist the less has 
he - energy, interest, direction-wise - any time far people and the 
growth of emotions relevant to this endeavour and concern. Is not 
the artist, not only proverbially so, but often in fact, notoriously 
bad in his relationships - petty, self-centred, selfish, 
uncooperative, and peevish, to name but a few of the multitude of 
relational and emotional defects to which he is emotionally subject?
So, although the emotional growth and education which Macmurray 
attributes to art are not to be despised, it certainly has its 
limitations, and is not so totally good as Macmurray seems to imply
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it is. Some rather barbaric ages were highly artistic. One has to 
think only of the Renaissance. And why does art tend to revive 
temporarily during modem wars, surely times of relational barbarism?
2) Are we convinced by Maanurray's neat categorising? Science 
he allies with matter; religion with people and the personal. Making 
allowances, especially for science, we can accept these linkages.
But is art to be allied with the organic? We concede that it is to 
do with vitality and energy - both obviously organic nanifes tat ions. 
But is this enough to really place it? Must we relate these three 
aspects of reflective thinking so exactly to matter, the organic, and 
the personal? In other areas, not discussed yet, far example 
morality (see FMW) Maanurray seems bent on categorising everything 
into three distinguishing groups. It is ironical that, in another 
context, Maanurray warns us against being over-logical and systematic 
in theorising and classifying, when in fact reality may not be so 
tidy and precise. "Since in the unity of theory and practice it is 
practice that is the determining factor, it is much better that the 
theory should be an ugly theory than that it should be a beautiful 
deception." (PC 41).
Could it be that this is an unconscious hangover in Maanurray* s 
mind from when he religiously and unthinkingly was conditioned to 
believe in the Trinity? That this idea of three has become so much a 
part of his mind and discernment, that everything subsequently has 
had to be structured according to it? Or is three a genuinely, 
recognisable, feature of reality? Is threedora an intrinsic, in­
built, element of, and in, the universe? Certainly I feel a little 
uncomfortable about the way Macmurray, so neatly and exhaustively, 
categorises religion, art, and science in their respective
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relationships to persons, life, and matter. It seems a little too 
glib. And interesting as it is, has it all that much value, even 
theoretically? I would not like to state positively that it has not; 
but at least it is questionable.
3) Are we all artists? I discussed this briefly in the 
relevant context, but it is worth mentioning again here, although I 
will not repeat in detail what was said there.
We are, or can be, all creators; but to say we are all artists 
is going too far. One might suggest that we are all scientists and 
all philosophers. We are in a way, but only moderately so. We may 
even all have the embryo mental and sensory equipment, but 
limitations of time and necessary specialisation far the benefit and 
survival of society, of which we are a part, prevent us developing 
such capacity, gifts, talents, or potential - call it what you will.
Why then pick on art only as a potential in us all? Or not even 
a potential. Macmurray says we are all artists. Surely it would be 
more beneficial to emphasise our religious possibilities. That at 
least would sew the idea in everybody's mind that they have it in 
them to get on better with all other human beings, and that life is 
not, or need not be, a struggle with and against each other for power 
and authority.
4) Is religion reflective? This must be mentioned here, 
although seemingly slightly irrelevant, as the question of reflection 
has arisen, as we have discussed art, much mare than when discussing 
religion and science earlier.
Religion, art, and science, you remember, are the main 
reflective fields of man. Why Macmurray has not included philosophy
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it is difficult to understand, except that a fourth field would upset 
his beloved, sacrosanct, and presumably aesthetically satisfying 
tripartitism.
However, to return to the point, is religion reflective? We can 
understand that the essence of both art and science is reflection. 
Actual practical doing forms the lesser part of the performance of 
each. The major part is that of thinking and contemplating. They 
both require a certain amount of withdrawal to be performed 
satisfactorily.
But, by Macsnurray's own definitions, of which we have given many 
on the early pages of the religious chapter, religion is essentially 
an active and creative relationship with other people, with each 
other. The last thing it is is a mental reflection or dwelling upon 
God or upon anything else. If it were this, or if religion were seen 
to be this, it would be immediately condemned by Macmurray as being 
otherworldly and unreal. Its whole task and endeavour is to get on 
with the business of loving, relating, and living satisfactorily 
together.
Religion is better performed the more rational and objective, 
and the less subjective and self-centred, one is. But to be this 
does not necessarily entail deep and lengthy reflection; although, of 
course, it improves by having some moments of withdrawal to review 
one's condition and relationships. But this is not to be a permanent 
state.
So raising this point rather questions, if not undermines, the 
validity of Macmurray's edifice of reflection. Instead of religion 
completing the trio perhaps it would after all have been better to 
have slipped in philosophy instead.
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But, as earlier said, despite these criticisms Macmurray has 
done well to remind us of the place of art in the human emotional and 
reflective economy; and of hew more concern with, and understanding 
of it would enrich both our cwn lives, and that of society at large.
(End of Appraisement)
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MARXISM
Relevant Books
The Philosophy of Communism. (PC)
Creative Society. (CS)
Marxism. (With other authors). (M)
Justification of Chapter Title
In view of Macmurray's great interest in the subject, and of his 
frequent reference to it, it might be thought that Communisn would be 
the most apt and relevant title for this chapter. I at first held 
this view. But a more detailed study of Macmurray's approach and 
attitude reveals that Marxism is far more appropriate; and this far 
the following reasons.
Firstly; as countless other people have done, and are still 
doing, Macmurray mistakenly identifies Marxism with communism 
(small c). One would think that a thinker of Macmurray1 s 
sensitivity, ability, and perception, especially with his strong 
Christian background and convictions, would not have made this 
obvious and, indeed, disastrous error.
More than anything he said upon the subject, and he has said 
much, and of which we shall be expounding and discussing here 
shortly, what a great service he would have done if he had only drawn 
attention, influential as he was at his peak in the thirties, to the 
fundamental and irreconcilable difference between Marxism and
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communism. Only thrice, and then only passingly and very briefly, in 
all his exposition, does he hint that Marxism may not be the whole of 
communism, and that other deeper and more human and personal 
influences were at work and contributed to its foundation and 
development. "Communism is not ultimately a matter of economics, 
even though it carries as a consequence some approach to economic 
equality. It is a matter of the inherently social nature of human 
personality. It must rest upon the need that men and women feel for 
living their lives in comnunity." (PC 95). "There is only one way in 
which we can escape from some form of state- communi sm maintained by a 
dictatorship of force, which would destroy freedom and with it 
individuality, and that is by creating a form of community life which 
is compatible with the individuality of all its members." (PC 96). 
"Throughout the history of Christianity the conception of the 
Communist society in which property is held in common for the needs 
of all, and in which brotherhood, equality and freedom are the 
governing principles of social organisation, has emerged time and 
again." (CS 142). You may say that nothing could be plainer than 
that; Macmurray obviously acknowledges the Christian origins of 
communism. But read deeper, especially chapters 5 and 6 of "Creative 
Society". Here Macmurray (page 91) goes so far as to attribute the 
four basic tenets of Marxism to Jesus 1 And he goes on to say, "My 
own interest in Communist theory - and I suspect also that this is 
the case with other Christians - arose through the discovery of these 
principles in the Gospel in the first instance, and the subsequent 
discovery that they reappeared in different but recognizable forms in 
the philosophy of Karl Marx." (CS 91 ).
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This I cannot believe. It may be remotely true for Macmurray, 
although I think that this is a bit fanciful, but not for others. 
Obviously many people's interest in communism originates frcm the 
practical attempts to implement politically and sincerely their 
Christian beliefs. Mine does. But the whole emphasis and 
orientation is on communism not Marxism, with its encouragement of 
bitter antagonism and human group hostility, as opposed to peace and 
genuine reconciliation amongst all men. Where is the mutuality, 
community, and voluntary sharing in Marxism? Strangely enough, as we 
have seen earlier in our discussion of religion, this is exactly what 
Macmurray, in his less prejudiced moments, advocates. And the two 
approaches are irreconcilable, an anomaly Maanurray seems not to 
notice, fudge as you might communisn with Marxian.
Secondly; and this appears, at first sight, to be quite 
incongruous with, and even to contradict, the first reason just 
given. Communism, seen politically and socially, we have just 
agreed, is bigger and wider than Marxian, and deeper and more human, 
less theory ridden, than Macmurray seems to understand it. Now, I 
say, and have to say - interpreting and expounding Maanurray's ideas 
on the matter of course - that Marxian is broader than conmunian.
How does this seeming inconsistency arise?
Because I am now speaking from the philosophical aspect. And 
remember Maanurray is primarily a philosopher. Whereas most 
conmentators and thinkers interpret and understand Marx in the light 
of politics and economics, and a little social history, using him 
merely as a theoretical prop and justification for ends already 
determined by other, often unconscious, motives, Maanurray 
appreciates him more deeply. Sometimes we might even feel that he is
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too generous and enthusiastic, attributing to Marx things which he 
perhaps was only implying. But only a Marxist scholar, exhaustively 
knowing his subject, could confirm or deny this. To talk therefore 
of communism in this context would hardly be broad and comprehensive 
enough. So Marxism is the more adequate and satisfactory title.
Why Was Macmurray So Keen On Cornnunism?
Why was Macmurray so keen on communism and Marxism, so that we 
can say that it was the third or fourth area of interest within his 
thinking - at least, at the time of his greatest and most productive 
period of life? There are four reasons.
1) At this time for Macmurray, the thirties, The Russian 
Revolution, or rather interest in and discussion of its effects and 
possible developments, was at its peak. Apart from fascism, with its 
obvious evil intent, evoking instant aversion in anybody of a liberal 
and democratic bent,> communism was the focus of interest, and indeed 
of partisanship and action.
Poetry reflected it. Popular writing espoused and expounded it 
e.g. the Left Book Club; and young people of many Western nations 
died for it in the cities and plains of Spain. The fact that, at 
this time, Stalin was at his most brutal, cruel, and vicious - 
murdering and oppressing thousands of his own people who dared to 
challenge his tyranny - had no effect on the ardent and blindly 
biased young. Russia was proclaimed, as showing the decadent, 
capitalist, world the way to a new rebirth.
Macmurray, as is very obvious from his writings and advocacy, 
was carried, if not swept, along by this popular wave of enthusiasm.
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"The development of carmunism in the modem world is a phenomenon of 
obvious importance and one which demands careful consideration and 
understanding." (PC 9). because the subject itself is one
that has an immediate bearing upon the social questions which press 
so heavily upon us all at the present time". (PC 9). Perhaps he got 
wiser as he got older, for only once in his later books, apart from 
very casual references to Marx, does he make a positive statement 
about the subject, when he says, obviously disparagingly, "In 
comnunist practice the personal is subordinated to the functional to 
a point at which the defence of the personal becomes itself a 
criminal activity". (SA 30).
2) Marxism, according to Macmurray, is the only example of 
explicit philosophy being put into effect. "Unlike most political 
movements (Marxism) has an explicit philosophy of its own". (PC 9).
Obviously the emphasis is on explicit, meaning in this context 
not only an articulated philosophy, but one which is relatively, if 
not totally, whole and comprehensive. Far it could be argued that no 
action, except the most instinctive, occurs in this world, including 
political action, without an underlying philosophy. Could we say 
that socialism, or even liberalism and conservatism, have not an 
implicit philosophy? Many books have been written expounding the 
philosophy of all three.
What Macmurray really means, and here again it applies to 
Marxism and not to communism as earlier distinguished, is that the 
whole of the philosophy was created and articulated separately first, 
and only afterwards effected, or attempted to be effected. Most 
other political movements tend to proceed and progress with the
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philosophy and practice developing piecemeal and alternatively, 
sometimes one making the running, sometimes the other. Incidentally, 
one of Macmurray1 s favourite themes in general is this continuous and 
necessary swing from reflection to action and from action to 
reflection. For examples see SRE 88. And SA chapters 8 and 9, 
especially page 181.
But whether Marxism is unique in this respect is at least 
questionable. Perhaps Fabianism, although less total in its 
philosophy and more empirical in its effect, could be given as 
another example of an explicit philosophy preceding action. Although 
less rigid and looser in concept it was first expounded and then 
intentionally effected, or attempted so to be.
Why does this aspect of Marxism so appeal to Maanurray, assuming 
that there is seme truth and validity in it? It is because it 
suggests to Maanurray a parallel with science, experimentation, and 
empiricism; the latter being especially favoured by Maanurray, as we 
saw when discussing his religious ideas. Of course, it could be 
argued that deciding first on an explicit philosophy and implementing 
it afterwards is just the opposite of empiricism. It is theorising 
first and acting afterwards. But Macmurray would emphasise, as 
valuable, its experimental aspect. "Instead of trying to construct 
in idea a conception of what a satisfactory society might be, we can 
set to work at a harder task, to understand what our actual society 
is and how it really works. That will show us what is possible and 
enable us, as ideals do not, to cooperate with the processes which 
are actually at work; and it will make our action experimental, for 
out of an accurate knowledge of the social facts a theory will emerge 
upon which social action can be based and which the action based upon
- 257 -
it will either refute or modify or confirm". (PC 44). This is hew 
Macmurray regards Marxism. Never before has a total philosophy been 
effected and tested experimentally.
Obviously if this is the correct interpretation of what is 
happening in the Russian experiment (as it was then called; we 
probably have, or ought to have, different ideas about it now if only 
because so much more time has passed) we can understand that for 
Maanurray, as a philosopher, especially with his emphasis on action, 
it would be of exciting interest to him, a unique event never before 
known to man. A milestone in human history and adaptation.
3) We were on the threshold of this third point, and the 
beginning of an overlap, towards the end of the last reason for 
Maanurray's enthusiastic concern far Marxism. Quite contrary to the 
European philosophical tradition, at least since Descartes, but 
really stemming from Plato, is Macmurray's advocacy, indeed it almost 
amounts to preaching so earnest and intense is it, his advocacy of 
the primacy of action. And this as a fact i.e. not what ought to be 
but is. We just do not recognise it.
Thought is merely functional, contributory, and instrumental. 
Unlike action it can never be meaningful, or an end in its own right. 
It certainly can never be paramount, as European tradition has 
mistakenly made it, or tried, with ever increasing frustration and 
impotency, to make it. We think we can grasp reality, in and by 
thought, whereas in fact, according to Macmurray, we can only know it 
in action. We are b o m  to act, not to think.
This is why philosophy in the European tradition, and especially 
the British, tends to concentrate upon epistemology, the theory of
- 258 -
knowledge and of truth, instead of on freedom which is the essence of 
right action. CH 70 must be read on this. Also; "To hold that 
reality is idea is to hold that thought is primary and action 
secondary. It is to mean that action is for the sake of thought, not 
thought for the sake of action. It is, in practice, to make thought 
an end in itself and knowledge the goal of life. It is to set up 
thought as the judge of life and deny that life can judge thought. 
Idealism, when it asserts the primacy of ideas ever things, is 
ridiculous; when it asserts the primacy of the activity of thinking 
over the activity of real life, it is perverse. It is, in fact, the 
rationalization of the desire to escape fran action and so from 
responsibility. It represents the tendency to substitute ideas far 
things, to take refuge from reality in imagination, to live in make- 
believe." (PC 25). See also PC 34/5 - which must be read. But, 
although secondary, thought is essential to satisfactory action.. 
"Ideas are the eyes of action." (PC 41). Thought provides, to give 
but one example, foresight; and therefore the ideal and proper 
condition is the unity of thought and action. Marx' s famous aphorism 
epitomises this. "Philosophers hitherto have explained the world in 
different ways; the task is to change it". (PC 26).
Marxism alone of all philosophies proclaims the unity of thought 
and action, theory and practice. Marx alone, according to Macmurray, 
has shifted the whole emphasis of philosophy, life and thought.
"Thus there comes directly out of the rejection of idealism the first 
fundamental principle of Marxian philosophy - that theory and 
practice are one." (PC 36). "Thus the principle of the unity of 
theory and practice dictates a completely new approach to social and 
political practice. If we grasp this, then we shall be able to
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understand hew all the rest of communist theory hangs together. If 
we do not, if we persist in thinking that communist theory, like 
other theories, works in terms of ideals and hew to achieve them, it 
will seem just a jungle of organized nonsense." (PC 44/5).
So important is this aspect of Marx far Maanurray that we must 
refrain from enlarging upon it here, and devote a section to it 
later. Sufficient to note at this point that its recognition of the 
unity of thought and action, is a major reason for Maanurray's 
interest in Marxism.
4) Maanurray's last main reason for espousing Marxism (and let 
it be clear that I have determined and unearthed these reasons from 
Maanurray's writings; he never stated them so explicitly, nor with 
any cohesion or coherence) is that Marxian is mare religious and 
Christian than is any religion or Christianity as we know them today. 
And do not forget that Macmurray is totally committed to religion and 
Christianity. Also remember that religion is Maanurray's paramount 
thing. So such a construction or contention, true or false but 
believed, would make him inevitably interested in Marxism.
Ihe Marxist's professed atheism, paradoxically, reveals a truer, 
finer, more sincere belief in God than does the life, behaviour, and 
professions of most Christians today, and of a society at least 
nominally professing allegiance to Christianity. These reveal far 
less concern far human well-being than does Marxism, far less will 
and intention to work towards a better life for all. "If a man has 
discovered that what God means far himself and for the society to 
which he belongs is untrue, and if he can see no possibility of any 
other conception of God than the one with which he is familiar, then
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honesty demands that he should profess himself an atheist. An honest 
and courageous atheist is surely more pleasing to God than a 
dishonest and cowardly theist. We should do well to consider whether 
the profession of atheism in contemporary society, and in particular 
by the Communists, is not in fact a repudiation of a conception of 
God which is at once traditional and false". (CS 19). "I cannot help 
feeling that this simply means that Communisn, whatever its exponents 
may say, has recovered that essential core of a real belief in God, 
which organized Christianity has in our day largely lost." (CS 24. 
Much more of this should be read on this page and the next). Maybe 
there is some truth in this.
These four reasons, seme mere passing and almost ephemeral, 
others of a deeper and more long-standing nature, enable us to 
understand why Maanurray had a considerable interest in Marxism.
Macmurray and Marxism
We now turn to consider what must be the essence or raison 
d'etre of this chapter, namely, Macmurray's exposition, 
understanding, interpretation, and analysis of Marxism. This is 
mainly to be found in "The Philosophy of Caununism" (1933).
For ease of consideration, economy, and raanagability, we will 
divide our review into two sections. Firstly; attention to those 
Marxian ideas mentioned, discussed, and commented upon by Maanurray, 
which are widely known and accepted as being fundamental to Marxism. 
Because of their familiarity it will not be necessary to elaborate 
extensively on these except where Maanurray may have an original 
comment to make upon them.
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Secondly, Marxist ideas ard aspects which are either originally 
interpreted by Maanurray, given greater emphasis than usual, 
neglected by the general carmentators, not found in the standard 
package of Marxian ideas, or even novelly treated by Maanurray,
These two together will display both Maanurray's knowledge and 
appreciation of Marxism, and reveal any new light or original 
thinking he may have on this subject. So firstly:-
Marxist Ideas, Known and Generally Accepted, Discussed by Maanurray
In starting we might mention that Macmurray had the highest 
regard for Marx's ability and performance, irrespective of his 
manifest thought and contribution - although, it must be noted, 
Maanurray never suggests why Marx did not do all that Maanurray 
thinks him capable of. He says, for example, "It is worth noting in 
this connexion that Marx was a man of highly critical philosophical 
ability, while Engels, though a very able man, was not outstandingly 
philosophical." (PC 18). "It is not, for all that, necessitated by 
Marx's views, nor did he himself provide a philosophical system, 
though he was eminently capable of doing so, if he had chosen." (PC 
19).
So what are these generally accepted ideas of Marx mentioned and 
discussed by Maanurray? There are five principal ones.
1) Firstly the dialectic, a form of logic which Marx got from 
Hegel. Formal, traditional, Aristotelian, logic was adequate to deal 
with matter but what of the great, new, emerging, interest of the 
18th. and 19th. centuries the biological, or to give it its wider and 
more comprehensive title, the organic? For this, and with great
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originality, Hegel adapted the ancient Greek form of conversation or 
argument and raised and extended it to describe the whole process not 
only of the organic but of reality itself. This idea of the 
dialectic Marx took over from Hegel and applied it at least to 
society, social history, and human development, if not to the whole 
of reality.
It is not relevant, for reasons already given, to discuss all 
this here, nor to illustrate the working of the dialectic. Either it 
is all too well-kncwn or can be read-up, at least from Macmurray's 
point of view, in chapter 1 of PC pages 15/19 and 31/33. So 
sufficient to say that Macmurray accepts this logical principle of 
Marx' s.
2) Secondly; reality, the world, is a thing not an idea.
Hegel, having warked-out and created the dialectic as descriptive of 
the ultimate process, said that this process is Idea. Hence the 
description of his philosophy as Idealism. Only one other 
philosopher went further than this, namely Berkeley with his 
solipsism. Not only is reality idea, but it is solely my idea. The 
only things in existence that can be kncwn, so far as I can ever 
knew, are my ideas.
New as everybody with the minimum of interest in the subject 
knews, Marx up-ended this, or to use the popular phrase, Marx "found 
the philosophy of Hegel standing on its head and merely turned it 
right side up." (M 30).
Dialectic there is, but this is working itself out in society 
and social history; not in the abstract world of thought and ideas. 
Ideas only reflect and mentally represent what is happening in
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reality, Macmurray firmly endorses all this, (inter alia M 30/4).
Throughout his writings, and not just here and on this point, 
Macmurray abhors idealism, and that is hardly a strong enough word.
He loathes it and regards it as totally mistaken, with disastrous 
effects.
This second aspect of Marx, adhered to by Maanurray, is 
discussed quite fully in PC 19/36, and in M. as already quoted.
3) Thirdly; as a result of the foregoing we come to the third 
major feature of Marxism, if not of Marx, namely dialectical 
materialism. This is fully discussed by Macmurray in M. chapter 2.
I say "if not by Marx" because Macmurray is doubtful as to 
whether Marx held this view (see PC 15/19) although everybody 
attributes it to him. ".... is generally described as the philosophy 
of dialectical materialism. It is doubtful, however, whether it was 
accepted by Marx himself". (PC 15). And again. "Now I have said 
that though this position is accepted by orthodox comnunist 
philosophy at the present time, it is not indubitably accepted by 
Marx. It is, I think, undoubtedly present in the writings of 
Friedrich Engels, and the close cooperation of Marx and Engels makes 
it rather difficult to distinguish between the two men. All that we 
can say is that it is curious that though Marx did not definitely 
reject this principle as it appears in writings with which he himself 
was so closely associated, he never cormitted himself to it 
unequivocally, and there is evidence to show that this non-committal 
attitude was a deliberate one." (PC 18).
Dialectical materialism means that the whole of reality, which 
is regarded as ultimately physical, is working itself out by the
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dialectic. As we have seen Marx agrees that the dialectic is at 
work, but will not affirm that Ultimacy is merely material, which the 
doctrine obviously implies. Of course, Macmurray will not accept 
this either, realist and anti-idealist as he may be, Instead he makes 
a clever transformation of it as we shall see much later.
Although we ought to leave the point now to be made to the next 
part - that where Macmurray shews some novelty over Marx's ideas - it 
will not be out of place here to observe an astute observation, if 
only a logical one, of Macmurray's on dialectical materialism; an 
observation which nobody seems to have made before, and which 
Maanurray himself does not express with total clarity. If we take 
precisely the respective and accepted meanings of dialectical and 
materialism, they are incompatible. Dialectical means the growth and 
emergence of new things out of a synthesis or compromise of the old. 
As with the organic, of which as we have seen it purports to describe 
logically, it is always 'becoming'. "An organic process is a process 
of development; a process not of 'being' but of 'becoming'. At one 
stage it is A, and at the next it is B and not A. That description 
itself is a falsification because a process of development never is 
at any stage. It is essentially a 'becoming' throughout. Any stage 
A is really A-beccming-not-A-but-B. Hence any description of the 
process involves the recognition of the emergence of the 
contradictory at every point, and the synthesis of contradictories in 
the further development." (PC 15/6).
Materialism, although a loose term, correctly defined, means the 
existence of entities which never grow, or even change; or if they 
do, they change only according to fixed rigid laws. Moreover, they
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hardly ever change of themselves, but require some external entity or 
agent to effect this, even if it is another piece or form or 
condition of matter. In other wards, their essence is of the 
mechanical, not the organic. On this Maanurray says "This is a 
matter of seme importance, because the use of the term materialism to 
describe communist philosophy is misleading. When we use the term 
'materialism' we normally take it to imply a mechanistic determinism, 
while 'dialectical materialism', like modem idealism, rest on the 
repudiation of mechanistic determinism" (PC 19).
Thus has Maanurray shewn that dialectical materialism is unreal, 
a combination of incompatible terms. Where the term dialectical 
qualifies anything "It implies that reality is either organic or 
super organic. It negates any mechanistic metaphysic." (PC 19).
But new in response, as it were, to his cwn criticism, Maanurray 
makes an even astuter move. He redefines materialism. And he does 
this so that it becomes not merely acceptable within the description 
of dialectical materialism but elevates it to a level where it has 
become the focal point, or at least a major effect of, a whole new 
way of philosophising; a way which we must all come to see, according 
to Macmurray, as being the only way, or the only relevant and 
progressive way, to philosophise.
Such a transformed view of materialism, which takes a whole 
chapter to expound (M. chapter 3), will be dealt with in the later 
section on Marxian ideas instituted or metamarphised by Maanurray.
4) Fourthly the economic interpretation of history. To state 
an obvious fact, but one far from being always satisfactorily, and 
certainly not fully, recognised (as we shall see later), society is
- 266 -
persons in relation." (PC 46, 53). New, if not the sole, but 
certainly the most fundamental, reason for people relating and 
cooperating i.e. being social at all, is to provide their basic 
material needs - food, clothing, warmth, and shelter; the means to 
survive at all. Thus the basic roots of society are economic. (See 
PC 53).
A second major feature involved in this situation is change.
(See PC 48. 53. 58). Changes in the economic process inevitably 
occur, brought about by climatic conditions, natural disasters, 
diseases, human conflict, population changes, and improved production 
techniques, however elementary and basic these in the past might have 
been, and however sophisticated today.
These two factors, the providing of the basic needs of a society 
and of inevitable change in the circumstances of that provision, are 
together enough to explain the 'cause' and 'course' of history i.e. 
of human social movement, development, progress, and conflict. All 
else is but a facile superstructure, almost an excrescence, upon 
this. Ideas, theories, culture, cultures, religion, customs, and art 
are mere superficial manifestations and reflections of this basic 
thing, and determined by it. They do not exist, as it were, in their 
own right. Their form and essence is determined by the underlying 
economic pattern and structure, and changes with it. This determines 
everything.
The comments of Macmurray upon this will be made after we have 
mentioned the next major Marxian idea which inevitably follows from 
the economic interpretation of history, namely the class struggle.
It might be said, however, in passing that if the economic 
interpretation of history were true, it could never be known to be so
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for it would have to be regarded as an inevitable and economically 
determined thrcw-up of the economic situation at the time of its 
conception.
5) Fifthly; the class struggle; because of this basic and 
inevitable human economic situation and entrapment, at any particular 
time in history one class will be holding economic power and 
dominating the scene, bringing automatically, and virtually 
unconsciously, its own philosophy and cultural superstructure, and 
imposing these on other classes.
Past top classes will be too effete and moribund to oust or 
oppose this new dominant class; but 'lower' classes, yet to have 
their day, and waiting in the wings, will opportunely challenge the 
present top class until they supersede it and assume power. This is 
the classic class struggle, or at least the theory of it. "The 
communist holds that the historic process is essentially a struggle 
between social classes for the control of the means of production." 
(PC 72. See also PC 55).
New the fact that this is called the class struggle# or even 
class war, suggests in standard Marxist theory that a class not in 
power hates (see the famous Communist Manifesto 1848) the class that 
is in power, and fights to eliminate it, ultimately succeeding.
It is interesting to note, however, that Maanurray has a 
slightly different interpretation. A top class at any particular 
time has not won, stolen, or usurped power deliberately and 
consciously. And certainly it has not done this for its own ends and 
benefits. On the contrary. Unknown to itself it has been merely the 
vehicle, the best vehicle at the time or it would not have succeeded,
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of the total economic situation. And when, because of the factors of 
inevitable economic change earlier mentioned, it ceases to be a 
propitious vehicle or instrument, it is superseded by a class more in 
keeping with the current, overall, situation, possibilities, and 
potentialities. See M 65/9.
But, Maanurray asks (M 69), why cannot class and social changes 
necessitated by the pressures of the supposed inevitable economic 
factor, be recognised, met, and peacefully effected? One reason he 
gives is human conservatism. In all ages of life men cling to 
outdated modes of life and thought. Superstitions are but one of 
many examples Maanurray gives of this (see M 69). None more so than 
in the economic sphere. Once comfortably ensconced, as the class at 
the top of the economic tree must be, any move for a change can only 
be seen by it as a threat to security.
This comment of Macmurray1 s, however, is not absolute. One 
could argue that change can and does occur without open conflict. To 
give but one example of many which could be given. In our own day in 
Britain, 1986/7, we are witnessing, and indeed ourselves becoming a 
part of, a social and economic class transition of quite a major 
kind. Since the defeat of the open and classical Marxist challenge 
of the Lefties e.g. Scargill's miners strike, and the infiltration of 
comnunist subversives into schools, there has developed over the last 
two years a very deliberate and conscious policy of enlarging share- 
cwning hcwever modest the holding, to include eventually, it is hoped 
and forecast, at least 80% of the people.
Another allied factor, first mooted, discussed, and very 
perfunctorily realised in a very few cases, but now very much
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occurring, is the granting of shares to workers in their own company 
i.e. the company by whoa they are enplqyed. These, and similar 
moves, might well obviate the abrupt and temporarily destructive 
change of power from the present top class, that of the financial- 
cum-managerial-cum-bureaucratic-cum-I.Q.elitist, to the well-off 
section of the so-called working class. In the past this would have 
been called the artisan part of the working class, but this is hardly 
a relevant term today, in this context at least.
In all the class struggle theory and analysis by Marx,
Maanurray, and innumerable other commentators and pundits, a factor 
of some importance, unnoticed by them, has come to ny attention very 
recently, and may itself become the cause of a new, if barely 
economic, discontent, despite the above modifier and ameliorator. It 
is slightly festering and smouldering already, even if it has not 
really surfaced. And surprisingly, or perhaps not surprisingly, it 
is due to class improvement for, as in all areas of life, the more we 
become basically secure in essentials the wider our vision, 
Imagination and demands grow.
I have heard it articulated only once - by Michael Arditti, who 
spoke on the radio recently (12th January 1987), about his recent 
play "The Chatelaine" (which was later broadcast). This play was 
written to illustrate Arditti's thinking cn this matter. This is; 
that a class may, indeed does, lose power, and is superseded in the 
Marxian sense, but still - and this is the point - retains its 
privileges, prestige, culture, and influence and, to a very great 
extent, its wealth.
Hew true this isl Especially of the British monarchy and 
artistocracy. To give a minor example of Arditti's; the deposed
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classes, as in the past, still live in high style in their country 
houses and estates but, unlike in the past we pay for them to do so 
through "Stately Homes" open days, and through government and private 
grants.
And abroad, there are still countless counts in Italy and 
Germany living it up, and innumerable rich Russian emigres living in 
Paris. The meaning and implications of this, in general and 
especially for Marxism, must be something well worth researching and 
theorising about. It is certainly something Marx failed to take 
account of, and all contemporary Marxists seem blind to it. And 
surely it is something more than a mere updating of Veblen' s "The 
Theory of the Leisure Classes."
What, forgetting the last two paragraphs, has Macmurray to say 
about the Economic Interpretation of History, and of the class 
struggle? His thoughts on these are scattered widely in PC chapter 
3, but a reasonable summary would be to say that man is far from 
being solely economic. He is economic, and where this is so, and so 
far as he is economic, the economic interpretation of history may 
apply.
But he is more than economic, more than a mere organic entity. 
"Far a very long time and, indeed, in principle, since man became 
man, the personal life of human beings has never been purely organic. 
So far as purposes are deliberately formed and action is deliberately 
chosen, human life is superorganic. Within any human society there 
has always been a field of individual and social freedom.
Friendships between individuals, far example, have never been 
completely determined by economic relations or even by common
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purposes. The range of this freedom has of course always been 
limited by economic considerations, and in the process of human 
social development every step in progress has meant an enlargement of 
the field of free relationship. It is, for instance, very much 
easier today far people belonging to different social classes to 
enter into friendly relations, or even to marry, than it was a 
hundred years ago. The super organic element in society has, 
therefore, been increasing in importance during the process of social 
development. But it does not follow that this makes any difference 
to the interpretation of social development as a whole". (PC 74/5).
But two qualifications apply. Marx foretells the end of the 
class struggle i.e. when the last and ‘bottom* class has assumed 
power. Then, too, the economic dialectic must automatically end and 
with it the economic interpretation of history* Marx of course 
recognises this and astutely makes provision for it by saying that 
what has really been pre-history will cease and real history begin. 
"It led to the statement (by Marx) that with the achievement of 
communism prehistory would come to an end and history would begin. 
That is an admission that the economic interpretation of history, 
with which the Marxists have made us familiar, is only applicable to 
the immaturity of social life. A truly human society would follow a 
process of development which could not be interpreted dialectically, 
that is to say, as a process of adaptation to the environment." (PR 
75).
This is an admission that essentially man is more than economics 
and organic. We are, to use Maanurray*s often mentioned term in this 
book (PC 19, 65, 67, 72, 75, 76 and 84), superorganic. Thus it would 
seem that Marx, in a devious, backhanded, and afterthought way, is in
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agreement with Macmurray.
The second qualification is this. What Marx really intends to 
do, and it comes through in much of his work, is, by the heightening 
of the consciousness of society and its functioning, to view and know 
society scientifically, "The main new principle, the principle of the 
necessary unity of theory and practice, demands a theory of society 
which is scientific, in the sense that it can be used as a basis for 
deliberate social action which will bring the development of society 
under the control of human understanding." (PC 57). Other relevant 
references are PC 45 and 77/8. Man has adopted science in the 
physical world, to his great advantage. Now he must do the same in 
the social world. And, as with the physical world, by doing this we 
can free ourselves from our total submission to it; in the present 
context this means freeing ourselves from the inevitable, inexorable, 
grip of economic dominance, and from the economic chain of history. 
Such a transition would mean a change from the economically 
determined society to a planned society - a society a very long way 
off, as Maanurray understands that term.
We now turn to the other half of our survey as proposed cn pages 
7/8 earlier. Namely: -
Some Aspects of Marxism Unnoticed, Or Not Usually To The Fore, 
Discussed Or Initiated By Macmurray
1) Stimer
Marx's debt to Hegel is proverbial. Even here we have had 
occasion to discuss it. And Maanurray certainly writes at length on
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this. Another important source is Ludwig Feuerbach, who wrote "The 
Essence of Christianity", and from which Marx got some useful ideas. 
"It is a plain matter of historical fact that the social content of 
communist theory is derived from Christianity, through the 
philosopher Feuerbach's treatise. Yet there is a strong resistance 
in communism against recognizing this". (CH 19/20). Less laudatory, 
and even more briefly, Macmurray says, "The philosophy of Ludwig 
Feuerbach merely represents stages in the rejection of idealism."
(PC 27). Both seem to be very important matters in relation to 
Marx's philosophy and deserve mare explanation and development. 
Although Macmurray refers to Feuerbach four times in his writings CS 
91, 117; CH 20; PC 27) he passes him over lightly.
But Macmurray does stay considerably longer with Max Stimer (PC 
26/31), usually considered to be a lesser influence upon Marx than 
the other two. Why does Macmurray regard him to be so important in 
relation to Marx and the development of his ideas? "For the 
remainder of this discussion of the origins of communist philosophy I 
wish to indicate another source of Marxian thought which has a 
special importance in that it is generally overlooked, although it 
supplies a clue to the values which underlie Marxian sociology. I 
refer to the philosophical anarchism of Max Stimer.11 (PC 26/7).
The relevant position is stated in Stimer's bock "The Self and 
Selfdom". He is the advocate and lover of freedom, almost to the 
point of anarchy. But what limits our freedom? What prevents us 
being free? We can see at once why Macmurray is interested in him 
and brings him forward. So; what inhibits our freedom? Simply, 
ideas.
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Marx agreed with Stimer on two points. Firstly, that freedom 
is good. Secondly, that ideas prevent it being realised. But from 
here onward Marx and Stimer part company. And it is his anger with 
Stimer, and his subsequent attack upon him, that caused Marx to 
clarify and make explicit his own ideas on the matter. What is the 
gravamen of their difference?
Stimer said it is our own ideas which prevent us being free.
We are our own enslavers. To find freedom therefore we have only to 
cast aside, to banish, ideas and reach down into the reality of the 
self - hence the title of his book. Macmurray reminds us (PC 28) 
that Stimer1 s position is similar to that of D.H. Lawrence in our 
cwn day, of whom he, Macmurray, is a great admirer. Speaking of 
different types of people he says, "The former are not merely dead 
souls; they stand far death against life. Ihey obstruct and fight 
against life wherever they find it. They are the people of whcra D.H. 
Lawrence - who understood these things better than any other man of 
our time - said that, they are sunless." (FMW 58).
Marx will have none of Stimer's individualism and subj ectivism. 
He rejects its efficacy on three counts.
1) To cast aside, or try to cast aside, your ideas still leaves 
you in the realm of Ideas. You are really trying to escape the 
tyranny of thought by thinking about it, an impossibility. Remember 
that Marx, like Macmurray, is strongly anti-idealist i.e. against 
believing that ideas are supreme and real. Moreover, in following 
Stimer's method you are being excessively individualistic, another 
bete noire of both Marx and Macmurray. (See PC 28).
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2) Suppose you do, or could, manage by this personal and 
private method to become free, or to think you were free. You would 
still be mistaken. You would not be free because of the prevalent 
ideas of society i.e. of everybody around you, manifested in law, 
conventions, customs, and by what in these days is called the 
conventional wisdom. All these are bound to limit and restrict your 
freedom.
3) And even if you had freed yourself, and society was free, 
you would still not be free (and here we are on real Marxist ground 1) 
because, probably, economic circumstances would not allow you to be 
and do what you want to be, express, and live your freedom: so Marx
concluded that the governing factor of the fight for freedom was the 
economic situation. That is the real meaning of the economic 
interpretation of history. It is not a dogma. It is an assertion of 
fact. Marx, then, took something essential from Stimer and 
qualified it. He accepted the principle that it is freedom we are 
after, and so took his stand firmly in the democratic tradition. He 
agreed also that ideas limit freedom and that it is necessary to get 
behind ideas to the personal reality which they represent. But he 
added that this personal reality is essentially social, that it is 
the reality of personal relationships in society, and further, that 
what determines the relation of persons in society is the economic 
reality which they face. The way to freedom lies through the control 
of economic necessity by the development of man1 s power over nature." 
(PC 30).
That Macmurray has drawn attention to Stimer1 s influence upon 
Marx, indirect and - as with Hegel - topsy-turvy though it may be, is 
a useful contribution to Marxian scholarship.
- 276 -
2) Theory and Practice Are One
So vital and paramount is this idea for Macmurray, as an 
innovation introduced by Marx, that it should be the first item in 
the first section of our review, instead of, as it is, the second in 
the second. Yet I must be honest and say that, in this context, I 
had never heard of it.
My subject for M.Sc. degree was Political Thought, Theory, and 
Philosophy Since 1815. Moreover, I specialised in the Socialist 
thought of that period. This does not make me an authority on 
anything, and certainly not on Marx and Marxist thinking. But you 
would have thought that I would at least have made a passing 
acquaintance with the idea. This was not so. Or if I did it 
impressed me so little, or seemed so marginal, at the time that I 
have forgotten it.
Only three alternatives can be drawn from this, my ignorance - 
according to choice - being either condemned or condoned apart. 
Firstly; that Macmurray became enthusiastic about something he 
already believed, was pleased to find it confirmed by such an 
authority as Marx, and therefore overplayed it. Secondly; he alone 
has recognised a profound truth invented by Marx, but not especially 
highly regarded by Marx, other ideas being more important. Or, 
thirdly; that Macmurray, being a philosopher, does find this very 
important in relation to other aspects of Marxism, which appear to 
Marx to be merely political, economic, or social. I tend to favour a 
mixture of the last two.
To illustrate that I am not exaggerating Macmurray's enthusiasm 
for this doctrine let me quote. "Thus there comes directly out of 
the rejection of idealism the first fundamental principle of Marxian
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philosophy - that theory and practice are one. The principle is the 
revolutionary principle of cannunist philosophy. Everything else in 
communist thought dwindles into insignificance beside it. To accept 
it is to break with the whole tradition of European thought and to 
demand a completely new culture on a new social and economic basis. 
You may drop or refute all the particular theories of Marxian 
economics and even the interpretation of social history; but if you 
accept this theory of the unity of theory and practice you are still 
committed to a complete revolution both on the theoretical and on the 
practical sides of life". (PC 36). And again. "Of these principles 
there is only one which is absolutely essential and that is the 
principle of the unity of theory and practice. It is this principle 
which makes communist philosophy not so much a particular 
philosophical system amongst others, as a new type of philosophy 
altogether, involving a new conception of what theory is and of hew 
any theory is to be judged." (PC 61). It could not be put more 
powerfully or clearly than that.
The irony is that, despite the pre-eminence Macmurray gives to 
this notion, surpassing all others in the Marxist scriptures, 
according to Macmurray, it is doubtful if one communist in a thousand 
has heard of it, or is conscious of practising it. Whereas they are 
all carrying out the class war, and regarding economics as paramount.
It ought to be noted at this point that although Macmurray 
chiefly calls this idea Theory and Practice, sometimes he identifies 
it with, or associates it with, Thought and Action, or even Ideas and 
Things. That these, in this context, convey almost the same thing is 
obvious, making slight allowance where relevant, and in particular
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cases. It is not possible in the short compass of this thesis to be 
too precise on this matter. Sufficient if we understand the import 
of the major underlying idea.
Apart from the obvious what are:-
Some Thoughts of Macmurray' s on Theory and Practice
1 ) By suggesting that Theory and Practice, Thought and Action, 
are one it is not meant that they are identical, or the same thing.
It means that although to do, to practice, and to act, are primary - 
after all, we do not live by thinking but by things e.g. food - 
nevertheless thought and practice are inseparably bound together (see 
M 34). They both exist in their own right, but thought has validity 
only when it is used to consider things, and is not merely indwelling 
upon itself.
2) Whether we knew it or not Theory and Practice are one. 
Neither this nor the next point are clearly explained by Macmurray 
(see PC 36/41 ) but by this he means that no matter what theories we 
profess, everybody observing us knews by our practices what our real 
theories are i.e. the standards, ideas, and beliefs we are actually 
living by. Thus real theory, as opposed to professed theory, must be 
one with our practices. (PC 36/40). This is a fact.
Macmurray summarises this "Here, then, is the first simple 
meaning of the principle of the unity of theory and practice in the 
communist philosophy. If you want to knew what people really believe 
you must study their behaviour" (PC 38/39). He then becomes 
extremely partisan on the camunists' behalf, illustrating how well 
they apply this principle. "New, you may think that this is 
something quite obvious that everybody agrees with and that it has
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nothing to do with communism. It sounds more like Christianity. But
let me remind you that one of the most annoying things about
communists is that they always refuse to take the professed ideas of 
political parties or business groups or churches or economists at 
their face value. They are a suspicious people. The reason is that 
they always will insist on comparing the theories professed by these 
groups with the way they behave. They think, in fact, that to know 
what a political party really stands for you must take to a patient
study of the general lines of its action when it is in power (PC 39).
Hew ironical in view of the real situation. And how blind can he be? 
As mentioned before, in Macmurray's day, Stalin was exercising power, 
presumably on behalf of the caimunists. When were professions ever 
more disproved by action? And from 1917 to this day, and no doubt 
into the future, professing Marxists will, by their actions, reveal 
their true beliefs - the assertion of force and oppression against 
anybody not submitting to their tyrannical lust for power and 
unfreedom.
True indeed is the point Macmurray is making. And instead of 
being the uncoverers, the Marxists are the prime examples of itl
3) Theory and practice ought to agree. Obviously here theory 
means professed theory, or it would not make sense with the last 
observation, nor with what he subsequently says.
The reason for this point is that a "theory which does not 
harmonise with practice is always dangerous". (PC 40). "Self- 
deception leads to disaster." (PC 40). To be otherwise is to be 
unaware of our own motives. "Ideas are the eyes of action." (PC 
41). "It is therefore of supreme importance that we should have a 
social theory which can be the basis of social action, and that
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theory should harmonize exactly with our social practice. Since in 
the unity of theory and practice it is practice that is the 
determining factor, it is much better that the theory should be an 
ugly theory than that it should be a beautiful deception. What is 
important is not that we should have high ideals but that our ideals 
and our practice should be in agreement. That may seem a hard 
saying, and it is certainly a revolutionary one. But the alternative 
is to stumble blindly in the dark to our own destruction." (PC 41 ).
This leads on to another sub-theme of Marx, which is also a 
favourite of Macmurray's as well. This is; an attack on utopianism. 
(See PC 41/5). Utopianism is condemned on several grounds. It is an 
example of separating theory and practice, thought from action. It 
floats the utopian up to worlds of unreality. With these reasons we 
may agree but not with the idea that Utopians stand outside society 
and assume that it "is plastic in my hands as if I were God making 
the world afresh." (PC 43). Nor that utopianism is individualistic 
and egotistical. Whilst most find utopias stimulating and 
imaginative, only a madman would take them seriously to the point of 
renouncing and opting out of this world, and cease to strive far its 
immediate, piecemeal, betterment here and new.
Macmurray seems unaware of this. He unfortunately takes the 
either/or view. He cannot see that there is a place both for the 
imagining of a better condition for man and a bit of social 
engineering founded on the scientific approach advocated by Marx. 
"What, then, is the alternative to utopian theories? The alternative 
is scientific theory." (PC 44). Not much to the fore in Macmurray1 s 
heyday, would science fiction, with its combination of phantasy and
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realism, bridge what seems for him the unbridgable?
4) Macmurray criticises practising Marxists, in relation to 
this principle that theory and practice are one, for not being 
Marxist. Even Marx himself recognised this failing amongst his early 
followers, and is reported to have said of himself "Thank God I am 
not a Marxist!" (PC 62).
The principle that theory and practice are one demands that 
society shall be experimental. It shall not be bound by dogmas. Yet 
Marxists are amongst the most dogmatic and rigid believers.
Admittedly Lenin modified Marx's theory and practice, due to his 
immense prestige as initiator, architect, and leader of the 
Revolution, and justified by his supposed use of the dialectic. "It 
is often triumphantly pointed out that the Russian Revolution did not 
follow the lines mapped out by Marx for a communist revolution and 
that Lenin was compelled to develop a new theory which differs in 
important respects from that of Marx. That is, however, not an 
objection to Marxism, or to Leninism. To think it is, is sinply to 
fail to understand Marxian theory and to relapse into idealism. The 
real question is this: "Is Leninism a true dialectical development
of Marxism?" If Marxian theory is scientific then it must be capable 
of experimental development." (PC 62).
But, that example apart, no one has dared to deviate, at least 
not for long, from the oracle. Witness the dismissal of Hu Yacbang 
in China as recently as January 1987 for his advocacy of, or perhaps 
weakness in face of, a modest move towards a Western style of freedom 
of ideas, behaviour, and communication. "The principle of the unity 
of theory and practice must itself apply to conmunist philosophy. 
Marxism is necessarily subject to its own law of the development of
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theory through experimental action. In other words, the philosophy 
of conmunism is not merely a philosophy of dialectical development, 
it is itself, if it is true to itself, a dialectically developing 
philosophy. To be a dogmatic Marxist, therefore, is to repudiate 
Marxism. The tendency to think of the body of Marx's writings as a 
new revelation which forms a standard of orthodoxy for communists 
developed early amongst Marx's disciples." (PC 61/2).
Why Do We Have This Principle?
Why do we have this principle that theory and practice are one? 
What are its sources and origin? Where does it stem from? I will be 
brief about these. 1) Because of the rejection of idealism. You 
will remember that Marx rejected Hegel's Idealism whilst retaining 
the dialectic. Such a rejection automatically leads to the view that 
action is primary, and such a conclusion requires, as we have seen, 
the unity of theory and practice, thought and action. (See PC 52).
2) Because of anti-dualism, of which as we saw here in the 
chapter on religion, Macmurray is a great advocate. "New in 
contrasting the dualistic modes of thought with the religious mode we 
notice that dualism always has the effect of turning theory and 
practice, the reflective and the active aspects of experience, the 
spiritual and the natural worlds, into opposition to one another."
(CH 85). See also SA 84.
To conclude this section on theory and practice two other points 
must be made.
1) The interest of Macmurray at this stage of his teaching, the 
thirties in thought and action, theory and practice, led to his later
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major theory of Agency which we shall be discussing in the chapter on 
philosophy. This was expounded in his work "The Form of the 
Personal". (Two volumes), first given as the Gifford Lectures 
1953/4.
2) Although not attributed directly to Marx, the very great and 
important change made by modem psychology from recognising itself as 
being the science of mind, to its self-recognition as the science of 
behaviour, may be due not a little to Marx's long-term influence. 
Macmurray remarks on this as follows. "We see why the emergence of 
psychological science depends on the weakening of the inhibition 
which maintained the separation of theory and practice throughout the 
first two stages of modem social development. So long as persons 
are thought of as minds the attention is confined to the theoretical 
aspects of human activity divorced from their setting in the 
objective world. What has made scientific psychology possible is a 
shift of interest from the theoretical to the practical, and 
therefore material, activities of human beings." (BS 117).
We new move on to the third point in the section cn Marxist 
ideas initiated or rediscovered by Macmurray.
3) Materialism Redefined
This conception was anticipated on page 11, you will remember, 
following Macmurray' s contention that the terms dialectical and 
materialism, although forming one idea in the Marxist orthodoxy, are 
- if rightly defined - incompatible, but instead of sitting down 
under his own criticism, and determined to accept and retain the 
Marxist concept, Macmurray up-dates the idea of materialism. Whether 
this is legitimate, astute, justified, or merely cheating, is to be
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decided after considering his exposition of it. What is his line of 
argument?
With Marx there arrived a new form, a new style, of philosophy 
and philosophising, a form which lifts it to a new plane of 
awareness. Because of the recognition of the unity of thought and 
action, theory and practice, already discussed here, philosophy 
discovered, became conscious of, its social function." Philosophers 
hitherto have explained the world in different ways; the task is to 
change it". (PC 26; M 43; SA 97). Marx's famous phrase, already 
guoted earlier, summarises this new outlook.
Such a change as has occurred transforms all branches and 
aspects of philosophy, none more so, and the one relevant for us now, 
than in the meanings of familiar philosophical terms. One such term 
is materialism. This term, according to Macmurray, is one of the 
main obstacles to the acceptance of Marx (see M 44). Instead of 
recognising that it has changed as a result of the new way of 
philosophising, countless thinkers and others use it in the old 
mechanistic, souless, dualistic way. Dualistic is perhaps the key 
word. Not only was there, and still is amongst those who have yet to 
catch-up with the new unity arising out of the recognition that 
action is primary, not only was there the duality of thought and 
action, theory and practice, but also those of mind and matter, body 
and soul, heaven and earth, this life and the next. Indeed our whole 
life and way of thinking, feeling, and experiencing has been riddled 
by dualism. "The traditional distinction between materialism and 
idealism is itself a reflection of the disunity of thought and 
action. It is one aspect of the old dualism between mind and matter,
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or between body and soul. As ideas these are opposites and defined 
as mutually exclusive." (M 44).
For three pages, M 44/6, Macmurray elaborates on the causes and 
effects of this dualism in all of us, and in society. Probably, as 
Macmurray says elsewhere (FMW 79/81), it stems from the Stoic 
tradition; or, perhaps, deeper still from a sort of innate 
schizophrenia in us which seems unable to blend or harmonise, let 
alone unite, thought and feeling, reason and emotion.
Whatever the reason, materialism has a bad "press". It is 
associated with the mechanistic and determinist view of life, and is 
even extended to include a moral connotation, referring to ways of 
living which are concerned with mammonism, instant physical 
gratification, and selfishness. It is seen as the opposite of living 
for the realisation of ideals and wider "higher" ends. See M 46/7.
But, and here is the crux of the matter, once you shift the 
focus of your consciousness away from traditional ways of seeing 
things and realise that life is action, and that action is primarily 
concerned with things and not with ideas, materialism is transformed 
and takes on a new aspect. "The moment you really recognize that 
life is action, and that human life is conscious action, it is no 
longer possible to keep this hard and fast distinction. Matter means 
something different, because it is no longer something incompatible 
with full human consciousness. As a result 'materialism' means 
something radically different. It means the recognition that the 
primary distinction to which the dualism of mind and matter crudely 
refers is between action which is blind and action which is fully 
conscious. The materialist is then the man who knows what he is 
doing, the man who acts with a full consciousness of why he acts in
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that way and of what the consequences will be. His opposite, the 
idealist, is new the man who is not aware of the relation between his
ideas and his way of acting, and whose behaviour and its consequences
are hidden from himself. The Marxian attack upon idealism is 
fundamentally an attack upon our traditional form of consciousness 
which consists in being unaware of the real relation between what we 
think and what we do, and in a conscious inability, which 
rationalizes an instinctive refusal, to bring the two into explicit 
relation. The result of it is that when we honestly and sincerely 
wish to act upon our beliefs and ideals, we produce consequences very 
different frcm and sometimes the precise opposite of those we 
intended and expected to produce." (M 47/8).
What is the essence of the new outlook? We see that the
material is the means to all that we would wish and desire. Science 
is materialistic. It has dropped all idealism, all the fantastic 
speculations of the pre-scientific era and discovered reality. "Why 
is it that scientific knowledge leads to our ability to control the 
processes of nature? It is because science is materialist in this 
sense. It puts aside prejudice and bias, and seeks to understand 
nothing but the way in which things behave in fact, and why they 
behave that way. It seeks to understand the real nature, the active 
nature of what it studies. It ruthlessly throws aside all theories 
which will not square with the results of acting upon them; that is, 
of experiment. And by submitting thus to the nature of things we 
discover what is possible, and so how far we can control them in 
practice. It is in this sense that dialectical materialism is 
materialistic." (M 49).
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The new materialism, paradoxically, can realise all the "ideals" 
which idealism, detached from action, and living apart in an unreal 
world of its cwn, could never realise. "It is the idealist who now, 
while believing that these changes will scmehcw come about some day, 
refuses to consider them practical politics here and new. His belief 
in progress is divorced from his modes of social activity. It 
remains an "idea", a dream, not something to be accomplished by 
deliberate, planned, social and political action. He wishes to keep 
his vision free from the dust and grime of material conflict, as a 
private consolation." (M 51).
And in case, bearing in mind the old meaning of materialism, and 
by speaking of science, it is thought that Macmurray means only 
material benefits, nothing is further from his mind. For half a page 
(M 50/1) he eulogises on its meaning for inproved human relations and 
on the regeneration of all human beings which must eventually result 
frcm seeing things anew in the light of redefined materialism. "The 
new materialism sustains the belief that it is possible to construct 
a universal society of men and women who shall all be free and equal, 
without distinction of race or nationality. It leads to the 
conviction that, given proper conditions of life, men and women 
everywhere will live in peace and justice and mutual sympathy 
throughout the world; that it is possible to put an end to the 
exploitation of men by men, of class by class, of nation by nation, 
of black man by white man, of female by the male". (M 50).
To close, a few summarising quotations.
The idealist "is to be defined as the man who wishes to cherish 
ideals without realising then by his own effort, while the
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materialist has become the man who refuses to be content with ideals 
which are not meant to govern and determine his own social action."
(M 52).
"However high our faith in human possibility, the primary 
consideration of what can be done here and now, and the occupation of 
doing it, necessarily narrows down the range of our imagination. 
Action is illuminated and enlarged by thought, but thought is at the 
same time checked and limited by action. Thought which aims at 
action increases the range of practical possibility enormously and 
progressively, but not to infinity, and the process distinguishes 
inexorably between the valid and the illusory vision." (M 52).
"Nothing is more characteristic of idealism than its fight 
against this process of disillusionment, nor more symptomatic of its 
inner unreality. For to be rid of our illusions is surely the first 
condition of discovering the truth. The promise of idealism is this. 
"Ye shall see visions, and be consoled thereby." But the premise of 
the new materialism is an older and surer promise." Ye shall knew 
the truth and the truth shall make you free." (M 52/3).
Assessment of the new theory of Materialism
How shall we assess all this? I think we can dismiss any idea 
that Macmurray is being arch or clever. He genuinely thinks that he 
believes in what he says; but perhaps in his enthusiasm he has gone a 
little too far.
That there needed to be a reorientation towards unity of thought 
and action; that we should be reminded of the paramountcy of action 
and of things, none can deny. But, however reinterpreted, can this
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amount to materialism? Would Macmurray himself, in the last resort, 
like to be called a materialist; even if this were prefixed by "New"? 
A better term, I would have thought, would have been Actionism, 
Radical Realism, or Wholism (Smuts, you recall, had a philosophy of 
Holism). But although Macmurray does not suggest, let alone discuss, 
these alternative titles, he does dismiss modem realism. "To be a 
realist, therefore, means not merely to make ideas subordinate to 
things; it means to make thought subordinate to action, to make 
theory subordinate to practice. . A realism which fails to do this is 
cxily the idea of realism. That would be the comnunist philosopher's 
criticism of modem realism." (PC 35). And again. Of modem 
realism, "It remains within the field of ideas and is, therefore, a 
kind of inverted idealism. Just as talking about action is not 
acting, so talking realistically is not being realistic." (PC 35/6).
An interesting point is where dualism arises. Is the man in the 
street, unconscious as he is of hew his ideas and attitudes embodying 
the cultural and social ethos of the society of which he is a part, 
dualistic? I am sure that I was not dualistic as a boy. Life was 
whole, indivisible, and infinite. Only as I grew up and took to 
knowledge did I become dualistic. Is it cnly thinkers who experience 
this dualism, or imagine they do? And does it come about only as a 
result of thinking? Presumably, in reality, it does not exist.
Where could it exist anyway? It is only in us. Or even if only in 
us, does it come about, as suggested earlier, by some natural 
irreconcilables in us?
Has the new materialism caught on? In a way, yes. People in 
general are less idealistic, less 'religious', less otherworldly, and
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even less dualistic than they were fifty years ago. They want 
"something done about it" more urgently and realistically than then. 
They live - and this not with any disparaging intonation - more in 
and for the present new. We scan the heavens these days by space­
ships, not by prayer.
Despite this, however, there is probably more unrealism about. 
Life was realistic enough for many people in the thirties, with 
unemployment and Hitler to contend with. But there is more escapism 
today - drugs, T.V., sport, soap operas, pop, rubbishy reading, and 
phoney cults by the thousand such as astrology, horoscopy, and pseudo 
religions. All very unrealistic.
But so far as thought is concerned the new materialism has few 
if any followers. But perhaps this is just how Macmurray - if he was 
true to his theory - ought to like it. The new materialism is 
certainly practised even if it is not thought!
We new turn to a whole new aspect of our subject
Macmurray1s Criticism of Marxism
Needless to say, this means criticisms of a relatively major 
kind which have not already shewn themselves, as some criticisms 
directly or by implication have done in the exposition as we have 
gone along.
But first we ought clearly to state where Macmurray stands in 
relation to Marxism, in so far as this was not made obvious in and by 
the foregoing. For this purpose we cannot do better than quote his 
own assessment. "Any serious criticism of communist philosophy must 
start by declaring openly hew much of its theory is accepted by the 
critic. I must therefore preface my criticism by saying that I
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accept the rejection of idealism and the principle of the unity of 
theory and practice in the sense in which I have expounded it. And 
since this is the truly revolutionary principle, such an acceptance 
involves taking one's stand within the tradition of thought which 
derives from Marx. The negative implication of accepting this 
fundamental principle goes very deep." Very much more follows on 
page 63 and must be read. It ends "It follows that any social or 
philosophical theory which we can then accept, must be either the 
Marxian theory or some development of the Marxian theory through a 
process of criticism which falls within the general principles upon 
which Marxian theory is based. This does not exclude a clearer 
statement of the fundamental principles than is to be found in Marx 
himself or in orthodox communist philosophy at the present time".
(All the above is PC 62/4).
Before proceeding one other point needs to be mentioned. For a 
reason not clear Macmurray is rather touchy about criticising Marx, 
including both his own and others criticisms. Does this conceal - or 
reveal - a slightly unsure allegiance to Marx? Three times in the 
"Philosophy of Comnunism" (10/12; 59/61; 73), he warns us that any 
criticism should not detract frcm the Marxian position and teaching, 
nor that it is serious ground for questioning Marx, let alone for 
renouncing or rejecting him.
Would Macmurray be so defensively and protectively zealous on 
any other thinker's behalf? To quote one example. "But before 
proceeding to criticism it is wise to remind ourselves that in the 
criticism of communist philosophy there is more than the usual danger 
of prejudice. It is always easy to find points of objection to any
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theory which human thought can construct. If we have a practical 
interest in the rejection of any theory, therefore, it is always 
possible to find grounds for rejecting it. This is, of course, a 
completely unscientific and unphilosophical method of procedure; and 
it is one frcm which communist thought in particular has suffered 
severely." (PC 59). As one example of this Macmurray gives the 
Labour Theory of Value, which many today find untenable, and 
therefore dismiss the whole of Marx's work because he held this 
theory. "But the labour theory of value was not even invented by 
Marx. It was the theory of the orthodox economists of Marx's time. 
If its rejection is a reason for dismissing Marx as a charlatan, it 
is a reason for dismissing Adam Smith as a charlatan also. But he, 
on the contrary, is honoured as the classical source of economic 
theory". (PC 60). Perhaps special warnings of this kind were 
necessary in the thirties when Russian communism was new and young.
And so to the criticisms.
1 ) That reality is more than an organic process
This Macmurray calls his "main criticism" (PC 64). This 
criticism could be seen in two ways. Firstly; that the case has not 
been made out for it. (PC 64). This Macmurray asserts is not the 
ground of his criticism. Indeed he is well satisfied with its 
justification. But, secondly, that it does not go far enough; and 
this is Macmurray1s criticism.
Marx says that "society is persons in relation", but he only 
recognises two types of relationship; the mechanical, where one 
person is used by another; and the organic, where people relate to 
achieve a common purpose. (See PC 65). But, says Macmurray, there is
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a third very important type of relationship, and the one which 
epitomises man, namely friendship. The essence of this is mutuality 
and equality. There is no question here of people using each other; 
nor of relating only to obtain a useful and necessary end.
Friendship is enjoyed for its own sake. Macmurray calls this type of 
relationship, personal.
And one other feature of it needs to be recognised (see PC 66). 
It is outside of the dialectical process of history. Friendship was 
the same in Caesar's time as it is today, it has not improved or 
worsened. It is not of the order to do so. "This means, in turn, 
that personal reality is superorganic; and a universe that contains 
within it something which is superorganic cannot itself be merely 
organic. Thus, the principle that reality is an organic process must 
be inadequate to the facts of personal experience." (PC 67).
So, if accepted this proves two things in contradiction to 
Marxism. Firstly, that reality is at least superorganic for, 
logically, an entity* (in this case the universe or reality) cannot be 
qualitatively less than its most developed and advanced part, however 
insignificant quantitatively that advanced part may be. A rose 
cannot be less than its colour and fragrance whatever else it is.
Secondly, that not only is reality not merely organic, but it 
cannot be understood dialectically; for the dialectic can only 
explain changing and organic things. Friendship and the personal, in 
essence, never change.
Further problems begin to appear concerning Marxist theory once 
we concede the above. There is social history which, for Marx, is 
solely governed by the dialectic working in and through the economic 
foundation and necessities of life. The economic is fundamental.
- 294 -
All else is superficial and secondary. But if we are not wholly 
organic, nor totally economic, hew can this theory of social history 
be maintained? "If there is a superorganic element in all human 
life, obviously a merely organic explanation of all human history 
must be inadequate and misleading." (PC 67).
Here Macmurray seems to compromise. In so far as man is organic 
so will the dialectic apply to human society and its development.
"On the other hand, there is certainly an aspect of history which is 
organic and to which the principle of dialectical interpretation must 
apply. To say that man is an animal or an organism is obviously 
true, even though it is not the whole truth. Human life has an 
organic aspect, and for that reason human history has an aspect in 
which it is an organic process. May it not be that the aspect of 
human history which Marx interprets dialectically and in terms of 
economics is, in fact, the organic aspect of human history and that, 
within the limits to which he applies it, his analysis is perfectly 
adequate and in principle trustworthy?" (PC 67/8).
I said just now that Macmurray 'appears to compromise' on this 
issue, but immediately he goes on (PC 68/72) to challenge this on 
several grounds. Firstly, that Marx's theory of social history 
implies that man is an inert element in the process. He merely 
adapts to the environment and is moulded solely by it. This, says 
Macmurray, is not the whole truth. Man increasingly moulds the 
environment, especially as his knowledge and understanding increases. 
Macmurray gives the example of flight. "It is by understanding the 
natural laws that make it inpossible for human beings to fly, that we 
find ourselves able to construct machines in which we can fly. We
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escape from the determination of natural laws by understanding 
natural law and accepting it as the rule of our own action." (PC 72).
Secondly, countless societies have failed in this adaptation 
process and have become either defunct or been absorbed in other 
societies. (See PC 70). Macmurray was writing this before the major, 
classical, work appeared on the subject, namely, Arnold Toynbee's 
"The Study of History" (1934/9). Macmurray makes this as a point of 
criticism of the Marxist social theory, but could it not also be 
interpreted as the working of the dialectic?
Thirdly, the dialectic cannot be an intrinsic element of the 
organic social process, but only a passing manifestation for, by 
Marx's own shewing and forecast, it is predicted to end - when the 
social class struggle has worked itself through, and the last class 
come to the top. (See PC 72/3).
So Macmurray' s contention that reality is more than an organic 
process, and that even the movement of the dialectic is not absolute 
in that process, brings many problems in its wake for the Marxists. 
Whether any Marxists have heeded, let alone tried to meet, these 
criticisms, requires further investigation, not possible or relevant 
here. Of course, they may not even have heard of then!
2) Marxism considers only the hunger motive
This criticism of Marxism is quite different from the last, but 
a moment's reflection and consideration reveals how it parallels it. 
It is of the same substance.
Macmurray says that there are two fundamental positive motives 
of human action - hunger and love (see CS 113). The negative motive 
is fear, which does not concern us here. As we have seen, it is
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closely associated with, and relevant for, religion not Marxism.
Hunger is the basic natural reason why people cooperate. This 
they do to provide the essentials for surviving. This is the 
economic basis for the development and progress of human society, and 
it determines its form and its relational structure and pattern (see 
CS 114).
But, paradoxically, hunger too can be seen as a negative motive, 
in that it is concerned with the "defence of the human organism 
against death", (CS 114), rather than with the self-realisation of 
the essence of human life in its creativeness. This can be put even 
more basically and aggressively, "Hunger is the type of all motives 
which are concerned with the appropriation for its own use by the 
individual of that which is other than himself. It is thus hunger 
which lies at the basis of the whole conception of private property. 
If this motive were to govern man in his relation to his fellows it 
would result in the universalising of the idea of slavery in which 
other human beings are looked upon as objects to be appropriated for 
use." (CS 114). But this has its ironies. We cannot all be masters 
and enslave others. There would be no slaves! And vice versa. But 
so far as it is able to operate as the negative aspect of the hunger 
motive, it is the cause of classes and inequalities.
Strong as it is however, and seemingly ruthlessly and 
exclusively pursued by many, hunger can never be the sole motive. 
Bands of thieves and crooks, and we would say today boards of 
directors, companies, and even governments, act 'hungrily' against 
all, and against as many 'outsiders' as they can. But exploitation 
and injustice to others can only be achieved by "observing the
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principles of justice amongst themselves". (CS 115).
The other motive is love. Its essence is self-transcendence.
It is concerned with the world and creation, with something beyond 
oneself. "In love a man does not appropriate the world to himself.
He spends himself upon the world". (CS 115). It is unconditional by 
nature. It is thus the positive and absolute condition of community. 
But in case we might be carried away into the realms of airy-fairy 
idealism by this conception, (see CS 120/1 ), Macmurray at once brings 
us down to earth, howbeit with a totally new conception, and one 
which he never attempts to explain. He leaves us to try and 
understand it, which we probably can with a bit of thought and 
effort. It is "superdialectical". (CS 116). Hdw is that far a 
neologism 1 He says, "We can see here the superdialectical form of 
personal life in a conspicuously clear expression." (CS 116). This 
seems to mean that the love motive can work only if it includes, but 
dominates, the hunger motive. Once again we are splendidly reminded 
of Macmurray's realism, his "new" materialism, his non-dualism, and 
his earthiness, in every sense of the ward. "Mere mutual affirmation 
of the existence of the other would be imaginary and ineffective, 
unless it included the recognition of the needs of the other and co­
operation for their satisfaction. It is only the presence of the 
hunger-motives, individualizing and separating human beings by the 
necessity of appropriating material for their individual needs, that 
allows the love-motives to realize themselves in action. The 
separateness of individuals is the condition of their integration in 
a human unity. Yet the love-motives cannot achieve the integration 
of men unless by providing the grounds for their co-operation. In 
principle, hunger cannot provide the ground for co-operation at all
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(CS 16). And again. "The integration of humanity is thus possible 
only through the presence of the negative principles within, and in 
subordination to, love. People who love one another will, if their 
love is real - that is to say, if it is a motive determining action - 
co-operative for the satisfaction of one another's distinct and 
individual needs. This is the absolute and basic law of personal 
nature." (CS 116/7).
What, you will be asking, has all this to do with Marxism? Or, 
more likely, have perspicaciously discerned the connection. Marxist 
interpretation of life, man, and society rests solely upon the hunger 
motive. "It is the exclusive concentration of Communism upon the 
temporal aspect of human life which leads to the view that life is 
completely determined by the economic factor and that the achievement 
of ccrimunity is necessarily effected by a struggle between groups in 
terms of their own economic interests. The whole Communist 
interpretation rests upon the hunger-motives to the exclusion of the 
love-motives." (CS 117). The love motive is of no account. Where 
it is acknowledged it is relegated to the fourth division of life. 
"Communisn fails to realize this wider setting of the temporal 
process and reduces the 'love-life of man' to the status of a 
'private' life which is incidental to the 'species-life' of humanity" 
(CS 119).
Marx's main criticism of Feuerbach is that he deified the love- 
life of man. Macmurray says, "It would be legitimate to reply that 
Marx deified the hunger-life of man" (CS 117).
But, as we said before, Macmurray will not let go of Marx, 
despite his cwn criticisms of him. This is illustrated by the
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following. "As we have seen, there is a relative truth in the 
Communist position. It is concerned purely with the changing form of 
human society through the historical process. It is true this is 
determined by hunger. It is true that it is a dialectical process.
It is true also that it has been kept going very largely through the 
struggle between groups of persons whose economic interests are 
antithetical." (CS 117/8).
What are the consequences of Marx's limited view? A built-in 
defeat of its cwn purposes. The human society it purports to so 
desperately desire just cannot be achieved solely out of hunger and 
economics. (What an insightful contention for us today, all of us, 
communist or not, if we would only see itl) Man is more than these. 
"Man cannot live by bread alone" (Deuteronomy ch.8 v.3). "This 
treatment of the part as if it were the whole does at certain points 
distort the understanding of the part. The Communist fails to 
realize that the establishment of a Comnunist society is itself 
impossible if hunger> is the only motive determining human behaviour; 
and this failure is reflected back into the interpretation of history 
as an economic process, because the Communist fails to realize that 
the process he studies is rendered possible only because the positive 
and direct impulse to comnunity, at every point in human history and 
in all the individuals who are the bearers of the process, makes 
economic co-operation possible." (CS 118). And again elsewhere. 
"Communism is not ultimately a matter of economics, even though it 
carries as a consequence some approach to economic equality. It is a
matter of the inherently social nature of human personality. It
rests upon the need that men and women feel for living their lives in
comnunity. This, indeed, is the real need of all human nature." (PC
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95). "Hie creation of a classless society through the destruction of 
economic privilege is, then, I repeat, the immediate, rational end of 
our social development. But its rationality and its necessity are 
not derived from any economic determinism. They are grounded in the 
essential nature of human personality, of which economic need is only 
one aspect, however important." ((PC 94).
3) Marxism can only arise in poor, not industrially 
advanced societies
There is nothing ' clever-dick’ or arch, or being wise after the 
event, about this criticism by Macmurray. Indeed it is made more as 
a comment or observation. Moreover, what Macmurray says, might be 
heeded by Leftist agitators today. Perhaps it is I They seem to be 
beginning to use more subtle and insidious means to achieve their 
ends now that a number of open challenges and confrontations over the 
last forty years, in the Western industrial world, have failed to 
bear any fruit.
What is Macmurray1 s point? That Marx prophesised, or foresaw 
and calculated would be a fairer statement in view of his genuine if 
faulty attempt to look at society ’scientifically1, that the economic 
and social revolution, when it came, would occur in the most advanced 
industrial societies. In fact it occurred in none of these but in 
the semi-feudal, quasi-peasant, Czarist Russia. "That the revolution 
which Marx foresaw happened in a largely feudal community, like 
Czarist Russia, while Marx himself was convinced that it must happen 
in a highly industrialized comnunity, shews that there was a flaw in 
Marx's principles of interpretation. It cannot be a matter of 
chance. The immediate conclusion which we have to draw and interpret
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dialectically is that the Marxian interpretation does work under 
feudal conditions in a world where industrialism has developed 
elsewhere." (PC 83). And countries where it has happened since have 
all been of the subsistence-level type.
Hew did Marx come to make this mistake? Because, says 
Macmurray, he overlooked the superorganic aspect of man and saw, and 
took account of, only the organic. The organic considers only mass 
action, because mass action is the blind, mindless, response to a 
given environmental stimulus natural to the organic. But in an 
industrial society, and especially as that society develops, 
compulsory education becomes necessary to introduce and maintain 
standards necessary to the industrial process and oo-operaticn. And 
with education, whatever its limited utility intention, comes greater 
awareness, less social blindness, less conditioned response, less 
thick-headedness, and more individuality, more sense of opportunity 
and opportunism.
We talk of mass media and mass-mindedness under these more 
advanced conditions, but this seeming uniformity is far less 
impulsive, blind, instinctive, and widespread than in a peasant or 
less-industrialised society. Only by reducing this awareness to a 
less rational level, a very difficult thing to do, could a sufficient 
number of people be aroused and induced to change the social and 
economic pattern, radically and drastically, by revolution, peaceful 
or violent (see PC 84).
Moreover, in peasant societies the general will of millions can 
be mass-hamessed to revolt, and to throw-off their yokes in order to 
create a better economic condition i.e. industrialism. In advanced
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industrial societies there is not this incentive.
Incidentally, there have been, according to Macmurray, examples 
of reversions; that is, surrendering of these new-found rights, 
freedom, and individuality, in order to save, or even improve, the 
industrialised, economic, condition. To do this is something Marx 
never envisaged, nor anybody else. "That people should abdicate all 
their political rights, and with then all that gives meaning to human 
life, in the interests of a successful functioning of the existing 
economic machinery simply could not have occurred to any European of 
the nineteenth century." (PC 92). Macmurray is, of course, 
referring to Fascism.
Fascism is not a popular doctrine today; not only because of 
World War Two and its total defeat, but also because the majority of 
people have become less nationalisticly minded and go for super- 
national co-operation, even if only on an area and limited scale.
But when Macmurray was writing on Marxism, Fascism was rapidly 
succeeding Russian Communism as the focal point of the world's 
concern. So we can understand why he refers to it; and discusses it 
so fully. He even refers to it as the natural dialectical 
development of the first stages of Soviet Marxism (in the last 
chapter of PC). "In accordance with the dialectical law this thesis 
must now produce its antithesis. That antithesis is fascism. The 
development of fascism in Italy and Germany is quite obviously, to 
any dialectical thinker, the sign that bolshevism has produced its 
own negation and that beyond both thesis and antithesis lies the 
final accomplishment of the synthesis through which alone a classless 
society can be achieved." (PC 86). "Bolshevism and fascism are, 
therefore, thesis and antithesis in the dialectical development of
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socialism. It is only through the interpenetration of these 
opposites that the final synthesis can be reached and it must be 
achieved as the reassertion of the thesis at a higher level when it 
has dene justice to the essential truth upon which the antithesis was 
based." (PC 87).
So much for Macmurray' s criticisms of Marx.
We new turn to one last brief point in this exposition
Marx and Religion
Can Marxism and religion be reconciled? This is a very 
interesting and important question for, as we have seen, Macmurray is 
in both camps. Moreover they are very major interests for him, as we 
knew from his writing at great length on both. Yet a third factor is 
that, according to Macmurray, Marxism's four leading contentions 
spring directly from Christianity; indeed were part of the teaching, 
message, and intention of Jesus Christ. (See CS chapter 5. Also CS 
91 and 149).
Even following Macmurray' s argument on this unusual association 
and assertion, whether we are prepared to go all the way with it or 
not, shews just how these two seeming opposite doctrines can be seen 
to be related. Yet Marxism is renowned not only for its atheism, but 
for its implacable hostility to religion. It even forecasts its 
complete disappearance when man and society have become mature, and 
moved beyond the present pre-human stage. "The Communist view of 
religion concludes that with the establishment of the true community 
of humanity, religion will necessarily disappear." (CS 137).
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Further, neither Marxism or religion have the least respect or 
tolerance for each other, save amongst a very few way-out priests, 
mainly in the Third World; and I mean a few. And this fifty years 
after Macmurray was writing on these matters. This could mean, of 
course, not that the problem is intractable but that nobody with any 
interest in the matter has read or heeded Macmurray. But is there 
anybody today trying to reconcile the two - practically, creatively, 
and constructively? I knew of no one.
That they ought to be reconciled Maanurray never doubts. They 
both have the same end in view, even if they have different 
terminology far it. Christianity wants the Kingdom of Heaven on 
earth. Marxism the creation of a human, free, classless, 
unexploiting society. The communist "feels himself to be an 
instrument through which this power is here and now achieving its 
purpose of creating a true and universal society in the world. The 
Christian would call it 'The Kingdom of God on Earth'; the Communist, 
of course, would not. But what he means is a real, universal, 
brotherhood of mankind based on equality and freedom". (CS 23).
Two things, one by each, can, says Macmurray, promote 
reconciliation; or, to use Macmurray's term, synthesis. "The problem 
that faces us is the synthesis of the two, not in theory merely but 
in practice. A synthesis is not the same thing as a combination. It 
necessarily involves a change in the forms of both the elements which 
are united. Christianity in its unreal form, and Communism in its 
purely material form cannot be combined. They are necessarily 
antagonistic." (CS 144).
What are these necessary respective changes? Firstly; Marxism 
must fully recognise - not merely relegate it to the side lines - the
- 305 -
personal aspect of human nature. The economic and all its effects 
may be important; but it is not the essence of man. Man is something 
more, as Macmurray proved earlier here.
Secondly; religion, especially Christianity, must become real 
and renounce its otherworldliness, its idealism, its indifference to 
the social and economic well-being of everybody on this earth. Marx, 
understandably, is mistaken about religion. Everywhere around him 
what passes as religion ignores the real problems of practical 
living. But this is not religion, nor Christianity, says Maanurray. 
It is pseudo-religion. At best it is merely consolatory; at worst a 
phoney escapism and unreality.
Can Marxists, entrenched in and conditioned to, as they are, the 
official line, ever realise that religion is about community and love 
here and new; and that love is a vital and more elemental 
characteristic of men than the mere material and economic?
Can Christianity threw off its image of otherworldliness and 
actively get dewn to the creation of brotherhood, which means the 
sharing of goods, and seeing that nobody is in need, on this earth? 
There are not the least signs of either doing any of these respective 
things at present.
All this, and other relevant points, are developed in chapters 5 
to 8 inclusive of "Creative Society".
Appraisement
1) This is by far the most difficult subject of Maanurray's to 
appraise. Although one can appreciate and generally understand what 
he says, and often accept his reasoning, hew can we know, short of
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being advanced Marxist scholars - and even they might find things 
difficult, knowledgeable as they might be - if his facts, and the 
interpretations and summaries based on those facts, are correct when 
he gives no sources, no footnotes, no references, and the barest of 
quotations, to support these? We are completely in the dark 
assessment-wise. We have to take on trust what is said. And never 
once does he discuss, based on the original text, different possible 
interpretations of the original. He merely asserts, unquestioningly, 
that this is the Marxian doctrine.
All Maanurray's other works are concerned with what Maanurray 
thinks and discerns in various fields and areas of life. They are 
not based on any one doctrine, unless it is, as in some cases, 
Christianity - where we can look up the references in a Bible 
concordance, if not given in Maanurray's text. But his writing on 
Marxism is different. Only twice does he mention books, those of 
Feuerbach and Stimer, which as we have seen are, although 
influential, relatively subsidiary to the main issues. Altogether 
there are three brief quotations, but these are put in such a way, 
sometimes without quotation marks, that we are not sure whether this 
is what Marx actually said; whether this is what Maanurray is making 
him say; or if Maanurray is merely paraphrasing him.
Certainly this almost total unsubstantiation, and consequent 
difficulty for the reader to even occasionally refer to, and check, 
the source from which all Macmurray's subsequent argument, 
contentions, and innovations spring, reduces the value of what 
Macmurray is saying, and makes more than perfunctory appraisement 
difficult. One may be appraising something which is not true. Or
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should we say, not real?
Allowing for this very limiting factor, we new turn to ask:-
2) Is Marxism a new type of philosophy - in so far as it puts 
action before thought, living before thinking, wanting things done 
rather than endlessly arguing and reasoning about than? Over all, 
Yes. The whole trend of Western philosophy - and Indian, if not 
Chinese, is a thousand times worse - has been on trying to think 
reality (an impossible task) rather than live it.
But there have been exceptions. Is not Stoicism a form of 
action philosophy, despite its slightly negative and avoiding nature? 
And Epicureanism is another philosophy concerned primarily with 
pursuing a way of life rather than thinking about it.
And over the last century has not a philosophy emerged, almost 
parallel with Marxism, namely Existentialism which has the same 
motive? Surely its insistence upon Existence before Essence, of 
being before thinking and evaluating, of experiencing as prior to 
formulating and categorizing, must be an example of the type of 
philosophising Macmurray regards as novel and peculiar to Marxism, 
and which is possible only through Marxism. If not absolutely a 
philosophy of action it is certainly one which puts personal feeling 
before thought. The self, not the thought, is in the front line. So 
perhaps although Marx clearly contended that philosophy must be 
concerned with change and not merely reflection, some other 
philosophies, at least implicitly, have this intention.
3) Why, except for Macmurray, has Marx no philosophical 
disciples concerning the above radical change and outlook? Marx of 
course has plenty of political followers but no philosophical
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adherents outside of standard Marxist philosophy. If it were as 
marked a change as Maanurray thinks it is, and indeed as I think it 
is, and there must be others too, why do philosophers in general 
still philosophise in the same old traditional way, spending whole 
ages of their lives pondering over and rehashing the old unsolvable 
problems?
Why are they not philosophising about the real, active, 
practical, urgent, world here and new, with all its problems? Not 
solving them, of course, which would not be their task, but 
unearthing and questioning publically the underlying values and 
assumptions on which those problems rest; and which is the only 
ultimate way of solving them. Why are there not philosophical 
advisers to governments, companies, education authorities, public 
boards and bodies, the church, and trade unions? Why is philosophy 
not a recognised profession like accountancy, architecture, 
economics, and countless other occupations? And why is it not 
regarded as practical - and consequently made use of by all? These 
are vital questions prompted by Marx's assertion that the task of 
philosophy is to change the world, not to endlessly, fruitlessly, and 
futilely think about it. With most of Marx I would quite happily and 
readily argue against. But with the idea of philosophy being for 
action, for changing the world, I do absolutely agree and endorse.
But we are here to appraise Maanurray not Marx. So to conclude. 
In general, Macmurray seems, as countless others have done, to have 
swallowed Marx wholesale - and then find criticisms afterwards.
Some comments have been made as we have gone along. For 
example, Maanurray's confusing of Marxism with comnunism; and the
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notion that theory and practice are one. Some assessment, too, has 
been made of Macmurray's new materialism.
Over all I think that Macmurray overstated the case when he says 
that Marxism is to be found in the teaching and practices of Jesus.
I am sure, for example, that not only did Jesus never articulate the 
dialectic, but he never even thought of it, worked it out, or 
consciously effected it in action. He was not the sort of person 
capable of doing this. All he did was to choose, quite naturally, 
the poor and humble as his followers. Marxism and Macmurray have 
theorised the rest.
On the whole, at this period of his life, the 1930s, Maanurray 
seems to have been, perhaps understandably, carried away by, and 
engrossed in, Marxism. The fact that in the later works he hardly 
ever mentions it would seem to endorse this. However, at the time, 
he did make some very perspicacious and valuable observations on 
Marxist philosophy and psychology, especially that it totally ignores 
the personal. Unfortunately these observations have been wholly 
overlooked both in thought and practice. Yet they could be the key 
to the reconciliation of Marxism and religion, Soviet communism and 
the West. One cherishes economic security; the other personal 
freedom.
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PHILOSOPHY
Relevant Books
Freedom in the Modem World. (FMW)
The Boundaries of Science. (BS)
Interpreting the Universe. (IU)
The Self as Agent. (SA)
Persons in Relation. (PR)
The Clue to History. (CH)
Reason and Emotion. (RE)
Marxism (M)
Quotations From Macmurray
To begin; to indicate what philosophy might be far Maanurray,
here are a few quotations.
Philosophy is the attempt to understand the meaning of 
human experience in the world. (FM 105)
Philosophy is largely concerned with the criticism and 
examination of prejudice. (BS 25)
Philosophy becomes dry and barren and meaningless when most 
people are not interested in it. (FMW 105)
Philosophy deals with the whole in its wholeness and unity; 
science and art are fragmentary and decil with fragments of 
reality. (RE 162)
Philosophy is the attempt to express the infinite in 
immediate experience through reflection. (IU 33)
Philosophy is the effort to represent reality in words.
(IU 35)
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Philosophy becomes real only when its problems are forced 
upon it by the immediate life of its time and environment. 
(FMW 15)
Philosophy is essential when religion fails. (FMW 109)
It is the inner life of the spirit which philosophy is 
trying to understand. (FMW 110)
Philosophy cannot be mere knowledge, but is always an 
action upon oneself and society. (M 44)
The substance of a living philosophy can always be stated 
and applied to ordinary experience in simple language, if 
one is not concerned to defend it in detail against its 
rivals and to demonstrate its truth point by point in the 
terms of set logic. (FMW 71 )
A living philosophy is always contemporary. Its roots are
in the life of its cwn time, and its problems are the
living problems of the world in which it is bom. (FMW 73)
A living philosophy must think out again, in terms of our 
contemporary life, the problems of reality and freedom. 
(FMW 92)
Introduction
Compared with other chapters this one may seem to be piecemeal, 
discursive, and lacking cohesion. So it is. But the reason for this 
is necessary and simple. Macmurray is a philosopher and, therefore, 
all his work is imbued with philosophical ideas. This applies to all 
the chapters produced here so far. They embody and exemplify various 
aspects of his philosophy.
There still remains, however, various and important 
philosophical ideas which, for one reason or another, cannot 
satisfactorily be included under these other headings. This chapter 
deals with some of these - hence its rather unstructured, disjointed, 
and discontinuous arrangement and presentation.
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Of course, with a different arrangement and classification they 
could all have been included elsewhere. But for ease of 
understanding I have chosen the present chapter pattern, feeling it 
to be the most satisfactory, interesting, and beneficial under the 
circumstances - which are, mainly, that this may be the first time 
you have encountered Maanurray and his ideas.
Philosophy Itself
What is Maanurray's view of philosophy? What are his ideas on 
philosophy itself?
Macmurray recognises that philosophy has two aspects or 
divisions, the theoretical and the practical. (See FMW 111/4). 
Theoretical philosophy asks, and tries to solve, the question "What 
is real and hew can we knew it?" Practical philosophy asks "What is 
good and how can we achieve it?" (See PMW 95/6). The first is 
related to the problem of knowing. "If, then, we are going to give a 
philosophical account of our experience of the world, it will be an 
expression of what we have come to think is real. But that is only 
the first step. We shall want to know whether our account of the 
inner reality of life is not mistaken. It will probably disagree 
with the accounts that other people give. We shall require to 
criticise it and test it, to compare it with others; because we can 
easily think we have got hold of something real when it is merely 
counterfeit. This testing and criticising of the expressions of 
reality which people have put forward in their accounts of what is 
real is the second important part of theoretical philosophy. That is 
why so much philosophy is concerned with the problem of knowledge.
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We want to knew how we can test our beliefs about reality, hew we can 
discover whether they are really true.” (FMW 113/4).
The second is related to freedom. "The problem of practical 
philosophy is the problem of freedom. 'How can we be free?' is one 
way of stating the general question. That is because all activities 
which are really significant for us are spontaneous. It is the 
feeling of constraint and bondage in our activities that makes them 
seem unsatisfactory to us. The sense of freedom is our guarantee 
that we are making the best of life. When it is lacking we are 
thwarted and forced to live in a way that does not express our sense
of the meaning of life  If we are not free, then life has no
practical significance for us, however much theoretical significance 
it may have. All the questions of practical philosophy, all the 
problems of how we ought to act and use our lives, have the problem 
of freedom at the root of them. Indeed practical philosophy has as 
its task nothing but the discovery of the conditions of free living". 
(FMW 114).
Not necessarily coincident with the foregoing but certainly 
allied to each is Macmurray' s classification or dividing-up of 
philosophy - into academic and living philosophy. (See FMW 105/6).
The first, academic philosophy, is like a game; an enjoyable, 
thrilling, and absorbing game, but of little consequential and 
practical value. It is, indeed, adequately summed-up in the word 
'academic'. The second is for real. In the life of the individual, 
and of societies, there come times of immense problems which are 
basically philosophical in nature. Macmurray does not explicitly say 
why they are philosophical, but it is obvious that they are this 
because of their concern with values. Such a time, says Macmurray,
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is with us new. He wrote this forty years ago. Nothing has happened 
since to modify or ease this situation; in fact, few could contend 
that things are not considerably worse I At such times everybody 
should be interested in philosophy. 111 am convinced that it is 
important that we should begin to be interested in philosophy. Not 
in the dry and learned disputes of the academic philosophies; not at 
alii But in living, contemporary philosophy, the philosophy of our 
own post-war twentieth century life. Philosophy, just like art, 
religion or politics, becomes dry and barren and meaningless when 
most people are not interested in it. It really comes to life when 
the mass of men begin to feel the need of it, to call for it, to 
support the struggling intelligence of the philosopher with sympathy 
and the sense that what he does matters to men". (FT4W 105).
It is not relevant to enlarge upon this here, but the whole of
the first part of FMW - "The Modem Dilemma" - is an attempt to 
analyse our present malaise and overall problem situation in terms of 
philosophy.
But why is it only sometimes that such demanding personal and 
social problems arise? Why is it, consequently, only sometimes that 
everybody should be concerned with philosophy? Because for periods 
we live optimistically, triumphantly, and outgoingly; and in such 
times reflection is not necessary. At such times, says Macmurray, we 
are living by faith (See FMW pp. 107/9). Presumably, to give an 
example, the nineteenth century, from 1815 onwards, was such an age. 
"So long as its soul is alive in this spontaneous way its problems 
are never very deep. It is too strong to be farced to stop and think
and understand its inner life." (FMW 108).
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Then comes the crisis "when a man's soul or the soul of a 
civilisation goes sick, and the flame of faith bums very lew. 
Spontaneity and vitality begin to disappear. This is when 
disillusionment sets in and life begins to seem meaningless. When 
that happens we can no longer face up to the problems that life sets 
us; we grow afraid and timid. In such a crisis reflection and 
understanding are essential. The vital necessity of understanding 
our cwn bodily mechanism comes from the fact of disease; and the 
science of medicine is forced upon us by the necessity of dealing 
with the diseases of the body not with its health. So, in the 
current of our social history, understanding is a luxury when the 
energy of faith is in full tide; but when faith is at the ebb it is 
an urgent nexessity. Philosophy is essential when religion fails." 
(FMW 108/9).
In the list of quoted phrases given earlier one especially may 
have seemed a little odd. Now we can understand its full meaning.
As just quoted, philosophy becomes essential when religion fails. 
Reflection becomes necessary when confidence and elan fade. It was 
said just new that the crises were always ones of value. We could 
have said with equal pointedness and depth that they were crises of 
choices and of significance. "You see, then, that philosophical 
problems are problems of the inner significance of life, individual 
or social life. That is the core of philosophy. It is from that 
particular angle that the philosopher looks upon the world and all 
its furniture and movement. He must look outwards for his answers. 
Because we can only understand the meaning of life in terms of the 
meaning of the world in which we live.
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"After all, we are part of the world, it is built into us, it 
dictates to us the terms on which we can live at all. If we want to 
live significantly, we must live somehow, and we must then discover 
what kind of significance life can have in a world like this. And so 
a great deal of philosophy is very much concerned with the nature of 
the world we live in. But for all that it is always in relation to 
the inner meaning of human life that the philosopher undertakes these 
elaborate investigations into the nature of the material world or 
into the origins of life." (FMW 111).
I need hardly say, in the light of the foregoing, and of all 
that has been expounded and argued in all the other chapters of this 
thesis, that Macmurray1 s sympathies, interests, and advocacies, lie 
entirely with live and practical philosophy. The following says it 
all. "When philosophy is alive it grows straight out of human life. 
However high in the air its branches may stretch themselves, its 
roots are deep in the soil of cannon human experience. If it is cut 
off from its roots, it becomes a dead tree which merely cumbers the 
ground and blocks the pathway. There is always plenty of dead 
philosophy about, just as there is plenty of dead art and dead 
religion. Academic philosophy, like academic art, is nearly always 
dead. It consists either of a scholarly acquaintance with the 
philosophy of other people or of argument about traditional problems 
for the sake of argument, full of very acute and learned subtlety of 
thought. It has great value, no doubt, as an intellectual exercise, 
and in the decoration of the temple of culture. But it has no vital 
significance whatsoever. A living philosophy is creative; it is 
something drawn from the heart of living experience and something 
that we can live by." (FMW 72/3).
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You will remember that contemporary art is the art which has 
most meaning and significance for Maanurray, brilliant as past art 
may have been. Only contemporary art can reflect how we feel today. 
The same with philosophy. Enlightening and profound as past 
philosophy may have been, only contemporary philosophy can - or ought 
to be undertaking if it is doing its job properly, which today it is 
not - unearth, and make explicit, and - hopefully - resolve, the 
value, significance, and radical problems which underlie any 
contemporary time, whenever that may be. "For this reason, a living 
philosophy is always contemporary. Its roots are in the life of its 
cwn time, and its problems are the living problems of the world in 
which it is bom." (FMW 73 - and very much more to the end of this 
page).
And more than this. Not only have contemporary philosophers the 
task of dissecting and analysing. They must create a new philosophy 
appropriate to the needs of an age. This equally applies today.
"Our social forms, our political organizations, our religion, our 
economic devices are all too small for us. They cramp our freedom 
and make us inwardly a little ashamed of ourselves. We have to make 
new ones before we can be at ease. In these conditions we badly need 
a new philosophy to define some significant thought, in terms of our 
own peculiar difficulties, which could serve to unite and direct our 
efforts at reconstruction." (FMW 74).
Broadly, in early modem times, philosophy was materialistic, 
mechanical, and mathematical reflecting the newly developing interest 
in the physical and numerically based sciences. Beginning in the 
nineteenth century, when biology and history were to the fore,
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philosophers from Hegel to Whitehead developed organically-based 
philosophical theories. Our age has yet to produce a philosopher 
capable of conceiving a philosophy reflecting our times, the 
essential of which is psychological or, as Macmurray prefers to call 
it, the personal. He himself, as we shall see, has at least paved 
the way for this coming and necessary - and presumably inevitable - 
achievement.
Incidentally; along with each of these phases there has been an 
accompanying logic, relevant and peculiar to it. A new philosophical 
age will thus require a new logic, for analytical and methodological 
purposes.
Whilst living and practical philosophy, relevant to any 
contemporary circumstance and conditions, can be created only by 
philosophers, such a philosophy can be effected only through its 
popularisation and acceptance by a majority of the people not 
immediately concerned with philosophy. "Nor must we forget that the 
eat changes in society which are the result of a growing knowledge 
of society are the result not of the brilliant thought of a single 
genius, however eminent, but of a multitude of similar, and in 
themselves seemingly insignificant changes in the minds of millions 
of ordinary people. The great thinker is only effective socially 
because of the thought that he sets going in multitudes of other 
minds." (Marxism 37). But, nevertheless, he must get the relevant 
"thinking going".
So the question and problem arises - Can such ordinary people 
and minds comprehend and understand philosophy? Surely it is too 
technical, abstract, and erudite, for it ever to become popular, 
however necessary that might be? No, says Macmurray. At least, not
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at these crucial, critical, and essential times.
And, of course, he set out to prove this by giving several 
series of broadcast talks in 1930 and 1932; talks which seem to have 
been exceptionally well and widely received. Whether they had any, 
or the desired, effect will be considered later. But philosophy can 
be made available in terms and language people understand. "There 
exists in some quarters a prejudice against the attempt to 
'popularize' philosophy - a prejudice which I myself formerly shared, 
at least to the extent of fearing that the attempt would prove 
impossible without a cheepening and falsification of the issues. The 
result of rny broadcasting experience has been to convince me that, 
however unsuccessful my own attempts may have been, the prejudice is 
quite groundless. There is no inherent impossibility in the effort 
to expound the central issues of philosophy in a fashion which will 
render them comprehensible to the uninitiated. Simplification there 
must be and a strenuous avoidance of abstractions and technicalities. 
But this is not a defect, since philosophy is the most concrete of 
all sciences, and its major effort is the simplification of complex 
issues." (FMW 15/6). There is much more of this; and it must be read 
at least to page 17.
The surprising phrase in the above quotation, as you would have 
noticed, is that "philosophy is the most concrete of all sciences". 
Ignore, of course, the reference to the sciences. This is only a 
general expression and is meant to be regarded in this context as 
meaning branches of knowledge or fields of study. But that 
philosophy is concrete, let alone most concrete, will astonish many, 
not least many philosophers themselves. Unfortunately Macmurray,
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nowhere in the whole of his writings, repeats this nor elaborates 
upon it. Yet I feel that it is a vital point and wholeheartedly 
support it.
What it means, I venture to suggest, is that live, practical, 
philosophy is concerned with values. Values are nothing more than 
crystalised, regularised, habitualised, choices and preferences - and 
choosing and preferring are the essence and foundation of human life, 
of being human. Not a second passes when we are not either choosing 
or living on past choices. Thus values are the most real and 
essential part of our lives and living. And as values are the 
essence of live and practical philosophy, philosophy is the most 
concrete, the most real, of all our branches of knowledge, and the 
source of all our actions and being. This, I believe, is the import 
of Macmurray1 s phrase. And it is without doubt a fact.
Why then, to move on, has Macmurray this vital interest, and 
concern for, living and practical philosophy - against almost all the 
philosophical odds of his time? Why is it so important to him that 
we feel the insistence with which he tries to pass it on to us? What 
is its source and origin?
The source is Marxism. As we saw earlier in the biographical 
note Macmurray came upon Marxism quite by chance; but once 
encountered he embraced it warmly and wholeheartedly, because of the 
association which he, rightly or wrongly, discerned it to have with 
Christianity. What his attitude to philosophy was before this we do 
not knew. Perhaps he had no interest in philosophy but only in 
religion, science, and classics.
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But however Macmurray tied-up Christianity with Marxism - and we 
discussed this in an earlier chapter - one important idea Macmurray 
did get from Marx, and it is this idea which pervades his whole 
philosophical outlook. It is, of course, that which is contained in 
the famous and oft-quoted phrase, "Philosophers hitherto have 
explained the world in different ways; the task is to change it." (M 
30).
By this Macmurray has been transformed. It is beyond 
understanding why, almost alone amongst philosophers - ignoring the 
already committed and biased communist thinkers - Macmurray has 
recognised the importance and profundity of this insight, and 
incorporated it in his cwn philosophy and way of philosophising.
Even Bertrand Russell, who more than most philosophers involved 
himself in practical living and social movements, never understood 
it; or if he did, never accepted it. For in the "Problems of 
Philosophy" he says, "If the study of philosophy has any value it 
must be indirectly". (P of P. 238). - which I take to be a mild and 
polite way of saying that philosophy is essentially academic and 
remote, with little relevance to everyday life. Sartre and Marcuse 
come to mind as perhaps, to some extent, intentionally or not (except 
the latter of course), acting out philosophical ideas in the real and 
practical world. But here again; both were firmly entrenched in 
Marxism.
Correct as I believe this explanation concerning Macmurray to 
be, we cannot be absolutely sure of it. Macmurray may have been a 
unique person by constitution whereby thought and action were more 
related and coupled than in most human lives. Discovering Marx's
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famous dictum might have only confirmed, or indeed been a 
rationalisation, of what was already there by nature. Hew else could 
we explain the fact that so many other thinkers, equally aware of and 
knowledgeable about Marx, are predominantly thought-bound and still 
immersed in academic and dead philosophy?
This insight of Marx must be properly understood. It has not 
altered the function of philosophy. As we have seen, philosophers 
have always been involved - thought-wise - with the current state and 
outlook of the world and of the period in which they find themselves 
thinking. "The history of our philosophy is our social history at 
its most serious, its most reflective and its most logical." (SA 19). 
"The philosophy of any historical period reflects the life of the 
period even more evidently than does its art." (SA 25). And in 
relation to this, philosophers have not merely reflected the current 
trend, but tried to deal with its problems, even if they have not 
seen these problems in a total context. At least some of them have. 
But - and here is the crux of Macmurray' s contention - the post- 
Marxian difference is that this reflection is new done in the full 
consciousness of what philosophy exists to do and must do. "The 
recognition of the unity of thought and action in philosophy, which 
we have considered in the previous chapter, has the effect of lifting 
philosophical thought an to a new plane of consciousness. The 
philosophies of the past have always been related to the social 
movements of the times in which they were produced. But this 
relation was never clearly present to the minds of the philosophers 
who produced than. The real motivation of their philosophical 
activity remained concealed from themselves. The discovery of the 
social function which his philosophizing fulfils makes the thinker
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conscious, in a new and significant fashion, of what he is doing and 
of why he is doing it." (M. 43).
What this all amounts to is that all the ideas of a philosopher,
in his new consciousness of intent, are related to action instead of, 
as in pre-aware days, to knowledge and to the attaining and hoarding 
thereof. "Earlier philosophers were acting on society and changing
it without knowing what they were doing. They thought they were
achieving a pure knowledge of reality which did not commit them in 
action at all. They were not conscious of the nature of their own 
task. Now if you do not know what you are doing, you cannot do it 
rationally and deliberately; your action remains unconscious."
(M 40).
Macmurray then comes up with an extraordinarily telling phrase 
which sums-up and encapsulates the inport of this whole concept.
This phrase embodies all that living and practical philosophy is and 
should be. It is that - Philosophy is always an action upon oneself 
and society. To show that I have not taken this out of context, and 
interpreted it idiosyncratically here is the full quote. "A 
philosopher who is unconscious of the reference of his thought to the 
development of society, will find the meaning of all his crucial 
ideas in a world of ideas which has no reference beyond knowledge.
The reference to action will remain unrecognized. To recognize that 
philosophy cannot be mere knowledge, but is always an action upon 
oneself and society, involves of necessity a re-interpretation of 
all, or nearly all, of our important ideas and terms." (M 43/4).
It is a pity that Macmurray did not make more of this one phrase 
which so perfectly, epigrammatically, and totally captures ideas
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which would otherwise take a bock to expound and elaborate upon. In 
its economy, if not in its rhythm and imagery, the phrase is the 
essence of poetry.
Arising yet again out of Marx's famous dictum Maonurray produces 
another startling conclusion; a conclusion which no other philosopher 
has asserted however much he may have vaguely suspected himself of 
being so, a suspicion inconceivable by most philosophers anyway. 
Philosophers are always so sure that they are proclaiming the one and 
only truth.
What is this further insight of Macmurray's? That philosophers 
are prejudiced, propagandist, partisan, and biased. Perhaps they 
ought not to be, but in the nature of things they can be nothing 
else. If philosophers are to be the cause of change in the world, 
then they cannot be the objective, impartial, non-conmitted, enquirer 
they are by tradition thought to be. They are not scientists, whose 
very essence is to be neutral. But then scientists never act. Of 
themselves they change nothing. Whatever action occurs there can be 
no neutrality.
Or to express this in reverse; can you imagine how neutrality 
can ever produce action? Its very nature is non-action, non­
participation. This whole matter is discussed by Macmurray in 
Marxism pp. 36/42. But to give a couple of relevant quotes. "In 
philosophy this situation, in which thought and action are united, is 
always present. In science we are concerned with a world which is 
assumed to exist in itself and to stand over against the 
investigator, and not to include the observer as an essential part of 
what he is investigating. But for philosophy the world to be known 
is the world which includes man as an essential part of itself, and
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which includes the thinker in the world he is thinking about. 
Philosophy cannot exclude the philosopher from the object of his 
knowledge. Philosophy is always personal knowledge, with the thinker 
at its centre." (M 37/8). "Philosophical knowledge is necessarily 
partisan and propagandist, and the greater the truth of a philosophy 
the more partisan and propagandist it is. 'But', you say, 'the 
thinker must be unbiased, he must not take sides, his business is to 
know things clearly and without prejudice. The moment he descends to 
propaganda he is no more concerned wth pure truth. He has sold 
himself and betrayed his trust'. The answer is that your statement 
itself is propaganda. It is partisan. It is propaganda far the 
party that wishes to prevent knowledge being made effective. It 
aligns you with the reactionaries against progress. What I have 
said, and what Marx said, is not that people should choose their 
philosophical beliefs for their propaganda value; not that philosophy 
ought not to be neutral in the social struggle, but simply that it is 
not and cannot be. In this field knowledge is action, and neutrality 
is impossible - literally inpossible. To hold a certain
philosophical belief is to choose a side in the social process....
There is no choice. A man's philosophy ranges him on one side or the 
other." (M 39/40).
We new turn to the last general philosophical idea of 
Macmurray's that we shall consider here. And once again it is a very 
unusual one. It is - the verification of philosophy.
Whoever thought, or heard of, philosophy being verified? If any 
philosopher mentioned or discussed it before it has never been taken- 
up; nor become part of philosophy's and the philosopher's required
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technique without which his purported teachings would not be taken 
seriously.
Yet verification is a big thing with Maanurray (See IU 74/83). 
All thought and reflection, as we have seen, is for action, for 
living. It has no meaning or value otherwise. Consequently, once an 
idea has been determined it cannot be proved by another idea but only 
by reference back to reality i.e. to the real world. This, simply, 
is what is meant by verification. It is the process of checking 
ideas against what really is. "Verification is primarily a return 
from thought to action, in order to find in the immediate experience 
of concrete activity a justification for accepting the conclusions 
which have been reached through the manipulation of ideas in the 
thought-processes. The implications of this are far-reaching. In 
the first place it implies a distrust of speculative thought. To 
accept the necessity of verification means more than to recognize the 
possibility of mistakes in thinking. These, after all, could be 
discovered and avoided by better thinking. It involves rather the 
belief that thought alone, however correct it may be, cannot 
guarantee its own conclusions. It means that all conclusions must be 
regarded as hypothetical." (IU 74/5).
Science is almost alone in the various fields of knowledge and 
of learning which recognises the need far verification. "The 
necessity for the verification of all conclusions is new completely 
recognised in the scientific field. In other fields it is still 
unrecognized or even denied." (IU 74). Yet, continues Macmurray 
later, "I am concerned to insist that there can be no such 
limitation; that no process of thinking has any claim upon our belief 
unless it is supported by, and appeals to, verification in action."
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(IU 80).
But hew can a philosophy be verified? Science verifies by 
subsequent experiment. Can we have experimental philosophy? There 
are two ways of verifying philosophy. Whether we are prepared to 
accept the first way as verification, as we would like to understand 
it, car whether it is rather stretching a point to call it this, is an 
open question. However, Macmurray calls it verification.
He says then, firstly, that a philosophy is always being 
verified, hewbeit unconsciously, in the process of individual and 
social history.
Needless to say, this means living, practical philosophy. "It 
is, of course, possible to speculate philosophically for the sake of 
speculating, and to prevent our conclusions from affecting practical 
activity. Such philosophy is not serious. It is a kind of game 
which certain people play. We are not concerned with sport, but with 
the serious business of thought. When philosophy is taken seriously 
it is bound to affect our immediate experience of living and to 
verify itself in the satisfactoriness of the life-experience which it 
helps to produce. In the social field, too, philosophy undergoes a 
constant process of verification. The way in which a society 
organizes and conducts its social life is always the unconscious 
expression of a philosophical conception of the world." (IU 81).
Macmurray then gives a number of brief examples of this, mostly 
examples of failure for reasons best known to himself, and ends "And 
the collapse of our own time is another instance of an unsuccessful 
experiment in philosophy." (IU 82). But this first type of 
verification he does admit is not wholly satisfactory as it is
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unintentional. "But such experiments are not deliberate. They 
produce no satisfactory judgment upon philosophical theory, because 
the theories themselves which they unconsciously test are not 
explicitly recognized." (IU 82).
In contrast, the second type of verification is intentional and 
deliberate; and consequently has much greater validity. "It is only 
when an experiment is deliberately undertaken on a basis of theory 
for the purpose of discovering what that theory will enable us to do 
that we could not do before, or not so successfully, that it fulfils 
the function of verification in the life of deliberate reflection." 
(IU 82).
Hew can this be done? Unfortunately, having said that there are 
many possible answers to this, Macmurray gives only one of them, and 
then only one example of that. We should very much like to know of 
the others. The solitary example provided is, as one might expect, 
the Soviet experiment which Maanurray takes to be an attempted 
verification of Hegel's dialectic. He says, "That experiment is 
consciously and explicitly based upon a philosophical theory, and the 
phases of its development are deliberately guided by the 
philosophical theory upon which it is based. We have here, 
therefore, the first attempt that man has made on a large scale in 
the deliberate verification of a philosophical conclusion. The thing 
is possible because it is being done. If it is possible to verify 
the Hegelian dialectic in this way, it must be possible to verify 
other philosophical conclusions in a similar way." (IU 82/3).
Whether we should accept and agree that it is an attempt to verify 
Hegel, without detailed argument for this, is difficult to say. 
Perhaps, however, we could agree that it is, widely seen, a
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philosophical experiment of some sort.
To verify, in whatever form, is for Maanurray crucial for 
philosophy. Remember Macmurray is a great empiricist. Speculation 
and philosophical rationalism have little place, if any, in his 
thought and philosophy. "But, in any case, I think we may conclude 
that until something of this kind becomes possible and is carried 
out, we cannot expect the beginnings of a developing body of 
philosophical theory which is more than speculative and, therefore 
more than guesswork car phantasy." (IU 83). Moreover, he reminds us, 
that if he is right in this idea of verification, it is going on 
anyway so why not make "the effort to control this verification in a 
rational fashion."? (IU 83).
In conclusion of his advocacy of philosophical verification he 
says, "It would seem as if history were driving us, under pressure of 
necessity to attempt the deliberate planning of our social life. The 
theoretical basis of such an effort at social reconstruction must be 
philosophical. If the philosophy which guides it is unconscious, we 
shall be at the mercy of unconscious forces, which, because they are 
unconscious, are controllable." (IU 83).
So ends this short account of some of Maanurray's ideas on 
philosophy itself.
Appraisement (1)
From my own experience I agree with Macmurray that philosophy 
is, or should be, practical and that it is for living. For some of 
my early years I studied philosophy academically, and very 
interesting it was too. Macmurray calls such interest a game; but it
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was more than that. It was a serious endeavour. But necessary as it 
is to be knowledgeable about supposedly ultimate things, beyond 
mental enhancement it did nothing.
But living and practical philosophy changes one's life. By 
being, to give but one example, fully conscious of one's value 
structure and pattern, and the relation of this to one's feelings, 
attitudes, relationships, and actions, enables a movement to be made 
towards more satisfactory living. For normal people i.e. those 
without recognisable or severe neurotic or psychotic disorders, 
philosophy is the one field of human interest and study most 
beneficial bo one's living.
And the reason for this is obvious. The area of living which 
practical philosophy deals with - the value and choice area - is the 
most fundamental of all. Or to use Macmurray's phrase, even if there 
is an element of metaphor about it, it is the most concrete i.e. the 
most real, the most basic.
One thing about this, however, I must disagree with Macmurray; 
but only because he does not go far enough. He says the time and 
need to concern ourselves with philosophical thought and reflection 
is when life goes awry: when urgent problems disclose themselves;
when the joy of spontaneous living and optimism begins, for an 
intangible, elusive, reason to fade; when crises, private or public, 
engulf and enshadcw the day. On the contrary, I think that we should 
always be philosophising, and not merely at times of doubt, crisis, 
and lost elan. Indeed, I believe that if philosophy were a normal, 
habitual, and integral part of our lives crises, of the personal, 
social, national, and international kind Maanurray is talking about,
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would not occur. Or if they did, would be immediately and adequately 
dealt with by established philosophical techniques.
This does not mean that we should be continuously 
philosophically reflecting. Far from it. Life is for living, and 
the very essence of this is spontaneity, lb lose this is the prime 
cause or symptom of a life short-falling. But it would be most 
valuable to spend, say, one-twelfth of one's waking life on 
philosophical, value, seminal, reflection. And, like everything else 
in life, the more regularly this was done, the more habitual and 
automatic it would become, and therefore even less time would have to 
be spent on it.
In the past people prayed, often privately, at the end of the 
day. Ignoring, if we can, any immediate religious intention and 
significance concerning this act, and of any self-deception either as 
to what one was really doing or what one chose to speak of, this 
practice seems to have been of immense value as a time of conscious 
and deliberate withdrawal into a reflection upon the actions, 
problems, doubts, failures, and relationships of that day. People, 
and the world, are poorer and certainly less able to cope and manage 
for the loss of this daily review and self-examination, and possible 
subsequent reorganisation and reorientation.
Socrates said, "The unexamined life is not worth living". This 
is not always true. A few older, unreflecting, people, often brought 
up simply and honestly, or perhaps it is a natural feature of their 
character, seem to have an ability to live satisfactorily. And they 
certainly find life worth living! "One still finds people who 
possess a peculiarly rich knowledge which has developed unconsciously 
through a long, vivid and varied experience of life and in whom the
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capacity for reflection has remained untrained and undeveloped, in 
whom even the capacity for speech or expression has remained meagre 
and difficult. These, of course, are exceptional cases." (IU 20/1). 
But that the unexamined life is not worth, or barely worth, living - 
save as life for all but the most suicidal - is true for 99% of the 
people. More philosophical reflection, properly undertaken, should 
become - as private prayer was - a normal part of everyday living.
For enlargement of this point see my "Practical Philosophy" (1982).
But the problem and question remains - "Why is philosophy so 
difficult to popularise?" Macmurray seems never to have been aware 
of this problem, and certainly did not address himself to it. He 
merely contends, as we have seen, that philosophy can be understood 
and used by everybody. All it needs for this to be achieved is that 
philosophers forget their technical language and jargon, and talk and 
write in the vernacular. He goes so far as to say that to do this, 
as he himself found, is even more valuable for the philosopher than 
for the common man and the philosophically uninitiated, far whom the 
exercise has been undertaken! "When I undertook the task of 
expressing my own philosophy in non-philosophical language, I found, 
with considerable astonishment, hew vague was my own apprehension of 
the real meaning of technical terms which I habitually used with 
considerable precision. The attempt to discover their meaning proved 
to be the finest philosophical discipline to which I have ever 
submitted, and of more value for the understanding of philosophy than 
any scholarly study of classical texts. Whatever may be the value of 
'popularizing' philosophy to the general public, it certainly holds a 
rich harvest for the philosophy. It forces him to an activity from
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which he customarily shrinks because it recalls him from the tenuous 
abstractions of concentrated logical processes - to an activity 
parallel to that which has proved the life-blood of progress in the 
natural sciences, the verification of results by reference to 
concrete fact. Where the effort to popularize philosophy is a 
sincere effort of self-expression the philosopher will find himself 
forced, not into superficiality, but into a deeper realization of his 
cwn meaning." (FMW 16/7).
Clear, however, as Macmurray1 s broadcasts of the early 30s were, 
and the equal clarity of their subsequent publication as FMW, one 
must conclude that the reception they received was no more than a 
'nine-day wonder1. If they had any influence at the time it was 
momentary and ephemeral. Philosophy did not enter the common life as 
a result of Macmurray's exercises. Nor has it entered since.
A little later, in 1941, another philosophical popularist came 
suddenly and vividly on to the stage of common esteem - C.E.M. Joad. 
And his reign and popularity endured, more or less at a constantly 
high level until his death in 1953. And he is still remembered by 
countless people both for his vibrant and amusing personality and far 
his still oft-quoted phrase 'It all depends on what you mean by
But although millions heard him weekly, and millions of copies 
of his very numerous and readable books sold, a few of them genuinely 
dealing with philosophy and not, as so many did, absorbingly 
admittedly, with the Joad ego, philosophy never caught on from him or 
from his advocacy and persuasion. Of course, following in the 
English and classical tradition, philosophy to Joad was only an 
intellectual 'subject'. Never a living, personal, instrument of 
growth and psychological and social development as seen and
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experienced by Macmurray.
The third exponent of popular philosophy in our time has been 
Jean-Paul Sartre. In contrast to the two foregoing philosophers 
Sartre has been extremely successful in making philosophy meaningful, 
if not to the masses, then at least to the intelligentia and to other 
not unintelligent people. And I think we can see why Sartre 
succeeded where others have failed. Macmurray, genuinely simple and 
real as his language and presentation are, lacked the authority. He 
delivers his message and philosophy in too soft a manner and tone so 
that we, unless long-standing students of his work, and deliberately 
determined to listen and understand, are deceived by our own ease of 
literal understanding, and thus miss the profundity of his teaching, 
completely contemporary and urgent as this is. We read his work and 
say, "Oh yes; very good. That's that", instead of, "Here are 
exciting new insights of great depth and worth. We must act upon 
them for our own and everybody else's good". So it is lack of 
authority and force of character which has kept Macmurray1s work ever 
on the side-lines, instead of at the centre where, content-wise, it 
should be.
Joad was never a profound and original thinker and philosopher. 
It is probable that he never had one original philosophical thought 
or judgement. He wrote only one book with any sign of breaking new 
ground. That was "Philosophical Aspects of Modem Science". His 
philosophy and philosophising were as dead as the dodo. It was, 
whilst admittedly extremely lucidly and interestingly put, nothing 
but a rehash of old, effete, philosophical stuff, principally that of 
Ancient Greece. On thousands of contemporary questions and problems
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he wrote vividly but not philosophically. Thus although ostensibly a 
philosopher, as a philosopher he had nothing to say of philosophical 
relevance to the problems of his time. Hence fear all his 
popularisation of knowledge, learning, culture, and wit it was quite 
beyond his capability to popularise meaningful philosophy.
Jean-Paul Sartre, on the other hand, created and was at the 
centre of a living philosophy which was meaningful to millions of 
followers. And what was the reason for this? It spoke not only in 
the contemporary idiom but its very substance; the problems it dealt 
with; the feelings it diagnosed, analysed, and made conscious and 
articulate; were all known and experienced by everybody of the age.
It could, of course, be argued that as a philosophy it imposed its 
concepts and ideas upon its hearers. They were not there before.
But is this not happening all the time in philosophy and elsewhere? 
Moreover, why was it able to do this unless people were ready for it 
- waiting, as it were, for a philosophy to meet their dormant, 
latent, and as yet qnarticulated needs?
It has been necessary to say all this to prove Macmurray right. 
Philosophy, if it is contemporary and deals with the problems of its 
age; if it speaks in a language, not necessarily simple, but in terms 
and concepts evocative and reflective of the lives and feelings of 
the people to whom it is addressed, it will spring to life, be 
hailed, acclaimed, and welcomed; and be a very relevant instrument 
for understanding in the minds of millions who will inevitably and 
gratefully embrace it. Only thus can philosophy be anything but 
dead, and an academic, irrelevant, unheeded exercise.
So we could sum-up this section by saying that Macmurray was 
right about the necessity for philosophy to be living and practical.
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But such philosophy is not merely for times of crises and lack of 
confidence, but for an whole age, as Jean-Paul Sartre proved with a 
philosophy acceptable to, and accepted by, millions of his own time.
Of the other three important aspects of Maanurray's ideas on 
philosophy itself, namely:-
1) That philosophy is always action upon oneself and society.
2) That philosophers, by the very nature of what they are 
doing, must be prejudiced; and that this is not something to be 
deplored, but merely to be surprised that this has not been 
recognised and asserted before.
3) That philosophy, to be of any value, needs verification. - I 
have commented upon in the text or agree with Macmurray for the 
reasons he has contended.
End of Appraisement (1 )
Moral Philosophy
To illustrate Macmurray1 s depth and breadth of interest in moral
philosophy, here are a few quotations.
Morality expresses the necessary and universal intention to 
maintain community, as the condition of freedom. (ER 189).
The moral rightness of an action rises from the fact that 
the actions of one person affect, either by way of help or 
hindrance, the action of others. (PR 116).
Morality refers to the structure of personal relations 
which unites the members of a community of agents, and 
personal relations are necessarily reciprocal. (PR 121).
A morally right action is an action which intends 
community. (PR 119).
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Justice is only the negative aspect of morality. (PR 205).
The moral struggle is primarily a struggle between persons. 
It is only secondarily, though also necessarily, a struggle 
within the individual. (PR 98).
Morality means faith in human life and human freedom, or it 
is a mere sham. (FMW 212).
Morality means friendship. (FMW 215).
Morality presupposes freedom. (SA 54).
Friendship, therefore, is the essence of morality. (FMW 
209).
Our idea of morality is simply our idea of the kind of 
behaviour that makes a man a good man. (FMW 185).
Morality is the expression of personal freedom. (FMW 209).
Morality is merely a demand far rational behaviour. (RE 
23).
Morality demands that we should act 'in the light of 
eternity', that is, in terms of things as they really are 
and of people as they really are, and not in terms of our 
subjective inclinations and private sympathies. (RE 23).
Some parts of Macmurray' s moral philosophy are very clear and 
coherent. Others are scattered, and not particularly easy to 
understand. It may be that there is some contradiction, or at best 
incompatibility, which a lengthy and exhaustive study and analysis 
would reveal. But this is not the place for such an undertaking 
which would need a thesis longer than this to do it justice. We will 
consider the more direct and straightforward aspects. Certainly a 
grasp of Macmurray' s moral teaching can be gained by giving an 
outline of the most lucid and coherent parts of his moral philosophy.
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However, a word of interest first. Earlier we spoke of popular 
and erudite philosophy and of hew, in Macmurray1 s view, the latter 
could and should be expressed in everyday language for the benefit of 
all. In all Maanurray's wide range of interests nothing more vividly 
illustrates how this should be done than in his writings on morality. 
In three chapters of PR (chapters V-VII) we have moral philosophy 
discussed in the most academic and erudite terms. A layman, if 
educated, could just about read them. But only a person with 
philosophical training could grasp and understand then.
But; in parallel chapters in FMW (chapters IX-XI), we 
have more or less the same things being said in the most limpid 
language, the content of which a bright school-boy could comprehend. 
Of course there is, and must be, a difference; but the fundamental 
substance, the meat, is the same. It is just that one is in the 
vernacular and the other in highly technical language and concepts.
A good example this of Maanurray's contention.
Morality and Community
What then, basically, - to move on - is Macmurray' s view of 
morality? It is, as we would expect, related to the personal, that 
state which man is, or ought to be. Only thus can we be truly human 
and not merely matter or organism, a thing or animal. "A morally 
right action is the action which intends comnunity" (PR 119). Or 
again. "Morality expresses the necessary and universal intention to 
maintain community." (ER 189). As mentioned before, intention is a 
great thing with Macmurray. We may not always be successful but our 
heart must be in the right place, or we can achieve nothing human.
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"It is to be noted that the moral rightness or wrongness of an action 
resides in its intention. This has two important consequences. The 
first is that it is independent of success or failure. The man who 
attempts to kill his neighbour and fails is morally guilty of murder, 
though not legally." (ER 120 and more immediately following).
As they stand i.e. the quotes on morality just given and those 
listed earlier on in the chapter, the definitions they embody of what 
morality is, may not be too meaningful to those unfamiliar with 
Macmurray' s ideas and terminology. So let us try to explain. 
Obviously, the word ootnnunity has the key role and it has a deeper 
meaning than it might be ordinarily understood to have. Community is 
"the self-realization of persons in relation." (PR 158). In several 
of his works, far example, "Creative Society" and "Persons in 
Relation", Macmurray goes to great lengths to distinguish between 
society and community (See PR 157/9). A society, from the smallest 
group to a world-wide association, is a collection of people coming, 
living, working or playing, and cooperating, together for a common 
purpose, conscious or unconscious. Or they might just find 
themselves together. Their being together in this way can concern 
anything from the pleasure of playing games together to a being 
together for their mutual protection and the reduction of fear. In 
intent they come and are together for anything but the mere 
recognition and enjoyment of their own personhood. Sometimes, in the 
conditions of society, this may develop between individuals. Indeed, 
it often does. But it is not the essence of, the reason for, being 
together at all.
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Community, on the other hand, is the condition of people being 
together for nothing but the joy and mutuality of their personal 
selves. They have no reason for being and coming together. It is 
merely the essence of being human that they are together thus.
And the exemplification of community is friendship and love. 
These are the manifestation of the personal. "Any community of 
persons, as distinct from a mere society, is a group of individuals 
united in a common life, the motivation of which is positive. Like a 
society, a community is a group which acts together; but unlike a 
mere society its members are in ooranunion with one another; they 
constitute a fellowship. A society whose members act together 
without forming a fellowship can only be constituted by a common 
purpose. They cooperate to achieve a purpose which each of them, in 
his own interest, desires to achieve, and which can only be achieved 
by cooperation. The relations of its members are functional; each 
plays his allotted part in the achievement of the common end. The 
society then has an organic form: it is an organization of
functions: and each member is a function of the group. A community,
however, is a unity of persons as persons." (PR 157).
How are two people related in community? "If then, we isolate 
one pair, as the unit of personal community, we can discover the 
basic structure of oomnunity as such. The relation between them is 
positively motivated in each. Each, then, is heterocentric; the 
centre of interest and attention is in the other, not in himself.
For each, therefore, it is the other who is important, not himself. 
The other is the centre of value. For himself he has no value in 
himself, but only for the other; consequently he cares for himself
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only for the sake of the other. But this is mutual; the other cares 
for him disinterestedly in return. Each, that is to say, acts, and 
therefore thinks and feels for the other, and not for himself. But 
because the positive motive contains and subordinates its negative, 
their unity is no fusion of selves, neither is it a functional unity 
of differences - neither an organic nor a mechanical unity - it is a 
unity of persons. Each remains a distinct individual; the other 
remains really other. Each realizes himself in and through the 
other." (PR 158). The essence of the relationship is equality and 
freedom (See PR 158). Macmurray says, "Liberty, equality, and 
fraternity is an adequate definitial of community - of the self- 
realization of persons in relation" (PR 158). Incidentally, 
elsewhere, Macmurray says that this famous slogan, as a political 
rallying cry, was, from the start, mistaken. For carmunity can never 
be realised politically, only religiously.
Now for a slight retraction. For convenience of exposition and 
explanation I have -» and indeed Macmurray does this too - used the 
word community in the above context. But to use it thus is not quite 
a true or exact description. What happens between any two people is 
best described as communion. It is where more and more people live 
in communion that community is created. Two such people do indeed 
form a community; but to intend merely this is not enough. Nothing 
short of the inclusion of the whole of mankind is meant by 
Macmurray' s intended community. "We must remember, however, that to 
obtain this analysis (given above) we isolated two persons from their 
relation to all others. If their relation to one another is 
exclusive of the others, then its motivation in relation to the 
others is negative; the two friends must defend themselves against
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the intrusion of the rest. Their friendship becomes a positive 
element in a motivation which is dominantly negative and this will 
destroy the realization of the inclusive relation itself. To be 
fully positive, therefore, the relation must be in principle 
inclusive, and without limits. Only thus can it constitute a 
community of persons. The self-realization of any individual person 
is only fully achieved if he is positively motivated towards every 
other person with whom he is in relation." (PR 159). So morality is 
the intention to create communion between all men on earth.
To come to this conclusion after all that effort - and there is 
far more than I have given or been able to convey - Macmurray admits 
is trite, hackneyed, and old hat. But, he says, it is none the less 
true and valid for all that. And if you say that this is what 
religions have been preaching and advocating for centuries, you are 
right. Which only stresses a point made by Macmurray in an earlier 
chapter here. Religion is about relating. It is about the attaining 
of the personal. It is about comnunian and human community. "But 
this is noting new, you may say, even if it is expressed in oddly 
abstract and new-fangled verbiage. It is just what all the universal 
religions have always said in simpler and more comprehensible terms. 
If that is so, and I see no reason to deny it - since it is not 
novelty but truth which we are seeking - it so far supports our 
hypothesis that religion is about cannunity." (PR 159).
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The Three Modes of Morality
To be intending and acting to advance and promote communion and 
comnunity is the morality we should all be living. Contrary to what 
you may be thinking this is no idealism, no pie-in-the-sky. Indeed, 
it is the most realistic of all ways of life, for only thus can we 
live as we are created to live. And nothing could be more realistic, 
more down to earth, more practical than that. Everything in the 
universe is happy, satisfied, and fulfilled only when it is 
performing the role far which it was made and intended.
But the special problem of man is that he exists in three 
orders; the material, the organic, and the personal; and each order 
has its own morality, it 'natural' way of behaving, of being at its 
best. Thus Macmurray's identification of three orders or modes of 
morality.
New; instead of having their sights fixed upon, and living out, 
the morality most appropriate for man i.e. personal morality as we 
described it in the last section, countless people are living the 
morality of the lesser orders. And, moreover, it is not individuals 
alone which are manifesting this error, but whole societies have 
inferior or mistaken moralities and a defective, sub-human, social 
ethos.
What is the morality related to each of these orders? The first
is:-
Mechanical Morality
(See FMW pp. 101/2, 185/192).
This is morality by prescription. According to this way of 
living, moral laws are seen as being either an intrinsic part of the
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universe, or as the decrees of God; and that the only way to live 
satisfactorily is to obey them. Everything is already laid dcwn.
The classical example of this is the Decalogue. Just obey this and 
all will be well.
As is easily recognised, the sense of this type of morality is 
mechanical. To follow it is to act as if a human being was merely a 
piece of natter, for this is exactly how matter behaves. "Any 
morality which talks of human behaviour in terms of obedience to law 
is a false morality. It is false because it is mechanical, because 
it thinks about human behaviour in terms, not of human nature, but of 
the nature of matter". (FMW 188). "There is no such thing as moral 
law, and the idea of obedience is not a moral conception. So far as 
my behaviour consists in obedience, I am not free; I am in fact a 
slave to whomever and whatever I obey. Someone or something, not 
myself, decides what I shall do, and I do it because it has been so 
decided. In that case I cannot be responsible for my behaviour. It 
isn't really mine. I am merely an instrument of someone else's 
purpose. That is why slavery, in all its forms, is immoral. A slave 
is in the position of having to do what he is told. He must not 
think for himself or feel for himself, and so he cannot decide for 
himself what he ought to do. His master does that for him. But that 
deprives him of all responsibility. He is not allowed to be real, 
and his actions are not really his." (FMW 188).
But why is obedience to some real or imagined external entity or 
prescription the idea of morality held by countless people? Because 
such a morality makes it so easy far everybody, not least those, from 
state rulers to parents and teacher, who have some authority over
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others. Properly acted out it makes for conformity and uniformity, 
both of intention and act. Everybody knows exactly where they stand. 
It is just like some huge social machine, and if it worked totally 
and everywhere we would be like a colony of ants. "So we want 
everybody to be consistent. We want them to recognize all sorts of 
fixed duties, to pledge themselves to do things in a way that will 
bind them for the future. We even go so far as to require people to 
promise that they will love and honour us all their lives. Why? So 
that we can be secure, and certain of the future, and lay our cwn 
plans for the future with safety. The real reason for wanting people 
to be consistent is just that we may be able to count on them, to 
calculate their behaviour beforehand. That is why we tell people 
that there is a moral law and they ought to obey it. It is really 
for our own supposed advantage. And you will notice that this making 
of laws to govern people's conduct is really an attempt to turn 
people into machines, to make them behave like material bodies, like 
the sun and the stars. And to do that is to attempt to destroy their 
freedom, to deny their human nature; and - to put it in another way - 
it is to refuse to trust them. If you trust people you don't try to 
bind them". (FMW 190).
Human beings are not machines - nor ants. Their freedom, their 
essence, is not bound-up with mere obedience. As some part of us is 
material, Maanurray wisely adds, there is a place in life for law, 
and for obedience to that law; but this has nothing to do with 
morality. To give but one example; we obey the mechanical, material, 
laws of health, and would be foolish not to. But this has very 
little to do with us as persons. It is merely instrumental to this 
end.
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Social Morality
(See FMW 102. 103/202).
Social morality is that morality which is related to life, when 
that term is used to refer to the biological, or the organic. From 
this point of view the species is all. The individual exists only as 
the current instance of that species, and to the fulfilment of the 
species' end which is survival, adaptation, ascendancy, progress, a 
bigger share, mastery and hold on and over things. "Every living 
creature, every organism, has an environment. The environment 
stimulates it and the organism reacts to the stimulus. As a result, 
its behaviour is a continuous effort to adapt itself to its 
environment. This produces the characteristic growth of the 
organism. It develops, or varies in a definite direction." (FMW 
194). "When we look at the world of life from the evolutionary 
standpoint we find that it is not the individual that counts (for the 
individual is very limited in his development, grows unadaptable, 
gets stuck, and dies) but the species, the group, the community of 
living beings. Life seems to be a great community of living things, 
of all sorts and kinds, all of which contribute something to the 
gradual development of a harmony which moves slowly forward from 
generation to generation, to the accomplishment of a great 
evolutionary purpose - the purpose of life." (BMW 194/5).
In human terms the essence of morality resulting from making the 
organic aspect paramount is social morality; that is, service to the 
community, duty, and self-sacrifice. Not so much today, but very 
much in the recent past, this was very much the predominant morality 
from 1850 onwards, and especially in this century, with the two World
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Wars, up until about 1950.
This is a good example of philosophy, in this case moral 
philosophy, unconsciously reflecting the main thought of its age; for 
was this not the great time of biological evolution, a doctrine 
wholly organic in conception?
Taken to its limit, as indeed it has been at times, it makes the 
state and organisation the be-all and end-all of human existence.
(See FMW 199/201 ). But it does not have to go this far to be, 
nevertheless, the moral philosophy of countless people.
Here once more, it must be asked, what is wrong with such a 
seemingly noble way of life? One reason Macmurray gives is slightly 
suspect.
If we all give who is to receive? Obviously, on this point, the 
answer is that we mutualise - I give one thing, and you give another, 
to our mutual benefit.
But Macmurray1 s other reasons are more cogent. Firstly; "It is 
false because it thinks of human life in biological terms, as if we 
were animals, not persons." (FMW 198). Secondly; one of its aims is 
to contribute to the production of a better species, often after each 
individual has died. If every generation after generation does this 
i.e. is always sacrificing itself in service to the future, who 
benefits? What is the use of it in human terms? Thirdly; social 
morality is erroneous because it treats men as means, as instruments. 
Consequently it is degrading, both metaphorically and literally. "A 
morality of service and self-sacrifice to the community is a denial 
of human reality. It treats everybody as a means to an end. That is 
what comes of thinking about human life in terms of purposes. If you 
are going to judge a man's goodness by what he contributes to the
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life of the comminity, then you make him merely an instrument, a tool 
for doing something. If men are at their best when they are 
servants, then slavery is the proper condition of human life. And if 
this purpose is not their own, but the purpose of society or the 
purpose of life, then it is worse still. Something or someone is 
using them, as you might use a sixpence to buy sweets or a bus 
ticket. That is to degrade human life to an animal." (FMW 199). And 
again. "Unless a man think for himself and feels for himself and 
determines for himself what he shall do with his life, he is less 
than human. If you tell him that he ought to serve society, work for 
the betterment of conditions in the future, identify himself with the 
cause of progress; in fact if you tell him that he ought to sacrifice 
himself or devote himself to anything, and that his goodness consists 
in that self-sacrifice and devotion; then you are denying his right 
to be a person, to be himself, to be real." (FMW 119).
Even as in the first kind of morality, mechanical morality, 
Macmurray is not attacking law as such, so with social morality he is 
not attacking social service and social contribution. All he is 
against is the irelevation and recognition as morality. "I am not 
attacking what we know as the social services or all the unselfish 
devotion that so many people show to the helpless and the needy. I 
am as anxious as anyone to clear up the miserable social mess that we 
have got ourselves into. Let that be clear. What I am repudiating 
is the attempt to turn the idea of serving humanity or society or the 
state into a substitute for morality. And I repudiate it because I 
think that it is precisely the thing that has got us into the mess. 
Because in practice it means serving organizations. Humanity is a
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vague, indefinite word that means very little. In practice it means 
the people you live amongst. If you must serve, or use the word 
service, then I will not object to you serving the people you knew - 
your friends and acquaintances. But serving people in general 
usually means serving nobody in particular. You can't be human if 
you live by statistics. That is why I insist that morality means 
friendship. If you are anxious to do your duty by the unemployed, 
then you have got to do something for the family you know about in 
the next street. If you mean by social service, doing good to 
definite, living, suffering people, that is all right. I have only 
this to say, that you will find that the only way you can really 
serve people in a way that really matters is to enter into friendship 
with them". (FMW 214/5).
This closing phrase leads us on to the third mode of morality.
Personal Morality
(See PMW 103/4.' 203/219).
Needless to say, this is the true morality. This is the 
morality all human beings should be intending. And as we saw earlier 
it can arise and exist only in a state of community, the foundation 
of which is friendship.
Why is this the proper morality? Because it is the only one 
where we can be free. Mechanical morality binds and enslaves us to 
law, or to any sort of prescription external to ourselves; social 
morality enchains us to duty and self-sacrifice. Persona; morality 
alone enables us to be ourselves in freedom.
Does this mean we can spontaneously do what we like? You 
remember in an earlier chapter we discussed freedom, and learned that
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Macmurray had a very unusual view of human freedom. We are free only 
when we knew and live in terms of reality. We may think we are free 
otherwise, but we are not. I will not repeat the arguments but refer 
you back to that chapter. But here is a short quote to remind us of 
some of the ideas discussed there. "We are free just so far as we 
think and feel for ourselves, and keep thought and feeling in harmony 
by acting upon our own thoughts and feelings. In other words, we are 
personally free in proportion as we are personally real. But there 
is a second main point which must not be dissociated from this one.
We can only be free in so far as we think and feel and act in terms 
of what is not ourselves. People who are self-centred and egoistic 
cannot be free." (FMW 206). And again "We are real only if our 
personal relations are real. We are free caily in and through the 
reality of our friendships. Morality, or human goodness, is 
essentially a matter of friendship. Friendship - not friendliness." 
(FMW 207). "The core of human freedom lies therefore in our capacity 
to be ourselves for other people." (FMW 207. A good surrmary of 
Macmurray's position is given in FMW 209/210).
Macmurray ends with two warnings or qualifications. Necessary 
as it is for all of us to be real "the man who really achieved it 
would find himself, I doubt not, as so many of the real people of 
other ages have found themselves, at war with the whole massed farces 
of his civilization. (PW 210). This is not very encouraging. In 
fact it is discouraging to anybody not already trying to live by 
personal reality. But his second qualification is more encouraging. 
"Some people might take my distinction between real and unreal people 
to be a hard and fast distinction. I didn't mean it like that.
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Nobody is just real or just unreal. Personal reality is a matter of 
degree. We are not endowed with reality at birth; we have to create 
our own reality by a continuous effort and struggle. We are all more 
or less unreal. Our business is to make ourselves a little more real 
than we are (FMW 210).
So ends what must be a cursory review of Macmurray1 s moral 
philosophy. But as mentioned earlier it does, I believe, contain the 
essence of his moral teaching.
Appraisement (2)
Being a Christian, and deeply concerned with religion, this is 
the moral conclusion we would expect Macmurray to reach. Hew true is 
it? Hew valid?
Once again, as we observed before in another context, Macmurray 
has managed to fit things neatly into a pattern of three. We are, 
hcwever, more or less convinced by the relating of the three modes of 
morality to the three orders of our human existence. Or rather, we 
recognise the moralities plainly enough, but whether they ought to be 
so closely allied with the orders is less certain. Whatever their 
moral attitude and behaviour at any particular time people are not 
consciously relating it to a particular natural order; they are just 
doing it.
It is questionable, too, whether the three modes of morality 
between then exhaust the moral possibilities. There may be others. 
For one thing, the area of hedonism, which might be said to be a 
moral motive i.e. its aspect of being seen as what is, and of hew to 
live, the 'good' life, seems not to be included in Macmurray1 s
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considerations and possibilities.
Regarding his disparagement of the second morality, the social, 
one wonders how Maanurray ties this up with Jesus' pronouncement that 
"Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for 
his friends". (St. John 15. 13).
But criticism, analysis, theory, and logic apart one must, and 
ought, in fairness to judge all Maanurray's ideas, especially his 
moral ones because they are so involved with action, by the criterion 
Macmurray invariably and unwaveringly throughout his works 
prescribes. Thought is not, indeed cannot, be judged by thought. It 
is to be tested and tried in action, in practice, in life. On this 
count to be personal, which one can only be in this situation - 
although observation may contribute something too - I have found 
Macmurray' s moral discernment, and especially his ultimate advocacy 
of the third mode, the personal, to be the most satisfactory and 
propitious - both to intend and, wherever possible to practice; 
remembering that unfree and unreal other people limit our freedom, 
and our ability to act personally. Only thus can we even begin to be 
ourselves and, at the same time, allow others to be theirs.
End of Appraisement (2)
Agency
The essence, the very task, of the philosopher is to think. So 
it is of many other specialists - scientists, historians, inventors, 
and writers, to name but some. But whereas all these thinkers have 
something tangible and specific to work on, thus keeping their feet
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firmly on the ground, the philosopher's lot and plot, because of its 
breadth, comprehensiveness, abstraction, and lack of concrete 
material to work on, tends to make him conclude that thinking is the 
core of reality, the centre of existence. Even as for the cobbler 
there is nothing like leather; so for the philosopher there is 
nothing like thought, says Macmurray. (PC 22).
And as philosophy, whether openly recognised or not, is the 
basic key subject, virtually containing or at least recognising, 
heeding, and utilising the findings and conclusions of all other 
disciplines and fields of life, it has, at least in Western 
tradition, made thinking more important than action. Plato initiated 
this tradition. Descartes endorsed and compounded it with his "I 
think, therefore I am." And all philosophies and philosophers have 
worked, and still work, on this assumption.
Macmurray alone - at least in Britain - and still almost alone 
anywhere, has broken this strongly-engrained philosophical tradition. 
The only philosophers who have moved slightly away from thought- 
centred philosophy, Macmurray says, are the linguistic philosophers. 
"This conclusion has clearly a positive relation to the current 
linguistic philosophy. Both are concerned to stress the centrality 
of language for philosophy. To transfer the task of logic from the 
analysis of thought to the analysis of language is to take a step 
towards the recognition of the mutuality of the personal and its 
implication, the primacy of action. But to rest here, to conceive 
philosophy as simply the logical analysis of language, is to fail to 
see the implications of this step, and to remain stuck in the 
presuppositions of the philosophical tradition from which it could 
release us". (PR 12).
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Action, not thinking, says Maanurray is the essence of reality. 
Everything of ultimate meaning and significance is to be found in our 
moving into, and in, the world of action, relating, and feeling.
This is the root of Maanurray's doctrine of AGEUC¥.
Let it at once be said that Maanurray is no despiser of thought 
and thinking. Admire him as he did, Maanurray is not another D.H. 
Lawrence. Reflection has a very important role to play in 
Maanurray's philosophy, and he has many chapters, indeed a book - 
"Interpreting the Universe" - devoted to it. And all he asks is that
when we think, we think from the point of view of action. "What is
proposed is that we substitute the 'I do' far the 'I think' as our 
starting-point and centre of reference." (SA 84. The rest of this 
page, and the next, are very relevant and should be read).
Moreover, thought is not something ultimate. It can never
discover, reveal, or disclose reality, to do which by thought is the
essence and intention of Western philosophy. Obviously its a mistake 
to search, via thought, for truth. The task is abortive from the 
outset. That this is so is evidenced by the paramount position given 
to epistemology and metaphysics, with ethics and social philosophy 
trailing, and aesthetics even lower down the scale.
Reality can be found and experienced only in action. Thought 
exists only to enable us better to deal with our prime task, our 
foremost purpose, which is to act.
People who do most of the thinking in our society, whether it be 
philosophical thinking or not, fall into this error. The classical 
example is that of many of our ancient and pre-war universalities, 
where the emphasis of teaching, and thus of its overt or implied
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ethos, was a renouncing, almost a despising, of the real and 
practical world - by which they alone survived in their ivory towers 
- of business, manufacturing, industry, commerce, trade, and other 
worldly occupations and professions. Plato has a lot to account for! 
Talking of reason as the distinguishing feature of man Macmurray 
says, "The empirical determination of the differentia is naturally 
derivative and variable in principle; and it has in fact varied 
considerably during the history of philosophy. If it has tended on 
the whole to have a predominantly theoretical reference, this is 
because Plato and Aristotle determined the tradition in this 
direction at the start by their conviction that the good life far man 
is the "theoretical" life." (PR 27).
It is not clear how far the man in the street manifests this 
radical and fatal error. If you are not a thinker such an idea is 
never entertained, so its truth or falsity is never considered let 
alone questioned. Therefore its effect is never known.
But if we are agents, what are we agents far? We are agents, 
says Maanurray, of the Other. Let it at once be said that an 
understanding of Macmurray *s conception of all these matters is not 
easy. It cannot be so obvious and simple as it seems. But an 
attempt will be made here at least to introduce such an 
understanding, however over-simplified it might have to be.
The Other is everything external to the self, yet it includes 
the self if only because any one self (you, for example) is part of 
the other for somebody else. The Other covers the whole gamut of 
things, creatures, and persons, - the material, organic, and 
personal.
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Now a self can only be a self because of its awareness of, and 
relationship to, the Other. And this awareness is produced by sense- 
experience. But, contrary to what would seem to be the situation, 
the most important sense-experience is the tactile, not vision. The 
self can exist and thrive without sight, but nobody has existed, or 
could survive, without the tactile - as a moment*s reflection on the 
matter will convince. Macmurray stresses this difference because in 
vision the self is almost totally receptive i.e. non-active. Whereas 
in tactual perception, because of direct contact, we have to be 
active. This is where we are really and livingly in contact with the 
Other i.e. reality. The whole of this is discussed in SA 107/8 from
"But from the standpoint...... (to)........be a practical
solipsism". And again, "Tactile perception is our only means of 
having a direct and immediate awareness of the Other as existent. 
Visual experience does not provide this. Far vision is not 
essentially active; it is characteristically passive." (SA 111).
Incidentally, this priority of vision which we experience, 
causing us mistakenly to fail to recognise the absolute essentiality 
of the tactile, probably accounts far the predominance we give to 
thinking. "Now this concentration of attention on vision has had 
very important effects upon philosophy in general. From the time of 
the Greeks, and especially through the influence of Plato, 'vision* 
has tended to be the model upon which all knowledge is construed. 
Thought is taken to be an inner vision. Reflection is 
'contemplation*. The basis of science is 'observation', and the 
scientist himself is 'the observer'". Here again, there is much more 
of this which must be read ..... ending ' "In consequence, the visual 
model tends to instigate a strong contrast between knowing and
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acting, which in abstract theory passes easily into a conceptual 
dualism" (SA 105/6).
What is the core of tactual experience? resistance. And 
resistance is, or causes, frustration. Thus it evokes knowledge and 
awareness of the self; knowledge of the Other; the beginnings of will 
- to overcome the resistance; and, to go back to the original and 
basic point of all this, demonstrates the primacy of action over 
thinking as the essential factor of being. "Resistance, therefore, 
is a frustration of the will. The experience occurs only when I am 
prevented from doing something that I am trying to do. If, for 
example, I set about walking straight forward in the dark, and 
collide with a wall, I become aware of the wall as an obstacle to my 
progress. The harder I press forward, the stronger the resistance. 
Yet if I had stopped walking before I reached the obstacle, I should 
never have known that it was there." (SA 108). Other relevant 
references are SA 108/9 and SA 110.
So if you read Macmurray fully - this short sumnary affords no 
proof - he has established the existence of the Other, and the 
existence of the self as discovered in relation to it. He has also 
established that the self, because of this situation, is basically 
and acting self. Thought is only a secondary and contributory 
activity. But, to turn to a further point, why has this self to be 
called an agent?
The Other, as we have seen, is an all-inclusive, and all- 
including, entity. It is a hierarchy or pyramid of three elements - 
materials, organisms, and persons - and we encounter and have to decil 
with all three.
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But the ultimate of these three is the personal. It is, as it 
were, both inmanent and transcendent. Indeed, the lower orders exist 
only so that they may produce and serve the personal. And the 
personal, the total Other is, for Macmurray, God. God, he says, is 
the ground of the personal. "God is the universal Other." (SRE 80). 
Even as when we speak in a general sense of matter we mean every hit 
of matter in the universe, so Maanurray conceives of God, by analogy, 
as the sum total of bits of the existing personal.
"Religious reflection universalizes its problems through the 
idea of a universal Person to whan all particular agents stand in an 
identical relation. This is the idea of God, and religious knowledge 
is rightly described as the knowledge of God. Such knowledge will 
apply universally to all instances of personal relationship." (PR 
168/9). "It is this whole situation which is generalized in 
religious reflection as the community of persons in active relation 
to the universal Other, that is, to God." (PR 179). "By shifting 
our standpoint from the 'I think1 to the 'I do1, we have restored the 
reference of thought to action, and in the result have found that we 
are driven to conceive a personal universe in which God is the 
ultimate reality". (PR 224).
In case the thought has crossed your mind that this is a form of 
pantheism Macmurray says, "The conception of God at which we have 
arrived is not pantheistic. Pantheism results from the attempt to 
give a religious colour to an organic conception of the world. A 
personal conception alone is fully theistic and fully religious. For 
there can be no action without an agent, and an agent, whether finite 
or infinite, though he is immanent in existence, necessarily 
transcends i t .......God, therefore, as the infinite Agent is
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immanent in the world which is his act, but transcendent of it.” (PR 
223).
New God has an intention. He would not be personal if he had 
not. To intend is a vital element in both Macmurray's theory of 
action and of the personal, as we shall see later. And, as is quite 
a cannon idea with Christian followers of most denominations and 
sects, this intention of God is being worked-out in the creation we 
know and of which we are a part. In technical terms this is 
demonstrated in the climax of, and in the last chapter to, the 'Self 
as Agent' called 'The Personal Universe.' "The argument which starts 
from the primacy of the practiced moves steadily in the direction of 
a belief in God. To think the world in practical terms is ultimately 
to think the unity of the world as one action, and therefore as 
informed by a unifying intention." (SA 221). It is because we are 
part of this intention, in action, that we are called agents; and the 
reason why we must regard ourselves essentially as such and not as 
thinkers, as so far Western philosophy has erroneously done.
New here a paradox arises. As persons we are free. We would 
not be persons if we were not. It would seem therefore that we can 
create any future we will. "Freedom is the capacity to determine
the future by action." (PR 212). And again. Freedom is "my capacity 
to determine the future in accordance with iry intention." (PR 210). 
Although these are quotes from Macmurray they do not, at their face 
value, mean exactly what he would wish them to mean. We can, he 
says, do what we will. But if this act is not in keeping with the 
intention of the Other frustration will inevitably result and 
continue until we realign ourselves or revise our own intention.
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"New it is the fundamental postulate of religious rationality that 
the purpose of God must inevitably be achieved. Thus, the discovery 
of the essence of humanity is the discovery, not merely of what human 
life ought to be, but of what human life will be when the work of God 
in history is complete." (CH 58). "If Man has discovered the 
intention which is involved in his own existence, he may refuse to 
adopt that intention as his own. He may avoid the light, knowing it 
is there. But the consequence of this refusal is necessarily 
disastrous. It leaves Man not merely denying his own nature, and so 
divided against himself, but at heart conscious that he is doing so. 
If he refuses the intention which defines his own nature, and so 
refuses to be himself, he must necessarily define an intention far 
himself in opposition to his own nature. This process of self­
frustration must inevitably prove self-destructive". (CH 59). Much 
other relevant analysis is to be found around these pages. "To 
conceive the world thus is to conceive it as the act of God, the 
Creator of the warld> and ourselves as created agents, with a limited 
and dependent freedom to determine the future, which can be realized 
only on the condition that our intentions are in harmony with his 
intention, and which must frustrate itself if they are not" (PR 222).
Except that Macmurray wishes to believe this, it is not clear 
why this should be so. Even if God does exist as the ground and sum 
total of the personal - although Macmurray says we ought not to ask 
'Does God exist?' but 'Is what exists personal?' (PR 215) - that he 
has this inexorable intention, overriding ours, does not logically, 
or even reasonably follow. But remembering that Maanurray is a 
Christian such a contention is reminiscent, put in philosophical 
language and abstract farm, of two well known Christian concepts.
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Firstly; that God has made us free, but that we can live 
satisfactorily only if we do his will i.e. obey him. Secondly; - and 
this is the more liberal exhortation stated by St. Augustine - "Love 
God and do what you like'. In modem terminology this means that if 
we already have the right attitude, and only if we have, may we do 
that which, in our freedom, we want to do. This will coincide with 
God's intention. This will be God's intention.
Incidentally; to refer this important matter to another 
interpretation; this seems to tie-up with Maanurray's idea, earlier 
fully discussed here in the chapter on "Freedom", that only real 
people can be free.
What would seem to be the benefit of adopting Macmurray's idea 
of action as being the recognised focal point of human existence, and 
of reality, and its allied concept of man as agent? Action, it need 
hardly be noted, is the focal point whether we recognise it to be so 
or not; far thinking of itself can produce, move, or achieve nothing. 
If we only thought and did not act we would not survive.
Firstly, then, to put the focus on thinking gives priority to 
theory over practice. This is not to say that theorising is not 
necessary, but it is not paramount. On this point Macmurray seems to 
waver, but he pulls back from the brink of relapsing into the Western 
traditional attitude just in time. Having said "The theoretical 
question is posed by the practical situation; for that very reason 
the significance and the verification of the theoretical conclusion 
lie in the practical field. Indeed the theoretical result, if it is 
meaningful at all, is the solution of a practical problem. If then, 
as seems indubitable, all theoretical problems have their ultimate,
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if not their immediate/ origin in our practical experience it seems 
reasonable to expect that all must find their ultimate meaning in a 
reference to the practical." (SA 22), - which is clear enough - he 
goes on to say, "It may turn out otherwise. There may be generated, 
by the instigation of practiced experience, a set of theoretical 
activities which have their meaning in themselves and require no 
practical reference to sustain or to validate them. But it would be 
a methodological error to assume this from the start." (SA 22. The 
following paragraph is also very relevant and must be read). Then 
with relief - we do not want our newly acquired mental orientation 
disturbed so soon, and it is the only time Macmurray does it - "All 
that is contended is this, that there is a necessary relation between 
our theory and our practice; that the activities of reflection can 
never be totally unrelated to practical life; that it is always 
legitimate to ask, of any theory which claims to be true, what 
practical difference it would make if we believed it. It may often 
be difficult to answer this question; but if the correct answer were 
that it would make no difference at all, then the theory would be a 
mere exercise of phantasy, neither true nor false, but meaningless." 
(SA 23). Practice and action, however badly done, must always be 
more important than theory.
Secondly; to make thinking the centre of life and activity, 
isolates and individualises the thinker. To think is to withdraw 
into the self. Throughout his work Macmurray makes a strong point 
about withdrawal and action. A whole chapter in "Persons in 
Relation" is called "The Rhythm of Withdrawal and Return".
Withdrawal is vital, but when thinking becomes the prior activity 
over actual acting then thinking is to be condemned. Withdrawal to
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this degree, and as a philosophical position, cannot help but 
promote, and indeed be, subjectivist and egocentricity. "We were 
driven to recognize another defect of modem philosophy, its 
egocentr icity". (PR 16). "Since the Self in reflection is withdrawn 
from action, withdrawn into itself, withdrawn from participation in 
the life of the world into contemplation, this point of view is also 
egocentric. The Self in reflection is self-isolated from the world 
which it knows. This theoretical and egocentric character of our 
philosophy is not doctrinal. It is a presupposition, generally 
unconscious, implicit in philosophical procedures." (SA 11).
The upshot of this is that to be truly human we must be 
relating, in action, with the Other which of course includes our 
fellows. To make thinking i.e. withdrawal the focus, to make it the 
real thing, is thus to condemn us all to sub-personalism. Indeed, 
this is what has happened, and is happening, to western man over the 
last centuries. As thought has become increasingly and ever more 
central, as endorsed by science and the prominence given to it, so 
has relating declined and forced to move ever further away from the 
centre of human consideration, concern, and action - as exemplified 
by the "decline" of religion. So too has our capacity to be human, 
caring, loving and mutual - all aspects of the personal - receded.
We have become more organic, ever more material, and less personal. 
This is exactly what we would expect to occur when thought, instead 
of action, theory instead of practice, become the focus and raison 
d'etre of philosophy.
Let it again be repeated. Thinking for Macmurray has an 
essential place in life. What Macmurray is against here is the fact
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that thinking has become in Western philosophy, and subsequently 
pervaded all Western attitudes, the supposed way to reality and right 
existence. Thinking can only be instrumental, a means. It can never 
cause reality and the right way of living to be experienced. This 
can be done only through action in its various forms - doing, 
relating, responding, feeling, mutualising, and knowing directly and 
immediately.
Thirdly; to give priority to thinking and theorising is to be 
dualistic. And dualism and pluralism are, as we have seen in the 
introduction, anathema to Macmurray. He is an absolute monist. 
Nowhere, in any field of reflection or action, will he get himself 
into a dualist situation, or concede anything to it. His argument 
concerning the present problem is that if we primarily regard 
ourselves as thinkers we still have to act. Therefore we are, as it 
were, either two selves or one self divided; both of which would be 
cases of dualism. If, on the other hand, we recognise the priority 
of action, thought exists only to further action. It does not exist 
in its own right. Therefore the situation is one of monism.
Moreover, the very fact of action makes us one and undivided. It is 
impossible to act in a state of two minds. Action is absolute, whole 
and single; it cannot be otherwise.
The concept of positive and negative figures largely in much of 
Macmurray's later work. Nearly everything has a positive and 
negative aspect both of which must be recognised as being quite 
acceptable and proper, and used as such. And concerning our present 
problem he uses this concept to effect. Action he proclaims is the 
positive; thought is merely the negative underside of action. It 
exists only to serve action.
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Action, agency, the personal are right and good because they 
alone are monist and banish dualism. "The particular unreality which 
concerns us is the disruption of the integrity of the Self through a 
dualism of practical and theoretical activity. We are asked to 
embark upon a purely theoretical activity which isolates itself from 
the influence of all ' practical1 elements - since these must 
introduce bias and prejudice - in the hope of attaining a knowledge 
which will take precedence over the beliefs by which, in practice, we 
live. This, I say, is impossible in practice, and in conception 
self-contradictory. If we could so isolate our theoretical 
activities from practical influences - from the emotional motive, for 
example, and the intentional valuations which determine our behaviour 
- we should have destroyed our own integrity. We should need to 
become two selves, neither of which would be a complete self. There 
would be a ’practical* or 'bodily' self which acts without thinking, 
and a 'theoretical', 'spiritual', 'mental' self, which thinks without 
acting. This is the genesis of the 'mind-bcdy' problem." (SA 78/9). 
"When we start from the 'I do', the possibility of reflection is no 
mystery; and the dualism of mind and matter is overcome." (SA 183). 
Fourthly; we have been using the traditional term 'self*. This is 
inevitable under the old understanding. The self is the subjective 
side and aspect of thinking. But with the transfer to action, as the 
locus of perceiving and living, the self is replaced by the person. 
This is a very inportant transference as we shall see in our next 
section. "It will be clear from this discussion that the term 
'person' fulfils the same function from the standpoint of the agent 
as the term 'self' does in traditional philosophy, which thinks from
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the standpoint of the subject. And since the effect of transferring 
our point of view from the 'I think* to the 'I do' is to overcome the 
dualism which is inseparable from the theoretical standpoint, the 
dualism of a rational and an empirical self disappears.'* (PR 27).
We have new seen, so far as is possible in so short a compass, 
why for Macmurray action must supplant thinking as the focal point of 
philosophy and of all philosophising; and why as a result of this the 
self must be seen as agent and not as subject, as it is under the old 
order.
But this exposition has been only far convenience. It is only 
the first step, although it has taken Macmurray a whole book - "The 
Self as Agent" - to expound. The really vital and inportant aspect, 
of which agency is only the beginning, is given in Macmurray*s second 
book of 'The Farm of the Personal* - "Persons in Relation".
Where the first book falls short, and Macmurray frequently 
reminds us of this, is that the agent, as so far understood, is a 
single, isolated, individual. As already said, this has had to be so 
for purposes of exposition. But new we are in a position to move on 
into the final and end-product of all this provisional realignment 
and reorientation to what is one of Macmurray*s major contributions 
to thought and philosophy, namely, the recognition, the preliminary 
and tentative surveying and mapping out of, and an early assessment 
of its value and necessity, of:-
- 367 -
The Personal
What is the personal? What is meant by the terra 'the personal'? 
It is simply the essence of the sum total of things which make man 
man, and which distinguish and differentiate him from every other 
kind of thing or being. "Properly speaking personality i.e. the 
personal, is a term which denotes the general character which 
distinguishes human life from all other forms of life." (CH 56). 
Indeed, we might go further than this; we ought to distinguish the 
personal from life, if life is considered to be exclusively the 
organic. "To say that human life is personal is primarily to deny 
that human life is organic, or that it can be treated as differing 
from animal life only in degree and not in kind. It is to assert 
that the essence of human life is radically different from the 
essence of the organic life, and that the relations which constitute 
the totality of human life are radically different from those which 
make a unity of the organic world. It is this essential character of 
human life that constitutes its humanness". (CH 56). But we will not 
be too precise on this point, as Macmurray himself is not.
You may think the term 'the personal' to be a little remote and 
formal, both in tone and connotation. So does Macmurray. But it is 
impracticable to use the term he would prefer and which, if it had 
not been distorted in usage, is much more apt, pertinent, and 
descriptive - namely personality. The reason is obvious.
Personality has come to mean that which individualises and 
distinguishes one person from another. Increasingly it is used even 
mare extremely than this to denote some exceptional, usually 
extrovert, characteristics of a few people more attractive,
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charismatic, or assertive, than the average majority.
But the personal, as understood and expounded by Maanurray, has 
nothing of this about it. In fact it is just the opposite. It is, 
as we have seen, that which is common and characteristic of all men, 
and has nothing to do with their attractiveness, appeal, or 
individuality. Twice at least Maanurray makes this point very 
clearly. Speaking of the personal he says, "In the first place, I 
have used the term 'the persona;1 where it might have seemed more 
natural to employ the word 'personality'. This is partly because we 
need a word which is more inclusive and wider in denotation than 
'personality* could reasonably be made. But more inportant is the 
fact that the term has been diverted from its natural meaning. We 
should expect it to refer to that quality or set of characteristics 
in virtue of which a person is a person; a property therefore which 
all persons share, and which distinguishes a person from all beings 
which are not personal. In fact, it has been specialized to mean the 
quality or set of characteristics which distinguishes one person from 
another. This would more properly be referred to as 'personal 
individuality'. It is hardly possible to use the term 'personality' 
new without suggesting the specialized meaning, and so stressing the 
element of difference between persons instead of what they have in 
common. It will be advisable, therefore, to avoid the use of this 
term as much as possible." (ER 25). Similar remarks are made in CH 
55/6. Occasionally, however, through inadvertence, oversight, or for 
convenience, Macmurray does use the term ' personality' with reference 
to the personal, as in IU 105, 124, 132, 154, 156. But we should 
understand, both in context and by the explanation just made, what he
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means,
Hcwever, to say that the personal is that which distinguishes 
man nay be a useful summarising phrase but we need the conception to 
be much more detailed and explicit than that if we are to understand 
and evaluate it adequately; and to this we now turn.
Much as we would like to relate them - and it may be pertinent 
to do this later - at this stage, if only for ease of exposition and 
for clarity of comprehending, we must see the personal, as expounded 
by Macmurray, as having two major facets or branches. Macmurray, let 
it be clear, does not make such distinction formally. The dichotomy 
comes to light only in an analysis of his exposition.
These two marked aspects of the personal we might call 1) The
formal or the mental; and 2) the relational or ccmnunal. Very
roughly we might describe the above as 1) the means or instrument of 
the personal - perhaps even the machinery; whereas 2) is the end, or 
the reason, for 1) being at all. Let us deal with the formal or 
means aspect first. •
There are two of these which define man or the personal - reason
and intention. Reason, "in the first place, is that which
distinguishes us from the world of organic life; which makes us men 
and women - super-organic. It is the characteristic of personal 
life." (RE 18). "Human action is intentional activity. The 
activities of human beings, when they are not intentional, lack the 
essential mark of humanness". (CH 6). "Now, Jesus' discovery is 
that human life is intentional, and that there is an intention which 
expresses the real nature of persons." (CH 76). Man is a rational 
and intending entity; or should be if he is living as man, and not as 
a mere creature or organism. In any case, these features are in us
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whether we recognise, accept, and use them or not.
To deal with reason first. It has two aspects. 1) The unique 
faculties and activities we possess as man. And 2) Objectivity. Of 
these unique activities Macmurray says, "We want to know what are the 
particular ways in which reason reveals itself in human behaviour.
One of the most obvious is the power of speech. Another is the 
capacity to invent and use tools. Another is the pcwer to organize 
social life. Behind all these lies the capacity to make a choice of 
purposes and to discover and apply the means of realizing our chosen 
ends. We might go on to draw up a list of such peculiarly personal 
activities; though it would probably not reveal immediately the root 
from which they all spring. There are, however, certain persistent 
cultural expressions of human life which are in a special sense 
characteristic of our rationed nature at its best. These are 
science, art, and religion. This calls attention to one point at 
least which is highly significant. Whatever is a characteristic and 
essential expression of human nature must be an expression of 
reason." (RE 18/9). Far more on this read RE 223 (bottom)/225.
One very important conclusion, and one revealed with sane 
novelty by Maanurray alone is that, "We must recognize, then, that if 
we wish to discover what reason is we must examine religion and art 
just as much as science. A conception of reason which is applicable 
to science but not to religion or art must be a false conception, or 
at least an inadequate one". (RE 19).
The outcome of this is that, contrary to the tradition and ethos 
of our society, emotion besides thinking can be subject to reason and 
rationality; emotion can be reasonable or unreasonable, rational or
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irrational. As we saw in the Introduction the revealing recognition 
and advocacy of reason in the emotioned life is probably Macmurray1 s 
major contribution to the possibility and hope of human development, 
and more will be said about it in the chapter on Maanurray's 
psychological ideas. "Thinking", he reminds us, "is obviously not 
the only capacity which is characteristically human and personal".
(RE 19).
Regarding the second aspect of reason, objectivity. This means 
living in terms of what is not ourselves. In other words, living in 
terms of reality. "The definition of reason which seems to me most 
satisfactory is this. Reason is the capacity to behave consciously 
in terms of the nature of what is not ourselves. We can express this 
briefly by saying that reason is the capacity to behave in terms of 
the nature of the object, that is to say, to behave objectively. 
Reason is thus our capacity far objectivity." (RE 19). And again. 
"Reason is the capacity for objectivity, and it is the possession of 
this capacity which distinguishes persons frcm whatever is sub­
personal. By the capacity far objectivity, I mean the capacity to 
stand in conscious relation to what is not ourselves. Everything, of 
course, stands in relation to what is not itself, and everything that 
is capable of consciousness stands in conscious relation to what is 
not itself. This, however, is not sufficient to constitute 
rationality. We must add that that to which we stand in conscious 
relation is recognized, is consciously apprehended, as not 
ourselves." (IU 127/8). "To say that personal consciousness is 
objective is to say that we are persons because we live in and 
through a knowledge of what is not ourselves. This is the essence of 
rationality. The difficulty of grasping it arises simply from the
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fact that it is almost impossible to be explicitly aware of it.
There is nothing to contrast it with. But if we consider the 
familiar statement that 'we live in the world' we shall discover that 
it is paradoxical. It asserts that we have our conscious being not 
in ourselves but in what is not ourselves. We live in the other, in 
that which we recognize to be other. It is only when we withdraw 
into ourselves and find ourselves in a dream-life of phantasy and 
imagination that we discover the possibility of consciousness which 
has no objectivity, and we discover it precisely because we are now 
living not in the world but in ourselves, in a world where we are not 
dependent on reality but masters of the unreal. Our dependence on 
what is not ourselves - or rather, since we are always dependent, 
whether we recognize it or not, our recognition of dependence and our 
living in terms of this recognition - is the core of our reality."
(RE 219).
Only as we are objective can we act. And to act is the 
prerogative of the personal. Macmurray contrasts acts with events. 
Events merely happen and have causes; acts are intended and have 
reasons. "We may define an act as the realizing of an intention".
(SA 189). "For every event there is a cause; far every act there is 
a reason." (SA 149). We cannot go into detail nor substantiate it 
here, but this is fully and widely discussed throughout SA especially 
in chapter VII, Causality and the Continuant. Of cbj ectivity 
Macmurray says, "It is thus the nature of an agent to act not in 
terms of his own nature but in terms of the nature of the object, 
that is, of the Other." (SA 168). A glimpse of what objectivity 
;means and entails is given in HR 61. "A true judgment is one which
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is made by one individual - as every judgment must be - but is valid 
far all others. Objective thought presupposes this by the assumption 
that there is a cannon object about which a ccnmunication may be 
made." (PR 61). Read also FMW 182/3, from "Our nature is not .... 
(to)  other things and other persons".
The opposite of objectivity is subjectivity and egocentricity.
To live thus is to be existing sub-personally. This is how creatures 
and organisms live when they, being non-objective, manage only by 
chance, to survive at all.
So reason has two aspects according to Macmurray. Reason is the 
manifestation of a number of attitudes and activities peculiar to 
man. And it is objectivity - living in the awareness of, and in 
terms of, what is not ourselves.
What of intention, the second aspect of the formal side of the 
personal? Already we have had occasion to mention it six or seven 
sentences back when speaking of objectivity. If we do not intend we 
are merely part of an unfree chain of events or happenings. This is 
approximately the position of the behaviourists and determinists.
But Maanurray will have none of it. "The purpose of God is the 
creation of Man as a personal ccrnnunity of free and equal persons".
(CH 96). Thus to be free, to be persons, we must intend. We must be 
creating and building into a future which is open. " The form of 
human society is determined by the intentions of its members, not by 
natural facts such as blood-relationship which are not intended by 
them but merely happen to them. Man lives by intention; that is his 
nature." (CH 82).
Clear as this may be it confronts us with a paradox, as we saw 
when discussing agency a f&t pages back. "Yet his intentions are
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continually frustrated. This means that he intends wrongly." (CH 
82). Macmurray answers this rather astutely. "His salvation (i.e. 
becoming right-intentioned) can lie only in discovering and willing 
that intention which is inherent in his own nature, as part of the 
world, and which therefore brings him into harmony with the reality 
in which he has his being." (CH 82).
But is Macmurray having it both ways? It would seem that he is, 
although his stress on our own - presumably true - nature may afford 
him an outlet. Nevertheless, is not this supposed innate goodness of 
human nature - far what is meant can be nothing else although not 
explicitly stated (unless God's purpose is evil) - only an echo of 
Rousseau, to whom in other contexts, but not in this, Macmurray often 
refers and dismisses? One example of this is, "The State will then 
vanish away and leave the completely organic society of Rousseau's 
romantic phantasy." PR 156). Such words cannot be interpreted as 
favourable.
But has Macmurray fallen into the same trap? Perhaps he just 
avoids the abyss when he says, "They i.e. the frustrates, must live 
by the intention of community which defines their own human nature. 
They must intend love, equality, and freedom as the structural 
principles of their practical relations with one another. If they 
will only accept their cwn reality and live by it they will find the 
kingdom of heaven has come on earth." (CH 83). What evidence is 
there to shew, except for Macmurray's concept of the Other and that 
this is good, that man ultimately wants to, or even can, go along 
with the Good - intention or no intention?
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Let us new turn to the other and major half of Macmurray's idea 
of the personal - that of relating and conmunity. This is rather 
nearer to the everyday idea of the personal than the preceding 
aspects of it.
Essentially, the personal we are now considering might be 
summed-up, at its most commonplace, graspable, and minimal level, in 
the phrase - HUMAN relating. But over the last seventy years since, 
due to modem psychology, human relations as a focal point of 
research, study, and interest - now changed, for no valid reason I 
can see, to the remote and abstract term "interpersonal relations" - 
has emphasised the negative aspect of the personal. It is inclined, 
if only by implication, to say - We all find ourselves here; we are 
all in the same boat; we may as well try, difficult as it is, to get 
on together; hew can we do this. This is not the personal or human 
relating Macmurray knows and espouses. His attitude is totally 
positive. Only in human relating, only in the personal, only in 
community - as he understands and explains this term - can we not 
only find ourselves but be ourselves, and live as we are intended to 
live. "Our awareness of other persons as persons awakens a complete 
consciousness in ourselves, so that we function fully as persons, and 
so are capable of a full consciousness of ourselves." (IU 125/6). 
"The impulse to do this i.e. be personal, is simply the impulse to be 
ourselves completely; not to gain anything, not to achieve anything, 
or to do anything in particular, but simply to be ourselves as fully 
and completely as possible. New we have only to state this and grasp 
it to realize that the whole significance of human life is to be 
found here. What other significance can our existence have than to 
be ourselves fully and completely? Obviously none. In the nature of
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things this must include in seme way everything else." (RE 101/2).
The personal - to be personal - is the sumnum bonum, not only of 
our existence but probably of all existence. The essence of this is 
epitomised in St. Paul's phrase, "Then shall I knew even as also I am 
known". (RE 63 and of course, OCR 1 - ch13.V.12). Only in the
personal can we both find freedom and be free. To know and
experience the personal is the highest, the most satisfactory, thing 
we can knew and experience as man. Moreover, we can conceive of 
nothing being higher. The personal life "is the life which we live 
as persons, and we can live it only by entering into relationships 
with other people on a fully personal basis, in which we give 
ourselves to one another; or, to put the same thing the other way 
round, in which we accept one another freely for what we are, and in 
which therefore there is and can be no purpose other than the sharing
of our lives in fellowship." (RE 101).
What are the vital elements, the ingredients, of the personal? 
How do we recognise it? What must be there in us, in our intentions 
and in our relationships, for the personal to be manifested? There 
are five constituents - equality, freedom, friendship, mutuality, and 
community. To exemplify and amplify these with relevant quotations
"When two people become friends they establish between 
themselves a relation of equality. They meet as equals, as man to 
man. There is and can be no functioned subservience of one to the 
other. One cannot be the superior and the other the inferior. If 
the relation is one of inequality, then it is just not a personal 
relationship. But once a personal relationship is established the 
differences between the persons concerned are the stuff out of which
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the texture of their fellowship is woven. And provided the equal 
relationship is maintained, it is precisely the differences that 
enrich the relationship. The greater the differences the more there 
is to share. The greater the fundamental differences between two 
persons are the more difficult it is to establish a fully personal 
relation between them, but also the more worth while the relation 
will be if it can be established and maintained. All great things 
are difficult, and this is the greatest of all" (RE 104/5).
"The personal life is the field of freedom. That means more 
than that people ought to be free in their personal lives. It means 
that without freedom there is and can be no personal life at all. It 
means that the measure of our freedom and the measure of our personal 
life are one and the same." (RE 105).
Many other relevant quotes must be read to illustrate the nature 
of the personal. They are:-
RE 105/6; RE 111; RE 205; IU 125/6; IU 134. And innumerable 
other quotations of this kind could be given illustrating and 
endorsing what the elements of the personal are.
In the above however one, so far, has not been illustrated or 
elaborated upon - community; which of its nature, and especially in 
this context, is allied to communion. Two points must be mentioned. 
Firstly; community is not to be identified with society; nor with the 
social. People may "mix" and belong to societies, but the essence 
and substance of such activity is not community. Equally people may 
be highly social, i.e. gregarious, by nature and be very "sociable", 
but they are not necessarily living in community, or in communion, or 
pursuing and experiencing the personal life. Often just the 
opposite. The keywords are intention and attitudes. "The intention
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to enter into community with others beyond the limits of the "natural 
community" is the basis for the enlargement of human comnunity" (CH 
67). Following the St. Paul quote given a while back Macmurray says, 
"It expresses the perfect and complete mutuality of communion, of 
mutual emotional awareness." (RE 63). "It is the difference between 
personal life and social life that we must get clear. They are 
obviously not the same thing, because it would seem that a certain 
degree of impersonality, a willingness to overlook and to suppress 
the peculiarly personal elements in our relationships with one 
another is essential to social life. The satisfactory working of 
social life depends upon entering into relationships with other 
people, not with the whole of ourselves but only with part of 
ourselves. It depends on suppressing, for the time being at least, 
the fullness and wholeness of our natures" (RE 96/7).
Secondly; friendship between two people may reveal the personal 
to them and between them, but this is not enough for living the 
personal life. We must intend, and actually seek to realise, the 
inclusion of everybody in the attaining of the personal. "We must 
remember, however, that to obtain this analysis we isolated two 
persons from their relation to all others. If their relation to one 
another is exclusive of the others, then its motivation in relation 
to the others is negative; the two friends must defend themselves 
against the intrusion of the rest. Their friendship becomes a 
positive element in a motivation which is dominantly negative and 
this will destroy the realization of the exclusive relation itself.
To be fully positive, therefore, the relation must be in principle 
inclusive, and without limits. Only so can it constitute a community
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of persons. The self-realization of any individual person is only 
fully achieved if he is positively motivated towards every other 
person with whan he is in relation. We can therefore fannulate the 
inherent ideal of the personal. It is a universal community if 
persons in which each cares for all the others and no one for 
himself. The ideal of the personal is also the condition of freedom 
- that is, of a full realization of his capacity to act - far every 
person". (PR 159).
One other possible fault must be noted and avoided. It is an 
illusion to think that we are most ourselves, most personal, when 
alone. Because social life is not personal we may find it 
unsatisfying. And if we mistakenly identify the two i.e. the social 
with the personal, we may resort to private and individual life in 
order to try and find ourselves. Solitariness can never disclose the 
personal. "We often feel that only when we are free from any 
necessity of co-operation, or even of relationship, with other 
people, can we be wholly ourselves. But this is an illusion, because 
to be ourselves at all we need other people. When we are alone we 
haven’t even the opportunity of expressing ourselves in speech. And 
that, with all that it implies, is a very essential part of our whole 
selves." (RE 97).
Anything material, even life and men when looked at materially, 
instrumentally, and mathematically i.e. as by formal, experimental, 
psychology, is "discovered" and spoken for by science. Anything 
organic and living, and even things when observed individually, are 
the province and concern of art. In what does the personal find its 
realm and apotheosis? In religion.
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Religion is the area, the manifestation, the aspect of human and 
universal life, concerned with the personal. There is no need to 
enlarge on this here. The role and place of religion, as discerned 
by Macmurray, has been expounded and discussed in the relevant 
chapter earlier. Sufficient, however, to remind ourselves of this in 
the present context. Religion "is the expression of our capacity as 
persons to knew the reality of personality that is not our own, and 
to be known by persons in our own personal reality. It is the 
expression of our need to live in that knowledge; to live in the 
mutuality of coimunion. Religion, therefore, is reason in human 
nature creating the community of persons - recognizing and achieving 
the unity of all personal life. It is the farce which creates 
friendship, society, community, co-operation in living. That is why 
I am wont to say that friendship is the fundamental religious fact in 
human life. The capacity far communion, that capacity far entering 
into free and equal personal relations, is the thing that makes us 
human; it is the rock on which personality is built. If it were not 
for this we would not be human beings". (RE 62/3). "The field in 
which all the capacities of personality are expressed in a mutual, 
objective, relationship with that which is not itself, is the field 
of religion. There is, then, a definite field of empirical 
experience which is the field of religion. It is the field of 
personal life". (RE 225). Religion sums-up, embodies, and is the 
personal; and the discovery, the recognition, and the disclosing of 
this to men, was the work of Jesus. "The discovery which Jesus made 
was the discovery that human life is personal". (CH 55). "Jesus 
also defines the discovery positively by determining the structure of 
relationships between human beings which would constitute a human
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community or a cannunity of persons." (CH 65).
The importance of this interpretation by Macmurray has never 
been fully appreciated and honoured, although it has been known for 
fifty years. We have had thousands of divine, incarnated, and holy 
Jesus*. We have had hundreds of human, secular, and earthy Jesus' 
e.g. Renan's. But have we, before Macmurray, had a credible Jesus 
who so easily yet so satisfactorily and convincingly linked the two?
I know of none. And what an illustration, to have discerned this, of 
Macmurray *s monism!
Needless to say, when we cane to religion, even when seen as the 
manifestation of the personal, God must be included relevantly.
"God," says Macmurray, "is the term which symbolizes the infinite 
apprehended as personal, and it derives, as indeed it must, from our 
iirmediate experience of the infinite in finite persons. The idea of 
incarnation, which in one form or another appears in all immediate 
religions, merely expresses the fact that our awareness of the 
personal infinite ccmes to us, and can only come, in and through our 
awareness of finite personality." (IU 124). "God is the infinite 
ground of all finite phenomena in the personal field - and, 
therefore, ultimately, of all phenomena whatever - but the knowledge 
of God is possible only through the empirical phenomena of personal 
relationship. In any particular relationship of persons, if it is 
truly personal, God is kncwn, as that which is partially, but never 
completely, realized in it. Thus, like the true scientist, the truly 
religious man will talk little about God - he will leave that to the 
speculative philosopher and theologian - and much about the empirical 
life of personal relationships." (RE 209/10).
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The importance and paramountcy of the personal can now be 
recognised and accepted - if, that is, you agree with Maanurray. But 
the fact that two whole volumes - collectively entitled "The Form of 
the Personal" - plus countless references to, and exposition of, it 
in many other works of Macmurray's have had to be written cn it; plus 
the honest recognition, unless we are very unusual and rare people, 
of the true position in ourselves; plus a look at society in general; 
illustrates beyond doubt that the personal is not a matter regarded 
with much importance today. And it is even less intended and 
practised. The decline of religion, however stuffy, absurd, and 
unrealistic much of its external manifestations and dogmas may have 
been, endorses this. For no doubt we have thrown the baby out with 
the bath- water.
It is not surprising, therefore, that a major part of 
Macmurray1 s interest in the personal, besides revealing it to us at 
all, is concerned with the crisis of the personal. He devotes a 
whole chapter (SA chapter 1) to explaining what crisis is and why we 
have it - as, of course, few people recognise it as such. And two 
whole books are devoted to analysing it, and suggesting what is 
required to resolve it. Maanurray also speaks of the personal as 
"the emergent problem of contemporary philosophy" (SA 17, 20, 21, 26; 
IU 141).
This crisis of the personal naturally manifests itself in 
society; in other words in life and action. Macmurray does not 
enlarge on this, rather regarding it as self-evident; but he does 
say, "That we are living through a period of revolutionary change is 
already a corrmonplace. We are all aware of this, though we may 
differ in our estimate of the depth and extent of the transformation
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that has already occurred or that is inevitable as we go forward. To 
me it seems certain that the scale of change must dwarf that of the 
transformation of medieval into modem Europe." (SA 26). Much more 
of this follows on the same page and should be read.
But apart from what he believes to be obvious, Maanurray does 
give two notable indicators. Firstly; the one already mentioned 
above, namely, the decline of religion. Secondly; especially in 
authoritarian nations, the enlargement of the functions and the 
increasing dependence and leaning upon the state. Of this he says, 
"One of these is the tendency towards an apotheosis of the state; the 
other the decline of religion. The two are intimately connected; 
since both express a growing tendency to look for salvation to 
political rather than to religious authority. The increasing appeal 
to authority itself reflects a growing inability or unwillingness to 
assume personal responsibility. The apotheosis of political 
authority involves the subordination of the personal aspect of human 
life to its functional aspect." (SA 29). This is followed by a 
condemnation of communist states - by which, of course he means 
Marxist states. (See SA 29/30). In earlier works - see CH - he, of
course, condemned the Fascist states as well, but by now - the mid-
1950s - the leading offenders had been eliminated.
Of the recession in religion he says, "The decline of religious
influence and of religious practice in our civilization bears the 
same significance. Such a decline betrays, and in turn intensifies, 
a growing insensitiveness to the personal aspect of life, and a 
growing indifference to personal values. Christianity, in 
particular, is the exponent and the guardian of the personal, and the
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function of organized Christianity in our history has been to foster 
and maintain the personal life and to bear continuous witness, in 
symbol and doctrine, to the ultimacy of personal values. If this 
influence is removed or ceases to be effective, the awareness of 
personal issues will tend to be lost, in the pressure of functional 
pre-occupations, by all except those who are by nature specially 
sensitive to them. The sense of personal dignity as well as of 
personal unworthiness will atrophy, with the decline of the habits of 
self-examination. Ideals of sanctity or holiness will begin to seem 
incomprehensible or even comical. Success will tend to become the 
criterion of rightness, and there will spread through society a 
temper which is extraverted, pragmatic and merely objective, for 
which all problems are soluble by better organization." (SA 30/1). 
Written thirty years ago what could be a truer picture of the 
situation today? And its worsening I Needless to say, there is the 
international aspect as well. "If we remember that history has 
brought us to a point where we must think of human society as a 
whole, and not limit our outlook to the confines of our own nation, 
there must be few who will fail to recognize, whether they welcome it 
or recoil from it, that we are involved in such a crisis." (SA 31).
Being concerned with philosophy - "I must treat this theme as a 
philosopher, for that is my only competence." (SA 17) - but 
strenuously denying that philosophy does not serve practical living 
(See SA 23/4), Macmurray then proceeds to discuss the crisis from the 
philosophical point of view. But not before he has made very clear 
what the relationship of philosophy to society and social history is. 
In fact they are highly related. Philosophy follows and reflects the 
social pattern and its problems. Therefore to be concerned with the
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philosophical aspect of the crisis, as Maanurray is, is not to be 
remote, removed, and abstract, but to be working in the very heart of 
it. "That there is such an interrelation, indirect enough and 
largely unconscious, between philosophical theory and social 
processes of a more empirical kind, is evident from any study of the 
history of philosophy ... very much more follows and must be read 
.... He must find a new starting-point; and his success depends on 
the discovery of the emergent problem for philosophy in his own 
time." (SA 25/6). "I have said enough to suggest a prima facile case 
for the view that there is a necessary relation between philosophy 
and social practice." (SA 26).
Always reflecting the society of which it is a part, philosophy 
- in modem times - has tended to mirror and create thought 
structures and forms to satisfy one of society* s main activities; 
science. (See SA 37). To meet the emergence of physics and 
mathematics, philosophy produced a philosophy of substance - even 
regarding the self as a substance - and a logic of static and fixed 
identical units.
Later, reflecting the coming of the biological sciences, it 
created the philosophy of organism - fran Hegel to Whitehead and 
Alexander - and the logic of the dialectic and synthesis.
More recently, and today, but as yet unaccomplished - hence the 
crisis - we are, or ought to be, creating a philosophy and logical 
form based on psychology. I say "ought" because except for a couple 
of attempts, Macmurray's apart, we are hardly aware of the need to be 
doing this and, both in thought and in practice are trying to meet 
and solve our problems within the old philosophical and logical
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farms; an impossible task. Without giving specific quotations all 
this is stated and elaborated upon in SA 30/36 - as is also what 
follows.
Kierkegaard was the first to become conscious of the new 
problem; but he, although very cognizant of it, shirked a 
philosophical solution by dodging off into the need for "faith" as an 
answer. "Kierkegaard discovered that the Hegelian philosophy was 
ludicrously incapable of solving - even, indeed, of formulating - the 
problem of 'the Existing individual'. (SA 36). "He concluded that we 
must abandon philosophy for religion, reason far faith." (SA 36).
About the same time as Kierkegaard, Auguste Comte too became 
aware of the emerging problem. But he resolved it, to his 
satisfaction, in the opposite way. He abandoned philosophy to 
science, believing that all would be resolved in, and by, a science 
of society. Thus was sociology founded; but not a solution to the 
problem of the personal. (See SA 36). Why both Kierkegaard and 
Comte failed is astutely diagnosed by Macmurray. They mistook one 
type of philosophy, then admittedly almost universally the 
philosophy, as the only possible kind of philosophy. They had not 
the imagination or ability to see that other types could exist, let 
alone create such a new form. "Far Ccmte, as for Kierkegaard, we 
must remember, philosophy is identified with a particular type of 
philosophy; that type which constructs itself on the form of the 
organic. If they discover that philosophy is incapable of 
formulating, either in its individual or its social aspect, the 
nature of personal experience, this need not mean that philosophy is 
invalid, but only that an organic conception of the personal is 
inadequate to the facts. Since philosophy must include the personal
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in its field of enquiry, this can only mean that we must abandon the
organic form as inadequate for the philosophical purpose, and
initiate a search far the form of the personal." (SA 37).
In our own day, according to Maanurray, two schools of
philosophy have recognised the problem and tried to meet it. These
are the logical empiricists and the existentialists. (SA 26/7).
Both have failed in Maanurray's opinion. The logical empiricists, in 
order to retain the farm, have banished all the problems and 
substance of philosophy to the ragbag. Metaphysics is out. What 
cannot be verified - verifiable being interpreted in a very limited 
and strictly scientific way - is not real. It does not exist. It is 
fanciful; a figment of man's groping imagination.
The existentialists, on the other hand, recognise the substance 
- they are extremely aware of the contemporary problem of the 
personal - but meet it with a total disregard and absence of 
philosophical form. In many cases they are quite happy to ostensibly 
substantiate their position not by philosophy but by drama, novels, 
and other literary forms. Ipso facto this is not philosophy, and 
therefore does not, and cannot, solve the crisis. (SA 28/9).
Finally Macmurray sums this up by saying "Existentialism has 
discovered, with sensitiveness of feeling, that the philosophical 
problem of the present lies in a crisis of the personal: logical
empiricism recognizes it as a crisis of logical farm and method.
Both are correct, and both are onesided. The cultured crisis of the 
present is indeed a crisis of the personal." (SA 29).
And then, immediately following, we have Maanurray's answer, 
which we know already of course. It is "to discover or to construct
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the intellectual form of the personal." (SA 29). The difficulty of 
doing this cannot be over-stated. "The transition from an organic to 
a personal conception of unity, hcwever, cannot be so simple as that 
from a physical to an organic conception. The transformation 
involved is much more fundamental. The difficulties are of the same 
type as those which beset the effort to establish psychology on a 
sure scientific basis. There are two major difficulties. Firstly, 
so long as psychology is conceived as a science of mind, 
consciousness, or the subjective, it fails. To establish itself it 
must think of itself as a science of human behaviour. Similarly in 
the philosophical transition, we can no longer conceive the Self as 
the subject in experience, and so as the knower. The Self must be 
conceived, not theoretically as subject, but practically, as agent. 
Secondly, human behaviour is comprehensible only in terms of a 
dynamic social reference; the isolated, purely individual, self, is a 
fiction" (SA 37/8).
But here already we have the clues. Psychology new sees itself 
not as the science of mind but of behaviour i.e. action. The self is 
no longer regarded as an isolated unit but dynamically, socially, 
active. Such observations, insights, and change of basic direction 
must lead to Maanurray's re-orientated philosophy of Action and 
Agency, discussed earlier in this chapter.
So we have come, as it were, full circle. Maanurray admits 
frequently that his work on the personal is only a preliminary survey 
and reconnaissance. A tremendous amount still needs to be done by 
subsequent philosophers. But he obviously believes, with 
considerable force, that the direction he has signposted is the one 
which both mankind and philosophy must take if they are to have a
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future.
Appraisement (3)
1) Can we be free if we are agents? We, admittedly, are agents 
of the total Other which includes ourselves. But our ‘bit* is a 
minute part of the Other and of the whole. And if we must, to be 
satisfactory, act as the Other would have us act, part though we may 
be of it, can this be called freedom? We have no real i.e. 
effective, choice. Moreover; if the Ultimate Other, God, has made up 
his mind as to what the eventual must be, and must in the logic and 
nature of things, according to Macmurray, achieve that fore-ordained 
end, whatever we do meanwhile adversely - or he would not be God, by 
definition - it is difficult to see how we can be free. This is 
especially difficult to take as throughout FMW Maanurray insists that 
when he says we must be free he means it and with no qualifications. 
If we are not free wfe cannot act, and therefore we are not persons.
Freedom, of course, can never be absolute. It is obvious that 
we live in a natural context the 'laws' of which we are unfreely 
obeying whether we are conscious of this or not. We cannot get 
outside of this. We are physically and biologically trapped.
But within this enforced, acceptable, limit, we can visualise a 
limited freedom. Hcwever, the question remains; Does Macmurray's 
theory of agency allow us any freedom? Is there a contradiction at 
the very core of this aspect of his philosophy?
2) Ignoring or accepting the doubts raised above, what are the 
advantages and disadvantages of accepting Macmurray's theory of 
agency? There can be no doubt that if accepted and acted upon it
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does totally reorientate us and shoot us out into a new world, or our 
conception of it. It is as if we were emerging on the first spring 
morning after months of winter. Bogged down, as so many of us are,
due to conditioning, tradition, and the ethos of our society, by the
priority and predominance of thought, endorsed by I.Qism as the focal 
point of existence, to accept Maanurray1 s viewpoint is to be as 
Keat's "Then felt I like some watcher of the skies when a new planet 
swims into his ken", or, Wordsworth1 s "Bliss was it in that dawn to
be alive. But to be young was very heaven".
Moreover, as never before, we do come to feel ourselves to be 
participants and co-creators in this immense process, instead of mere 
describers, analysts, and stand-asiders if not outsiders. This must 
be self-evidently good. And good far us all i.e. all together and 
all mankind, for it must make us realise that we cannot ever 'think' 
solutions to our problems but only live solutions; or to be more 
precise, discover their solution in action.
The disadvantage might be that of over-reacting on the obverse. 
Action, as the paramount thing, needs to be reasserted. But, as we 
have seen, thinking is not thereby to be discarded. It must be seen 
as merely instrumented. But to think must not be overlooked, or we 
should sink back into a state of non-reflection and de­
personalisation. We must not become emotionalists, intuitionists, or 
believers in "the blood".
3) Hew are we to live objectively i.e. in terms of what is not 
ourselves yet at the same time be, as Macmurray insists, ourselves? 
One can see that in a very advanced self these two worlds would not 
contradict each other, at least not often. One could become, as it
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were, bigger than either.
Except fear his doctrine of personal reality in FMW - and there 
rather abstractly - Macmurray seems never to meet this problem of 
what we are and of being ourselves. Countless people of all ages, 
never more so than in our own, are essentially subjective, 
egotistical, self-seeking, and selfish, even within the acceptable 
limits of society let alone the thousands who are positively evil and 
criminal, and those who would be but far fear. What are such people 
essentially and of themselves? Surely, they are only what they 
manifest? There is no beautiful, good, appreciating, self hidden and 
waiting to be revealed. Are, and ought, these people to be 
absolutely free? That Maanurray says they are not free, because of 
their desire to act adversely, seems to be asking us to accept 
something too far-fetched to believe. And even if he is right, how 
are we to proceed meanwhile i.e. until such per sens dp become real?
We cannot have freedan during this period or they would either 
enslave or kill us! *
And to raise an allied point. Nothing is more beneficial to 
personal - not worldly - success, health, and happiness, if you have 
tried it, than objectivity. But how many people can and would 
attempt to do this; or even understand it? Our whole social and 
educational ethos is geared to egocentricity and individualism - even 
if that individualism extends to include favourable and favoured 
groups. Except far the old unpcropitious religious method, now 
defunct, of exhortation, not one element of our society is countering 
this, or even trying to. No major school of thought is advocating 
it. In fact, to moralise, publically or privately, is the surest and 
quickest way to be completely discounted and ostracised.
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Can there then, within the bounds of our society - so wrapt up 
in technology, science, finance, and materialism - and here one 
cannot help being something of an economic determinist - be envisaged 
any major change such as Maanurray advocates? I find it difficult to 
see its possibility, much as it is desirable. But we must not 
despair; although examples of such a major change of psyche are 
difficult to find, or perhaps they are non-existent, in history.
4) There is no evidence to show that even if the will of the 
Absolute Other must ultimately prevail, and its purpose achieved, 
however obstructive and destructive human behaviour may be, that this 
will and purpose is good or propitious. That it is is a mere 
assumption by Macmurray for which he produces no evidence of a 
philosophical kind. We would not expect proof or anything like it. 
But we would expect, on such an important matter, something more than 
mere assertion and belief. Are there shades of Kierkegaard here?
That Maanurray does believe this is proved in the following 
quotation. "We might say - to use a form of words with which we are 
familiar - that the reality of the world is a personal God, who is 
the Creator of the world and the Father of all men. His work in 
history is the redemption of the world from evil and the setting up 
of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth." (PR 174/5).
5) Maanurray says the personal can never be found in the social 
or the private, in society or the individual, in socialising or 
withdrawal. I would not question that it cannot be found in society; 
or, at least, is certainly not to be mistakenly Identified with it. 
But what about individuality and withdrawal? Maanurray himself 
recognises the need for withdrawal. He speaks frequently of it, and
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even has a whole chapter in PR called "The Rhythm of Withdrawal and 
Return. And did not Jesus himself withdraw, the most famous and 
proverbial occasion being his solitary reflections in the wilderness?
Perhaps, however, on this point we are being a little too 
precise and exacting. In withdrawal, maybe, one cannot be personal; 
but it is an essential element or procedure to the attainment of that 
end.
6) It may seem unrealistic and querulous to raise this point 
but - Are we in a crisis? So many times and ages in the past have 
seen themselves as being in a state of upheaval and urgency. But how 
many, seen in historical perspective, really were? And, on the other 
hand, there can be no doubt that great changes and upheavals occurred 
where the happenings, let alone the significance of them, passed 
unnoticed. Did anybody really notice what was going on during the 
first hundred years of the Industrial Revolution, let alone give it 
the name we so glibly lip today? Yet that was transitional enough.
Might not the present seeming disruption, stress, and supposed 
crisis be less real than it actually appears to be due to the 
intensity and ubiquity of the media, which has never before existed 
on such a scale and with such immediacy and pcwer?
This is not to say that the personal is not the emerging problem 
far man. I am convinced that it is. Our greatest need, both as 
individuals and as man, is to become mare personal, less material, 
less organic, less 'natural'. The most common, widespread, and 
manifestly hopeless and despairing excuse we hear is "Oh well, that's 
human nature." And this so frequently both privately and publically. 
This is indicative enough of the need for widespread education in the 
personal, and in its philosophy of freedom, action, and
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responsibility. Hcwever; whether it has yet reached crisis 
proportions is an open question, and may at this stage be expressing 
it too strongly - especially when Maanurray wrote it in the 1950s.
End of Appraisement (3)
- 395 -
PSYCHOLOGY
Relevant Books 
Reason and Emotion. (RE)
Freedom in the Modem World. (BMW)
Interpreting the Universe. (IU)
The Self as Agent. (SA)
Persons in Relation. (PR)
Hie Clue to History. (CH)
Creative Society. (CS)
Introduction
Philosophers tend to fall into two categories - psychological 
and logical. Neither, let it at once be said, is exclusive. No 
philosopher would be a philosopher without reason and logic. And in 
most areas of philosophy what is actually happening in the human mind 
and experience cannot be totally and deliberately overlooked merely 
to satisfy logic and perfect reasoning. The difference is a question 
of approach and method. The first category puts emphasis on life and 
living, on spontaneity of expression, and live argument. The second 
hold themselves back, and consider, state, and concede only that 
which is totally certain and logically consistent and water-tight.
The first are primarily intuition!sts and feelers. Hie second, 
formalists and exponents of abstraction. An obvious example of the 
first is Plato; of the second Spinoza.
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Increasingly, especially in British philosophy, only the second, 
the rigidly formalist and logical, has come to be considered and 
accepted as philosophy at all. Imagination and creativity there can, 
and ought to be, in philosophy; but this must always be strictly 
subject to, and under the control of, formalism. Unfortunately, the 
result is almost always aridity and loss of contact with real life, 
people, and living. Philosophy becomes barren and sterile.
When this stage is reached nobody heeds it, believes in it, nor 
considers it has anything to contribute. This is not to say, not to 
hope, that its opposite - psychological, intuitive, 'feeling* 
philosophy - will then, to redress the balance, come into its own.
But there is no reason why it should not; and, provided it is 
realistic and rational, has no less value than formalistic 
philosophy.
Macmurray belongs to the psychological category. And this is 
self-confessed, even if it were not obviously so. "It may be 
objected that in raising the question of motive I am abandoning 
philosophy far psychology, and falling into one of the fallacies 
which even a beginner should know how to avoid. To this I shall 
reply, first, that the motive of this objection is to defend the 
illusion by forbidding us to bring the question of motive to 
attention; second, that philosophy does not constitute itself, as 
science does by isolating a field of study, but by refusing all such 
exclusions and abstractions. A philosophy which excludes certain 
questions on the ground that they belong to the field of psychology 
is giving itself the form of science, and so becoming a pseudo­
science. The questions it does raise will shew themselves sooner or
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later to be ’nonsense questions*, till in the end it finds itself 
with no content at all. What I am doing is to remove the limitation 
which results fran adopting a purely theoretical standpoint and to 
reassert the inclusiveness of philosophy by thinking from the 
standpoint of action. If thinking is one of the things we do, then 
the question, "What motive have we for doing it?" becomes an 
essential element in any philosophical account of thought." (FR 132).
And this might well be the reason why Macmurray has gone 
unconsidered far over forty years. When I visited him at his home in 
Edinburgh in September 1971, and asked why he thought his work had 
not received the acclaim it would seem to deserve, he gave this very 
reason, "Because they think I am more of a psychologist than a 
philosopher," he said.
Bearing this in mind - not that it alters one iota the value, or 
lack of it/ concerning what is said - we now move on to a few of 
Macmurray* s psychological ideas. And by far the most important of 
these is:-
Emotional Reason
In considering this, or rather before we consider it at all, the 
first thing we must do is to revise and upgrade our idea of emotion. 
It is usual, as an inbuilt and conditioned part of our Western mental 
categorising and conceptualisation, to regard ourselves and our minds 
as having two major aspects or ways of functioning, namely thinking 
and feeling, thought and emotion. Other factors are obviously 
recognised - imagination, will, intuition, and memory, to name but 
some - but these do not hold and divide the field as do the major
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two.
Maanurray never challenges this classification. He agrees and 
endorses it. "We distinguish two aspects of our consciousness - 
thought and feeling. These are two ways in which we make contact 
with the world." (EMW 135/6). He does recognise however that their 
difference is not total and absolute. They can and do overlap. 
"Though they are never completely separable, they do have a relative 
independence.1' (FMW 136).
Hew does he distinguish and describe, but not necessarily 
perfectly define, them - both in themselves and in their function? 
"In thinking I include all the ways in which we knew what things are 
and try to understand what they are." (PWW 136). Feeling, he says, 
".... includes the whole range of our emotional experience, from 
simple feelings of pleasure and pain to the most complicated 
emotional states of love and reverence and the loftiest reaches of 
desire." (EMW 145).
This is not the place to discuss thinking. Here we will concern 
ourselves with emotion.
Emotion is Prior to Thinking
Before we proceed further with our examination of emotion, the 
important, key, and paramount point, the crux of Maanurray1 s position 
and advocacy, must be stated. It is this. That in our society, in 
the Western world at least, thinking is not merely seen to be, but is 
automatically assumed to be, prior, superior, more valuable, mare 
reliable, more intrinsically the aspect of what man is or should be, 
than is emotion.
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Emotion is the underdog. It is the cause of all our 
tribulations. Hie sooner it is controlled by thought - if that 
distantly receding day can ever cane - the better. In the 18th and 
19th centuries, before Freud arrived, it was thought to be imminent. 
Thinking, especially when imbued with reason, is good. Emotion is 
bad. This has been both the stated and the implicit psychological 
and moral philosophy of Western man. And, says Macmurray, it is 
completely false and untrue. "We are inclined to think of feeling as 
something a little ignominious, something that ought to be 
subordinated to reason and treated as blind and chaotic, in need of 
the bridle and the whip. I am convinced that this is a mistake. It 
is in the hands of feeling, not of thought, that the government of 
life should rest. And in this I have the teaching of the founder of 
Christianity on my side, far he wished to make love - and emotion, 
not an idea - the basis of the good life." (IWW 146).
Emotion is not >the enfant terrible. It is not of itself the 
source of all our troubles, something to be regrettably deplored far 
existing at all. On the contrary. Emotion is the fount of all we 
are and can be. It is thinking which is contributory and relatively 
inconsequential, a minor function of our existence, a truly 
unflowered plant in a garden full of the exotic blossoms and 
gloriously coloured shrubs of emotion. Far from being the 
Cinderella, emotion is not only the Prince, but the whole palace, 
court, celebrations, and romance as well. Emotion is life. Thought, 
if anything, is its hand maiden and general factotum. "The emotional 
life is not simply a part or an aspect of human life. It is not, as 
we so often think, subordinate, or subsidiary to the mind. It is the
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core and essence of human life. The intellect arises out of it, is 
rooted in it, draws its nourishment and sustenance frcm it, and is 
the subordinate partner in the human economy. This is because the 
intellect is essentially instrumental. Thinking is not living. At 
its worst it is a substitute far living; at its best a means of 
living better. As we have seen, the emotional life is our life, both 
as awareness of the world and as action in the world, so far as it is 
lived for its own sake. Its value lies in itself, not in anything 
beyond it which it is a means of achieving." (RE 75).
"The first point that I want to insist on is the primary 
importance of feeling in human life. What we feel and how we feel is 
far more important than what we think and how we think. Feeling is 
the stuff of which our consciousness is made, the atmosphere in which 
all our thinking and all our conduct is bathed." (FMW 145/6). And 
again. "Scientific thought may give us power over the farces of 
nature, but it is feeling that determines whether we shall use that 
power for the increase of human happiness or for forging weapons of 
destruction to tear human happiness to pieces. Thought may construct 
the machinery of civilisation, but it is feeling that drives the 
machine; and the more powerful the machine is, the mare dangerous it 
is if the feelings which drive it are at fault. Feeling is more 
important than thought." (FMW 146).
There is no proof of any of this; or perhaps it is truer to say 
that Macmurray does not give any. This is a good example of the 
different approaches of philosophers earlier mentioned. A formalist 
would demand, or self-discipline himself to produce, a bock-length 
treatise to prove that this is so. But hard as it may be for us to
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reorientate our conceiving, conditioned as we are and have been to 
Western thought forms and categories, the attempt to do so gradually 
brings us round to Macmurray's way of seeing this important matter, 
and to accept it.
Once again, as so often with Macmurray, the proof of the pudding 
is in the eating - or, more exactly, in the experiencing, as we 
knew, from previous chapters in this thesis, Macmurray goes even 
further than this. Action is the prime thing for us as man. And is 
not action far closer allied to emotion than to thought? Let us 
continue then with emotion.
The Function of Bnotion
What is emotion? As with most other questions of this kind, and 
there are millions of them, it cannot be answered essentially. By 
experience, by acquaintance, we knew. By description we may knew. 
But we can never know essentially. And in most cases we cannot 
visualise what an essential answer would be like in form, let alone 
know if a particular answer would satisfy.
But we can say, as with emotion at present, something about it 
which marks it off fran all other things, and fran all similar 
things, by and with which it might be confused.
What then is necessary to emotion? What are its main features 
and functions? Firstly; there is the range and breadth of feeling 
and feelings, fran the most mind-bending and consuming to the hardly 
perceptible just on the threshold of consciousness. And not only is 
there a range of intensity but a spectrum of kind, fran hate and 
revulsion to love and bliss; from ugliness to beauty; from pain and
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distress to beatitude and serenity. All this is suramed-up in the 
earlier quoted sentences from FMW 145, and others on that page.
Secondly; emotion is the motivator, or appears in consciousness 
to be so. The real, fundamental, cause of action is need. Emotion 
is, as it were, the essential accompaniment of this, the concomitant, 
obverse, side of the one coin. The body needs food, so the 
accompanying emotion, the motivator to get sustenance, is the feeling 
or emotion of hunger. Sex stirs within at puberty, and this arousal 
is accompanied by the emotions of love and tenderness - or of 
possessiveness, aggression, or jealousy. Bnotions are the 
motivators. In more ways than one they 'move* us. "Hie intellect 
itself cannot be a source of action. All motives of action are 
necessarily emotional." (RE 45). "All the motives which govern and 
drive our lives are emotional. Love and hate, anger and fear, 
curiosity and joy are the springs of all that is most noble and most 
detestable in the history of men and nations." (EMW 146). "Now, 
every activity must -have an adequate motive, and all motives are 
emotional. Hiey belong to our feelings, not to our thoughts." (RE 
23). "We can insist that all our activities, whether practical or 
theoretical, have their motives as well as their intentions, and are 
sustained by an emotional attitude." (PR 33). "Even his emotions, 
instead of disturbances to the placidity of thought, take their place 
as necessary motives which sustain his activities, including the 
activity of thinking." (PR 12) So it is not ideas which motivate and 
move, as much as this would appear to be the situation, but feelings. 
And feelings alone continue to keep us motivated and moving. Never 
ideas. It is a wonder we have never learned this, for it was known 
in Greek times. "Thinking, however, is nan-causal; it 'moves
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nothing' as Aristotle said." (SA 80). See also CH 208 for a similar 
version of this.
Thirdly, and very importantly, and almost totally unrealised or 
understood in our society, emotions, emotional life, is the source of 
all our valuing. Values, at root, are nothing more than the pattern, 
priority, or scale of our choices. And we are constantly choosing 
either anew or according to earlier - established value patterns.
But whilst choosing anew, new or at any time in the past, or in 
the future, values will always arise in the emotions, never in the 
intellect. "Value is emotionally apprehended." (FMW 50). "Feeling, 
when it is real feeling, is that in us which enables us to grasp the 
worth of things. Good and evil, beauty and ugliness, significance 
and value of all kinds are apprehended by feeling, not by thought. 
Without feeling we could knew neither satisfaction nor 
dissatisfaction; nothing would be mare worthwhile to us than anything 
else. In that case we could not choose to do one thing rather than 
another; and we could not even think, because we could not choose 
anything to think about, nor feel that one thought was more 
significant than another". (BMW 147). "Feeling, then, when referred 
to an object, is valuation; and the most general discrimination in 
valuation is the acceptance or rejection of a possibility in action." 
(SA 190).
Despite this you may still insist that your values are thought 
and not emotion determined. Macmurray has two answers to this. 
Firstly; this may seem to be so, but in fact you have taken over 
formally and mentally the values and judgements of society, or of a 
famous critic, without bothering to feel and evaluate for yourself.
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"How many people would maintain stoutly that Milton's Paradise Lost 
is a very beautiful poem, who have never read it, or have been bored 
by it when they didl" (RE 37).
But, and here is the relevant point, the original valuation was, 
and could only have been, conceived in emotion. This divorce, by the 
way, of thought and emotion is another aspect of our lives, of which 
the foregoing is a good example, but only one of countless which 
could be given, of which Macmurray is highly critical.
Secondly; and similarly you may originally have created the 
valuation out of, as you must have done, your own emotional life and 
experience, but far convenience have consolidated and mentally 
encapsulated it into a 'thought1 for ease of use and for psychic 
economy. "It often seems as though we use our intellectual judgment 
to decide that something is good or bad, even when our emotions 
disagree with our judgment.
But in that case what we are doing is to apply a standard of 
judgment which is itself derived from other emotions, perhaps our own 
earlier ones, perhaps those of other people, and very often the 
emotions of people long since dead which have become traditionally 
standardized. A judgment of value can never be intellectual in its 
origin, though of course the intellect can fannulate as standards of 
judgment the types of action which have in the past been recognized 
emotionally as good or bad. (RE 36/7). '"But surely1, you say, 'we 
can think that something is worth while doing and do it because we 
think it is worth while, even when our desires and feelings would 
prevent us from doing it.' YesI we can very nearly do that, though 
even then it is only with the help of feeling - a feeling of self- 
respect or reverence far the ideas which guide our judgment." (FMW
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147).
These then are some of the aspects and important functionings of 
emotion.
Reasons for Bnotional Disparagement
If Macmurray is right, and I have no doubt he is, why have we 
this mistaken and disparaging view of emotion? Why do we so highly 
value thought and undervalue emotion? Before we proceed, however, a 
slight qualification must be made. Since Macmurray wrote and 
diagnosed all this thirty or more years ago, a seeming revaluation 
has occurred in this area of living. Bnotional life is freer and 
there is a general atmosphere of released feeling. I say seeming, 
because it is much too early yet to assess the effect of so-called 
permissiveness. For one thing it may be only a nine days wonder. 
Whilst not perhaps so widespread, because of the lack of modem 
instant communication and publicity, and therefore of widespread 
human imitation and mass world-wide conformity, who can say that the 
Restoration or the Naughty Nineties were not periods of temporary 
permissiveness and freeing of the emotions?
And both soon faded. The releasing of emotions had no permanent 
effect. It only caused a reversion to set in. So whether the 
current spell of emotioned freedom is a final and permanent 
reorganisation of the place and role of emotion in living cannot at 
this stage be discerned.
Two further points must be noted, but only very briefly in 
passing, important as they are. Firstly; is the present release of 
emotion as Macmurray would wish it to be? There can be only one
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answer; certainly it is not, as we shall see when we come to the main 
reason for concerning ourselves with emotions at all - from 
Macmurray1 s point of view, that is.
But in justification or qualification it could be said that the 
current excesses accompanying the recognition and unfreezing of 
emotions should be seen as an expected reaction to the thought- 
dominated repression of the past. Once this initial phase has passed 
we may enter into a period not of reaction but of steady growth and 
progress towards a true, real, and satisfactory recognition, 
philosophy, and expression of the emotions. That is the state 
Macmurray would have us achieve and be.
Secondly; non-openly recognised as Macmurray may appear to be, 
hew far has he contributed to the current freedom and permissiveness? 
Others may be more frank, direct, and seemingly influential, but are 
these not, D.H. Lawrence apart, of the second generation who 
originally learned fran Macmurray, silent and unackncwledging as they 
remain about the source of their inspiration? And will Macmurray yet 
be influential enough to complete and eventually satisfactorily close 
the opening-up of emotional freedom he may have started, in the 
realisation of his vision of full and mature life? We have broken 
emotional rigidity. Are we capable of leading it forward into the 
richness it is possible to attain emotionally far ourselves and far 
all mankind?
After this temporary but necessary and relevant review of the 
contemporary emotional scene, let us return to our main theme and 
ask, even if it is not imnediately the situation at the moment, why 
has emotion been, if not unrecognised, then relegated to the basement
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and scrapheap of human concern and valuation?
There are several reasons, but all stem from the prime reason. 
And that is because, irrespective of what we believe about ourselves, 
our historical development, and our fundamental attitudes, we are 
still living out the Reman philosophy, especially the aspect of 
Stoicism. Essentially, we are certainly not Greeks. Nor with our 
slighting and perfunctory attitude to art would we ever think we 
were. At least we are honest about that.
But, equally, we are not Hebrews, with their single and unified 
view of the world and life; nor of their even greater successors the 
Christians - although this is something we do, quite mistakenly, 
whether morally, religiously, philosophically, or actively, pride 
ourselves on being. "To this day our culture has remained in the 
Roman mould. It is essentially imperialist; that is to say, its 
governing ideal is the maintenance and perfecting of an efficient 
organization of social life, depending on law, industrial management, 
and the maintenance of power for the defence of law and property.
Art and religion have been harnessed to the service of this ideal of 
administrative and organizational efficiency and subordinated to it. 
We are proud of Shakespeare and our artistic achievements - 
especially when they are a century or more in the past - but we look 
upon the artist and his artistic temperament as queer and disorderly 
and a little contemptible. We are annoyed with anyone who dares to 
deny that we are Christians, but at the same time we are inclined to 
look upon the pious saint as a nuisance and a mollycoddle. Such is 
the immense power of persistence of the tradition of the Roman 
Empire! We are Romans at heart, tough like the Romans we are willing 
to use art and religion so long as they agree to play the pat of
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menials to our ideal of social efficiency". (FMW 75/6).
The revealing and exposure of this error is very important, of 
course, and relevant far emotional life. Far the essence of 
stoicism, adopted by the Romans from Asia Minor - from whence, we 
must remind ourselves, came St. Paul, another person very much of the 
same mould and temperament - is a denying and repressive philosophy. 
(See FMW 79/81 far a development of this).
It regards reason, better described and understood in this 
context as rational thought and thinking, as patently and absolutely 
good, whilst emotion is the source of evil and unhappiness, and must 
be denied. The agent of its mastery and overcoming is will. Seen as 
the agent of rationality. Without further elaboration it will be 
seen that this is identical, as enlarged upon earlier, to the 
traditional view of emotion in our culture. "The philosophy of the 
Roman tradition is Stoic. It insists cn the distinction between
reason and emotion. Its ideal makes reason dominant and emotion
%
subservient, or even in itself the source of all evil; and therefore 
glorifies the rationed life, the life of will, with its emphasis on 
law and principle, plan and policy. For this ideal of life emotion 
is the real enemy, though it may be used in the service of will and 
reason so far as it will submit and accept the yoke." (FMW 82).
But how do we come to hold this view? Surely not directly from 
the Romans who ruled, when seen in historical perspective, for only a 
relative short period - at least in Britain. Yet ironically Britain, 
in the Western and ex-Rcman world, is one of the sternest promoters 
of emotional disparagement and suppression.
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It comes through the Church. "With the break-up of the Roman 
Empire, the Church fell heir to the Reman spirit and the Roman 
authority and transformed the Roman Empire into a religious 
imperialism that aimed at and largely achieved a universal dominion 
over the spirit of civilized humanity. This religious imperialism, 
under the pseudonym of Christianity, gathered to itself and subjected 
to its purpose all the powers of the human spirit and made itself the 
arbiter of truth in theology, philosophy and science, of beauty in 
art, of social and individual right in morals, manners and politics, 
until it had blotted personal freedom from the earth, or bound it in 
chains." (RE 171/2).
TWo major attempts have been made to threw off this tyranny of 
emotional suppression. But, unfortunately, one at least caused 
indirectly even greater suppression. St. Francis or Assissi probably 
sewed the seeds of the first attempt. He was, in his simplicity of 
heart and feeling, the obvious precursor of the Renaissance and the 
Reformation which together contributed to the attempted overthrew of 
both the Roman and Church rigidity. For a full summary of this see 
RE 172.
But although this freed art, it did not wholly free the other 
aspect of emotion, religion. Many branches of the new Protestantism, 
now able and allowed to read and interpret the Bible, especially the 
writings of St. Paul, directly for themselves, fell into a denial of 
emotion - except as expressed in emotive oratory - greater and more 
severe than that of the traditional and orthodox Church, now 
supposedly superseded. We have only to think of the Puritans to 
confirm this. (See FMW 83/7).
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But there have been countless austere and emotion-denying sects 
- never failing of course to be extremely emotional themselves. And 
new ones are still appearing. Ironically, according to Macmurray, 
the only positive thing to come out of this first attempt to free the 
emotions, was an intellectual one - science. "The one creative 
achievement of the Reformation was science and the scientific 
spirit." (RE 172). (Also BMW 85/6).
The second revolt of the emotions, as Macmurray calls it, came 
with the Romantic Revival of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. 
"Though notably an artistic and literary phenomenon, it had profound 
effects in every department of European life and thought and worked a 
vast revolution in our tradition. In politics it produced Rousseau 
and the modem democratic state. In social life it produced the 
educational and humanitarian movements. In philosophy it produced 
Hegel and modem idealism. In science it produced Darwin and 
evolutionary biology* In religion it produced the higher criticism 
and undermined the authority of the Bible. In economics it produced 
Karl Marx and socialism. This complete transformation of life had 
its roots in an outburst of emotional spontaneity. Its high priest 
were the Romantic poets with their pure emotional lyricism." (FMW 
87).
And this second revolt was mainly abortive too. It may have 
produced liberalism and political democracy as formal and outward 
exemplifications of freedom, and many other signs of emotional 
liberation. But whatever initial reality it may have genuinely 
enjoyed was short lived. Very soon it gave way to sentimentality, 
pretence, and hypocrisy. And if the last might sometimes seem to be
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too strong a term, then call it self -deception. Rome reasserted 
itself, but cunningly returned in a disguised, but no less, 
effective, farm. "It granted the demands of emotion in theory and 
then proceeded to make its concessions ineffective in practice. And 
in doing this it introduced a pretence into the life of Europe which 
has poisoned it to this day. Our emotional life was set free in 
word, but not in fact. This is the origin of sentimentality. Ihe 
second revolt of the Greek-Chri stian elements against the dominance 
of the Reman sentimentalized the moral and social life of Europe." 
(FMW 88).
As evidence of this Macmurray gives the following as examples. 
Under democratic rule we pretend that we govern ourselves. The whole 
panoply of political parties, voting, free speech, and secret ballot 
is established but virtually we are still governed by the few who get 
what they have already determined. Who the few are Macmurray does 
not say. At the same time he suggests, perhaps rather incongruously, 
that what finally happens is determined by 'rational necessity1. (See 
FMW 88/9).
Another big area of sentimentality and pretence is that of 
romantic love. In the 19th century especially the outward expression 
of the freedom to love between two people was carefully guarded by 
the hypocrisy of Mrs Grundy. Sentimentalised love and salvation for 
our fellcw men saw to it that they were not loved when it came to the 
needs of toil, industry, and prcper housing.
Love of colonial peoples and their 'Christian and cultural 
advancement' was the pretence of nations bent on exploiting such 
peoples and the raw materials and products of their lands. (See IMW
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88/9).
And if Maanurray were writing today he would not lack far 
examples. He would be able to quote the hypocrisy of 'caring', where 
thousands of old people, deserted by their materialistic and 
mammonistic nucleated family, are living in loneliness, or been hived 
off into institutions. Even Victorians did not do this. 'Care' far 
youth is belied by the widespread and profitable drug trade. And 
there is the pretence of 'caring' far one's children whilst they are 
emotionally, if not materially, neglected while mothers needlessly - 
by any emotionally mature standards - go to work. Dozens of other 
examples could be given. We sentimentalise over one murder, whilst 
6000 people are being slaughtered on the roads annually.
A little optimistically Macmurray, writing in the thirties of 
course, felt that a new revolt was afoot. "There is an equally 
marked tendency towards a new revolt of the Greek and Christian 
tradition. Europe seems to be gathering her farces together for a 
third great attack on rationalism, for another bid for real freedom, 
for another reassertion of emotioned reality against organization and 
efficiency. If history is any guide to prophecy we may expect that 
this tendency will grew and prevail; and we may expect also that this 
time its victory will be a final one. It will be, in any case, 
another battle for freedom; and at least for the Greek and the 
Christian elements in our tradition freedom is the very reality of 
life." (EMW 92).
But apart from permissiveness, discussed here earlier, and which 
so far has produced licence rather than freedom, there seems to be no 
evidence of this yet, especially as man at this time seems totally 
absorbed by intellect, science, and technology, materialism and
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economics, and I.Qisra to the neglect of all the aspects of life, 
emotion, and real religion Macmurray has so strongly urged us to 
heed.
As I said earlier, further examples of why we have this 
disparaging attitude to emotions, is bound up with, and stems from 
this prime, basic, reason. We are, at heart and by tradition, Romans 
and Stoics. But to mention two others briefly.
Firstly; we are afraid of emotional life; at least beyond a 
certain point. And this point has a very low threshold. We may 
envisage the richness of a full emotional life, but we envisage also 
the pains, which are a possible, if not inevitable, accompaniment. 
Therefore we shy off such a life, preferring the narrow path of 
limited feeling far fear of pain. "The reason why emotional life is 
so undeveloped, is that we habitually suppress a great deal of our 
sensitiveness and train our children from their earliest years to 
suppress much of their own. It might seem strange that we should 
cripple ourselves so heavily in this way. But there is a simple 
reason for it which I want to mention in closing. We are afraid of 
what would be revealed to us if we did not. In imagination we feel 
sure that it would be lovely to live with a full awareness of the 
world. But in practice sensitiveness hurts." (RE 46. There is more 
of this essential reading on this and the next page.) • "On the whole 
we seem to have chosen to seek the absence of pain, and as a result 
we have produced stagnation and crudity." (RE 47).
Secondly; the last point concerned pain; this one concerns an 
allied feeling, disillusionment. If we would learn car seek to feel 
really, to feel genuinely and appropriately, we must shed our
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illusions. Most people, endorsing the afforementioned analysis and 
recognition of sentimentality and pretence, would prefer to keep 
their illusions, especially the illusion they have of themselves.
"The real struggle centres in the emotional field, because reason is 
the impulse to overcome bias and prejudice in our own favour, and to 
allow our feelings and desires to be fashioned by things outside us, 
often by things over which we have no control. The effort to achieve 
this can rarely be pleasant or flattering to our self-esteem. Our 
natural tendency is to feel and to believe in the way that satisfies 
our impulses. We all like to feel that we are the central figure in 
the picture, and that our own fate ought to be different from that of 
everybody else. We feel that life should make an exception in our 
favour." (RE 22/3).
So these are Macmurray1 s main views as to why emotions are, 
mistakenly, regarded so disparagingly in our culture.
Reason in the Emotions
So far, we have dealt with one side of Macmurray's analysis and 
teaching concerning the emotions. The emotions must be openly 
recognised, accepted, given their place, seen as the major and the 
most important part of our lives; and at the same time seeing thought 
and intellect in their proper place, which is one of mere 
instrumentality and subordination to the emotions. This is the 
situation. We merely do not see it as such. Any wonder then that 
our living, both collectively and individually, is so awry, so 
bankrupt, so groping, so dangerously and destructively near the 
abyss, so much the cause of pain and suffering both within our own
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selves and in our relationships. No wonder our values are 
unbelievably puerile, stunted, stupid, unsatisfactory and 
unsatisfying. No wonder we live fran one crisis to another, socially 
and personally. Failure to recognise emotion, and persisting in the 
promotion of intellect, is a root cause of our problems.
But it is not the only one. To recognise emotion and establish 
it as the prime realm of our being and consciousness is vital. But 
alone it is not enough. We could still be in serious trouble. What 
then is needed? We must bring reason into the emotional life.
Now Macmurray admits the difficulty of even believing this, let 
alone accepting and executing it. We are so used, here again by our 
long tradition and by conditioning, to regard reason as applicable 
only to thinking and the intellect that to associate it with the 
emotions seems absurd. "Reason means to us thinking and planning, 
scheming and calculating. It carries our thoughts to science and 
philosophy, to the counting-house or the battle-field, but not to 
music and laughter and love. It does not make us think of religion 
or loyalty or beauty, but rather of the state of tension which knits 
our brows when we apply our minds to some knotty problem or devise 
schemes to cope with a difficult situation. We associate reason with 
a state of mind which is cold, detached and unemotional. When our 
emotions are stirred we feel that reason is left behind and we enter 
another world - more colourful, more full of warmth and delight, but 
also more dangerous." (RE 15/6).
We might even go so far as to hold the view that "reason is just 
thinking; that emotion is just feeling; and that these two aspects of 
our lives are in the eternal nature of things distinct and opposite; 
very apt to come into conflict and requiring to be kept sternly
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apart." (RE 16). Or that, "Emotion belongs to the animal nature in 
us, and reason to the divine; that our emotions are unruly and 
fleshy, the source of evil and disaster, while reason belongs to the 
divine essence of the thinking mind which raises us above the level 
of the brutes into cornnunion with the eternal." (RE 16).
But Macmurray will have none of this. Reason can, and must be, 
as much a part of our emotioned life as it is of our intellectual. 
"Rationality is not a peculiar characteristic of the intellect. It 
is equally characteristic of the emotioned life. We can put this in 
terms of the expressions of personality by saying that art and 
religion are just as rationed as science car philosophy." (IU 131).
What is reason or rationality? We are inclined to think of 
reason as something in ourselves; something to do with the structure 
of our mind; something we do or do not possess, like a gift or 
talent, and which by nature some people have more of it than do 
others. We regard it on a par with a good memory or a patient 
nature; or even an innate logicality.
Macmurray reminds us firmly that it is nothing of the sort. And 
he illustrates this by reference to the reasoning process we do 
understand, namely thinking. He says, "The rationality of thought 
does not lie in the thought itself, as a quality of it, but depends 
upon its reference to the external world as known in immediate 
experience." (IU 131). How then can thoughts be either "true or 
false? About that we have no difficulty. Yet if we think carefully, 
we shall realise that there is no special difference between feelings 
and thoughts in this respect. Our thoughts are just what we think.
We just think them, and they are what they are. How then can they be
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either true or false? The answer is that their truth or falsity does 
not lie in them but in a relation between them and the things to 
which they refer" (RE 24). '*What makes a thought rational or logical 
is the purpose which governs it - the purpose of expressing 
symbolically some aspect of the world we know." (IU 131/2).
Elsewhere he says, "Reason is the capacity to behave in terms of the 
nature of the object, that is to say, to behave objectively". (RE 
19). "Reason is the capacity to behave consciously in terms of the 
nature of what is not ourselves." (RE 19).
So reason is the capacity to live in terms of what is not 
ourselves. To live in terms of reality. And this applies as much to 
our feeling life as to our thinking. "Our emotions have the same 
characteristic of referring to that which is recognized as not 
ourselves. That they are often subjective is beyond doubt; but then, 
so are our thoughts. We recognize that thought may be false as well 
as true and that only when it is true is it appropriately related to 
the world to which it refers. Equally we recognize that our feelings 
and emotions refer to real things and that they may be appropriate or 
inappropriate to the situation to which they refer. I may feel angry 
with someone and recognize at the same time that I have no reason to 
feel angry. In that case I recognize that my anger is unreasonable. 
In recognizing that, I recognize that my emotions are capable of 
exhibiting the quality of reason, that they may or may not fit the 
objective world to which they consciously refer." (IU 132). "Why 
should our feelings be in any different case? It is true that they 
are felt and that they are what they are felt to be, just like our 
thoughts. But they also refer to things outside us. If I am angry I 
am angry at something or somebody, though I may not always be able to
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say precisely what it is Since our feelings, then, refer to what
is outside them, to some object about which they are felt, why should 
they not refer rightly car wrongly to their object, just like 
thoughts?" (RE 24/5). Examples of reason and unreason are given in 
RE pp. 20/1 and 27/8.
One problem of recognising reason, oar lack of it, in our 
feelings is that, unlike in our thinking where at least we do 
sometimes recognise that it can be right or wrong, good or bad - we 
are inclined to believe that with emotions we just feel something or 
we do not. Feeling is regarded as set and homogenous. It is or it 
is not. "What can it mean, then, to distinguish between rational and 
irrational feelings? We are in the habit of saying that our feelings 
are just felt. They can't be either true or false; they just are 
what they are. Our thoughts, on the other hand, can be true or 
false. About that we have no difficulty. Yet, if we think 
carefully, we shall realize that there is no special difference 
between feelings and thoughts in this respect." (RE 24). ".... We
are very apt to take the view that one feels what one feels, and 
that's all there is about it. If one is jealous, for instance, one 
is just jealous, and it can't be helped. One must just make the best 
one can of the situation. Now that isn't so. There is in the 
emotional life itself a capacity for growth and development." (RE 
35).
Thus, as we have already seen, if we would progress in our 
emotional life we must alter the way we see feeling, and realise its 
capacity for intentional change and growth.
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Emotional Unreason
Where and hew are we irrational, or non-rational, in our 
feelings? Where, in particular, are we shortfalling in our exercise 
and practice of emotional reason?
There are four ways. We have feelings we ought not to feel. We 
fail to feel when we ought to be feeling something. We mistake our 
feelings. And we suppress our feelings. Some of these, especially 
the first and third, may slightly overlap, or be confused in 
recognition. All illustrate, of course, Macmurray's basic principle 
that our feelings can be unreal, whereas they ought always to be 
real.
An example of the first, is the person who is proud of having 
done something of which he ought to be ashamed. The proud and 
cynical property dealer who boasts he has made a slick profit by 
harassing old, long-standing, tenants until they were forced to leave 
what had been their home for forty years. Most 'big deals' 
illustrate having feelings which ought not to be felt. Being sorry 
for, or even exulting in, the dodging abroad of crooks, cunningly 
escaping the law e.g. the Great Train robber. Wallowing in 
sentimental, escapist, trash e.g. soap operas on television.
Of the second, failing to feel, a good example of this is the 
Good Samaritan, or rather of those who passed by. How often do we 
fail to feel compassion and sympathy with a person or cause because 
they, or it, are outside of our group, or nation, or sphere of our 
interest?
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On mistaken feelings; we express criticism car feel hostility, 
often self-rightously, when all the time our real feeling is that of 
jealousy. We are irritable or angry with somebody at breakfast when 
we feel rough after a bad night.
Suppressed feelings are illustrated by unconscious hypocrisy as 
is the case when "the man whose passion far power takes the form of 
unselfishness and benevolence, it is so easy to feel that you are 
acting out of pure unselfish desire far another person's good, when 
you really are satisfying an unconscious passion far ordering about." 
(EWW 150).
All the above are discussed in FMW 145/154. Macmurray sums-up 
emotional unreason as follows, "Perhaps these examples are sufficient 
to make the main point clear. When we feel in an unreal way, our 
feelings are turned in upon themselves. We enjoy or dislike our 
feelings, not the object or person who arouses them in us. When we 
feel in a real way, it is the object or person that we realize and 
appreciate. So I repeat - feeling is unreal when it is divorced from 
the world outside us and turned in upon itself." (Ftffl 153).
Signs of Emotional Reason
By now we should have gathered and understood what the features 
of unreason, and of reason, in emotional living are. But very 
briefly let us list a few of the signs of the emotionally mature, or 
emotionally rational, person.
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He will obviously be objective; that is, not be subjective and 
see and feel everything in terms of himself or of his in-groups. He 
will be liberated, have freedom and creativity of person, especially 
in himself and in his relationships i.e. not merely be creative in an 
artistic sense. Openness will be a feature, with no energy being 
wasted on suppression, or on the need to hide anything. He will be 
free of hang-ups, obsessions, chips on shoulder, addictions, 
compulsions, and undue prejudices. Wholeness will be a feature, and 
even if an outsider cannot observe this, he will feel it within 
himself. If you are not aware of wholeness, but feel divided or 
restrained or inhibited, you have not yet achieved emotional reason.
The last point to be mentioned, amongst many which could be 
given, is that the emotionally mature person will be empirical in all 
things. He will not be dogmatic. But empiricism is not to be 
confused with temporising, with sitting on the fence, with 
expediency. Enpiricism is not a disguise for opportunism and absence 
of firm values, feelings, and right action. These the emotionally 
mature person will always manifest. Macmurray gives his portrait of 
the emotionally reasonable and satisfactory person in BMW 155/166.
Emotional Training and Education
Emotional training, as with all training, is bound up with 
discipline. "... the training of the emotions is a disciplining of 
the instinctive reactions of the human animal." (EE 68). But as 
Macmurray instantly recognizes the key word is discipline, or rather 
what we mean by it.
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There are two forms of discipline - repression and imposed, and, 
discovered and self-imposed. To illustrate the difference Macmurray 
examples discipline of thought. Hie Medieval world imposed ideas. 
Men were told what the truth was, and everybody was disciplined to 
think this way. With the coming of the modem world this no longer 
obtained. Thought was freed.
But, and here is the vital and relevant point, this did not 
mean, or result in, indiscipline. On the contrary; greater self- 
discipline had and has to be imposed to arrive at any truth at all. 
Science, and the self-discipline, thought-wise, of the scientist, is 
the prime exanple of this. For a full account of this see RE 68/9. 
All would agree that the first, the Medieval way, is really a 
repression of thought. In fact, it destroys real thinking, which is 
to seen only in the second way, that of the modem world.” Hie 
result is a multiplicity of theories and conclusions, a continuous 
struggle between rival thinkers, a very Babel of intellectual strife. 
Yet we all agree that such freedom is the very life-blood of thought; 
and in theory, at least, we stand for the liberty of the individual 
to think for himself.” (RE 68/9).
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In the emotional field "The discipline of authority aims at 
securing the repression of types of emotion that are considered 
improper, and fostering emotioncil tendencies that are laudable and 
good." (RE 69). Such discipline is possible; and its effects and 
advantages are uniformity. Everybody knows where they stand, what 
they must feel, how they must react, how they must relate. It makes 
far "frictianless social relationships; for the maintaining of 
tradition. But it succeeds only by destroying the free spontaneity 
of emotional life." (RE 69)
But real, permanent, worthwhile discipline of emotions is of the 
other kind, equivalent to the second kind of thought. "Against this 
dogmatic authority we must set our faith in the freedom of the 
individual to feel for himself, to develop his own emotional gifts 
and graces, and to reach out towards the discovery of the value of 
life, not through the acceptance of standards of good feeling, nor 
through the inposition of intellectual conceptions of goodness upon 
his emotional life, but through the exercise of his own emotional 
capacities. That this involves discipline is certain; but it is a 
discipline of a very different kind. It is the discipline which 
comes through the continuous effort to discover the real values in 
life for oneself" (RE 69).
Emotional training and education therefore must be of a kind 
which teaches people to feel far themselves. To stress the point, 
but with much greater humility than is necessary I feel, Macmurray 
goes on to say, "We have to realize how feeble and ineffective our 
own emotional life is, and to realize that for that very reason our
- 424 -
notions of what is good feeling and what is not are also feeble and 
probably false. Then we shall perhaps begin to discover what we can 
do to develop in children the rich capacity far a spontaneous 
emotional life which has been so stunted in ourselves." (RE 70).
Maybe this was true fifty years ago. And perhaps due to Maanurray's 
training, howbeit indirectly, 1 do not feel that my emotional life is 
poor, barren, and inadequate. However; I do of course agree with the 
empirical and open approach, with living discovery and illumination, 
as opposed to imposition and authority, as the right way far the 
training of the emotions.
Having reached this point, what, according to Maanurray, must be 
the features and the guide-lines - even if not imposed - of this 
emotional training? What are the focal points, the relevant areas, 
for such education? There are two.
The first, is found in the senses. "The fundamental element in 
the development of the emotional life is the training of the capacity 
to live in the senses, to become more and mare delicately and 
completely aware of the world around us, because it is a good half of 
the meaning of life to be so." (RE 44). This is the area of our 
living and experiencing where emotional training must begin. "We 
shall then have to notice that the emotional life is inherently 
sensuous, and that the training of emotion is primarily an education 
of the senses", (RE 70). It could not be stated more directly than 
that.
However, Maanurray does appreciate the difficulty of terminology 
(see RE 37/9), which we cannot go into here. Needless to say, he 
does not mean crude sensuality but a "refined sensuality" - a phrase 
which Maanurray laudatorily quotes fran William Blake (see RE 71), -
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and an awareness which becomes more complex, rich, and satisfying as 
we learn to grow into it. "Sensibility is an integral part of human 
nature, and must be developed far its own sake. We have to train 
children to make their sensuous life rich and fine; to see far the 
sake of seeing, to hear for the sake of hearing, to smell and taste 
and touch for the joy of living in and through the fundamental 
capacities of apprehension with which we are endowed." (RE 71). And 
again. "What makes us afraid of the manifestations of sensuous life 
is its crudeness and vulgarity; and that is merely the mark of its 
primitive, undeveloped nature." (RE 71, and what follows to the 
middle of 72).
In this teaching and training two things must be avoided. We 
must honestly educate our sensual awareness far its own sake. We 
must not have half an eye on its pragmatic and practical benefits 
e.g. scientific observation, or functionalism. "As we have seen, the 
emotional life is our life, both as awareness of the world and as 
action in the world, so far as it is lived for its own sate. Its 
value lies in itself, not in anything beyond it which it is a means 
of achieving. Now, any education which is fully conscious of its 
function must refuse to treat human life as a means to an end. It 
must insist that its sole duty is to develop the inherent capacity 
for a fully human life. All true education is education in living." 
(RE 75/6). "What is of fundamental importance to keep in the centre 
of our consciousness is that the education of the emotional life, 
whether on the side of sensuous apprehension or of activities of 
expression, must have no ulterior or utilitarian motive. It is an 
education in spontaneity, and therefore both the awareness and the
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activity which it seeks to refine and cultivate are ends in 
themselves. We are seeking in this field to make children 
exquisitely aware of the world in which they live, purely for its own 
sake, because this constitutes an increase in the quality of life in 
them. We are seeking to develop a fineness of expressive activity 
because it is good in itself, not in any sense because of what may be 
achieved through it." (RE 73/4).
Secondly; there must be nothing of the intellect about it. Real 
emotional education is embodied in, and arises out of, art; art 
widely interpreted of course, and not limited to the productions of 
great and natural artists. But too much art teaching in our schools 
is taken up with talking about, listening, seeing, reading, and 
criticising works of art already existent instead of art experiencing 
and producing. ".... what is wrong with such aesthetic education as 
is normally included in the ordinary school curriculum is that it 
turns education in art into an intellectual or scientific activity, 
and becomes not a training in artistry but a training of the mind in 
the analysis and understanding of the artistry of others." (RE 74).
This leads cn to Maanurray1 s second vital element in emotional 
training. The first was the training and growth of sense experience. 
The second is spontaneous expression.
The essence of human life, as we have discussed before, is 
action not thought, intellect, or reflection. Therefore to be 
complete, to complete itself, the sharpening of sensuous experience 
achieved in the earlier stages of emotioned training, must complete 
and fulfil itself - or rather the human being as the experiencer and 
promoter of emotions must fulfil himself in action. "The reason is 
that awareness is directly related to action and that our modes of
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awareness determine our nodes of action. If we limit awareness so 
that it merely feeds the intellect with the material far thought, our 
actions will be intellectually determined. They will be mechanical, 
planned, thought-out. Our sensitiveness is being limited to a part 
of ourselves. - the brain in particular - and, therefore, we will act 
with only part of ourselves, at least so far as our actions are 
consciously and rationally determined. If, on the other hand, we 
live in awareness, seeking the full development of our sensibility to 
the world, we shall soak ourselves in the life of the world around 
us; with the result that we shall act with the whole of ourselves." 
(RE 44).
"The second field, therefore, in the education of the emotioncil 
life is the field of spontaneous expression". (RE 72). These are 
activities which are performed for their own sake, and not far any 
end beyond. They are not performed far ulterior motives. We call 
this - joy of expression, and it naturally manifests itself in dance, 
song, music, and love. Indeed in anything done not by decision or 
reflection, but by instant emotion. And again, the purpose of 
emotional education is to refine not to thwart, inhibit, or destroy, 
which is what so much of our education does. In how many people has 
the joy and spontaneity been destroyed by so-called education? 
Maanurray1 s ideas seem to resemble those practised by A.S. Neil at 
"Summerhill", and by Homer Lane, and it is strange that Maanurray 
does not mention these as evidence of the propitiousness of such 
education.
For convenience Maanurray has discussed these two aspects of 
emotioned training separately, but in fact they are, and must be seen
- 428 -
as, counterparts and as mutually essential. "Other things being 
equal, fineness of expression and fineness of sensory discrimination 
go hand in hand, so that there are not two separate trainings 
requisite, but only one, in which the development of fine sensory 
discrimination is achieved through the effort to express what is 
sensuously apprehended; and the effort to develop the sensory 
discrimination is undertaken through the effort to express it in 
activity of some kind." (RE 73).
How exactly, and in detail, is this training to be done? On 
this question Macmurray opts out. "It is not my part to determine 
the methods through which this is to be done. Those whose business 
it is to experiment with teaching methods will be able to devise such 
methods without much difficulty, provided they are clear in their 
minds what it is that they wish to develop." (RE 73). As said, a 
couple of paragraphs back, perhaps Neil's "Summerhill" would provide 
a good model far Macmurray*s emotional training ideas.
What of the failure to educate? What will be, or is, the effect 
of our obsession far education of the intellect, with its constant 
selection of intelligent students for higher education, and for lower 
gradings right down the scale, with no thought for emotional and 
value considerations unless these impede, disturb, or distort the 
workings of, and the insatiable appetite for, the ubiquitous 
intel1igence?
The effects are twofold. Firstly; obsession with power.
Secondly; the destruction of wholeness. Regarding the first, "but 
the effect of concentrating upon the education of the intellect to 
the exclusion of the education of the emotional life is precisely to 
frustrate this purpose i.e. education for living. Because the
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intellect is concerned with the means of living, the exclusive 
concentration upon its training, and the relegation of the emotional 
life to a subordinate position, can only result in making our pupils 
capable of determining the means to human life and very little of 
living it. It will inevitably create an instrumental conception of 
life, in which all human activity will be valued as a means to an 
end, never for itself. When it is the persistent and universal 
tendency in any society to concentrate upon the intellect and its 
training, the result will be a society which amasses power, and with 
power the means to the good life, but which has no correspondingly 
developed capacity for living the good life for which it has amassed 
the means. This is, to my mind, very obviously the state in which we 
now find ourselves. We have immense power, and immense resources; we 
worship efficiency and success; and we do not know how to live 
finally. I should trace this condition of affairs almost wholly to 
our failure to educate our emotioncil life." (RE 76). Who would deny 
that that does not say it all?
As for the second, the loss of wholeness, Maanurray says, "ihe 
intellect, because it is instrumental, can only deal with life 
piecemeal. It must divide and it must abstract. It is in the 
emotional life that the unity of personality, both its individual and 
its social unity, is realized and maintained. It is in emotional 
activity that this unity is expressed. Emotion is the unifying 
factor in life. The failure to develop the emotional life will 
therefore result in abstraction and division; in a failure to see 
life steadily and as a while. When the intellect takes charge, the 
inevitable result is specialization, the erection of particular
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aspects of human activity into complete conceptions of life, the 
substitution of the part far the whole, A practical disintegration 
of life, a disjointedness in conception and in practice is the 
consequence. Both the individual and society will be infected with 
the narrow vision of the specialist, which makes balance and rhythm 
and wholeness unrealizable and even inconceivable. Here again our 
own failure to educate the emotional life shews itself in the 
competition of desires within us which we cannot coordinate; and in 
the competition of rival claims and interests, factions and nations, 
within our society. Though circumstances have forced upon us the 
intellectual realization of the necessity far achieving unity and 
wholeness in the social life, national and international, we find 
ourselves incapable of achieving the unity which we so urgently and 
consciously need." (RE 77).
Earlier I mentioned wholeness as a sign of emotional reason and 
maturity. The above paragraph obviously endorses what was said 
there. Everywhere we look, from international to personal relations, 
from those in society who are apparently sane and normal to those 
obviously adversely affected by drugs, addictions, alcoholism, mental 
illness, relational problems, and numerous other anti-social 
tendencies, evidence is there far all to see - who will see.
Appraisement (1)
1) It must be mentioned, and the blame cannot be put at the 
door of Macmurray, although it does interfere with the full 
appreciation, understanding, and a right evaluation of his work, that 
despite modern psychology having existed for at least ninety years
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there is an unbelievable inprecision about its terminology and the 
very loose usage thereof. Reason is but one example of this. 
Sometimes it seems to mean an inbuilt mental structure within each 
and every human mind; sometimes it is mere ratiocination; at another 
time it is nothing of itself, but the process or attitude of seeing 
all things external to ourselves as they really are and not as we 
would wish them to be.
Feeling is another variable term. Maanurray would have done a 
great service if he had attempted, as perhaps he might have done as a 
philosopher, to stabilize such terms and give them a single meaning, 
at least within his cwn works.
2) Following, and to illustrate especially the last point, 
mention must be made of thinking. In life and everyday use, thinking 
is, as we all recognise, utterly chaotic. Thinking may be used to 
indicate anything going on in our heads to the most precise and exact 
form of logic, reasoning, and ratiocination. And of course, every 
other type of mental1 activity between these extremes.
But, and this particularly applies as a comment upon Maanurray, 
that whilst he mainly uses and understands thinking not in the very 
limited sense of ratiocination, nor in the sense of everything going 
on in our heads, but in a sort of inbetween sense, he seems always to 
contrast it with emotion and feeling. Cannon and universal as this 
analysis may be it seems to me to be fundamentally wrong. Save where 
thought is pure ratiocination and exercised upon a totally objective 
matter, as say in mathematics, it must always contain an element of 
emotion, however small.
And, needless to say, most of our thinking contains, even if 
unknown to ourselves, or even strenuously denied by us, a large
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proportion of emotion. And the further we move from thinking about 
mathematical and scientific to political, social, religious, and 
moral matters the more emotion it contains. For a fuller account of 
this see my "Practical Philosophy" (Gateway 1982). This, i.e. the 
separation of thought and emotion, is a very common error; but once 
made - as Macmurray undoubtedly makes it - how far does it, being 
erroneous, vitiate all the subsequent contentions based upon it?
(3) It seems to me that a very big problem surrounds 
Maanurray*s idea of free thinking and free feeling. Let me say at 
once that of course they are good, essential and right. Only in this 
free situation can we be, or rather have an opportunity of becoming, 
fully human, fully personal, and what it is in us to became.
But the situation is not as simple as Macmurray makes out. To 
illustrate again from thinking. The Renaissance did free thought, 
and enable science as its foremost exanple, to be created. But we 
did not, as a result, all become scientists each discovering and 
thinking out the truth for himself. Far from it. Even today, when 
education is widespread, knowledge is discovered by about one thinker 
in a million, whilst the other 999,999 of us accept what the one 
discoverer says. And he says this in a similar, if not identical, 
way to the Medieval s. Most of us have no idea hew we could ever 
discover anything for ourselves.
About other things, such as politics, morals, and education, we 
do 'choose', but only within a very narrow band; and no ideas of this 
kind have been discovered for ourselves.
The upshot of this is twofold. One; if left to our own devices 
could we discover real feelings and values without being told what
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these are, or at least what the alternatives are, and what we should 
be looking for? I doubt it. Secondly; and here I think Macmurray 
might - I do not want to be dogmatic about this as the whole question 
deserves a treatise to itself - have made a mistake in his analogy. 
Thought can discover the facts and the truth about the world. For 
example, it can discern that water is H20. That is how it is out 
there; and the same with millions of other facts. But are values and 
right emotional responses anywhere, whether external qr internal to 
ourselves, and waiting to be discovered? I very much doubt it.
They are obviously different from material facts, which is 
freely admitted, but are they not also of a different kind and order, 
such that they are, and cannot be, discovered just by the exercise in 
freedom, of anybody's search far emotional truth? It may be that in 
real freedom, and with the right intent (itself a value), we can grow 
into right emotional and value attitudes, although this might be 
doubted. But that they already exist and are waiting only to be 
discovered seems to me inprobable.
Is Macmurray, unconsciously, merely reverting to the old Greek 
value trilogy of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth - with their perfect 
'farms1 laid-up in heaven, waiting only to be discovered and 
recognised?
4) Bearing in mind Maanurray's wide-ranging ideas on religion 
and psychology, nothing is more surprising - and this is no sudden 
surprise for me; I have been baffled by it for several decades - than 
Macmurray's main, indeed almost only, discernment regarding emotional 
education and training.
He advises, you will remember, the sharpening of our sensuous 
experience, and the expression of this as, and in, art - very widely
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understood, of course. Admittedly this is a very essential and wise 
advice. It will help to counter balance excessive intellectual ism. 
But is emotion no more than this? And can other aspects be left to 
themselves provided this one step is adequately and satisfactorily 
taken? One would think not.
A very major part of emotional life, as Maanurray would be the 
first to admit, concerns relationships and relating. And what of 
religion? Has he not said, "The roots of religion are in the 
emotioned life". (FMW 57). Surely than it is not illogical to 
conclude the converse, namely that our emotional life is grounded in 
religion? What training has Maanurray offered far this vital field?
And ignoring whether we are sensuous and need to emotionally 
express ourselves, what of the whole vast area and experience - and 
problems - of our own insides, our inner private life and feelings? 
Surely both relational and inner training, properly devised, would be 
the biggest step in our society which we could make towards providing 
satisfactory, happy, and unharming persons.
Whilst, as we have seen, Macmurray opted out of giving advice in 
training details, he could have indicated, more than he has dene, the 
broad conspectus necessary for full emotional growth and development. 
His pointers seem much too narrow, important as they admittedly are.
5) Teachers are a popular target far emotional immaturity and 
Maanurray does not fail to add his slap. "One of the first results 
of such a fundamental change of attitude would be, I doubt not, that 
we should recognize that it is as ridiculous to put the emotional 
training of children in the hands of teachers whose emotional life is 
of a low grade or poorly developed, as it is to commit their
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intellectual education to teachers who are intellectually 
unintelligent and stupid." (RE 70). But it should be recognised - 
and I am a little sorry that Maanurray does not do this - that many 
more people, especially in these days of the mass madia and 
cannunicaticns, are influencing children's and adult's emotional 
life, and to a far greater degree than teachers are.
Journalists, writers, pop stars, politicians, entertainers, 
exhibitionists of all kinds, criminals, so-called artists, and 
parents immediately come to mind. Of course we want mature teachers. 
But mare than this we want mature and emotionally developed people, 
with satisfactory values, in influential and responsible positions of 
all kinds, and at all levels. And these we are certainly not 
getting. It is these who are creating the social setting and ethos; 
and it is they who are to blame, if anybody, for failing to become 
emotionally mature themselves, and induce society at large so to 
become.
6) One last comment. On page 88 of FMW. Macmurray; as we have 
seen here earlier, gives his views on pretence, hypocrisy, and 
sentimentality. One major point here was our pretence concerning 
democracy. Whilst accepting that democracy, as we practice it, is 
not the pure, chaste, and perfect god we so complacently and self- 
satisfyingly pride ourselves on it being, it does not, nevertheless 
seem to justify quite the cynicism and scorn Maanurray seems to heap 
upon it.
We all ought to see, which few do, that democracy is not 
complete, finished, and satisfactory yet. It is still rather 
limited, blunt, and unrefined. Moreover, it has yet to move out into 
many more areas of our living. But in decrying it, in the way
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Maanurray does, democrat as he is, seems to be over-stepping the 
boundary of emotional reason.
End of appraisement (1)
Fear
A Major Concern
Whilst Maanurray never devotes a whole chapter to fear, 
reference to it occurs frequently throughout his works, often 
covering many consecutive pages - sufficient indication that fear is 
an important thing in Macmurray's thought. Why this is so is not 
easy to discern. It may be an objectively recognised and relevant 
theme of his. But one feels that it is rather more than this. Yet, 
on the other hand, it does not amount to obsession or eccentricity. 
Perhaps, as with all writers and thinkers, what they choose to 
concern themselves with is deeply rooted, and often obscure. Even 
they may not be aware of their own psychological source or motive.
Fear for Maanurray is a wholly bad thing, and something to be 
removed or overcome. "Fear is the disease, the one root-disease, of 
human life" (PMW 61).
Ncwhere does Maanurray appear to appreciate its value as a 
necessary factor in human survival. When he does distinguish between 
animal and human fear this is not, as we shall see, a distinction 
between essential and inessential fear, but of kind and origin. He 
does not recognise the place, let alone the necessity, of animal fear 
in man; or, if he does, never refers to it. Yet one feels that he is
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not automatically assuming this and therefore finds it not worth 
mentioning, Man presumably has no animal fear.
Be that as it may, what is the difference between: -
Animal and Human Fear
Animal fear is instinctive, and is felt instantly and 
immediately, and is only felt in response to physical threat and 
danger. It occurs solely for survival, and produces the effect of 
flight or petrification. It is purely biological and natural; a 
stimulus-response situation. When the danger is over fear passes and 
attention focused upon the next current biological need and activity. 
".... animal fear is confined to the perception of the immediate here 
and now. The immediate recognition of a present danger arouses the 
instinct of fear and produces the activity, or the paralysis of 
activity, which is naturally adapted to meet the needs of self- 
preservation. (CS 45). "Animal fear comes and goes with the 
appearance and disappearance of immediate danger." (CS 46).
Human fear is totally different, both in origin and response. 
Human beings have much wider and far-ranging mental faculties, which 
include a much fuller awareness, self-consciousness, imagination, 
reasoning, wide knowledge, foresight, together with the capacity to 
be ‘living now' in the past, present, and future. Because of this 
human fear does not appear only at times of Immediate physical 
danger, but - because of the range and scope of both visual and 
emotional, mental life - pervades the human consciousness, sometimes 
to the extent of excluding all other thoughts and emotions. No 
threat of any perceptible or tangible kind is, or need be, present.
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"But with the appearance of reason this limitation to the immediate 
present is broken. Consciousness becomes prophetic, and knowledge 
gains capacity to see past, present, and future at once. This has an 
immediate effect upon the instinctive emotions. They appear in 
consciousness as determinants of action not merely in relation to the 
immediate situation, but in reference to the whole range of possible 
situations which foresight reveals. Fear, therefore, in human 
consciousness, is not an instinctive emotion which appears with the 
immediate threat of danger, but a pervasive attitude, referring to 
the whole range of possible danger which the foresight of rational 
knowledge reveals to consciousness." (CS 45/6). "Human fear is a 
pervasive element in all human consciousness, because it is the 
response of consciousness to the recognition of the pervasiveness of 
danger to the self in all situations, or in the nature of life as a 
whole" (CS 46). "The fear which reason produces is inherent in human 
life. Human activity is action in the light of knowledge, and it is 
this knowledge that,is the source of human fear." (CS 47). See also 
CS 98/9.
The Effects of Human Fear
Human fear does psychologically and socially, as it were, all 
the things animal fear does physically and biologically. It either 
thwarts action, or causes running away. And essentially, in human 
terms, this means a refusal to cooperate, commune, or participate 
with, one's fellows. It means a defensive attitude to life and to 
people, a withdrawal; it means isolation, and is the cause of 
individualism and egocentricity. As we saw earlier, the great human
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thing far Maanurray is communion; union and harmony with, and 
throughout, all humanity. "Life is, in its nature, spontaneous 
activity. To be alive is to express, in an unembarrassed oanmerce 
with the world outside us, the life that is in us in action. Fear 
freezes the spontaneity of life. The mare fear there is in us, the 
less alive we are. Fear accomplishes this destruction of life by 
turning us in upon ourselves and so isolating us from the outside 
world. That sense of individual isolation which is so common in the 
modem world, which is often called 'individualism1, is one of the 
inevitable expressions of fear. I should like to call it 
'egocentricity'. Selfishness and self-consciousness are expressions 
of the same thing. A life which is fear-determined is a life which 
is fundamentally on the defensive. It is permeated by the feeling of 
being alone in an hostile world; with the result that all its 
energies are directed towards building up a defence - what the 
psychologists nowadays call a system of defence-mechanisms - against 
the world. In this>condition our heart's demand is for security, for 
protection, for some kind of salvation from the hostility of the 
world." (FMW 59). "The root problem of human action lies here. Fear 
is unlike all other emotions because it is negative. It is not a 
positive motive for action, but a motive for the inhibition of 
action. The permanent pervasion of consciousness by fear signifies 
the continuous presence of an inpulse to refrain from action and to 
suppress it." (CS 46).
Fear also destroys freedom. We cannot be free if we are in the 
grip of so strong an emotion, requiring and compelling us to be both 
conscious of only one thing and to escape from one thing. "... fear 
inhibits action and destroys freedom." (FR 159) It is easy to see,
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therefore, why Maanurray regards fear as mankind's major self- 
inflicted enemy, and why we must be rid of it at all costs.
Fear and Death
Maanurray sees death involved in this in two ways. Firstly; the 
prime fear is that of death. Maanurray, if we ferret out his meaning 
aright, seems not to mean that we are afraid of dying itself, but 
that death is the ultimate and personal condition to which fear is 
ever driving us i.e. isolation and complete lack of human contact. 
This would seem to argue - which Maanurray does not either see nor 
does for us - that really we do not want to be afraid. If we were 
so afraid of the fear of death, we would very soon see, far our own 
comfort and ease of mind, that we did not experience fear far any 
other, less extreme cause or reason. ".... fear of death is the 
symbol of all human fear." (CS 46). "What religion has called 
spiritual death, or 'eternal death, is a continuous dominance of a 
rational consciousness by fear, the perversion of the mind by the 
death principle in life itself." (CS 46/7). See also CS 37.38.
Secondly; death _is that condition, even if we are still living, 
where fear has taken over. Perhaps the classification is too sharp, 
but Maanurray divides men into those who are fear-ridden and those 
who are fear-free; those who are life-denying and those who are life- 
affirming; those who are alive and those who are dead. Too sharp or 
not, we all recognise and knew people who fall into these categories. 
Never more so, perhaps, than today, when countless people cannot do 
anything without a tablet, drink, or 'fix'I "New there are two, and I 
think only two, emotional attitudes through which life can be
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radically determined. They are love and fear. Love is the positive 
principle, fear the negative. Love is the principle of life, while 
fear is the death principle in us. I mean that literally." (FMW 58. 
There is very much more of this, relevant to, and endorsing, the 
above paragraph; and should be read). "There is only one secure 
defence against life, and that is death. Hie person who lives on the 
defensive is really seeking death, seeking to escape from life. And 
most of us succeed only too well, and wake up late in life to 
discover we have never really lived at all." (FMW 60). "There is 
thus a close psychological connexion between fear and death in human 
behaviour. Life is activity, and depends upcn the continuous 
presence of positive motive for action. Death is the natural 
suppression of the activity in which life consists. Fear is the 
presence in a living consciousness of the suppression of the life- 
activity." (CS 45).
But here we must add an anomalous note. Despite the fact that 
Maanurray refers to death a number of times as our major fear, it 
must be recorded that once elsewhere he, rather incongruously, 
proposes something else as our prime fear, ".... the most fundamental 
fear in human life is the fear of changing the structural habits of 
society". (BS 53). I cannot account for this anomaly, although it 
must be conceded that this is a very pronounced and common fear in 
most human beings, even if it is mainly unconscious and less openly 
acknowledged.
Returning to the main point. This adverse effect of fear 
applies not only to individuals but to to societies. Most societies 
are fear-ridden and fear-determined. When a society is positively
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and life-affirmingly motivated we notice it at once. Macmurray gives 
the first Elizabethans as an example. "Now most of us, and therefore 
our societies in general, are fear-determined in this way. There are 
a few great periods in our history, like the Elizabethan Age, far 
example, when the fear-principle seems to have been temporarily 
relaxed, and when the spontaneity of life reasserted itself. Then 
men and women did great things and lived naturally and creatively, 
it is worth noting that it is only rarely in individuals and more 
rarely in societies that human life exhibits itself in its proper 
nature, when it is not mastered and inhibited by fear.” (FMW 59/60).
The Increase of Fear
It is knowledge, reason, and imagination which brings to us as 
human beings fear of a special kind. But it does not stop there. As 
man progresses in knowledge, technology, and mutual dependence, fear 
inevitably increases. This is contrary to what we would 
conventionally think. More knowledge, we believe, will help us to 
overcome fear. Not so, says Macmurray. More knowledge increases 
fear.
Whereas in the past, to give but one example of countless which 
could be given, a man with his own plot had only to fear the arrival, 
or non-arrival, of rain at the right time. New society, and the 
supply of our needs, are so complex that a failure of one small part 
of the chain can cause widespread havoc. "The full significance of 
this can only become apparent when we take into account the 
development of human life. That development increases fear by 
increasing knowledge of Nature and of man. It also increases the
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interdependence of man and the dependence of man on Nature. A highly 
industrialized society is far more dependent upon the inter-relation 
of human activities, and upon the natural stores of material for 
human life, than a primitive agricultural community. The knowledge 
of this intricate interdependence is in itself a knowledge of the 
increase of the individual's helplessness in the face of threats to 
his life." (CS 40).
However what we have discussed so far is only, as it were, the 
physical aspect. There is the overall psychological aspect as well 
which adds another dimension. "But there is more than this involved. 
For in the course of development, the mere fear of physical death 
becomes the symbolic centre of the fear for the self. What is 
threatened by life is the whole delicate nexus of possessions and 
interests and values with which the individual has identified 
himself. Self-preservation for the human individual means much more 
than the preservation of physical existence. It comes to mean the 
guarding and defence of all that is dear and significant to him, of 
all that gives meaning to his existence. The more extensive and 
subtle the self-hood becomes, the more numerous and subtle became the 
threats of its destruction from other individuals and from the 
changes of natural conditions." (CS 40/1). Other relevant references 
which should be read are CS 51/2 and CS 99.
Fear seems to be our lot whatever we dol Is there no way to 
overcome it?
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Overcoming Fear
Before discussing real ways of mastering fear we must mention 
the mistaken ways. These include trying to renounce or forget the 
ways of knowledge, and attempting to return to the state of supposed 
innocence. This is impossible because once we know we cannot unkncw. 
Moreover, the essence of our humanity, the heart of the personal, is 
to know and to be aware in a special way. All attempts at reversions 
are but illusions, unrealities; as too is another false way we meet 
fear, namely the very widespread idea that we will not, or do not, 
die.
Presumably this means die permanently, for the most starry-eyed 
person cannot help but see that everybody goes through the physical 
process of departing. "If the fear of death is the universal symbol 
of all human fear, one way of dealing with that fear and its effects 
must be to deny the reality of that which is feared. To do this is 
to substitute falsehood for truth. So long as a religious doctrine 
of immortality is taken to signify the unreality of death, it is a 
devil's doctrine. For to deny the reality of death is to deny the 
reality of knowledge which is the expression of human reason. It 
implies the denial of the reality of all human knowledge; the 
assertion that the world which we know is illusion. This can only be 
achieved by constructing an imaginary world of illusion and asserting 
that jit is reality. The escape from fear which is achieved in this 
way is an illusory escape. While it seems to deliver man from the 
fear of death, what it actually does is to deliver man from the 
reality of life." (CS 50). Subsequent pages should also be read.
"The desire of man to escape from fear through the way of illusion
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expresses itself in a desire to return to the pre-rational, or sub- 
rational, state of animal existence. The warship of the primitive, 
the deification of childhood, the craving to get back to Nature, are 
all expressions of this desire to escape frcm the reality of 
developing knowledge." (CS 52).
But even if we accept new knowledge, fear still so often 
prevails. We then cling to the old values which, in relation to the 
new knowledge, creates chaos. Surely this is something we are 
experiencing today i.e. over the last thirty years. "Nearly all 
important advances in human life are met by a reactionary movement 
which finds the supreme values and achievements of human life in the 
past. The reason far this is simple. The solution of the problem of 
fear at any stage of human development establishes the present as the 
familiar and the kncwn. The development of knowledge demands an 
advance in the forms of human life which involves a step into the 
unknown. Fear reasserts itself as the fear of the unknown and is 
met, in pseudo-religion, by the assertion of the reality of the 
familiar and the established." (CS 52/3).
Fear, to turn to the mare positive side, can according to 
Maanurray be overcome in three ways, although they are very closely 
related.
The first way is by faith. In Maanurray* s thinking this means 
an attitude of, and life-direction in, trusting and confidence, not a 
belief or dogma; although these may, of course, indirectly create 
confidence within you. Needless to say, Maanurray regards Jesus as 
the exemplification of such a faith. "What is the solution which 
Jesus discovered far the problem of fear? There can be ndoubt that
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he was throughout concerned with it. There are numerous expressions 
which shew that he looked upon fear and the isolation and self- 
defence to which it gives rise, as unnatural. He expresses amazement 
at the lack of faith which he finds among men. It leads him into 
expressions of an almost exaggerated intensity. 'If you have faith,1 
he says, 'as a grain of mustard seed ye shall say to the mountain, Be 
thou removed and be thou cast into the depths of the sea; and it 
shall be done'. Faith is his name for that attitude of consciousness 
which is completely triumphant over fear, far which the world is home 
and there is no sense of isolation or helplessness. Faith is far him 
the natural condition of human consciousness and it expresses itself 
in the control of the material world." (CS 109).
As an exanple of faith in the self-belief sense helping to 
provide this we may quote, "Perhaps the fundamental component of a 
belief in God is the expression in action of an attitude of faith or 
trust. Its opposite is an attitude of fear. A man who is on the 
defensive in his attitude to life does not believe in God, whatever 
his professions may be. Belief in God necessarily delivers a man 
from fear and from self -centredness, because it is his consciousness 
that he is not responsible for himself nor for the world in which he 
lives. It involves the recognition that his cwn life is a small, yet 
an essential part of the history of mankind, and that the life of 
mankind is a small but essential part of the universe to which it 
belongs. It involves the recognition that the control and the 
determination of all that happens in the world lies in the hands of a 
pcwer that is irresistible and yet friendly. It is more than the 
recognition of this; it is the capacity to live as if this were so.
It is the habit of living in the light of this faith." (CS 20/1).
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But although faith may be the answer Macmurray does not end on 
an encouraging note. "But how does one begin to grew faith? I must 
confess that if there is an answer to that question, I do not know 
it. I do not think there is one". (EMW 67).
The second way to reduce or eradicate fear is by human 
integration. "The continuous increase in the sense of individual 
isolation must be offset by a continuous increase in the sense of 
integration with man and with nature." (CS 41). But it must be real 
and personal integration. The negativism of Hobbes - which Macmurray 
discusses at length in PR 134/140 - will not do. Hie so-called 
society created out of fear is no society at all. Only community, 
which alone must of its nature, be founded on love, can banish fear.
But equally, such a ccmnunity cannot be founded on backslapping 
and Christian name calling - so typical of our society today! '*Ndw, 
there is one kind of defence to which I must draw your attention, 
because of its importance and its peculiar deadliness. It is the 
provision of what the psychologists call escape-mechanisms, but which 
is more simply called pretence or make-believe. We resort to 
imaginary activities and pretend they are real ones. Far example, we 
pretend that we are enjoying life by working ourselves into a state 
of excitement. We slap one another on the back and call one another 
by our Christian names to pretend that we are really in touch with 
one another, and to cheat the feeling of emptiness and isolation that 
gnaws at our vitals. And the sociability, the energy and activity 
that we create in this way is spurious. It commits us to unreality. 
It is the expression of our fear of being alone, not of our love of 
being together. It is the activity of death, not of life, and to
- 448 -
anyone who has eyes to see it gives itself away by its mechanical 
nature. Every real expression of life is an expression of positive 
spontaneity and works from within outwards." (M/ 61).
And here, arising out of the last point of human integration and 
cannunity, we reach the third and major way of overcoming fear - 
religion. "All religion is grappling with fear." (PMW 62). "The 
function of religion is then to mobilize and strengthen the positive 
element in the motivation of its members, to overcome the negative 
motives where they exist, to prevent the outbreak of enmity and 
strife, to dominate the fear of the Other, and subordinate the 
centrifugal to the centripetal tendencies in the community. If then 
we take into account the development of society from the small, 
primitive family or kinship group to an ever greater inclusiveness, 
which in our own time is approaching universality, we may define the 
function of religion as being to create, maintain, and deepen the 
community of persons and to extend it without limit, by the 
transformation of negative motives and by eliminating the dominance 
of fear in human relations." (PR 163). "The development of religion 
is the condition of the development of humanity." (CS 41).
"Religion is the effort of human consciousness to deal with the 
knowledge of death and to overcome the fear of it. It is the 
expression of man's quest for eternal life, for a life that has 
overcome the fear of death finally and for ever." (CS 37/8). 
"Salvation from the fear of death must thus include the reintegration 
of the individual with his fellows and the reintegration of man with 
Nature, in the light of the full consciousness of death. This is the 
task of religion." (CS 39).
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But, warns Macmurray, there is true and false or pseudo 
religion. Most of it to date has been of the latter kind. Religion, 
the instrument of release fran fear, has become based on fear. Not 
only have we the expression - one of dozens which could be relevantly 
quoted - "To live in the fear of the Lard", but most Victorian 
religion and its long aftermath, is based on fear. Together with its 
inevitable accompaniment, feelings of guilt. Equally religion can be 
regarded as a "comforting illusion, an escape mechanism. It helps us 
to imagine that the world is not hostile; it promises us help and 
comfort and recompense for what we suffer. Others will say that 
religion is a dope. It drugs our sense of the evil and suffering of 
our lives with illusions - of free-will, immortality, happiness and 
so forth - and so makes us resigned to the evils which are our 
natural portion. What are we to say of this? The honest answer 
seems to me to be that it is true of nearly all the religion that the 
world has known." (FMW 62).
True religion, Macmurray asserts, will not protect you. But it 
will rid you of fear. "We can distinguish real religion from unreal 
by contrasting their formulae for deeding negative motivation. The 
maxim of illusory religion runs: 'Fear not; trust in God and He will
see that none of the things you fear will happen to you1; that of 
real religion, on the contrary, is 'Fear not; the things that you are 
afraid of are quite likely to happen to you, but they are nothing to 
be afraid of1." (PR 171). For a full account of this unusual 
interpretation see PMW 63/4.
As stated earlier Macmurray has much to say on fear. Whilst not 
being one of his major themes, it finds a considerable place in his 
secondary considerations.
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Appraisement (2)
1) Is all animal fear only immediate? This we cannot know. 
Scientific investigation may have something to say about it. But 
from ordinary observation and knowledge it would not seem to be true, 
especially amongst higher animals. Not only do they instinctively 
prepare and protect themselves fran danger and attacks yet unseen, 
but can seem to be danger-conscious and ill-at-ease when not 
immediately threatened. Some creatures seem to ooze anticipated 
trouble, and are obviously apprehensive.
2) And as complementary to the last point, as it were, have 
humans no animal fears? Much of our fear is anticipatory and mental, 
but surely we can be filled by animal fear; far example, when 
suddenly confronted and surprised by a car rushing towards us, or a 
burglar standing over us in bed with a raised club, in the middle of 
the night. Admittedly, all phobias, and even knowledge of the 
effects of disease in us, are rightly seen as human fear. Animals 
would not have them.
3) Most, if not all, of Macmurray's human fear, seems to stem 
from our fellows and relationships - or lack of then. Get these 
right, through community and religion, and fear will banish. Now; 
important as other human beings are in this respect, they are not the 
sole source of our fears. As already mentioned, we may fear chronic 
illness, disablement, or other incapacities. It seems to me that 
these are of a different order from fear of loss of work, love, 
money, and friends. With a developed resilience we can meet these, 
but the former are more difficult, especially in dealing with their 
accompanying fear.
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Moreover, the main fear we have in connection with these is that 
of pain. Whatever therefore is the use of Macmurray saying that your 
attitude to these things should be not that it will happen to you - 
it will I - but when it does happen there is nothing to fear? Tell 
that to a cancer victiml
And regarding fear of our fellows. Surely we ought to fear them 
for our own security. Ought we not to fear the terrorist or the 
mugger? And fear for our children* s safety in face of the sexual 
pervert?
Once again, as we have seen before in other contexts, language 
distinctions come into it. This so often happens and ought to be 
much more recognised than it is. Perhaps, in the last example, 
fearfulness for our children is not quite the right term. Better, 
for example, to call it rational watchfulness or reasonable wariness. 
But in all his writings Macmurray makes not one attempt to either 
define fear or, if not to define it, then tell us how is using the 
term. This is definitely a failing on his part. Nor can we be sure 
that he uses fear always in the same sense, whatever that may be. 
Until this happens i.e. until there is some definition or meaning 
given, all we can do is to take his teachings and interpret them as 
we will. We may even benefit from them. But we can never be sure we 
have understood them aright.
4) Is fear of death our biggest fear? And is it, as Macmurray 
suggests, the epitome, the symbolic embodiment and exemplification of 
all fear? Personally, I am aggrieved that by death I shall cease to 
be experiencing, cease to be relating, cease to be feeling, cease to 
be knowing, and ceasing to be a part of "all this" - whatever "this"
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is. But I do not think I fear death. I much more fear the possible 
horrors leading to it.
On this point of death we must say that concerning this supposed 
fear associated with it, our understanding of Macmurray's view may be 
less exact than he intended. Either it may be his usage of language 
which is ambiguous and inexact, or, something which may be peculiar 
to Macmurray; and, of course, to millions like him who do fear death. 
But this is not necessarily cannon to all mankind, as he is so 
obviously pronouncing it to be.
End of Appraisement (2)
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HISTORY
Relevant Books
Clue to History (CH)
The Self as Agent (SA)
Persons in Relation (PR)
Interpreting the Universe (IU)
Introduction
In studying Macmurray, reading his books, and discerning his 
thought, you would get the impression that religion, psychology, 
science, Marxism, and freedom are his major interests. And so they 
are. These things permeate the whole of his work.
But although he' does not emphasise it, a deeper study reveals 
that history commands a considerable place in Macmurray1 s thought, a 
place probably equal to or greater than does art, another theme 
holding only a secondary place for him. This first impression, of 
relative unconcern for history, may be due to the fact that only one 
book, "The Clue to History" has been devoted to it; and then, despite 
the title, this could really be seen as a major work on religion 
rather than on history. And reference to history elsewhere - except 
for the Marxist interpretation of history - is limited to part of two 
other chapters, and these without 'history1 in the title.
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Yet from his own mouth the importance of history is proclaimed, 
and to our surprise, when we read, "Historical reflection is the 
matrix of all modes of reflection. They arise from it and return to 
it again". (SA 214). And again. ".... if we first consider one of 
the unreflective disciplines which we have hitherto left unexamined, 
and which, in its own way, underlies and encloses all others. I 
refer to history." (SA 204). Having been conditioned by Macmurray's 
own thinking to believe in the paramountcy of religion, science, and 
art as the prime forms of reflection, this comes indeed as a shock.
There have been philosophies based on, and highly related to, 
history, especially those of the Italians Croce and Gentile, the 
German Dilthey, and in England Rosanquet. And there is, of course a 
very notable branch of speculative thinking, the philosophy of 
history. But there are very few philosophers, apart from the above, 
and Marx, who take history too seriously or entwine it with their 
basic notions. And although, as we have seen, Macmurray is, or was 
at one time, a Marxist, his interpretation of history is wholly 
different. Yet to incorporate history into his philosophy is what 
Macmurray has done. Indeed; although not totally or absolutely so, 
perhaps it is probable that his philosophy, especially his religious 
philosophy, could be seen as dependent upon, or even arising out of, 
his interpretation of history.
But although his interpretation of history is important, this is 
not the only thing he has to say about history and allied matters.
He speaks, for example, of the relationship of philosophy to the 
actual social historical process; and of the study, origin, purpose, 
role, and function of history, and of its ecology in the realm of 
reflecting in general. It is this aspect with which we will begin.
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What History Is
As we would expect of Macmurray, and which applies to all 
thinkers on any subject, no one thing, sentence, or notion can 
summarise Macmurray's idea of what history is. Only a number of 
statements and explanations can do this. And included in these are:- 
History is action.
History is a mode of reflection; it is a reflective 
discipline.
History partakes of both art and science.
History is the construction of a public memory.
History is the comprehending and understanding of the 
continuity of human intention.
History is all-inclusive.
History signifies that the world is one action.
There can be no definitive history.
Let us consider some of these, either separately, or together as 
relevant.
That history, looked at in one way, is a mode of reflection is 
self-evident. It is something we mentally visualise and create. As 
a reflective activity history does not exist 'out there* but in us.
It is an imaginative reconstruction and interpretation of what we 
take to be happening, or to have happened, in that part of existence 
which is external to ourselves, but of which at the same time, and 
perhaps ambiguously or paradoxically, we are a part. What we are 
reflecting upon may be something which we have immediately 
experienced of externality; but usually, because of its 
extensiveness, we can only know of it indirectly and at secondhand.
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Even if we were involved e.g. drove a tank in the Libyan Desert 
during World War Two, our direct experience historically is so 
limited that most of our knowledge of this event in which we had so 
participated, would be reflective and secondhand, an imaginative 
reconstruction.
But, and here we come to the first point in the list above, 
history may, in one sense, be a reflective discipline, but this 
reflection is based on action. History, the subject matter, or that 
which is reflected upon, is action. "History, then, is concerned 
with action, in the sense that the subject matter of the historian's 
reflection is the doings of men in the world." (SA 205). " ...
history is concerned with action, and any attempt to determine its 
place among the reflective disciplines from a purely theoretical 
point of view involves itself in insuperable difficulties." (SA 205).
New action, as we have seen previously, has a special meaning 
for Macmurray. Action, you will remember from the section on Agency, 
is a human act based on intention. Action is contrasted with events, 
which are just happenings. Events are caused. Actions have reasons 
and motives. Events are impersonal. Actions are personal. History 
is, and can only be, about action. To illustrate this difference in 
historical terms Macmurray refers to the Battle of Waterloo.. "If I 
say that the Battle of Waterloo happened in 1815, I may be tempted to 
ask what caused it; and in my answer to treat human decisions and 
intentions as mere matter of fact. It will be safer to say that the 
battle was fought in 1815, far then language will itself suggest the 
proper historical questions, "Who fought it?", and, "What were they 
fighting about?" (SA 206).
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Where occasionally events do have relevance for history e.g. a 
major earthquake, it is because of their significance for men. They 
have no historical relevance or meaning of themselves. "Here the 
distinction between 'action' and 'process', between 'what is done' 
and 'what happens', is of primary significance. What merely happens 
lies outside the historian's province. He is concerned with natural 
events and organic processes only in so far as they enter into the 
activities of human beings and play their part in setting the field 
for human decisions". (SA 205). And again. "Natural events, as 
such, do not enter into history. But the knowledge of them does; and 
even our speculations about the unknown add their quota to the 
determination of our intentions in action. Nature itself, we have 
seen, with all her events and processes, organic or inorganic, is an 
ideal abstraction. So far as natural events enter into human 
experience they modify human action, and so come within the scope of 
history." (SA 206).
History and Evolution
Not only is the foregoing a fact in itself but it cannot be 
over-emphasised in relation to a mistaken development which has 
occurred in historical understanding over the last one hundred and 
thirty years; and it probably goes back further, to stem frcm Hegel. 
History is not, nor ought to be seen and paralleled with, evolution. 
Nor with the counterpart of evolution, the organic. "To affirm the 
organic conception in the personal field is implicitly to deny the 
possibility of action; yet the meaning of the conception of the 
personal lies in its reference to action.". (PR 46. This is but the
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briefest quotation, pp. 45 to 47 should be read.)
Once this is drawn to our attention we immediately realise how 
widespread, even if unconscious, this mistake is. Evolution, and the 
organic, stimulated historical studies in the 19th century, and are 
to be commended for so doing. But, properly understood, evolution 
and history are miles apart, and are certainly not to be identified. 
Nor are they interchangeable conceptions.
The reason why they cannot be identified we have just noted. 
History is a human, personal, and intentional activity. "History is, 
then essentially personal; and it exhibits the form of the personal". 
(SA 211). It is not an adaptation to environment, which is the 
prerogative of the evolutionary and organic, but an intended act 
conceived in freedom, however misused that freedom may be. "The 
general result of these convergent cultural activities - the Romantic 
movement, the organic philosophies (idealist or realist), and 
evolutionary science - was that contemporary thought about human 
behaviour, individual and social, became saturated with biological 
metaphors, and moulded itself to the requirements of an organic 
analogy. It became the caimcn idiom to talk of ourselves as 
organisms and of our societies as organic structures; to refer to the 
history of society as an evolutionary process and to account for all 
human action as an adaptation to environment." (PR45). "The use of 
organic categories in general, and of the concept of evolution in 
particular, had a double effect. It stimulated a new interest in the 
study of history; and at the same time confused history with organic 
development." (SA 205). "... We tend to apply organic categories,
and particularly the idea of evolution, in the field of history 
proper, and so to think of our human past as a determinate natural
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continuance which could not have been otherwise.” (SA 205).
This has unfortunately produced several philosophies which have 
been very influential. This confusion has been responsible "for a 
crop of philosophies of history and interpretations of history which 
have had important practical results, of which the most portentous is 
the caimunist movement. It is not the only one, however. The 
liberal faith in an inevitable progress has the same confusion at its 
source." (SA 206).
Incidentally, this mistake of identifying history with evolution 
and the organic has a reverse side. We sometimes speak in historical 
terms of natural and inanimate things, things which have evolved e.g. 
the 'history' of the earth and geological development. This too is 
wrong. "We tend to describe any attempt to understand things by 
reference to their origin as 'historical', and talk of the 'history' 
of the earth or the 'history' of a biological species." (SA 205).
But, surprisingly, on the next page, Macmurray contradicts this, or 
seems to do so. Why, is not clear. "There is no serious objection 
to using the term 'history' with reference to natural processes; and 
we have seen that action necessarily contains natural processes in 
its negative aspect, so that an abstraction of these for relevant 
purposes is justifiable." (SA 206). I would not purport to explain 
this inconsistency.
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Memory
We have seen that the term history has two allied and mutual, 
but totally different, aspects. One is action - that which has been, 
and is, going on humanly in the world. The second is our idea, or 
mental conception, of what that going on and action is, or has been. 
Let us new turn to this second aspect, the unreflective. What is its 
essence? Upon what is it founded, without which it would not be? 
Quite obviously, memory. "... history is concerned with the human 
past in its pastness. It makes no reference to the future; it does 
not seek to derive from the past anything that can be referred to the 
future. This can best be expressed by reference to memory; for 
memory provides the archetypal form of all historical reflection."
(SA 211).
In dealing with this Macmurray first speaks of the difficulties 
and problems of memory in general. There is its incompleteness. It 
is not, nor ever can be, total. What is remembered is always 
selective or selected. It is always relevant to memoriser's 
intentions. There is a double twist about this. For whilst the 
memoriser was memorising - mostly unconsciously of course - he was 
acting. Therefore he memorised only what is or was relevant to his 
purpose at the time, that is whilst he was engaged in that action. 
"What represents the past for the Subject is the content of memory. 
Memory is the present representation of what has been known in 
action, as a contemporary whole. But though it is given as a whole, 
its representation is incomplete and inadequate. For memory contains 
only what was noticed by the agent; and this noticing has been 
determined selectively by a practiced intention. Until the end is
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attained, until the moment of withdrawal, the Other is known only as 
means to an end, and what is noticed is therefore only as much as is 
relevant to its use as means. The immediate content of memory, 
therefore, is only so much as was adequate to the particular 
intention of an action." (SA 208).
But allowing for the foregoing being an accurate description of 
hew memory functions, it has inbuilt difficulties. Memories are 
notoriously inaccurate and unreliable. Memory is an imaginative 
reconstruction i.e. not a created and original fantasy, but 
nevertheless a re-visualising on the mental screen. And this process 
can so obviously be open to mis-imagining in relation to the actual 
event it is supposed to recall.
Moreover, in the process of recall and reconstruction the least 
failure, hesitancy, or doubt may be supplemented by invention, 
however unintentional. For a fuller account of this read SA 208.
A further difficulty about memory arises frcm the fact that that 
which it recalls was originally based cn observation, and this may 
have been inaccurate. At the time, an impression of a happening is a 
synthesis of messages from the five senses, which have to be mentally 
coordinated. Here (see SA 209) Macmurray makes rather a lot of the 
time taken, howbeit only a fraction of a second, to receive and 
register visual and auditory signals in this process. This does not 
seem to me to be especially significant to the point. The 
possibility of an observation being at fault, and thus recalled 
erroneously, may not be regarded as a problem peculiar to memory.
But is obviously very relevant to the accuracy or inaccuracy of 
history.
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Memory is always the memory of a person i.e. one little brain.
In relation to all that has, and could be, experienced, and needs to 
be remembered - especially when we are considering history, the 
memory of the whole past - the memory of each person is 
infinitesimal. Macmurray says that allowing for the failings of 
memory earlier mentioned, "even if these difficulties could be 
overcome, even if a particular agent could remember all he had ever 
experienced, and could be sure that his memory was completely trust­
worthy, the content of his memory would constitute only a tiny 
fragment of what there has been to experience. As a knowledge of the 
past it would amount to very little". (SA 209).
But despite all these possible shortcomings memory is memory and 
its all we have got. However, like all other aspects of reflective 
activity memory, as knowledge of the past, is incomplete until it has 
been expressed, communicated, and shared. In the present case this 
takes the form of encapsulating memories in records, diaries, and 
memoirs. Already we> see this is the stuff of history. "The 
inadequacy of memory as a knowledge of the past comes from the fact 
that no reflective activity is complete until it is expressed; and 
this expression must itself be independent of the continuing activity 
of the self." (SA 209/210). There is much more of this around these 
pages and must be read.)
But other disciplines record. Scientists, whilst experimenting, 
record in detail their experiments as they go along. Artists record 
that which they have brooded over. "The scientist must record his 
observations and experiments with meticulous exactness, and he must 
have access to the records made by others." (SA 210). For the artist 
"the making of his final expression is itself the recording of a
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continuity of contemplative experience." (SA 210). How then is the 
making of history different? History treads a middle path between 
extremes. Science captures and records generality. The artist 
records only to capture one single object or experience. History 
records to construct a public memory." There is need for a
reflective discipline, the intention of which is neither to
generalize nor to particularize but to record. This discipline is 
history, the business of which is to construct an adequate and 
reliable public memory." (SA 211).
At this point it is relevant to discuss, as Maanurray does, the 
age-old question as to whether history is an art or a science. 
"Philosophers have found it difficult to determine whether history 
should be classed as one or the other; and historians themselves have 
wavered between the two ideals, sometimes treating the writing of 
history as a form of imaginative literature and sometimes using a 
scientific procedure, so far as their subject matter would allow."
(SA 204/5). However one looks at it, history is a bit of both - or
neither. Like science it is concerned with facts, but not with the 
generality which distinguishes science. History particularises. In 
this it mirrors art; but unlike art (to ccnplete the circle) it does 
not exist to evaluate but to factualise. "It is this refusal of 
generalization, this effort to represent the particularity of 
temporal sequence, which makes history seem, in some respects, to be 
art rather than science. Yet it does not, as an art does, express a 
reflective valuation: for it is concerned to express matter of fact, 
and in this it stands closer to science. Unlike science, however, it 
does not seek to discover recurrent patterns which could form a basis
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for prediction. History, then, is neither an art nor a science, 
though it has certain affinities with both." (SA 207). This seems to 
be a rather satisfactory analysis by Macmurray.
Just new we spoke of history existing to create a public memory. 
But this, although strangely enough Macmurray never uses the term, 
can only be relative and never absolute. The ideal, according to 
Macmurray, 11 ... is to represent the whole human past as if it were 
the memory-content of a single agent who had experienced it all, and 
whose memory was completely adequate and reliable." (SA 211). But 
even within this ideal there cannot be completeness because of the 
inevitability of selectivity. This is evidenced by "the way in which 
representation of a past epoch varies from historian to historian and 
from one generation of historians to the next". (SA 211). This only 
endorses, in the context of history, what is already known about 
memory. It recalls and remembers only what is relevant for its 
present purpose, and for the immediately practiced i.e. action and 
current intention. The element of memory "recalled is always a 
present and practical interest. For what is actively remembered is 
ipso facto brought into a determining relation to present intentions 
and preoccupations. What is actually recalled is selected for its 
relevance to the present; and the accounts that we give of the same 
experience of our own from time to time necessarily vary with the 
occasion far their production. Nar does this variation necessarily 
affect their validity. Just as there ca be no definitive memory, so 
there can be no definitive history." (SA 212).
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The Task of History
We have probably realised by now that although history exists to 
be, or to create, a public memory, to say this does not describe 
adequately history nor its function, however satisfactorily or 
perfectly this is done.
Nor does history exist, as many would think, to 'memorise' 
events. General summaries of history in reference books are often 
headed, "Events in Tudor Britain", or, "Historical Events from 
Ancient Times to the Present Day". Macmurray says "It would be 
wrong, or at least misleading, to say that the historian is concerned 
to construct the record of past events. For he is not concerned with 
events as such, in the scientist's sense. He does not abstract from 
experience a purely objective world of events". (SA 211). And again. 
"History is not mere chronicle." (SA 212). What is it then?
Because history is personal i.e. an activity only humans do, it 
is concerned not with events but with understanding, an understanding 
of human continuity and - and here is the important idea, as we have 
learned - of human intention. And, to complete the circle, human 
intention manifests itself in action. Thus to unearth in historical 
studies the intentions of the past, and relate these to the 
intentions of the continuing present, is the essential task of the 
historian i.e. that which he is doing, or endeavouring to do, whether 
he is conscious of this or not. In fulfilling this task the 
historian has two things to do. "He must discover and express the 
unity of intention which combines the contemporary doings of many 
agents into the action of one society of agents; and also the 
continuity of this corrmon intention from generation to generation."
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(SA 213).
Biography has the same intention except that it is concerned 
principally with the intention of a single individual, whereas 
history "... so far as it succeeds, exhibits a multitude of 
individual acts as constituting a single section, in virtue of a 
community of intention." (SA 213).
Once again Macmurray emphasises the importance of the present 
for history. For history the "fixed point of reference is the 
present; its effort is to exhibit the continuity of the past with the 
present, and the present as continuing the past. But this past is a 
human past; its elements are the doings of agents. Consequently, its 
continuity with the present can only be a continuity of action; and 
action is constituted by intention." (SA 212/3).
History is All-inclusive
History is all-inclusive because nothing is outside of its 
ambit. Even natural'events, when affecting human beings, must be 
included in history. And although reflection is not action it, too, 
must be included because reflection produces knowledge and this 
always modifies action. "We must notice (next) the essential 
inclusiveness of history. Since knowledge is a dimension of action, 
no extension of knowledge can be without a practiced consequence. 
Natural events, as such, do not enter into history. But the 
knowledge of them does; and even our speculations about the unknown 
add their quota to the determination of our intentions in action. 
Nature itself, we have seen, with all her events and processes, 
organic or inorganic, is an ideal abstraction. So far as natural
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events enter into human experience they modify human action, and so 
come within the scope of history." (SA 206). Even the unknown, at 
any particular past time, is within history I What is now known to 
have been unknown must effect the idea of the past. "If it be urged
that very much happens in the world of which we are ignorant, and
that the world itself exists independently of us and of our 
knowledge, it must be admitted that this is the case, and that we 
knew it to be the case. Yet our very ignorance is a negative element 
in the determination of our intentions; and the historian can only 
understand the actions of men in the past by recognizing their
ignorance of much that is familiar today. History, therefore, is in
this sense all-inclusive. Hie whole human past, with all the 
knowledge that informed it, with all the errors and illusions and 
misjudgements which distorted it, is matter of history; and there is 
no event, however seemingly remote from our practiced interests, 
which may not turn out to be relevant to the historian's task.." (SA 
206/7).
And naturally all subsidiary histories should be seen as part of 
the one, all-inclusive, history. "Hie sciences and the arts, 
philosophy and religion all have their histories, and these histories 
are not separate histories but parts of one history which is the 
story of the doings of man on earth." (SA 207).
What conclusions does Macmurray draw from this all-inclusiveness 
of history? Very wide ones indeed. He contends, with other evidence 
of course, that the world, as he puts it, is one action, one 
inclusive action, of which every intention and action of every 
individual is, and must be, a part. All those with this in mind will 
live and act quite differently from the way they would if they did
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not have this view. "If we act as if the world, in its unity, is 
intentional; that is, if we believe in practice that the world is one 
action - and our consideration of history has shown us what this 
signifies - we shall act differently from anyone who does not believe 
this. We shall act as though our own actions were our contributions 
to the one inclusive action which is the history of the world. If, 
on the other hand, we believe that the world is a mere process of 
events which happen as they happen, we shall act differently. Our 
conception of the unity of the world determines a way of life; and 
the satisfactoriness or unsatisfactoriness of that way of life is its 
verification." (SA 221). And again, incidentally, we have another 
example of Macmurray1 s criterion for both living and philosophical 
judgement and evaluation; the criterion, not of truth - the usual and 
almost exclusive criterion of western philosophers since Descartes - 
but satisfactory living. And another example of Macmurray's 
empiricism.
What The Historian Must Do
We have seen what the role of history, in its reflective aspect, 
is. How do historians work? They collate records and documents and 
other relevant evidence e.g. from relics and sites, and create 
"histories". These histories are then collated by other historians. 
Once recognised, gaps in historical memory are filled, or attempted 
to be filled, by positive search or, failing success here, by 
tentative imaginative guesswork, reconstruction, and suggestion, 
pending the discovery of further evidence. (See SA 212, "As in all 
forms of reflection.......available to every one").
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The importance of the historian's function cannot be over­
stated, for as Macmurray says, in what might be regarded as a summary 
of his historical thinking. "Without a common memory there can be no 
common action; without a public memory no public life. And without 
the systematic and methodical investigation of the historian,
determining the record of the past there can be no reliable
public memory, but only a legendary tradition." (SA 214). And again, 
to finalise. "Historical reflection is the matrix of all modes of 
reflection. They arise from it and return to it again. Without the 
record of past activity they are impossible; and if the record is 
unreliable, they are led astray." (SA 214).
History and Philosophy
The relating of philosophy with history, in almost a total 
sense, as with, for example, Hegel, Marx, and Croce has already been 
referred to. But that is not what we are concerned with here. 
Macmurray, in a way rarely perceived observes their closeness and 
interdependence without going the whole hog and regarding them as 
almost identical or at least wholly interdependent. What are 
Macmurray' s views on their relationship and similarities?
Firstly; just now we spoke of history's inclusiveness. In this 
it is very like philosophy. Both are concerned with the whole - 
history with the whole of the past, philosophy with the whole of 
experience. Any new manifestation of each, however seemingly 
partial, is in fact a contribution to the whole. There can be no 
disparateness in history or philosophy. This is in contrast to all 
other studies and disciplines, except religion, which do, quite
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legitimately and happily, attend exclusively to a mere aspect of 
their general field. Science is a prime example of this. "This 
inclusive character history shares with philosophy. These two 
disciplines have, as it were, a camncm starting point; it is the 
whole of the past as entering into the determination of action. The 
history of philosophy is a part of history; but it is also a part of 
philosophy in a way that the history of science is not a part of that 
science. For philosophy, like history, is one, and every new 
philosophy is a continuation of the one philosophy just as every new 
history of an age is a rewriting of the one history." (SA 207). 
History and philosophy are alike in that they are both stretches of 
seamless fabric.
Secondly; and perhaps more iirportantly, for whilst the foregoing 
point might be seen as one of coincidence, this point very much 
concerns the mutuality and inter-relationship of philosophy and 
history. And although it is so obvious as to be ccmmon-place, nobody 
in contemporary life, whether influential or not, whether at the top 
of the tree or man in the street, seems to be in the least aware of 
it.
It is that in history, especially in social history according to 
Macmurray, a philosophy is implicit and working itself out. "The 
history of our philosophy is our social history at it most serious, 
its most reflective and its most logical." (SA 19). And this means 
too, of course, that there is an implied philosophy in our society, 
living, and actions today, if we could only unearth and discover it. 
For the chances are it is not the philosophy or ethos we profess, 
either as individuals or as a society. A foremost characteristic of
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human beings is their immense capacity for self-deception. We 
believe we believe something whereas we believe something quite 
different and - more to the point - act according to this unconscious 
belief.
Another point concerning the relationship of history and 
philosophy, and one which may seem to contradict the above but 
actually does not, is that looking back i.e. seen historically, 
philosophy always reflects the condition of a society, or that with 
which society is essentially concerned. Philosophies in the age of 
the discovery and exploring of physics were mechanistic and 
materialistic. In the 19th century, the age of biology, philosophies 
were organic. Today, the age of psychology, we have yet to create an 
adequate philosophy which, tentatively, Macmurray has proposed as the 
personal. "That there is such an interrelation, indirect enough and 
largely unconscious, between philosophical theory and social 
processes of a more empirical kind, is evident from any study of the 
history of philosophy which looks for it". (SA 25. There is much 
more of this around this page. Too much to need quoting, but very 
relevant). "The decisive questions of serious philosophy are never 
determined at random. They have their origins in a historical 
necessity, not in the chance interests of a particular thinker."
(SA 21). "I have referred to the farm of the personal as the 
emergent problem of contemporary philosophy." (SA 21).
But even new we have not referred to all that Macmurray has to 
say about history and philosophy. An even more innovative and daring 
point has yet to be made. It is usual to think that philosophy, 
unlike science, cannot be verified. It is more than mere belief, on 
which most religion rests. It is supported and buttressed, or is
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supposed to be, by rational thinking, subjecting it to a severe 
scrutiny of critical appraisal. But Macmurray goes further. He says 
that philosophy is verified - or proved wanting - by, in and through, 
history. Such a verification may for various reasons (see IU 81) not 
always be satisfactory, but nevertheless it is an attempted 
verification.
"But hew, you might ask, can there be experiment and 
verification of our reflective conclusions outside science? How, for 
instance, is a philosophical theory to be verified? I shall answer 
in the first place that philosophy is always verified, even if 
unconsciously, in the process of individual and social history. It 
is, of course, possible to speculate philosophically for the sake of 
speculating, and to prevent conclusions from affecting practical 
activity. Such philosophy is not serious. It is a kind of game 
which certain people play. We are not concerned with sport, but with 
the serious business of thought. When philosophy is taken seriously 
it is bound to affect our immediate experience of living and to 
verify itself in the satisfactoriness of the life-experience which it 
helps to produce. In the social field, too, philosophy undergoes a 
constant process of verification. The way in which a society 
organizes and conducts its social life is always the unconscious 
expression of a philosophical conception of the world. Ihe breakdown 
of European life in the eighteenth century, as illustrated, for 
example, by the fury of the French Revolution, by the scepticism of 
Hume and Votaire, or by the cynicism of Gulliver's Travels, is itself 
the discovery of the practical failure of the philosophy by which 
Europe had lived since the Reformation. And the collapse in our own
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time is another instance of an unsuccessful experiment in 
philosophy." (IU 81/2). "It is in the historic process of human 
development that life and logic interpenetrate, and that philosophy 
is continuously, if unconsciously, submitted to the processes of 
verification." (IU 160).
Rightly or wrongly, Macmurray believes the Soviet Marxist state 
to be the first deliberate and intentional experiment undertaken on 
the basis of a conscious philosophy and is thus "the first attempt 
that man has made on a large scale in the deliberate verification of 
a philosophical conclusion." (IU 82).
Here we conclude Macmurray's ideas of what history is, and make 
a brief
Appraisement (1)
As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, history is a 
much bigger, comprehensive, and important thing for Macmurray than 
would appear from the general trend of his writings. And we have not 
finished yeti As a general assessment it would seem that as with 
many other aspects of Macmurray1 s work, philosophers of history have 
not acknowledged him with quite the attention he deserves. Even if 
not fully worked out, he has some very innovative ideas on history 
especially where, as we would expect of him, he lifts it out of the 
organic into the personal. Indeed it would seem that nobody, whether 
general philosopher or historical specialist, has caught on to 
Macmurray* s thinking on these matters. But arising out of this I 
come to my first particular comment.
1) What is the effect of seeing history as personal and
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intentional and not as organic and evolutionary? Macmurray says such 
a change of outlook will make us look for reasons and not for causes.
But even amongst specialists, let alone the millions who indirectly
or unconsciously use history in their thinking i.e. the man in the 
street and especially journalists and writers, is anyone so 
discerning as to distinguish between cause and reason? And are not 
cause and reason more or less the same from a working and practiced
point of view? And are they not often interlocked anyway?
To give an example. A reason far World War Two would be 
Hitler's paranoia. A cause of it would be the economic and social 
condition of Germany in the late 1920s. But within this analysis 
could Hitler's attitude be said to be intentional? Was that not also 
more of a cause than an intention? Obviously there is much scope 
here for both clarification and refinement of terms and their 
meanings, and a more extensive analysis by Macmurray - with 
illustrations. Hie above is my own.
Merely to have ‘Stated this gives not enough material to be 
convincing. This is not to say that further and deeper examination 
would not be worth doing. I believe it would.
2) All history is relative. It can never be definitive. It is 
written, and constantly rewritten, in the light of the present, both 
for its need as a public memory far use today, and as a store of 
actual knowledge as more of the past comes to light. So says 
Macmurray; and I believe this to be so.
But one problem concerning this is never raised, nor seems to 
have occurred to Macmurray. What constitutes what might be called 
real history, however biased unintentionally, from propagandist 
history, rewritten with a deliberate bias to suit a particular nation
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or current ideology, usually of a rampant, subversive, and disruptive 
kind? Both presumably serve the present and the needs of a 
particular society. Yet if present need is the criterion, who is to 
say that either is right - or wrong, as I am sure we would be 
inclined to say the latter was?
Ncwhere does Macmurray talk of historical standards and criteria 
of judgements. Ndr of what constitutes historical truth or validity. 
To be fair in this we must remember he is not an historical 
philosopher. But they are questions evoked by his writing on 
history.
3) Is history the matrix of all reflection, as Macmurray says 
it is? I do not think so. But I can understand how Macmurray has 
made this mistake. History includes the history of everything to do 
with man, or which man has come to use or make-over for himself. Of 
every man-concerned thing there is a history.
But this ubiquity of time, permeating every intention and thing, 
does not imply that it is the general thing fran which all else has 
sprung - this springing being, as I understand it, the meaning of the 
term matrix in this context. Just the contrary. History is the 
record of things once they have sprung. It is not the source but the 
story.
And if we take history as reflection i.e. the mental side of the 
process, as described earlier, it is still, far the same reason, not 
the matrix of all reflection. To illustrate the point and to hazard 
a conjecture. What might primitively be called economical or 
physical survival or even, on the other hand, a vague and incipient 
sense of questioning, wonder, and attempted orientation and
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explanation, are more likely to have been the matrix of reflective 
activity; certainly not history.
And the same could be said at any contemporary time. I do not 
think that people today have their reflective ability first formed in 
the historical mould, hcwever subjective. Indeed I am sure they do 
not. As a matter of fact, elsewhere severed times, Macmurray states 
that religion is, or was, the basic, seminal, form of human 
reflection from which all other aspects of thought and activity have 
sprung, emerged, and broken away from. And in this history itself, 
so far as it has been interpreted for a very considerable time now, 
proves him to be right. Ancient and primitive peoples know only 
religion. Our multifarious specialisms developed later.
4) Is history one, all-inclusive action? Or, to put it more 
exactly, does history reveal that reality is one, all-inclusive 
process? It is not clear how Macmurray justifies this assertion. 
Perhaps he does not. If observation and discussion is anything to go 
by, few people if any feel that they are part of one, all- 
comprehensive, time scheme, and that what they feel, think, and do 
contributes to this process. They may vaguely feel part of the 
particular society to which they belong, but very few would regard 
their work, let alone their personal and relating selves, as 
contributing to an ultimate, universal, ordained process or end. 
Perhaps we are as yet too parochial, too insular, in our 
consciousness to be aware of this. We are not developed enough.
But if we were, could not this knitted nexus of which we are a 
supposed part be very nearly bordering on the socially and 
politically organic, a situation which, as we have seen, Macmurray 
deplores and regards as inferior because non-personal?
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There is perhaps only one solution to the above. In the nature 
of things we tend, I will say no more, both sis individuals and as the 
human race, to become what we intend or think we can become. This is 
reminiscent of Browning* s soaring fancy:-
"Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp,
Or what's a heaven for?"
So whether history is one comprehensive action or not, it can 
become so as we think and live far it so to be. Of course, Macmurray 
does not make this last point. He is content with his statement that 
history is one, inclusive, action.
5) Whether exactly and wholly satisfactorily true or not, 
Macmurray' s notion of philosophical ideas being verified in social 
history is both a trenchant and valuable one. Instead of continuing 
to be so myopically concerned with logical exactitudes and verbal 
reasoning and niceties, it is a pity more philosophers do not come 
out into the real world and test their ideas in action. For this is 
the ultimate upshot of Macmurray's contentions. He may, at this 
stage of his presentation, appear to see history as the only 
verification or negation of an idea. But by implication, and indeed 
as he states explicitly in relation at least to the marxist 
philosophy, even deliberate social attempts and experiments can be 
made to verify a theory - and should be made.
Increasingly, once man reaches out beyond his immediate stage of 
inlooking and anthropocentric concern with the natural and the 
economic, such intentional and experimental proof cr disproof of 
philosophical, political, and social ideas will become a normal part 
of human practice.
End of Appraisement (1)
- 478 -
The Clue to History
Introduction
So far we have been trying to understand what Macmurray1 s idea 
of history is as a discipline, a subject, a mode of human reflection, 
a branch of knowledge. We have, as it were, looked into it's 
methodology, and its raison d'etre. It could be said we have been 
looking at its form.
We now turn completely - to the other side of the picture, to 
Macmurray's interpretation of history as it appears with its whole 
vast panoply of human activity and intentions. We now look, in other 
words, at its content. Macmurray calls this the clue; but he could
have called it, perhaps with even more precision, the key. 
Interpretations of history purport to unlock the doer and reveal to 
us the meaning of our being and of the human pilgrimage. But we will 
not quibble over words and, whatever terms are used, Macmurray has no 
doubt or hesitancy. All is clear to him.
And as you would expect from all we have so far learned, his 
interpretation of history can be summed up in one word - 
Christianity. To say this in so forthright a manner may quite 
understandably cause you to threw a fit of impatience and 
exasperation, or slurp into a mood of despondency and despair. Not
another 1 - you exclaim. And I fully sympathise with you. If nothing 
else, familiarity has bred contempt. We are rightly fed up with such 
interpretations of history, of which there have been thousands; and 
hundreds more come out annually. Ihey are, if nothing worse, 
hackneyed, trite, and baring.
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But in Macmurray, if you will bear a while, we see a glimmer of 
light. I say this to encourage you to read on. It could be that 
there is more than this. But you must, of course, form your own 
conclusion. For Macmurray has, if not a totally new interpretation, 
then certainly a number of new lines and insights, which may cause 
you to think again, and at least be prepared bo reconsider the 
position.
Of course, he has much to say of a familiar kind. For me to 
repeat this, or use it to substantiate and reinforce Macmurray*s 
contentions would be puerile and time wasting. It is all too well- 
known. So here I shall be doing two things. Firstly; noting, 
expanding upon, and analysing the matters upon which, so far as they 
can be, are peculiar to Macmurray. Secondly; where relevant, I shall 
be doing this at the same time as the first - but unfortunately it is 
a more difficult task - namely, stating and displaying Macmurray* s 
substantiations of these new contentions. I say difficult because, 
as we have learned by new, substantiation is not Macmurray *s strong 
point. But if he has something original to say, and I believe he 
has, this shortcoming should not unduly deter us. He will have paved 
the way for further new thinking and interpretation.
Hebrew Roots
Macmurray *s Christian interpretation of history is firmly rooted 
in the Old Testament and the ways and outlook of the ancient Hebrews. 
Jesus brought new insights but these he could not have had had he not 
been part of, and brought up in, the Jewish tradition. "Christianity 
is essentially Jewish. The intention which defines it has its source
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completely within the experience of the Hebrew people. Hie Old 
Testament, which is the first part of the Christian Scriptures, is 
the classical literature of the Jewish people. The New Testament is 
based upon it; was written mainly, if not entirely, by Jews; and its 
central figure is a Jew. The real continuity of the Old and New 
Testaments has never been seriously denied, and the first disputes in 
the primitive church turned on the question whether it was possible 
for a Gentile to join the Church without submitting to the rites 
demanded by the Jewish law. The fact that Christianity is rooted in 
Jewish experience cannot be denied." (CH 17).
The most important thing about early Jewish history is that it 
was religious. We may infer from Macmurray that this is still the 
situation today, but not being an authority on religious history or 
conparative religion, I cannot confirm if this is so, but would very 
much like to know. From observation it could very well be so.
But to start with we must be very clear as to what Macmurray 
means by being religious in this context. The best way to understand 
this is to go back to primitive tribes. As earlier mentioned, to 
such tribes everything was, and is, religious and interpreted as 
such. There is no economics, politics, art, or even work and 
leisure. All is one fabric concerned, enacted, lived, even if 
unnamed, as religion.
There is only one slight schism in this primitive conception - 
which Macmurray does not mention - and that is, there may be various 
gods, which suggests that the seeming wholeness of outlook may not be 
total. But the fact that there are gods, still supports the 
contention that the societies were wholly and exclusively religiously 
orientated.
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Now of all primitive peoples, even as they all began to grow 
away from the primitive, the Jews alone remained religious in this 
sense. All other societies developed secular aspects, and fractured 
and fragmented their conception and experience of life and living. 
Only the Jews continued, or at least continued so in the times we are 
referring to, to see, do, and speak of everything religiously.
Jewish society "resembles other human societies in the religious farm 
of its primitive tribal life. It differs from them because it 
develops an elaborate civilization and culture without breaking loose 
from the religious form in which it originates. This is only 
possible through a development of religion, and the inner history of 
the Hebrew people is the history of the development of religion."
(CH 28). And to be religious means to be seeing and interpreting 
everything and every happening in terms of God. " Where our 
historians say, 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon', or 'Nelson won the 
battle of Trafalgar', the Jewish historian says, 'God brought the 
people up out of the Land of Egypt'. This is no mere concession to 
religious prejudice, but the continuous farm which all Hebrew 
reflection takes. It means that Hebrew thought is at once religious 
and empirical. It is religious in that it thinks history as the act 
of God. It is empirical in that it reflect upon history in order to 
discover the nature of God and the laws of divine agency." (CH 38).
Another important aspect of this for Macmurray is that to be 
religious is to be monist. Peculiarly, much as he talks about this 
throughout his works, I never recall him mentioning the term monism 
once. He always expresses it through his anti-dualism. He never 
makes clear why the essence of religion is, and must be, moist; but
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see CH 93 far what is perhaps a hint. But this is his assertion.
And the Jews, unlike all other peoples, never divided their 
lives into the secular and the religious, nor into any other of the 
countless ways e.g. class, heaven and earth, this life and the next, 
rich and poor, which make ours and all other societies dualistic, or 
even pluralist. "This totalitarian character of the religious 
consciousness seems paradoxical to any other farm of consciousness. 
Hie paradox can be stated in this farm. If a society (or an 
individual) has a religion it is not religious. If it is religious 
it cannot have a religion. Hie reason is that to 'have' a religion, 
religion must be conceived and experienced as a particular aspect of 
life which is contrasted with others which are not religious. The 
religious mode of consciousness is precisely a habit of mind which 
prevents such an atomizing of life. For any other farm of 
consciousness religion is a particular and limited set of activities 
or a particular and distinguishable set of beliefs. But for the 
religious form of consciousness, religion is a way of living the 
whole of life, and consequently, as part of this, a way of thinking 
and understanding the world." (CH 29).
Pages 16/41 of CH have very much more to say concerning this 
unique character of Jewish society, especially in relation to 
religion. But I hope enough has been said to illustrate how, more 
than is usually conceived, or at least with a very different 
emphasis, they had to be the forebears of Christianity. Many have 
stressed the importance of the Jews in discovering one God, but only 
Macmurray has interpreted this in such a profound, penetrating, 
ubiquitous, and all-pervasive, social way.
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Jesus
If the Old Testament Jews paved the way, Jesus embodies it.
Or at least in his teaching and actions he shews and demonstrates the 
clue to history; that is, the interpretation of history as Macmurray 
discerns it.
Earlier, in the chapter on religion, we discussed the general 
contribution of Jesus, and will not repeat it in detail. It might be 
useful to re-read that section before continuing. You will remember 
that four main points were made.
Jesus:- 1) Universalised Judaism.
2) Developed the idea of God from Lord to father, thus 
banishing fear.
3) Discovered the Personal.
4) Discovered the common people.
Here, however, we will speak of the contribution of Jesus as it 
specifically applies, according to Macmurray, to history, bearing in 
mind that all the foregoing points have some relevance.
At this juncture Macmurray is eager to draw attention to a 
feature of Jesus, Christianity, and the New Testament which apart 
from what seems to be the bizarre ravings and interpretations of 
dubious and suspect religious sects, mainly fundamentalists, is 
ignored or quietly but intentionally overlooked by most orthodox 
Christians, churches, and religious exponents and authorities. This 
is the apocalyptic element.
Macmurray dividing, for ease of understanding, the teaching into 
the ethical and the apocalyptic says, quite rightly, that in our 
dualism we have taken up, almost exclusively, the ethical aspect of
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Jesus and Christianity, and banished the apocalyptic. Yet this is 
the vital and important part of the message, and very relevant far 
complete historical understanding. "In the teaching of Jesus two 
elements are customarily distinguished. The first is his exposition 
of the conception of human life in the world which is implied in the 
whole religious tradition of his people. The second is apocalyptic. 
It is concerned with the future, and is, therefore, prophetic in the 
narrow sense which we are apt to give to that word. It is the first 
of these elements which we usually refer to as the teaching of Jesus, 
and which we tend to see as the revelation of a new religious ethic. 
The apocalyptic element we find rather difficult and uncongenial, and 
we tend to treat it as much less inportant, and almost as a kind of 
excrescence which has no fundamental significance for our time. If 
we do try to take it seriously we tend to treat it as a spiritual 
symbolism." (CH 49). "But this contrast of 1 ethic' and 
'apocalyptic* is itself the expression of a dualistic apprehension, 
and examination of it provides perhaps the clearest and simplest 
means of discovering the significance of the distinction between the 
form of religious thought and of dualist thought. I should beg of my 
readers therefore to concentrate their attention on this issue, which 
alone seems to me to be of prime importance; because the failure to 
grasp it makes the understanding of Jesus or of Christianity 
impossible." (CH 83).
Moreover, Macmurray will not - except for purposes of exposition 
- recognise the ethical and the apocalyptic as two and different 
aspects. "The point which seems to me the essential one in this 
connexion is not that we must take the apocalyptic element in the 
teaching of Jesus seriously, as well as his moral and 'religious1
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teaching, but that the fact that we find it difficult to relate the 
two aspects reveals the dualistic and non-religious character of our 
cwn minds. These two aspects are fundamentally one; and to 
understand Jesus, or indeed the religious mode of consciousness of 
which he is the supreme expression, is to realize their essential and 
necessary unity." (CH 49).
So we accept the ethical and abhor the apocalyptic, especially 
in its horror and ferocity which seems contrary to the newly 
discovered God of Love. "It prophesises a catastrophic exercise of 
power which will destroy the wicked and reward the righteous and 
establish by force the kingdom of God upon earth. This at once 
introduces difficulties. The 'spiritual' character of the 'ethic' 
has vanished, and its place is taken by a vision of ultimate violence 
which is its opposite. The God of Love in the ideal world becomes a 
God of vengeance and terror in the material world. Hie apocalyptic 
is the negation of the ethic. The ethic is the repudiation of the 
apocalyptic. The apocalyptic represents the kingdom as coming 
precisely in the way that the ethic teaches that it cannot come. It 
shews God acting in a way that repudiates the nature assigned to him 
in the 'ethic'. It is no wonder that those of us who accept the 
teaching of Jesus as the revelation of the divine character and of 
the ideal of conduct for man find ourselves constrained to gloss over 
or explain away the other aspect of the teaching ascribed to Jesus in 
the Gospels." (CH 84).
How are these reconcilable? Or rather, hew does Macmurray as an 
affirmed non-dualist, reconcile them? He starts by telling us that 
our conventional idea of the ethic is wrong. We think, and I am sure
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that this is true, that the ethic is founded on 'ought' and idealism. 
We must strive, hard as it may be, to live the 'good' life as 
prescribed by Jesus. We shall fail. But this, to live 
satisfactorily, is hew we ought to be behaving.
Macmurray will have none of this. Jesus was never idealistic or 
spiritual. "Anyone who thinks this ought to read the Gospels, and 
attend to the form of Jesus' teaching, for it is certainly not the 
form that moralists employ. Jesus speaks usually in the indicative 
mood, not in the imperative, the term 'ought* and its equivalents 
scarcely occur in his teaching." (CH 88). "But it is not merely the 
absence of the ethical form, with its characteristic words and 
phrases, that is noteworthy in Jesus' teaching. There is evidence of 
a deliberate avoidance of it. There are occasions recorded upon 
which Jesus was invited to enunciate ethical principles, and we find 
that he does not respond," (Macmurray then gives examples of this.
CH 89/90).
Jesus never suggested how we ought to be living. The tone in 
all his pronouncements is assertive, authorative, absolute, positive, 
and factual. What he teaches is what is; and only as we live thus 
can we be entitled to remain alive at all. "To call any doctrine 
'ethical' is to assert that it consists of statements about value and 
not about fact; that it is concerned not with what is, but with what 
ought to be. If we call the teaching of Jesus an ethic we imply that 
Jesus was a moralist, concerned to determine the nature of the good 
life - which is not the life that men actually live - and to 
determine the rules by which men ought to act. We imply that his 
effort was to construct an 'ideal' of life, by which actual life is 
condemned, and which perhaps, others might use as a pattern, which
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they should try to 'live up to'." (CH 88).
Unfortunately, to illustrate this, Macmurray gives a rather 
muddled version and interpretation of the well-known "He that saveth 
his life shall lose it". (CH 88/9). But I am sure better examples 
could be given, as indeed Macmurray does much later. (See CH 97).
What is the upshot of this far our present purpose? Simply, 
that if you do not live the way of life prescribed as a fact not as 
an ideal or a value, by the so-called ethic, the apocalyptic thread 
will inevitably and inexorably come upon you and the world. It is as 
elementary and straightforward as that. God has prescribed how his 
creation shall be, and of how you shall behave. His wishes are for 
mankind to be one, undivided, community of which every member is 
equal and free. "But we can achieve an understanding of the 
religious thought of Jesus provided that we intend the disappearance 
of dualism in practice; if we will the end of our claim to 
superiority and the achievement of equality and freedom." (CH 85.
And, of course, many other references to this intention are given 
throughout Macmurray's works.). If we fail in this, Armageddon will 
come upon us. This is in the nature of things. Or, expressed 
religiously, the will of God.
By the long, foregoing, argument, much more detailed as 
Macmurray expounds it, we perceive how the dualism of the ethic and 
the apocalyptic are resolved and banished. They are part of one 
chain of events. "Thus the spiritual understanding of the will of 
God for man (which is what we represent as an 'ethic') is ipso facto 
an understanding of what will happen to man in the future - our 
'apocalyptic'. The two are one and the same, necessarily." (CH 94).
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Thus can Western man become, as the Jews were, religious again. 
For, as we have seen earlier, the essence of religion for Macmurray 
is a total and absolute non-dualistic attitude to all life and 
experience. More; it is a totally undivided consciousness, both in 
man collectively and in each one of us.
The Clue to History
What then is the clue, or clues, to history emerging from all 
the foregoing? As this by now should be very obvious and implicit in 
all that has been expounded, I shall content myself with a few 
pertinent quotations to explicate and confirm.
"This then is the principle by which Jesus understands the 
nature of human freedom and its relation to the intention of God in 
history, which is the nature of reality. God acts in history as 
creator of Man. The intention of his creation is known - a universal 
community of persons, with freedom and equality as its structural 
principles of relationship. Clearly such a relation is not possible 
unless Man wills it, because the structure of human relationship is 
the expression of human intentions. If God is to create a free and 
equal humanity, then Man must intend a free and equal humanity.
God's action in history must then be the creation in Man of the 
effective intention to realize universal freedom and equality and 
since God cannot fail to realize his own intention, this will to 
community is necessitated.". (CH 100).
"History is the process by which the intention of God for human 
life is being carried out." (CH 37).
"Thus Jesus marks the point in history at which it becomes
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possible for man to adopt consciously as his own purpose the purpose 
which is already inherent in his own nature." (CH 55).
"The end of the process of history is known. But the 
achievement of that inevitable end depends upon its acceptance by 
Man." (CH 58).
"So the discovery that Jesus made does not merely determine what 
the intention of God for Man is, and what the fulfilment of the 
process of history will achieve. It also provides in the individual 
a sufficient motive far making that intention his own." (CH 59/60).
"The gradual deepening of the Hebrew insight into the nature of 
history as the act of God found its complete expression in Jesus.
This expression is complete, not in the sense that there is nothing 
to add to it - Jesus himself repudiated this notion - but in the 
sense that it has reached the stage at which the question 'What is 
the intention of God in history?' can be answered with complete 
universality and objectivity. Jesus has discovered the structural 
law of the action of* reality in human experience. He has brought 
into human consciousness, in the form of rational knowledge, the reeil 
nature of human life, and the law of its relation to the nature of 
reedity as a whole. The result of this is that it is now possible 
for men to adopt as their own intention, universally, the intention 
of God for man, and to seek to realize it. Further, since the 
intention of God for man is necessarily man's real intention - the 
intention which expresses his real nature as part of the world - its 
acceptance unifies human action and integrates human nature. Its 
rejection, on the other hand, sets man in opposition to himself, and 
leads to self destruction." (CH 116/117).
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An Uneasy Conclusion
Except for some minor reservations and queries we cannot fail to 
have understood what Macmurray means. It is all clear enough. But 
it is this which we find so puzzling and disconcerting. Macmurray 
has succeeded in creating what is very rare these days, I imagine, 
namely a sense of unease. At least he has for me.
From modem, especially British, philosophers, we do not expect 
a religious interpretation of this kind, especially when it holds 
such a central place in a toted, philosophy.
From religious thinkers, biased and partisan from the start, we 
do expect and get such interpretations. And, unless we are already 
of their proclivity and persuasion, we rightly dismiss them as 
propagandist; even the few at their best, let alone the thousands of 
repetitive and turgid offerings.
But Macmurray has our respect, or at least mine. He is a man of 
philosophical calibre, with a wide compass of knowledge, 
understanding, and experience. Is his very religious interpretation 
a mere lapse on his part? Is it an ingrained streak from a childhood 
and childish conditioning from which he has been unable to escape and 
throw-off? Is it a mental and emotioned, blind spot or aberration?
Or, on the other hand, is Macmurray almost alone in trying, as a 
philosopher, to really interpret and satisfactorily incorporate 
religion into the structure of human thought and feeling, in a way 
acceptable to our reasoning and developing rationality?
Obviously, in raising this question, we cannot automatically 
accept Macmurray's answer, but at least we knew what it would be. It 
is stated in the first chapter of CH, and severed, times after. It is
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that; we cannot perceive things religiously because we are dualists. 
Rid ourselves of this division and all would become as he sees it.
If this was how Macmurray felt, i.e. totally monist, then he was 
a very exceptional person. But one vaguely suspects that this 
contention, even if right, was an intellectual perception of his.
Hew not to feel and be dual is tic is the problem.
Nevertheless, one has a slight feeling, no more, that Macmurray 
could be right, a situation which, for me at least, would require a 
considerable upheaval of thought, feeling, and shift of basic 
position. But as I have knewn of Macmurray far over forty-five 
years, I do not think that, unless I waver and compromise in my third 
age, as did Joad, I am not likely to be convinced enough to accept it 
new.
Perhaps, strong as some of our minds may be, we are reflections 
of society more than we think, and only if society turned to monism, 
would we become monist and interpret history with as strong a 
religious thread as Macmurray has done.
Actual History
We have concerned ourselves with two aspects of Macmurray's 
historical thought. Firstly; with his theory of history i.e. what it 
is and its role in the pantheon of human reflection. Secondly; with 
Macmurray's interpretation of history and his discernment of the 
clues to its meaning. There is a third aspect, talcing up over half 
of his "Clue to History", which is a review, interpretation, 
analysis, and critical appraisal of Western European history from 
Roman times to the mid-nineteen thirties, the age of the onset of
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Communism and Fascism. This section is called "The Progress of 
Europe", indicating by its title something of Macmurray1 s response to 
these areas, which is cautiously optimistic.
But to expound and elaborate upon all that Macmurray has said 
here is beyond our need or concern far the immediate purpose, and 
must be left for a further thesis.
We end with a brief: -
Appraisement (2)
1) We have divided ourselves into specialisms. We are 
dual is tic, even pluralistic. Our pristine monism and wholeness have 
gone. But have no benefits resulted? Could we without it have had 
not merely a better standard of living, comfort, and security, but 
such a knowledgeable, interesting, and diversified existence?
Although things still seem to be going the other way at the 
moment i.e into more specialisation and fragmentation, might not this 
be seen as merely a necessary phase and that when we, as a species, 
have mastered and controlled through it all material things, we can 
return to wholeness? And even such divisive human dualisms as class, 
inequalities, and unfreedoms of various kinds, might eventually be 
banished through it.
Were we, to use Macmurray1 s preferred religious terminology, 
'wrong in God's sight and intention', to specialise and extend our 
nomenclature and classification of things and the world, and thus our 
perception and management of things? Have we, in our actual or 
supposed freedom, so contradicted God's intention by using the brains 
He, presumably gave us? Admittedly in all this we have become unduly
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obsessed by specialism and its immediate benefits. There is no doubt 
that we have gone too far too quickly. We have given ourselves no 
time to absorb and consolidate. But this is not Macmurray1 s point. 
We, it seems, should not have made any distinguishments at all. That 
is, if we were, or desired, to retain our religious outlook.
If we, as seems fair to do, approximate most, if not all, of 
this diversification with science, it is ironical and paradoxical 
that Macmurray himself proclaims several times that science is the 
only true manifestation and expression of Christianity to appear so 
far.
As always, it is a pity that Macmurray, as a philosopher, does 
not use the very effective, indeed essential, rhetorical device of 
Hypobole i.e. to raise, meet, and answer questions in his own mind 
and writings in reply to anticipated criticisms which he surely must 
envisage will be made of his contentions. We expect ignorance of 
this device in religious and other writers, but not in philosophers.
2) Do the clues to history reveal what history is about? In 
fairness, if we accept the clues, then the interpretation Macmurray 
has made might seem to be satisfactory. But how relevant are the 
clues he has selected? In a mighty, huge, universe our relevance, 
let alone importance, seems non-existent, or at most insignificant, 
especially as Macmurray's main contention is that we are here to be 
friends, create community, and be personal. If, say, Macmurray saw 
man as the instrument and vehicle of God's intention to master and 
control the universe, there might be some relevance in our existence. 
But Macmurray, whilst never denigrating knowledge and science, seems 
unable to entertain, let alone nurture, these sort of ideas,
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imaginings, and reaching-outs.
Yet, though he was writing before the era of science fiction, he 
must have been acquainted with the works of Verne, Wells, and 
Stapledon, and with modem physics and astronomy. Why was his 
imagination not aroused, or if it was, why had it so little, if any, 
effect on his philosophy, which is not a limited philosophy of arid 
analysing of half an acre of thought, but one which purports to be 
broadly encompassing?
3) Whilst understanding Macmurray1 s idea of the 'ethic' of 
Jesus, can we accept it? Is the ethic not value permeated; not an 
exhortation to be relationally and morally better; not an ideal to be 
prized and made manifest in our living?
Certainly Macmurray' s is a novel interpretation, and on this 
occasion he does give some evidence with his comment that Jesus 
rarely, if ever, used the term 'ought'.
Moreover, to accept Macmurray' s view does alter the whole 
picture. If to live thus is not a choice to be grcwn into as we 
increase in love and care, but an imperative command similar to a law 
of nature, not to do which automatical ly and inevitably ensures our 
suffering or death, then we had best get on with it - fasti
The difficulty is to knew if he is right ccr not. Hew can we 
tell? Although he does not in this case suggest it, the test always 
with Macmurray is to try it. In some ways, even if we do 
occasionally have better relational spells - but these may be 
economically based - man seems not to have improved all that much 
under two thousand years of Christian moralising and exhortation, so 
perhaps a change of interpretation, with its accompanying change of 
outlook and emphasis in action, may help to lead mankind forward.
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But I have yet to hear of a thinker, philosopher, statesman, 
politician, or publicist - one would hardly expect it of a cleric - 
ever mentioning this view of Macmurray's, let alone taking up and 
advocating its introduction and trial. However, this may be no 
criticism. As in many things, Macmurray seems to be a voice crying 
in the wilderness.
End of Appraisement (2)
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A SHORT EVALUATION
Non-recognition - and the causes of this.
In any book of reference, or of specialism in religion, 
philosophy, psychology or anything else, Macmurray hardly gets a 
mention. You will have difficulty in finding his name and doings 
anywhere - except in old "Who's Who's"; and who isn't in theml Apart 
from this he might well have not existed. Even Kierkegaard, most 
well-kncwn example of a thinker whose work and contribution took at 
least a hundred years to be acknowledged, did have some standing in 
his cwn day, if only in the country of his birth and for reasons now 
superseded. Macmurray has none.
As we have seen, he shone for a brief spell on the then novel 
radio in the early thirties, but otherwise had an unsung life.
Except for academic work, seemingly of a very routine kind broken 
only by the giving of several named lectures and lecture series e.g. 
Gifford, he was obviously regarded by his contemporaries as 
unexceptional and mundane, with nothing original to say or 
contribute. Even as a co-founder of Ccninanwealth during the Second 
World War there is a suggestion - perhaps out of pique by another co­
founder - that his role in this new political venture was no more 
than marginal.
But was his only failing that of being different from the 
general trend of his time? Was he, and has he been, ignored because 
his way of thinking, both in content and advocacy, were merely out of
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fashion? I believe this to be so. And on two counts.
Firstly; because in his day, and increasingly since - one might 
almost say exclusively so - thought, especially philosophical 
thought, and no more so than in Britain, was considered to have value 
only if it dug into and analysed minute areas of relevant interest, 
and this only in a linguistic and logical manner. No other ways of 
thinking and interpreting were recognised, nor considered to be 
acceptable. And on this the philosophical establishment ruled, and 
still does, absolutely. Metaphysics; wider relationships and 
associations, and the examination thereof; were entirely out and 
taboo. To even mention them was anathema, and branded you far life.
Thus was Macmurray, not being of this way of thinking, 
ostracised and treated as of no importance. He sees, as we have 
noted and discussed, the role of philosophy, indeed of all thought, 
to be practical and have relevance far living. Thought, and its 
probings, are never to be regarded as ends in themselves. In this he 
is even outside of the old, wider, Western philosophical mainstream 
and tradition, which regards thought as paramount, and action of no 
consequence or relevance for philosophy.
Secondly; Macmurray is highly moral. Could anybody thus be more 
out of touch with life from the twenties onwards, except perhaps for 
a short period during World War II. And briefly afterwards? Nobody 
today cares a damn about morality, let alone considering what it is 
or might be. Moral is the current taboo word and attitude.
But, and here is the irony of the misjudgement, Macmurray is not 
a moral traditionalist, which might justify suspicion and neglect. 
Only to the superficial and dismissive would he appear so - 
especially in his advocacy of Christianity, and despite the fact that
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he interprets this in a new way ignored by his detractors.
Indeed, nothing is farther from his mind than traditionalism.
No writer, not even J.S. Mill, has been so earnest an advocate of 
freedom. And none but Macmurray has, to such a degree, analysed, 
justified, and promoted freedom. Moreover, Macmurray alone has 
demonstrated how freedom is related to, and is indeed a part of, true 
morality.
So instead of being regarded as "old hat" Macmurray is, in 
numerous ways ahead of his time. Hie most urgent and necessary 
requirement of today is a book called "The Morality of Freedom", and 
I am not sure if Macmurray has not already written it, howbeit by 
another name. It is just that it has gone unheeded.
These are but two of the reasons for Macmurray1 s oblivion.
Others can be as easily discerned. But enough for the present to 
give these possible reasons for Maanurray's isolation.
What is Macmurray Doing?
What is he doing? A number of very important things - 
important, that is, for the whole human race and its future.
Firstly; he is extending reason and the concept thereof. 
Hitherto it has been understood that reason is a quality of thought 
and of thinking. Occasionally we refer it to a person*s actions. We 
say, "He is unreasonable". But we understand this to be a very loose 
use of the term.
But with great innovative insight Macmurray says reason can and 
should apply to the emotional side of life, both in ourselves and in 
society at large. And, as with reason of thought, its discernment
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and task is exactly the same; to bring objectivity and reality into 
our feelings. That is, to feel and respond in terms of "what is", 
and not subjectively i.e. in terms of our own unexamined and imnature 
feelings and values. It is, and requires, a total shift of emphasis 
and focus of living from "in here" to "out there". If this became 
part of the world ethos society and human behaviour would be 
transformed overnight, as has our power of rational thinking by the 
adoption of reason there.
Secondly; Macmurray has, or hopes to induce us to, shift the 
whole emphasis of our living from thought and reflection to action. 
This especially applies to philosophising, but also mare widely. 
Important as thinking is admitted by Macmurray to be, thought is not 
an end in itself. Thinking can never give us the truth about 
existence and reality, much as it has sought to do so in 2500 years 
of Western tradition. Only life and living i.e. action, can reveal 
truth. The world is one action. We are the current, living,
"agents", and exemplification, of that action. Our task, 
individually and collectively, is to discern our role in that one 
act, and perform it.
Thirdly; Macmurray is re-establishing religion. He is re­
establishing it to its farmer and rightful role as the key and vital 
essence of human living. We are persons. We are not merely matter 
or organisms - essential as these dimensions may be to our continued 
existence. Relating to each other, mutuality, and the creation of 
community - and an ever-widening and including comnunity at that - 
are our prime conditions and endeavours as persons. If we are not 
living thus, intentionally, we have downgraded and demeaned ourselves
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to mere organisms, or even to things. And religion is both the state 
and instrument of this personhood. Religion humanises.
Unfortunately formal religion, by clinging out of fear to old 
forms, ceremonies, traditions, dogmas, imagery, practices, and rites
- all very relevant and valid in their time - has ceased to be 
religious in the real and necessary sense. Only a revised, 
contemporary-orientated, mature, non-dogmatic, empirical religion can 
be of any value today and fulfil its vital role, as outlined above.
The revealing of this situation, and the advocacy of the urgent 
recognition and implementation of such a renewed and acceptable 
religion in all our lives is one of Macmurray’s major ideas and 
contributions to the contemporary, malfunctioning, sick, and diseased 
situation of man and of human malaise.
His Description and Place
Hew best can we describe and place Macmurray?
Two ways can best show these - the second following reasonably 
from the first.
Firstly; there can be no doubt that Macmurray enables us to see,
- and, if we will, accept - old, long-standing, and intrinsic 
elements and basic conceptions of Western man in a new way. And not 
merely in a new way, but one which is acceptable to contemporary man, 
with all his modem knowledge and scepticism. Examples of these are 
God, Christianity, religion, human relating, and the uniqueness of 
man and his being.
After Darwin, Freud, Science, and Technology - and their 
immensely wider and philosophical influence, each tending to
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diminish, belittle, dwarf, demoralise, materialise, and debase man - 
Macmurray demonstrates that we are of a different order from that 
which we have, mistakenly and erroneously, by the foregoing events, 
been pressurised into thinking we are - with all its adverse moral 
and social consequences.
And he does this rationally and acceptably i.e. we can quite 
comfortably take the necessary steps to cross the divide and not have 
to believe and take things on faith, a way totally out of keeping 
with contemporary methods, and one of the principal causes of our 
problems today. We have got into a mess. Macmurray shows us the way 
back to the last crossroads acceptably so that we can take once 
again, if we will, the right road forward. In this Macmurray is 
unique.
Secondly; because of the foregoing Macmurray must be regarded as 
a bridge. Unlike with Kierkegaard and all the other religious 
teachers and apologists - great and small - we are not asked to 
"leap" by faith across a gaping chasm, or be damned.
Nor is Macmurray the kind to persuasively and gently lead us 
across the lcwer but nevertheless safer and solid stepping stones.
Well in keeping with philosophy - and this is why he must be, 
and can only be, regarded as a philosopher, despite cries to the 
contrary - he constructs a bridge. We cross it if we will, and if we 
see the rationality of so doing.
This bridge can be seen in many forms.
It is a bridge from thought and the armchair to real living and 
action. Thought at last has relevance 1
It is a bridge from the old religion of dogmas, beliefs, 
tradition, and demanded and compulsory conformity, to the new
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religion of openness, empiricism, and creativity.
It is a bridge from the cul-de-sac of niggling over-concem with 
words, logic, and proof to a wider conspectus of what philosophy 
really exists for.
It is a bridge from an excessive analysis of everything, so 
inhibiting and stultifying, to action, to a synthetical attitude 
encompassing more and more of wholeness, life, and relationships.
It is a bridge from the arid, soulless, intellect and excessive 
IQism, to the richer life of emotion and genuinely caring.
It is a bridge from self-centredness, subjectivity, fear, and 
insecurity - and all the psychosomatic disorders these bring - to 
maturity, health, and freedom.
And Macmurray is able to build this bridge because he is 
uniquely placed in both camps; or should we say, both sides of the 
river. Most people know only one side, even those who profess to be 
universalists in one form or another - if universalism can be so 
qualified!
His fallings
What are Macmurray1 s failings, shortcomings, and shartfallings? 
He has, of course, many.
For a philosopher he lacks argument. He does not lack 
rationality. Far from it. His attitude to all the aspects of life 
he tackles, and these are more than with most philosophers, is far 
more rational than that of most highly acclaimed philosophers.
But at least you expect some reasons to be given to substantiate 
a contention. These Macmurray rarely, if ever, gives. Absolute
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proof of anything there never can be. Logic is not quite so 
important in life as sane would have us believe. But from a 
philosopher, or even a professional thinker on anything, we expect 
seme indication of the ways a conception has been reached. This is 
better for the contender. It would show he had worked though his 
thinking, foreseen possible difficulties, and not merely jumped to 
conclusions.
Although an avowed empiricist - to turn to another shortcoming - 
even extending empiricism to fields not usually regarded as 
particularly favourable to this approach, Macmurray often fails to 
live up to this, his proclaimed intention, in his own discussions and 
analysis. To give but one example. He believes in God. This comes 
out very affirmatively in his writings. But where is the empirical 
evidence for such an entity? Admittedly Macmurray does try to place 
God as the sum total, the ground, of all relationships. But is this 
not either an arbitrary conception or merely a begging of the 
question, or a circular and improvable contention?
A further failing is that of not shewing us hew. Surely as a 
professional, practical, philosopher i.e. all thought is for action, 
that is, effect on living; surely as a philosopher, "living out" over 
the years his own philosophy - as he must have done to be sincere - 
he must have learned a lot about the practice and effecting of his 
ideas.
Yet on one occasion when the practical aspects, and the 
implementation thereof, a very important matter in the education of 
the emotions is specifically referred to he passes the buck and says 
that, once accepted in principle, trained professional
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educationalists could soon work out ways of effecting that particular 
idea. This for me, and no doubt far countless others, is not good 
enough. As I have proved, in my own living, Macmurray1 s philosophy 
is something which, once accepted, we begin to work out for 
ourselves. But this task would be much easier if, at least 
sometimes, Macmurray had indicated "hew". Many people would not have 
a clue as to how to begin, let alone do it.
The Last Word
Despite failings, unheedings, neglect, and thinking and 
philosophising in a manner unfashionable with the present pundits and 
self-appointed philosophical establishment, I believe Macmurray has a 
vital, rational, message for mankind. He has shown us a way - back 
or forward, whichever way you look at it - into a full, rich, whole 
emotional life of community and relating, frcra the attainment of 
which we have strayed, temporarily let it be hoped, by our excessive 
concern with science, technology, the intellect and thought, all of 
which are merely instrumental. Today, ever-increasingly and 
mistakenly, we regard them as ends.
Until more of us heed Macmurray and what he is saying, the world 
and man must drift more and more into a rigid and arid cul-de-sac 
from which it may eventually not be able to free itself. We shall be 
done.
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MACMURRAY fS SOURCES AND POSSIBLE SOURCES
Macmurray makes no acknowledgements, direct or indirect, to 
other thinkers or sources as sources. But two of these are obvious. 
They are:-
1) The New Testament
2) Marx
It comes through also that Macmurray is a great admirer of Plato 
and Kant. But as these were both dualists and Macmurray is an avcwed 
monist, it cannot be said that these are a source of his essential 
ideas.
J.B. Coates (Ten Modem Prophets - 1944) suggests that Macmurray 
got much from Bergson - although Bergson is mentioned only once in 
all Macmurray' s works. But although both are extra-materialist, 
Bergson makes life Or the organic paramount, whereas for Macmurray 
the personal is the ultimate essence. Hcwever Macmurray no doubt got 
something of importance frcm Bergson's moral and religious thinking.
Except in passing, Macmurray hardly refers to anybody. From 
this we may infer that his sources are merely unacknowledged or that 
he is a profoundly original thinker. As no thinker exists, not even 
Plato, much as he is hailed as the father of Western thought, who 
received nothing from either predecessors or the general trends of 
thought of his age and society somewhere, hcwever difficult to trace 
exactly, it is inprobable that Macmurray is wholly original.
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Macmurray1s Sources (Continued)
Therefore I suggest the following as possible additional 
sources. All, in some way or another, put something other than 
thought and intelligence as the essence of man, and as the proper end 
and procedure of philosophy.
B.P. Bowne (1847-1910) - an early personalist. One idea of his
is especially relevant for Macmurray;
God is a Worker
James Ward (1843-1910)
E.S. Brightman (1884-1953)
M. Blondel (1861-1949) - perhaps the most avcwed of all
Actionists.
M. Buber (1878-1965)
M. de Unamuno (1864-1936)
J. Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955)
N. Berdyaev (1874-1948)
For reasons not entirely convincing Macmurray several times 
denounces, and denies any association with, Pragmatism. But can we 
fail to see, even if he didn't, the influence of the Pragmatists upon 
his thinking?
C.S. Peirce (1839-1914)
W. James (1842-1910)
J. Dewey (1859-1952)
Pierce says, "The whole function of thought is to produce habits 
of action". If not identical, Macmurray's ideas shine through here.
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Macmurray' s Sources (Continued) 
Whilst having much in common with the Existentialists, Macmurray 
was just too early to be influenced by the mid-twentieth century 
Existentialists (e.g. Sartre); although from the earlier Heidegger 
(1889-1976) he may have got some of his ideas, especially those on 
death. Kierkegaard's 'leap of faith' has no place in his staunch 
empiricism. There is not much sign of the Phenomenology of Husserl 
in Macmurray's works.
Footnote
Despite his very different vocabulary, imagery, and conceptions 
- and his bizarre neologisms - it is interesting to compare Teilhard 
de Chardin with Macmurray. Both are of the same time; both have very 
strong scientific backgrounds, both are totally Christian; and both 
foretell the inevitable coming of the World of God, through man, 
irrespective of man's compliance, indifference, or defiance.
